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Foreword

The

historic International

the Naval

War

Law Studies

("Blue Book") series was initiated by

College in 1901 to publish essays, treaties and articles that

contribute to the broader understanding of international law. This, the eighty- seventh

volume of the "Blue Book" series, is a compilation of scholarly papers and remarks
derived from the proceedings of a conference hosted at the Naval War College
on June 22-24, 2010 entitled "International Law and the Changing Character
of War."

The June 2010

International

Law Conference

participants

examined the

national law challenges presented by the changing character of war.

The

inter-

objectives

of the conference were to catalogue the extent to which existing international law

governs these changing aspects of warfare and to assess whether these develop-

ments warrant revision of existing international

law. Five panels of presenters ad-

dressed topics that spanned the entire spectrum of armed conflict and focused on
several

emerging

legal issues. Specifically, the panelists

undertook an examination

of the legal issues associated with the use of force in cyberspace, the civilianization
of war fighting and the concept of "direct participation in hostilities," the use of

unmanned

systems, lawfare in asymmetrical conflicts,

and

legal issues associated

with the investigation and enforcement of violations of the law in asymmetrical
conflicts.

Renowned

international academics

ian, representing military, diplomatic,

tutions

both military and

civil-

and non-governmental and academic

insti-

and

legal advisers,

from the global community contributed to the conference and this volume.

volume a detailed study of the emerging international law challenges to be had as the character of war evolves, as well as
their potential impact on the ongoing development of international law, the law of
armed conflict and military operations.
The conference and the "Blue Book" were made possible with generous support
from the Naval War College Foundation, the University of Texas School of Law
and the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. The International Law Department of
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the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval

War

with the International Institute of Humanitarian

Law of Armed

Conflict,
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Commandant
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to the future

and editors

for their invaluable contributions to

understanding of the law of armed
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conflict.

WISECUP

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
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Introduction

During the
modern

last several

years

we have witnessed impacts

warfare, to include cyber operations in Estonia

civilianization of the battlefield in Iraq

in

Yemen and

Pakistan, a lawless

and

relates to civilian deaths

targets

—

to

legal

in,

and Georgia,

and Afghanistan, use of unmanned systems

enemy invoking

"lawfare"

—

particularly as

it

on enemy
of public and

injuries incurred during lawful attacks

undermine military operations and an enhanced

judicial scrutiny of military actions. Legal practitioners,

and

on, and changes

academics have worked to identify

level

both military and

civilian,

how international law governs

changing aspects of warfare and to determine

if

these

there are any shortfalls requiring

changes to the existing legal framework. The legal debate on these matters has been

both vexing and

fruitful:

but a number of unanswered questions remain, making

these topics ripe for discourse.

Following

its

tradition of the in-depth study

and teaching of the manner

which the law impacts military operations, the Naval
conference entitled "International

War

in

College hosted a 2010

Law and the Changing Character of War." The

conference brought together distinguished international law scholars and practitioners to

examine the challenge to international law posed by the changing

character of war.

Dr. Nicholas Rostow, a former Legal Adviser to the National Security Council,

opened the conference by setting the stage for the discussions to follow using as his
scene setter the "Study on Targeted Killings" report authored by Professor Philip

Alston for the

UN Human Rights Council. Although Dr. Rostow, like many others,

does not agree entirely with Alston's conclusions on the applicability of
rights

human

law in armed conflict, and on the lack of transparency and accountability, he

noted that this report,
ternational law.

like

many others, raises questions that pose a challenge to in-

Over the next two and a half days in five thematic panels the speak-

ers presented their analyses of

As a conference

some of those

highlight, the attendees

challenges.

were privileged to attend a luncheon

address delivered by Professor Robert "Bobby" Chesney, the Charles
Professor in

Law at University of Texas School

of Law,

who

J.

Francis

provided an overview

of the emerging federal habeas corpus case law involving detainees held

at

Guan-

tanamo Bay. He highlighted the differing detention standards used by the executive branch and the federal courts' diverging assessments of the applicability of the
law of armed conflict in these cases.

Introduction

In closing the conference Professor

Yoram

Dinstein reflected that changes in

modern warfare have put legal scholars and practitioners representing nations that
abide by the law of armed conflict unnecessarily on the defensive in the face of
"modern barbarians" who conduct hostilities in an utterly unlawful fashion. He
urged those scholars and practitioners to no longer remain silent, but to go on the
legal offensive against

ciples of the

those

those

who resort to methods that violate the most basic prin-

law of armed conflict Professor Dinstein also encouraged resistance to

human

rights activists

during armed conflict

who have

erroneously and perilously asserted that

human rights law should supplant the law of armed conflict,

warning that should they prevail

it

would be impossible

to effectively engage in

hostilities.

This edition of the International

Law Studies

("Blue Book") series encapsulates

the incredibly thoughtful insights and lessons learned that each presenter brought
to the conference, including

many gained from

in a variety of conflict zones.

The product of their scholarship and roundtable

personal experience while serving
dis-

cussions are found within this volume.

The conference was organized by Major Michael D. Carsten, US Marine Corps,
of the International Law Department (ILD), with the invaluable assistance of Ms.
Jayne Van Petten and other ILD faculty and staff. The conference was made possithrough the support of the Naval

ble

Yearbook on

individuals

would

Is-

Human Rights. Without the dedicated efforts and support of these

and organizations, the conference would not have been the exceptional

success that
I

College Foundation, the International

Humanitarian Law, the University of Texas School of Law and the

Institute of
rael

War

it

was.

like to

thank Professor Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo and Colonel Daria

P.

US Army, for serving as co-editors for this volume, Captain Ralph
Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), for his meticulous work during the editing proWollschlaeger,

cess,

and the

staff of the College's

Desktop Publishing Division, particularly Susan

Meyer, Albert Fassbender and Shannon Cole.

I

also extend thanks to Captain

Rymn Parsons, JAGC, US Navy, the Commanding Officer of Navy Reserve, Naval
War College (Law), the reserve unit that directly supports the International Law
Department. The

unit's willingness to assist

with the project and

available to facilitate timely publication of this "Blue
grateful to

all

make personnel

Book" was

essential.

I

am

of the reserve officers, but specifically appreciate the exceptional

work of Commander James W. Caley, JAGC, US Navy, for his comprehensive and
painstaking work on the index. This publication is the culmination of the tireless
effort of each of the previously named individuals, as well as numerous others, and
is a tribute to their devotion to the Naval War College and the International Law
Studies series.
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Admiral James
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Wisecup, the President of the

Naval War College, and Professor Robert "Barney" Rubel, Dean of the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies, for their leadership and support in the planning and conduct of the conference, and in the publication of this eighty- seventh volume of
the "Blue

Book"

series.

This "Blue Book" continues the Naval

War College's long

tradition of compiling the highest quality of scholarly inquiry into the

temporary and challenging

legal issues arising

from the

most con-

entire hierarchy of mili-

tary operations.

The International Law Studies series is published by the Naval War College and
distributed worldwide to US and international military organizations, academic
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Preface

From June 22 to

24,

2010 the Naval War College hosted over one hundred and

eighty renowned international scholars

and practitioners, military and

civil-

and students representing government and academic institutions to participate in a conference examining a number of international law issues arising from
ian,

the changing character of war.

The conference featured opening, luncheon and

closing addresses, as well as five panel discussions addressing specific legal issues
that relate to the changing character of war. Panelist

by

a

comments were summarized

commentator, followed by questions from attendees. These discussions

re-

sulted in detailed examinations of key issues.

The following conference summary was prepared by Commander James Caley,
JAGC, US Navy, a member of the Navy Reserve unit that supports the Naval War
College's International Law Department. The summary recapitulates the highlights of each of the conference speakers' presentations. As co-editors, we are
deeply indebted to Commander Caley for his attention to detail and assistance in
facilitating the publication of this "Blue Book." We would also be remiss if we did
not thank Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), for his outstanding support and dedication in editing the submissions for this volume of the International
Law Studies series. We also extend our sincere appreciation to Susan Meyer of the
Naval

War

College's

Desktop Publishing Division for expertly preparing the page

we would like to thank Albert Fassbender and Shannon Cole
excellent work in proofreading the conference papers. The quality of this

proofs. Additionally,
for their

volume

is

a reflection of their professionalism

and outstanding

expertise.

Opening Address
Dr. Nicholas Rostow, a former Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, delivered the

opening address. Focusing on what some refer to

others call extrajudicial executions, Dr.

Rostow

critically

between the law of armed

conflict (or international

burgeoning body of human

rights law. Dr.

as targeted killings

examined the interplay

humanitarian law) and the

Rostow's remarks suggested that the in-

terjection of human rights law into
sive

ambiguity in,

and

armed conflict has created dangerous and diviand uncertainty as to, what law should apply and how, the effect

of which will be to worsen, not ameliorate, the nature of war.

Preface

After

first

highlighting the agenda and identifying issues dividing the interna-

community, Dr. Rostow critiqued the

tional

report, released in

May 2010,

entitled

"Study of Targeted Killings" prepared by United Nations Special Rapporteur Philip
Alston. In the report, Alston challenges the legality of targeted killings through the

use of drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Critical of nations such as the United
States, Russia

and

Israel that

authorize drone attacks based on self-defense, Alston

questions the credibility of that justification and notes that, even

could be

armed

justified, targeting

conflict

and human

Rostow argued

Dr.

correct law, furnishes

upon

of individuals

such action

requires compliance with the law of

rights law.

examine individual actions or apply the

that Alston fails to

no explanation

as to

international humanitarian law or

what he means by human

still

if

whether

human

rights law. Dr.

his analysis

rights law,

Rostow

that direct participation in hostilities, as defined in

and

was predicated

fails

to articulate

also questioned Alston's views

Common Article 3 of the

1949

Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, should be narrowly construed, applying only to persons observed to be actively engaged in hostilities. Dr.

Rostow

urged a broader interpretation, tempering his view with the caveat that "the United
States has
to

no interest in catching people in counterterrorism nets that have nothing

do with terrorism."

Rostow

Dr.

defense should hinge on the availability
Intelligence

employ force in selfof "smart" weapons, and that Central

rejected Alston's views that the decision to

Agency (CIA)

officers

who

operate drones are unlawful combatants

because they do not wear uniforms. In closing, Dr. Rostow exhorted the attendees
to seek greater clarity

and certainty

in the challenging issues to be addressed dur-

ing the conference.

Panel I: The Changing Character of the Battlefield:
The Use of Force in Cyberspace
Panel

I

tackled the

complex legal issues underlying this potent and growing form of

Moderated by Captain Stacy Pedrozo, JAGC, US Navy, of the Naval JusSchool faculty, the panel, consisting of Columbia Law School professor Mat-

warfare.
tice

thew Waxman, Durham University Law School professor Michael Schmitt and
Professor Derek Jinks, current Stockton Chairholder at the Naval

War

College,

used recent large-scale cyber attacks in the countries of Estonia and Georgia to
lustrate

il-

how cyber warfare may be conducted and how difficult it is to combat, es-

pecially with regard to the issues of identification
issues explored included

nues of response (kinetic

and attribution. Other significant

when does a cyber attack constitute use of force, what avev.

non-kinetic)

may exist and what is the responsibility of

xxiv
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States for attacks

launched by non-State actors from within those

burden of proof for State re-

Jinks raised additional questions as to the appropriate
sponsibility, noting that three

a reasonable doubt

and

competing standards

fully conclusive)

which resulted

in

(clear

and convincing, beyond

have been advanced.

Captain Pedrozo opened the panel with a
tacks in Estonia,

States. Professor

summary of the April 2007

defacement

of,

and denial of

cyber at-

service from,

websites belonging to the Estonian Parliament, banks, ministries, schools, newspapers

and broadcasters. Several websites were forced to shut down for a few hours or

some instances even longer when these

in

sand

visits a day,

sites,

which

were flooded with two thousand

one thou-

typically received

visits

per second. Estonia ac-

cused Russia of direct involvement but failed to furnish proof, and no clear picture
has ever been produced as to whether this was ever a State-sponsored event. Esto-

who was eventually conReform Party. He was fined

nia charged only one person, an ethnic Russian Estonian,
victed of attacking the website of the Estonian

approximately $1,640. Russian authorities refused to help with the investigation.

Waxman commented that cyber attacks are both legally and factually

Professor

difficult to characterize. Legally speaking, Article 2(4)

ter prohibits

any

State

of the United Nations Char-

from using force against another, which,

in the

many, means use of kinetic force and, hence, would not prohibit cyber
the view of others, coercion alone
is

enough

—

view of

attacks. In

by economic pressure or other mode
The problem is distinguishing lawful from

either

to constitute a use of force.

unlawful coercion. Factually, cyber attacks are

difficult to identify

and

attribute,

making it hard to assign culpability. This is not a new problem for Article 2(4)
ysis as there is

anal-

much UN case history from the proxy conflicts of the Cold War.

Professor Schmitt observed that there
less there is

an armed

meaning of

Article 51 of the

attack, a State

UN

is

authority for the proposition that un-

cannot respond in self-defense within the

Charter without authority from the Security

Council. In Professor Schmitt's view, however, States have a right to defend themselves before

an

attack.

an attack with a response authorized at the last opportunity to prevent

The

self-defense right includes the right to respond kinetically to cyber

attacks so long as the response
(e.g.,

is

proportional.

With

respect to non-State actors

insurgent groups), a proper response to a cyber attack maybe to

that the host State take action against the non-State actors and,

tack only

if

the right of the host State to defend

its

first

demand

if unproductive, at-

sovereignty

is

weaker than the

right of the attacking State to self-defense.

A more

difficult issue

may be

ascertaining the relevant standard of proof for

proving cyber attack liability. Clear and compelling evidence
dard, but

is

the proposed stan-

maybe impossible to reach given current levels of technology, which can-

not overcome identity masking. Professor Jinks pointed out that identifying the
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cyber perpetrator
is

is

essential to

any response

in self-defense

and that

identification

very difficult. Perpetrators operate in decentralized networks and can easily mask

their identities.

Though Article

in order to respond, there

attacks

is

51 of the

UN Charter requires proof of State action

widespread precedent of States responding to violent

from non-State actors under

justification of self-defense, to include the

Caroline case.
If States

State, they
first

have a right to respond to non-State actors in the territory of another

still

must meet a high standard of proof and perhaps the host State must

given the opportunity to deal with the non-State actors. According to Profes-

sor Jinks the development of an accountability

framework requires

and

of proof. At this juncture, a State

may respond

exercises "control," as
basis

is

the case

may exist under Article

the non-State actor,

is

51

when

if

unable to

a State

if it is

able to prove the host State

An

employs contractors.

alternative

the State acknowledges and adopts the action of

assist in neutralizing

the threat or harbors the re-

The most appropriate standard of proof may be

sponsible group.

establishing

agreement on the appropriate standard

a legal standard for State response

(ii)

(i)

clear

and con-

vincing evidence, though the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia uses the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" and the International

Court of Justice employs a standard of fully conclusive evidence. Given the varying
existing standards of proof and the difficulty of meeting

context, there

may be a need to

the standard of proof.
eral costs.

The

To

solution

is

any one of them

in a cyber

relax both the standard of State responsibility

and

relax the standard of proof is to invite significant collat-

to forge an international consensus

on

State obligations

and the consequences of breaches.

The cyber

attacks in Estonia involved civilian targets.

rected at civilians?
attacks

Can cyber

attacks be di-

To be sure, violent attacks are prohibited but non-violent cyber

do not necessarily run afoul of international humanitarian law. Perhaps the

on the consequences of the attack, the seriousness of which, in
might justify an armed response. The objective of the attack also

issue should turn

the cyber arena,
raises issues.

For example, the cyber attack on the Georgian Ministry of Defence

The indirect effects on commerce of an attack on a
military target may also be deemed to be direct, if they are foreseeable. Finally,
those conducting the cyber attack are often civilian contractors. The "direct partic-

was directed

at a military target.

ipation in hostilities" standard should therefore apply.

Luncheon Address
University of Texas School of

Law

professor Robert Chesney delivered a thought-

provoking luncheon address that recounted the

xxvi

results of the thirty-three

habeas

Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo and Daria

corpus proceedings in
Bay. Professor

US

P. Wollschlaeger

federal courts involving detainees held at

Chesney explored the

Guantanamo

differing detention standards utilized

by the

Bush and Obama administrations, the 2001 statute authorizing military force
against terrorists and the statutes pertaining to military commissions. Professor
Chesney also noted the widely diverging conclusions reached by trial and appellate
judges regarding the applicability of the law of armed conflict to these cases.

Beginning with the general observation that over the

US

last several

years great

Guantanamo Bay but not
Iraq or Afghanistan, Professor Chesney suggested that the volume of habeas litigation by Guantanamo detainees is explained by the fact that these detainees are coninterest has

been taken in

detention operations in

fined outside the reach of the United Nations or other international body,

therefore in every practical sense held within the constant jurisdiction of the

United States alone.

Of

the thirty-three decisions

Guantanamo

by

Article III courts addressing the merits of

detainee petitions for habeas corpus, nineteen granted

ing in the release of eleven detainees. Fourteen detainees have lost

with two of these cases affirmed on appeal. The definition of who

relief, result-

on the

merits,

maybe detained

pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force for acts related to international terrorism

is still

evolving.

who were members

sons

The current standard authorizes detention of per-

—or substantially supported—Taliban or al-Qaida or

of

associated forces engaged in hostilities against the United States or coalition partners.

The

definition

is

informed by law of war principles, yet the

DC Circuit Court

of Appeals opined that the law of war is irrelevant to this formulation, deciding that

domestic law, grounded in the Military Commissions Act, furnishes the relevant
statutory background. In Professor Chesney's view, the varied judicial opinions

make

this area ripe for further legislative action.

Panel II: The Changing Character of the Participants in War: Civilianization

ofWarfightingand the Concept of "Direct Participation
Panel

II,

in Hostilities"

which was moderated by Professor Charles Garraway, Associate Fellow of

the Royal Institute of International Affairs

(Chatham House)

in the

United King-

dom, wrestled with contentious issues surrounding the concept of direct participation in hostilities

(DPH). Panel members Ryan Goodman, a

New York University

law professor; Brigadier General Blaise Cathcart, Judge Advocate General of the

Canadian Forces; Francoise Hampson, an Essex University law professor; and Dr.
Nils Melzer, legal advisor to the International

examined the ICRC's controversial 2009
Direct Participation in Hostilities (IG)

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),

Guidance on the Notion of
and the extent to which the IG does or does
Interpretive
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not

reflect international law.

trasting

Among

the salient issues considered were the con-

and confusing status- and behavior-based approaches

manitarian law and

human

rights

in international

hu-

law to determining when civilians are "directly

participating in hostilities," thereby losing protections against direct attack other-

wise provided to civilians under law.
Professor Garraway opened the panel by describing the 2009 IG as both un-

on
the principle of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Noncombatants are presumed not to be directly participating in hostilities, and therefore are entitled to protection from attack. In the ICRC's view, Professor
and highly

controversial

Garraway noted,
as

— they

controversial. International humanitarian law hinges

—but only

civilians lose this protection if

if,

and only for so long

directly participate in hostilities.

Professor

Goodman

disagreed with the

ICRC

interpretation of international

law in Section IX, "Restraints on the Use of Force," noting that the IG failed to
identify specific treaty law

Goodman

also

and

State practice in support of

its

position. Professor

noted the law of war already contains restrictions applicable to the

who are hors de
combat, escaping prisoners of war; and actions taken in reprisal. He noted that such
restrictions may seemingly support the ICRC's position on restraints of the use of

killing

force,

of an otherwise legitimate target, to include combatants

but not to the extent which the IG suggests.

Professor

Hampson

discussed the ongoing debate regarding the interrelation-

ship between international humanitarian law and

human rights law with respect to

targeting. Specifically, given the nature of a given conflict, she analyzed the applicable

when

law (Hague and Geneva treaty law and customary international law) and
each might apply. She noted that the

and the application of

ICRC position relies on both human rights law

a law enforcement paradigm,

which

based approach to distinguish civilians from combatants. Hence,
behaves

like a

tack that

is

combatant by engaging in

accorded

civilians

hostilities,

behavior-

utilizes a

when

a civilian

he loses the protection from

during that action only. In contrast, international

humanitarian law uses primarily a status-based approach for distinguishing
ians

from combatants. The ICRC in the IG

group exercising

a

at-

civil-

now accepts that a member of an armed

continuous combat function creates a category that

based. Logically, then, for status-based targeting decisions to be lawful,

is

status

LOAC has

to prevail over

human

problem

more complex depending on the nature of the conflict and, in fact,
in some limited circumstances human rights law may prevail.

is

a bit

she argued that

rights law. Professor

Hampson

notes, however, that the

Brigadier General Cathcart noted that distinguishing civilians from combatants
is

intelligence driven,

ing.

Any doubt

is

and therefore must be well established

for purposes of target-

resolved in favor of finding civilian status.
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Finally, Dr.

Melzer remarked that the purpose of the IG

ICRC's interpretation of the current
legal

is

to encapsulate the

state of international law,

and provide key

concepts that can be used by legal advisors to guide military commanders and

develop rules of engagement. Dr. Melzer also clarified that targeting should be

based on the combat function of the

and who are trained and have the
targets. It

is

target.

Persons

who

function as combatants,

capability, to participate in hostilities, are lawful

the ICRC's view that the question of whether a person loses the protec-

tion of civilian status

must be determined at the time of targeting.

an organized armed group, such person

and can be lawfully targeted.

falls

into a continuous

On the other hand,

participate in hostilities, without allegiance to

If a civilian joins

combat function

persons that only intermittently

any particular organized armed

group, can be lawfully targeted only when they are performing a combat function.

The intervening periods must be governed by law enforcement

principles.

Panel III: The Changing Character of Weapon Systems:

Unmanned Systems/Unmanned
Panel

III,

Vehicles

moderated by Villanova University School of Law professor John

Murphy, was comprised of Professor Pete Pedrozo of the Naval War College, Hina
Shamsi of New York University School of Law, Colonel Darren Stewart of the San

Remo

Institute

and Professor Ken Anderson of American University's Washing-

ton School of Law.

Its

primary focus was unmanned (or remotely piloted)

aerial

(UAV) operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ms. Shamsi, Senior Advisor to the Project on Extrajudicial Executions at New York University School of
Law and a contributor to a recent United Nations special report on targeted killings
(Alston Report), criticized recent UAV operations on multiple grounds, including

vehicle

lack of transparency

and accountability, and the extent

destabilizes existing legal

to

killing

frameworks. Professor Pedrozo outlined the legal basis

on which CIA-controlled UAVs

are operated in Pakistan, while Professor

son discussed whether geographic considerations delimit
Professor

which targeted

Murphy opened

the panel

Ander-

UAV use.

by lauding unmanned drones

as systems

capable of precision targeting that minimize civilian casualties. In contrast, Ms.

Shamsi, a contributor to the Alston Report, criticized drone

guing that they make
tions

beyond those

it

easier to kill

and thereby

that are legally justified

facilitate

(UAV)

operations, ar-

an expansion of execu-

under international humanitarian law.

She further contended that the operation of drones by the CIA, though not

illegal

under international humanitarian law, should nevertheless be halted because the

CIA is not capable of complying with the law of war and is not sufficiently transparent in

its

operations to verify compliance. Moreover, she concluded, under

xxix
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rights law, targeted killings are illegal because they are

an objective, but are merely to

and

sia

Israel

have

all

justified

kill.

not designed to accomplish

She observed that while the United

States,

drone attacks on the basis of self-defense,

Rus-

this justifi-

cation cannot stand where the resulting deaths occur in another State's territory,

such as in Pakistan.

man-

Professor Pedrozo noted that special rapporteur Alston did not possess a

date to investigate or render conclusions with respect to international humanitar-

should be understood only insofar as they

ian law,

and thus

human

rights law. Additionally,

his assertions

with the law of war.
against Taliban

He

community on

fully

comport

asserted that drone operations taking place in Pakistan

and al-Qaida

Professor Anderson

he observed that CIA operations

relate to

forces

do not

violate Pakistani sovereignty.

summarized the general view of the international

drones, saying that they

may be

legal

used in armed conflict or in law

enforcement operations, subject to geographic limitations, and are governed by

human

rights

law in those instances when

international humanitarian law. This
that drones

may

is

human

rights

in contrast to the

law

is

not superseded by

view of the United States

be deployed without geographic limitation against combatants

wherever they are located when the United States chooses to exercise

its

lawful

right of self-defense.

Colonel Stewart

commented

that

UAVs

are like

any other weapon platform;

they have significant capabilities and vulnerabilities. As a result, to properly evaluate the use of UAVs they

must be viewed

in the context of the overall military plan

or strategy. Only in such context can the

UAV targeting be truly determined to be

lawful or unlawful. Colonel Stewart also argued that evolving technologies, such as

autonomous weapon systems, while enhancing the ability to neutralize threats,
tend to replace human judgment with algorithms, a potentially unwise exchange.
The legal community must be the driving
and use of such emerging technologies.

force to ensure the lawful application

Panel IV: The Changing Character of Tactics: Lawfare in
Asymmetrical Conflicts
Panel IV delved into the lawfare
fare

is

conducted by the United

phenomenon and its growing impact on how warStates,

Great Britain and

Israel.

The panel, moder-

Graham of The Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center
and School, included Duke University School of Law professor Charles Dunlap,
Ms. Ashley Deeks of Columbia Law School, Tel Aviv University professor Pnina
ated by Mr. David

Sharvit Baruch
tial

and Captain Dale Stephens of the Royal Australian Navy. Substan-

comment was made on

the September 2009 Report of the United Nations Fact
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Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict prepared by Justice Richard Goldstone

(Goldstone Report), and the manner in which
to discredit

Hamas used the

report in an effort

and thereby constrain Israel. Observations were also made on the unin-

tended consequences of recent attempts by military forces to limit
ties in

Afghanistan, such as the trend by insurgents to

and deeply within

closely

of international law

—

embed themselves even more

civilian populations. Professor Sharvit

the lengths to which Israeli forces

now go

—

far

civilian casual-

Baruch detailed

above and beyond the requirements

to avoid civilian casualties.

Mr. Graham opened the panel with

a discussion of

asymmetric urban fighting

with non-State actors, highlighting the Goldstone Report. The report discusses the
legality

which

of

Israeli

Israel

operations against

Hamas

in

Gaza and

finds thirty instances in

purportedly violated the law of armed conflict, including reckless use

Graham questioned whether the
fundamental shift in the manner in

of white phosphorus and flechette munitions. Mr.

Goldstone Report portends

—or

reflects

which principles of the law of armed

—

a

conflict are applied in

asymmetric armed

conflict.

Professor Sharvit Baruch discussed the exhaustive approach Israel takes to

com-

ply with the law of armed conflict prior to target approval, to include intelligence
vetting, legal review of

warnings to

civilian populations.

Additional Protocol

marks on

both preplanned and immediate

I

as

and extensive

She viewed Article 57 (Precautions in Attack) of

being customary international law and focused her

Israel's efforts to

comply with

method of exploiting the law during armed

For instance, just prior to the

first

re-

its dictates.

Professor Dunlap, to whom the term "lawfare"
a

targets,

is

largely credited, described

it

as

conflict to achieve operational ends.

Gulf War, the United States purchased

satellite

imagery of coalition forces from multiple commercial companies, thereby denying
that intelligence information to Iraq

and obviating the need

for military action to

keep Iraq from obtaining the imagery.
Professor Dunlap observed that insurgents are adept lawfare operators.
as

an example that the law of armed conflict does not prohibit

He cited

civilian casualties

during combat operations; they are accepted as collateral damages under rules governing necessity, distinction and proportionality. But

nounces that the United

would

risk the life

when

a

US

States will not engage the Taliban if such

of civilians, the Taliban will

start to

embed with

attack occurs that kills or injures civilians, although the attack

was

official

an-

engagement

civilians. If

lawful,

an

media

reports are often adverse.

Ms. Deeks spoke on various court decisions and
States

and

its

European

litigation: lawfulness

how

coalition partners. She focused

they divide the United

on four broad categories of

of detention, lawfulness of treatment during detention,

xxxi
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lawfulness of a transfer of custody from one State to another and lawfulness of par-

The

ticular intelligence activities.

courts

on such

States.

As

tailed to

by

US and European

cases are causing tensions in the operational environment.

ropean courts have provided

less

and international

in military

differing decisions of the

a result

The Eu-

deference to the decisions of the executive branch

affairs

of such litigation

matters as compared to courts in the United

risk,

European military operations maybe cur-

avoid gray areas in the law. In addition, a change in policy brought about

litigation can,

partners to

over time, have a chilling effect on the willingness of coalition

work together and share information. She

cited potential steps that

could reduce the risk of litigation as including ensuring States' compliance with

counterinsurgency (COIN) principles in an effort to win the hearts and minds of
the affected population

mechanisms designed

and the establishment of independent non-judicial

to oversee the decisions of the executive branch.

Captain Stephens argued that lawfare

is

neither

good nor bad. Laws by their na-

ture are indeterminate, thereby creating gaps that require
to take advantage of such gaps.
principles,
erly,

To

fill

filling.

Lawfare attempts

such gaps, legal advisors attempt to use legal

which are generally moral concepts. These legal principles,

can effectively be used as a means of counter-lawfare.

COIN doctrine in asymmetric
COIN operations as a tool of war.

the

conflicts

and

if used

prop-

One such way is to apply

to emphasize the rule of law in

Panel V: The Changing Character of International Legal Scrutiny:

Rule
Panel

V

Set, Investigation

and Enforcement in Asymmetrical

Conflicts

considered the unprecedented levels of public and judicial scrutiny

now

being given to the use of armed force. Panel moderator Captain Rob McLaughlin,

Royal Australian Navy, and panel members Professor Wolff Heintschel von

Commander Andrew Murdoch of the
Royal Navy, Dr. Roy Schondorf of the Israeli Ministry of Justice and Commander
James Kraska, JAGC, US Navy, a member of the Naval War College faculty, examHeinegg of Europa-Universitat Viadrina,

ined instances of internal and external scrutiny, such as that occurring as a result of

on Gaza. Concern was expressed that
this scrutiny has the potential to dissuade military commanders from militarily appropriate and lawful actions due to the costs and burdens of such scrutiny, irreIsraeli actions to

enforce

its

naval blockade

spective of liability.

Captain McLaughlin began by observing that

all

countries are subject to in-

tense legal scrutiny in the operational environment, with non-governmental or-

ganizations (NGOs),
investigations.

among

others, well

Key considerations are who
xxxn

equipped to conduct independent
is

investigating

and the body of law
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applied in the investigation. Legal scrutiny

is

especially significant in the

asym-

metric context.
Professor Heintschel

von Heinegg

asserted that the law of armed conflict does

not recognize asymmetry. This law simply gives privileged status to certain persons. In

asymmetric conflicts, one party attempts to compensate for military weak-

imposed on the other party by the law
of war. Examples are perfidy and use of human shields, though employing human
shields would not necessarily prevent an attack under law of war principles. He

nesses by taking advantage of the weaknesses

maintained that the law of armed conflict is

flexible,

but often not helpful when ap-

He opined that perhaps new law needs to be forged.
With respect to investigations, nations must move quickly to publicly supply accuplied to asymmetric conflict.

what had occurred. Professor Heintschel von Heinegg ob-

rate information as to

served that enforcement in the asymmetric context

He

is difficult.

indicated that

the International Criminal Court could be useful in this regard, although

may be overestimated by some.
Commander Murdoch reviewed

three cases to demonstrate the

its

value

manner

in

which recent court decisions and related public scrutiny have negatively influenced British operational commanders. In each case there has been some form of
military justice, civil proceeding, parliamentary review and/or public inquiry that

took years to complete. This
also exposes military

level

of scrutiny is very costly in time and resources.

It

and government personnel to personal and reputational risk.

To help offset such risk, the military requires a well-resourced operational capability to

respond to and,

if possible,

preempt a judicial challenge.

Dr. Schondorf offered the perspective that
routinely accusing Israel of war crimes.

age

Israel's

has engaged in lawfare by

The purpose of the allegations was to dam-

reputation and force investigations. These tactics can be very effective

for non-State actors because

cused State

Hamas

is

once an allegation

is

made, the reputation of the

ac-

immediately compromised. The non- State actor does not face the

made a democratic State will take such
an allegation seriously and conduct an investigation. In contrast, a non -State actor
has no similar interest in conducting its own investigation and there is no public
same risk. In

addition, once an allegation

expectation that

forced to expend

it

do

so.

As

is

a result, to discredit these allegations, nations are

enormous amounts of time and

results of such investigations are

by the time the

resources, but

completed the public

is

no longer concerned with

the incident.

Commander
of Gaza

is

Kraska addressed the question of whether

Israel's

subject to the law of naval warfare or the law of the sea.

agreement, he argued that the law of naval warfare on blockade
if the hostilities

do not constitute international armed
xxxin

conflict,

naval blockade

While noting
is

dis-

applicable, even

because the area

is

Preface

one of continuous violence. This, he suggested,

is

consistent with the

US Supreme

Court interpretation of international law involving the North's blockade of the
South

in the

American

Civil

War.
Closing Address

Yoram

Professor Emeritus

Stockton Professor

at the

marks focused on the

armed

which

Naval

War College, delivered the closing address.

fact that scholars

and military

His

is

re-

practitioners of the law of

have become too defensive and apologetic in the face of both

conflict

lawfare,

Dinstein of Tel Aviv University, the 1999 and 2002

used effectively by the adversaries of civilized nations, and

(ii)

(i)

in-

human rights activists and NGOs
from the law of armed conflict to human rights law.

creased pressure brought to bear by overzealous

who desire a "regime change"
His basic theme was that there

is

no reason

and the tone of the response need

discussion

civilized nations to
first is

tions

—

to be changed.

two modern phenomena that have led

In Professor Dinstein's view, there are

The

to be defensive; in fact, the focus of the

become excessively apologetic and defensive when waging war.

that the "barbarians at the gate"

from armed

are exploiting a lesson

lized nation's warfighting effort

—rogue

States

conflict in

and

terrorist organiza-

Vietnam, that

is,

that a civi-

can be effectively impeded by eroding public

support for pursuing victory. In the war in Afghanistan, public support for confronting the

enemy

is

eroded by highlighting

age in the course of hostilities.

civilian casualties as collateral

dam-

"We" (whom he defined as the scholars and military

practitioners of civilized nations) have, in fact, allowed false notions about the

unacceptability of civilian casualties, under the law of armed conflict, to take root

and unnecessarily hamper our military operations. He

armed

conflict takes civilian casualties as collateral

stressed that the law of

damage

for granted,

and only

requires belligerent parties to minimize them.

—

The second phenomenon is that NGOs and others assert wrongly and dangerously that human rights law supplants the law of armed conflict. The human

—

rights
ful.

NGOs have contributed to a misperception that lawful State action is unlaw-

Undeniably,

such gaps

exist.

human

rights

law can

fill

gaps in the law of armed conflict, where

The crux of the matter, however,

constitutes lex specialis.

It

is

that the law of armed conflict

has been recognized as such by consistent State practice

and by judicial opinions.
Professor Dinstein believes that,

if civilized

military practitioners need to change the tone
that the response to spurious criticisms

is

nations are to prevail, scholars and

and tenor of the debate, making sure

widely heard and understood.
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Conclusion

We

hope

add

to

that the thought-provoking articles published in this "Blue

—and help shape—the debate on

the multiple

Book"

complex emerging

will

legal is-

by the changing character of war. The legal insights offered here to
practitioners and scholars should assist them as they address these and other

sues presented
legal

issues that

may evolve in future conflicts.

This "Blue Book" would not have
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successful conference

made

come to fruition had it not been for the enorpossible in large measure
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PARTI
OPENING ADDRESS

I

Combating Terrorists: Legal Challenges in

World

the Post-9/11

Nicholas Rostow*
Introduction
a great pleasure to be back at the Naval War College and an extraordinary
Ithonor
look out, see colleagues of long
to be opening this conference. As
is

I

I

More important than that, although that fact is important, I see colleagues who have been my teachers as I have pursued my own work.
The annual International Law Department conferences famously address the
most difficult and contentious topics in the field known variously as the law of
standing.

armed conflict, laws of war and international humanitarian law (IHL). (While I regard these terms as coextensive, not everyone does, which
fusion

and controversy.) The coverage of

this

conference

challenging: detention, civilianization of warfighting, the
ticipation in hostilities," the

itself is a
is

source of con-

equally broad and

meaning of "direct par-

impact of drones, asymmetric warfare, and issues of

enforcement and accountability.

I

imagine discussion also

will

touch on embar-

goes and blockades. These topics are of operational, not just academic, interest.
Participants here are well
fact

known for taking real-world concerns into account. This

alone sets the conference apart.

Former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, US Naval War College. The views
my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US government or any other
entity with which I am or have been associated.
*

expressed are

—
Combating
The themes
tives
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to be

examined over the next few days highlight

difficulties

this

phenomenon

England

recently, a

only a shorthand way of referring to

is

differences of view that are of legal, political

and social significance. At a conference

US official was surprised to discover that the health of the In-

ternational Criminal Court

I

may

with seeing terrorists in the context of armed conflict than

Europeans and others,

tire

different perspec-

within the legal and political communities worldwide. While Americans

have fewer

in

World

was the thermometer

for gauging the health of the en-

international legal system.

thought therefore to begin our conference with some thoughts about the

UN

Human Rights Council Report, dated May 28, 2010, of Professor Philip Alston of
the New York University School of Law on "extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions," including "targeted killings."
is

at the center

those

who

1

It

merits attention because the subject

of debate about the lawful use of lethal force against terrorists and

support, harbor, direct or finance them.

2001 and the rejection of a law enforcement-only

It

takes us back to September

—or mainly law enforcement

approach to combating terrorism.

number of questions and highlights a number of isbegin with a summary of the argument and then note some

Alston's approach raises a
sues.

I

shall therefore

questions about

its

assumptions and conclusions.

The Alston Report

armed conflict turn most often on the weapon chosen, the target
and collateral damage. Lately, the extent and definition of the battlefield, particularly when combating terrorists, also are issues for analysis and debate. In addition,
as a result of the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Israeli
Legal questions in

"wall," 2

whether or not a State has a right of self-defense under international law

against attacks

—

either

State actors, continues to

should make clear

planned or executed

—by

terrorist groups, that

is,

non-

concern policymakers and commentators alike. To begin,

my views

on

this issue: terrorist

groups such as Al Qaeda and

others are engaged in hostilities with the United States

though they are not themselves

States. States

I

and other

States even

from which they operate have an obli-

gation under international law, whether customary or derived from binding

UN

3

Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1373 (200 1), or treaties, to pre-

vent terrorist groups from engaging in attacks and to put a stop to active and passive

support for terrorism.

suffering attack

is

When

a State

is

unable to carry out

not without recourse, including an inherent right to use force

necessary and proportionate in self-defense.
trivial.

Nor

is

this duty, the State

The

necessity requirement

the proportionality requirement: that

is

if

hardly

quantum of force reasonably

Nicholas Rostow

necessary to bring an end to the condition giving rise to the right to use force in
self-defense in the first instance.

The use of force must conform to requirements in

the law of armed conflict as well. 4
Alston's Report has stimulated

much

interest because

it

addresses subjects of

He begins by focusing on unmanned aerial vehicles and weapons
fired from them as among the most controversial instruments in the conflict with
terrorists. He asserts that "a missile fired from a drone is no different from any
other commonly used weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or
current concern.

gunship that

whether

its

fires missiles.

specific use

The

critical legal

question

is

the

same

for each

weapon:

5

complies with IHL." Alston concludes that assessment of

each use of force to ensure compliance with the requirement of proportionality

must be made with respect to "each attack individually, and not for an overall military operation." 6 He thus elides the jus ad bellum and thejws in hello. Each operates
in different contexts and with different understandings; treating them as one leads
to confusion, mistake of law and uncertainty. Recognizing that the proportionality
standard must be met for a use of force to be lawful and that the principle of discrimination between military and civilian targets

armed

conflict,

Yoram

Dinstein put

it

is

at the core

of the modern law of

better than Alston: those

need to take into account the duty to minimize
Perhaps because his audience

is

the

who

civilian casualties.

UN Human

plan attacks

7

Rights Council and perhaps

own work is international human rights law, Alston looks at
of force with international human rights concerns foremost in his mind. (This

because the focus of his
uses

no way suggests that I do not share his aspirations for a world that respects and protects human rights.) Let us see what Alston does with his perspective.
First, he takes a more limited view than I suspect would be shared in this auditoobservation in

rium of what constitutes

a legitimate target for killing in

ant' or 'fighter' or, in the case

of a

civilian,

armed conflict: "'combat-

only for such time as the person 'directly

8

participates in hostilities.'" Alston states, without analysis,

It is

not easy to arrive

at a definition

of direct participation that protects civilians and at

same time does not "reward" an enemy that may fail to distinguish between civiland lawful military targets, that may deliberately hide among civilian populations
and put them at risk, or that may force civilians to engage in hostilities. The key, how-

the

ians

ever,

is

to recognize that regardless of the enemy's tactics, in order to protect the vast

majority of civilians, direct participation
fighter,

may only

or conduct that directly supports combat.

include conduct close to that of a

More

attenuated

viding financial support, advocacy, or other non-combat aid, does
direct participation. 9

acts,

[sic]

such as pro-

not constitute
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Alston asserts that "direct participation" excludes
general war effort,"

e.g., "political

support and propaganda."

10

He

activities that

World

may

support "the

advocacy, supplying food or shelter, or economic

adopts what he

calls

the "farmer by day, fighter

by

night" 11 distinction to protect the daytime farmer from being a legitimate target.

Such an approach, which

is

included in Additional Protocol

I

12

(and one of the rea-

(My lawyer would have
me say "arguably favors.") Alston prefers the guidance of the International Comit may
mittee of the Red Cross with respect to direct participation in hostilities
stop and start on a continuing basis. One becomes a legitimate target only when
engaged in a targetable activity. 13 This is not a position that will win many advocates among those engaged in combating terrorists and their attacks. Further, if his
sons the United States

is

not a party), favors the

terrorist.

—

goal

is

"to protect the vast majority of civilians," 14 then

one might have thought he

would have emphasized the importance of suppressing

terrorism. Thus, Alston's

Report suffers by seeming not to take terrorism so seriously

as

governments and

publics do.

The UN Security Council has suggested that one take a broader view. In Resolution 1373, adopted following the 9/11 attacks, the Security Council "decided" that
all

States shall

[ejnsure that any person

who

participates in the financing, planning, preparation or

perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts

is

brought to justice and en-

sure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws

punishment duly

reflects the seriousness

and regulations and

of such terrorist

acts.

that the

15

While engaging in criminal support for terrorism may not per se make one
target,

it

does suggest that Alston

is

rather too quick to

a lawful

narrow the categories of

would regard command and control,
training and supplying of materiel as putting one in the category of legitimate target, but the fact that he excludes financiers raises a question. By not evaluating the

legitimate military targets.

impact of

UN

I

assume

that he

Security Council resolutions

on

his assumptions, Alston

under-

mines the usefulness of his work.
Achieving a general definition of terrorism has bedeviled the international community. At the same time, through a series of
multilateral treaties, the

same community has narrowed the

disagreement about whether a particular act
usually

committed by terrorists

such a way as to

make

UN Security Council resolutions and
is,

or

is

as "terrorist." Alston

status severable, as Professor

definitional gap for

not, terrorist

by defining

seems to define

acts

"terrorist" in

Harvey Rishikof likes

to say.
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Thus, for Alston, the terrorist can be

many things at once, each one separable from

the other, with different legal consequences for each.

human rights law in the fight
against terrorists creates a legal unreality for those who combat terrorism. UN SeSecond, Alston's emphasis on international

curity Council resolutions are both
reflects political

more inclusive and more vague. Their language

compromises achieved through the drafting process, compro-

mises that allow unanimous adoption of counterterrorist resolutions. Thus,

UN

Security Council resolutions routinely reaffirm

that terrorism in

all its

forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious

threats to international peace

and security

.

.

.

[and] the need to

combat by all means, in

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including
applicable international

and

national peace

human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, threats to inter-

security caused

by terrorist

acts.

Those engaged in combating terrorism can use

16

this Security

Council language as a

standard against which to evaluate plans. Alston's failure to consider the impact of
Resolution 1373 and other Security Council counterterrorism resolutions limits
the operational utility of his work.

Alston

insists that

human rights law apply in
either how they do or the conse-

the laws of war and international

the context of armed conflict without analyzing

quences for military operations. Thus, Alston
flict is

unclear or uncertain,

law." 17
rives

"it is

asserts,

where the law of armed con-

appropriate to draw guidance from

human rights

He does not specify the content of such law and whether, to the extent it de-

from

treaties, all

or just

ment of the law of armed

some

States are parties.

The same

conflict as his references to the

is

true in his treat-

1977 Geneva Additional

Protocols show.

He argues that, as a result of failing
to disclose the legal basis for individual targeting decisions and who has been killed
Alston's operational concern

is

procedural.

with what collateral consequences, "clear legal standards [have been displaced]
with a vaguely defined license to

vacuum."
texts

—

18

As Alston

Russia's

rebel groups,

war

and

in

kill,

and the creation of

a

major accountability

notes, targeted killings have taken place in a variety of con-

Chechnya, the

Israel's

US war with Al

wars with Arab

Qaeda,

States, quasi-States

Sri

Lanka's war with

and groups

are a few

examples. Alston sums up the situation as follows:

Although in most circumstances targeted
tional circumstance of

armed

conflict,

killings violate the right to

they

may be

legal.

This

is

life,

in the excep-

in contrast to other

terms with which "targeted killing" has sometimes been interchangeably used, such as
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"extrajudicial execution,"

by

definition, illegal.

"summary execution", and

"assassination",

all

World
of which are,

19

This approach to conceptually distinct acts reflects a rush to conclusion based on insufficient

and imprecise

analysis.

The US

official position, for

example,

is

different.

The US View
Harold Koh, the State Department Legal Adviser, gave the
position in a speech in

He made

Obama administration

March 2010 to the American Society of International Law. 20

number of significant points that assist in deciding who is and who is
not a lawful target. First, Mr. Koh said that the United States is engaged in a number of armed conflicts simultaneously: "In the conflict occurring in Afghanistan
and elsewhere, we continue to fight the perpetrators of 9/1 1: a non-state actor, alQaeda (as well as the Taliban forces that harbored al-Qaeda)." With respect to targeting,

a

he stated, "U.S. targeting practices, including

lethal operations

with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with

all

conducted

applicable law, including

the laws of war."

With regard to the authority to use
national law, the United States

is

in

force,

Mr. Koh

stated,

"As a matter of inter-

an armed conflict with al-Qaeda,

as well as the

may use
force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law." He

Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and

continued, "[I]n this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority

under international law, and the responsibility to
ing lethal force, to defend

itself,

its

citizens, to use force, includ-

including by targeting persons such as high-level

al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks." This point

is

important as

all

decisions

about targeting, the location of the conflict and treatment of prisoners flow from

Mr. Koh stated that the United

armed

conflict,

ing individuals

it.

States recognizes the applicability of the law of

and the core principles of distinction and proportionality. Target-

who

ners, supporters

are legitimate military objectives, such as

and the like, is within international law.

commanders, plan-

Killing such persons

is

not

them of judicial due process, for none is due, and does not violate US
prohibitions on assassination for the same reason: legitimate and lawful acts

to deprive
legal

of self-defense are not crimes. Finally,
as increasing the precision

Alston shares the

US

Koh

defends the use of unmanned vehicles

of attacks and limiting collateral damage. In this respect,

view.

The US position raises questions just as the Human Rights Council report does.
The question of the use of precision weapons is one such issue. What legal consequences flow from possession of them?

Do they affect the way a State, as a matter of

8

Nicholas Rostow

law,

must conduct military operations, including those

right of self-defense codified in Article 51 of the

ons eliminate recognition that error
casualties, if they occur,

is

endemic

must be intended

in exercise of the inherent

UN Charter? Do precision weapto warfare

and mean

that civilian

Goldstone Report suggests)? 21

(as the

How does the requirement to distinguish between military and civilian targets affect, if it

does, the right to use force in self-defense

does not possess precision weapons, and

its

when

the State with the right

enemy hides among,

or otherwise ex-

ploits, civilians?

These and other questions spring to mind in the course of studying the Alston
Report and such other
port.

22

with Al Qaeda and

even

if they

Rights Council documents as the Goldstone Re-

more questions than it answers. Alston raises a further
of Central Intelligence Agency officers engaging in armed conflict

Each of them

issue: the status

Human

raises

its allies.

Do they, as Alston asserts, not enjoy combatant status

meet the requirements of the Geneva Conventions? Should one distin-

guish between the

CIA

in military operations

officer

engaged in cloak and dagger and those

who

engage

and look and behave like the regular armed forces except for

the source of their paychecks?

Conclusion

We shall be discussing these and other issues

in the next

few days. Their impor-

tance to success in the effort to combat terrorism and terrorists

Other

hard to overstate.

They include the fact, which seems often to be
a political act aimed at political objectives. This is

issues are significant as well.

forgotten, that the use of force

true whether the goal

is

is

capitulation or change of policy. For the United States, the

goals invariably include persuading the adversary to

comply with international legal

standards of behavior. At the same time, the tactical choices
cal

is

made also have politi-

consequences. These need to be considered as one goes forward with a use of

force. In addition, calls for the introduction

decisions, not just the detention of prisoners,

of judicial process into military

seem

involvement of the judiciary necessary or wise?

to be

growing louder.

Is

such

And what are the consequences of

introducing judicial process as a routine part of military operations?

As the war with Al Qaeda and

its

associates continues with

no end

in sight

with some groups pressing for criminal prosecutions of those fighting
getting the analysis

Alston's Report

is

and better needs

and argument

right

is

a political

and

not wrong in every respect; neither

to be done. This conference will

and

terrorists,

legal necessity. Professor

is it

right

—

therefore

do some of that work.

more

..

Combating

Terrorists: Legal Challenges in the Post-9/11

World
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Mission Impossible? International Law and
the Changing Character of War

John

As

F.

Murphy*

a participant in the conference "International

Character of War," in this

flected in the title to this essay,

article

i.e.,

the changing character of war have

I

I

shall

that the use

and abuse of international law and

combined to place major obstacles in the way of

US

forces

and

their allies. In sup-

be drawing extensively on examples arising out of "the

changing character of weapon systems" panel, but

I

shall also

dimensions of "the changing character of war" to buttress

I.

the Changing

hope to present and support the thesis re-

the successful prosecution of armed conflict by

port of this thesis,

Law and

be exploring other

this support.

Challenges Posed by the Changing Character of Weapon Systems

In the panel "The Changing Character of

Weapon

Systems:

Unmanned

Systems/

Unmanned Vehicles," an overarching theme was the issue whether the use of these
new weapon systems was compatible with international law. As noted in particular
in Professor Pedrozo's article, the criticisms of the use of unmanned systems to at1

tack adversaries outside of traditional

* Professor

I want to acknowledge the excellent reand Carolyn (Carly) Studer, third-year students

of Law, Villanova University School of Law.

search assistance of John (Sean) E. Jennings
at

combat zones like Afghanistan and Iraq have

III

Villanova University School of Law, on this

article.

Mission Impossible? International

Law and

been especially sharp. The primary focus of the
telligence Agency's
aerial

system or

first,

to address

all

unmanned
Al-Qaeda

of the numerous arguments advanced by the

my discussion to two closely related arCIA personnel utilizing the armed
armed conflict, and if they engage in

that the civilian nature of the

drones precludes them from engaging in

armed

has been on the Central In-

to kill leaders of the Taliban or

of the drone attacks, but rather limit

guments:

critics

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.

make no attempt

critics

Changing Character of War

(CIA) use of armed drones, a prime example of an

unmanned aerial vehicle,

in the Federally
I

the

them "unlawful combatants"; and second, outside of
United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with

conflict, this renders

Afghanistan and Iraq, the

the Taliban, Al-Qaeda or any other militant or terrorist group. If such attacks occur

outside of an

armed

conflict, they

must be

treated as criminal acts

and not armed

attacks that give rise to the right to use military force in self-defense. Rather, they

must be combated by law enforcement measures and governed by international

human

rights law, not the

law of armed

national humanitarian law. Because
the critics contend, they

may not be

conflict, or, as

armed drones

some

prefer to call

it,

inter-

are not law enforcement tools,

used outside of combat zones.

Government Agency
One of the most persistent critics of the CIA's use of armed drones has been Mary
Ellen O'Connell, holder of the Robert & Marion Short Chair in Law at Notre Dame
University. According to Professor O'Connell, the CIA is not bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice of the United States to respect the laws and customs

The Effect of the CIA's Status

of war and therefore

Under

the law of

it

as a Civilian

does not. 2 Moreover, according to O'Connell:

armed

conflict,

only lawful combatants have the right to use force

conflict. Lawful combatants are the members of a state's regular
The CIA are not members of the U.S. armed forces. They do not wear
uniforms. They are not subject to the military chain of command. They are not trained

during an armed

armed

forces.

in the laws
sity,

of war, including the fundamental targeting principles of distinction, neces-

proportionality,

and humanity. 3

O'Connell's remarks presume that the law of armed conflict governs the CIA's
use of armed drones in the

FATA in Pakistan. This is a debatable point; we shall re-

turn to the issue below. But assuming arguendo that
flict

does not prohibit

hostilities.

on

civilians,

it

does, the law of armed con-

including intelligence agents, from participating in

As Pedrozo points out, 4 even Philip Alston, the

UN Special Rapporteur

summary or arbitrary executions, in his study on targeted killings,
conceded this point. 5 Moreover, the use of armed drones by CIA personnel

extrajudicial,

has

does not necessarily constitute a war crime
14

if it

results in a death in the

FATA. 6

John

Only if the

killing itself

conflict, e.g.,

it

who

conducted in a manner prohibited by the law of armed

involves the deliberate targeting of civilians not directly participat-

ing in hostilities, does
relevant

is

it

civilian status

It is

as unlawful

killing, plus

those

it is ir-

personnel or State armed

who

authorized

it,

can be

7

of the

First, if they are

war status.

killing, intelligence

who committed the

prosecuted for war crimes.

quences.

war crime. Under such circumstances,

constitute a

conducts the targeted

forces; the actor

The

Murphy

F.

CIA personnel does have

other significant conse-

captured by the enemy, they are not entitled to prisoner of

a matter of some debate whether they are to be treated as civilians or

combatants while they are detained. 8 Second, they may be attacked,

ei-

members of an organized armed group or as civilian direct participants in
hostilities. Third, they enjoy no belligerent immunity for their actions and thus
ther as

maybe prosecuted,
mestic crimes

(e.g.,

either for

war crimes

(e.g.,

deliberately killing civilians) or do-

murder) in a national court. 9 In other words, the absence of the

on the part of CIA personnel to participate directly in hostilities within the
meaning of Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I 10 has consequences, but is not in
itself a violation of the law of armed conflict.
At this writing, the media are full of commentary on the release of 75,000 US military documents on the war in Afghanistan by WikiLeaks. Although much of the
commentary has focused on reports in the documents of Pakistan's Inter-Services
right

Intelligence Directorate assisting the Taliban in Afghanistan in their use of impro-

vised explosive devices (IEDs) against
alition forces, there are also
aerial drones.
lost

many

members of the Afghan government and co-

reports in the

documents of the

of

For example, one document reported that communications were

with a Reaper drone, armed with Hellfire missiles and 500-pound bombs, and

an F-15 fighter plane had to be ordered to shoot
Tajikistan. 11
casualties

At

it

before

it

crossed into

were never made public. 12

this writing there are also conflicting reports

ians, a

down

These documents also reportedly indicate that some reports of civilian

forces occurring

tion

fallibility

on

July 23, 2010 that

about an attack by coalition

Afghan sources claim

claim that has been denied by NATO

officials,

who

killed fifty- two civil-

stated that

an investiga-

NATO was conducting "has thus far revealed no evidence of civilians injured

or killed." 13

To be

sure, reports of large

numbers of civilians

are not something new. Indeed, tensions between the Karzai

US government

killed in Afghanistan

government and the

over civilian casualties allegedly caused by airstrikes have been a

long-standing problem. As

I

stated

on another occasion:

Although the law of armed conflict clearly prohibits an intentional direct attack against
the civilian population as such, and indeed categorizes

15

it

as a

war crime, "there can be

Mission Impossible? International

Law and the Changing Character of War

no assurance attacks against combatants and other military objectives will not
civilian casualties in or

known

result in

near such military objectives." In the latter case, the civilian ca-

damage" and do not give rise to accountability of the
government of Afghanistan, President Karzai
can order the complete cessation of airstrikes (he has done so on occasion), and as a
matter of international law, the United States and its allies are bound to comply even
sualties are

as "collateral

attacker. Nonetheless, as the sovereign

—

though such

airstrikes are a crucially

important factor in the battle against the Taliban,

and the Taliban regularly intermingle among the civilian population in order to use
them as human shields (itself a violation of the law of armed conflict) and then use civilian casualties as part of their war propaganda effort. In short, the Taliban has been
successfully engaging in so-called "lawfare," using false accusations of violations of the

jus in hello in order to

win public opinion to

their side.

14

Although the documents released by WikiLeaks apparently do not report the intentional targeting of civilians

they do "suggest that the

by CIA personnel

CIA has

in either Afghanistan or Pakistan,

sharply increased

its

use of paramilitary units in

Afghanistan, and provide details of unintended killings of civilians by Task Force

up to kill or capture militant leaders." 15 Such unintended killings do not constitute war crimes but they greatly undermine the war effort and increase the pressure on the Afghan government to prevent their recurrence, 16 as well
373, a secret unit set

as

provide material for the Taliban war propaganda

The

civilian status

of the

CIA drones

the air and missile warfare manual,

17

effort.

also has legal significance. Rule 17 (a) of

which, while

it

has no

official status, is

the

product of a team of experts on the law of armed conflict and has been well received

by governments, provides that only military aircraft are entitled to engage in armed
attacks.

There

is

no question that CIA drones are not military aircraft.

that rule 17 (a) of the
is

valid, the use

manual reflects customary international law.

It is

If this

arguable

argument

of CIA drones in an international armed conflict would be a viola-

tion of the customary law of armed conflict. 18

There

is

a serious issue, however, as to

an "international armed

conflict,"

whether the CIA drones are being used

in

because of the ambiguity of the concept as ap-

on the law of international
armed conflict, Yoram Dinstein defines an international armed conflict as limited
to conflicts "raging between two or more sovereign States." 19 As Dinstein acknowledges, however, "drawing a line of demarcation between inter-State and intrastate armed conflicts is not as simple as it appears to be at a cursory glance." 20 He
plied to current circumstances. In his leading treatise

points to Afghanistan in 2001 as an example. Prior to 2001 the Taliban regime

fought a long-standing

civil

tuted solely an internal

war with the Northern

armed

conflict. In 2001,

which because of its control over most of the

Alliance,

which

clearly consti-

however, the Taliban regime,

territory of Afghanistan constituted

the de facto government of Afghanistan, "got itself embroiled in an inter-State

16

war

John

F.

Murphy

with an American-led Coalition as a result of providing shelter and support to the

Al-Qaeda
11

who had launched

terrorists

September of that year

the notorious attack against the

US on

." 21
.

.

.

no longer the de facto
government of Afghanistan. Rather, the Karzai government is both the de facto
and de jure government of Afghanistan. For their part the Taliban are involved in
an insurgency against the Karzai government and use the FATA as a safe haven
from which their forces and Al-Qaeda forces launch cross-border attacks into Af-

Under current circumstances, however,

the Taliban are

ghanistan. Moreover, because of the deteriorating situation between the Taliban in

Pakistan and the Pakistan government,

it is

arguable that the Taliban in Pakistan

have launched an insurgency against the Pakistan government.
If this scenario

has

some plausibility, then some

further

comments by Dinstein

may be apposite:

A non-international armed conflict arising in State A may also have spillover horizonwithin a neighboring country (State B). ... In this scenario, insurgents

tal effects

Government of State A find temporary shelter within State B and ignite anGovernment of State B. As long as the two governments of States A and B (acting separately or in cooperation with each other) wage
hostilities against the insurgents, the two simultaneous conflicts
despite their crossborder effect remain non-international in character. But if the two Governments become embroiled in combat against each other, the armed conflict changes its character
and becomes inter-State. 22
against the

other "civil war," this time against the

—

—

One may

plausibly argue that Afghanistan

same position
noted further

as States

A

and B

and Pakistan

are currently in the

in Dinstein's hypothetical. If so,

it

needs to be

although there are tensions between the Pakistan and Karzai

that,

governments, there

is

no armed combat between them. It well may be,
both Afghanistan and Pakistan should be classified as

at present

then, that the conflicts in

non-international in character.
If it is correct to classify both

of these conflicts as non-international, the

tus of CIA personnel or of CIA drones

no counterpart

in the

Additional Protocol

I.

becomes

irrelevant. This

is

civil sta-

because there

is

law of non-international armed conflicts to Article 43(2) of

To the contrary, States often use their police and intelligence

services in the fight against rebels.

As

to the status of aircraft, rule 17 (a) of the air

and missile warfare manual's requirement that only military aircraft are entitled to
engage in armed attacks expressly does not apply to non-international armed
conflicts.

Parenthetically,

Court rejected the

may be noted that in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 23 the US Supreme
assertion by the US government that since Al-Qaeda was not a
it

17
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State

and had not accepted

ventions,

governed by the rules

set forth in the

"war on terror" was a non-international armed

that the so-called

Geneva Con-

could not invoke their protections. Rather, the Court held

its affiliates

therefore that at a

to be

Law and the Changing Character of War

conflict,

and

minimum Article 3, which is common to all the Geneva Conven-

tions, applies to the conflict

of international law

is

with Al-Qaeda. The validity of this holding as a matter

debatable, however, since, as Dinstein has argued, "from the

vantage point of international law ... a non-international armed conflict cannot
possibly assume global dimensions." 24 Michael Schmitt buttresses this conclusion

by noting that

Common

Article 3 itself defines the conflict to

which

it

applies as

"not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High

Contracting Parties." 25

Even the language Schmitt quotes from
subject to different interpretations.
ring only to "internal"

armed

Common Article 3, however, has been

On the one hand, it can be interpreted as refer-

conflicts, that

is,

civil

pears to be the interpretation Schmitt favors.
interpreted as referring
States.

more broadly

to

wars or insurgencies. This ap-

On

any armed

This appears to be the interpretation that the

the other hand,
conflict that

is

it

can be

not between

US Supreme Court in Hamdan

Under the latter approach the phrase means occurring in the territory of "at
26
least one of the High Contracting Parties."

favors.

These arguments favoring conflicting interpretations of

Common

Article 3,

while interesting, need not be resolved for purposes of resolving the issue of the
fect

of the CIA's civilian status, because neither interpretation would support the

proposition that the "war on terror"
then, the civilian status of the

use of drones

is

is

CIA is

an international armed conflict. In

irrelevant for determining

this case,

whether the CIA's

compatible with international law.

As Schmitt has noted, however, the Supreme Court

in

Hamdan

"neglected to

how it arrived at the determination that the 'war' with Al Qaeda qualified as

explain

an 'armed

conflict,' a

term of art

for applicability of the

Is

ef-

in the

law of war." 28

the United States Engaged in an

law of war" 27 and the "condition precedent

We now turn to this issue.

Armed Conflict with Al-Qaeda or Any

Other Militant or Terrorist Group?
Neither the Geneva Conventions nor Additional Protocol

an "armed

armed
graph

conflict." In contrast, Additional Protocol

of Article

contains a definition of

defines non-international

such a way as to sharply limit the scope of the Protocol. 29 Para-

conflicts in
1

II

I

1

of Additional Protocol

ered by Additional Protocol

I

and

18

II

applies to

all

armed

conflicts not cov-

R Murphy

John

which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible

command,

exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable

them to

carry

out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.

Paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol

II

then provides that "[t]this Protocol shall not

apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as

riots, isolated

sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being

and

armed

conflicts."

In the 1995 Tadic Interlocutory Appeal

on

Jurisdiction, 30 the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia addressed the preliminary issue of the

armed conflict in response to a contention by the defendant that
had been no active hostilities in the area of the alleged crimes at the relevant

existence of an

there
time:

whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends be-

[W]e find

that

an armed

conflict exists

yond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the
case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, internawhole territory of the warring States
the whole territory under the control of a party,

tional humanitarian law continues to apply in the
or, in the case

of internal conflicts,

whether or not actual combat takes place

there.

31

The question whether the US conflict with Al-Qaeda qualifies as an armed conflict is not easily answered. The only time this conflict could have qualified as an international armed conflict would have been when the United States invaded
Afghanistan in 2001 and then only to the extent that Al-Qaeda forces were integrated into the Taliban forces, the de facto army of Afghanistan. At present, as
noted previously, both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are fighting as insurgents in Afghanistan, and it is arguable that the conflict there now is an internal armed conflict. The conflict in Afghanistan may even be within the scope of Additional
Protocol II because arguably the Taliban and Al-Qaeda exercise such control over
parts of southern Afghanistan as to enable them "to carry out sustained and concerted military operations." These operations, the argument would continue, constitute "protracted" internal armed violence rather than just "isolated and
sporadic" armed violence.
Assuming arguendo the validity of these arguments, they do not pertain outside
of Afghanistan, and Al-Qaeda violence in other places would not seem to fall
within the scope of Additional Protocol II. It must be noted, however, that the
19
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United States

is

Law and

the

not a party to Additional Protocol

Changing Character of War
and

II,

it is

debatable whether

armed conflict is part of customary internasome commentators have argued that the law of armed

the Protocol's definition of an internal
tional law. Alternatively,

humanitarian law,

conflict, or international

maximum

to protect people to the
in a

way

that

gaps.

fills

They point

is

extent possible and thus should be interpreted
to the Appeals

Chamber

case to support the proposition that for purposes of
conflict" should be broadly interpreted to cover as

Even

the conflict between the United States

if

or terrorist groups

armed conflict,

it

is

body of doctrine that aims

a "living"

decision in the Tadic

Common

Article 3,

many people

"armed

as possible. 32

and Al-Qaeda and other militant

not an "armed conflict" within the meaning of the law of

does not necessarily follow that the drone attacks in Pakistan vio-

late international law.

As discussed

at

some length

in Professor Pedrozo's article,

the drone attacks in Pakistan are compatible with the United Nations Charter, specifically Article 2(4)

and

Article 51, as

an exercise of the right of self-defense. 33 For

my purposes, I will comment on only one aspect of the debate over self-defense: Article
51's

requirement that the use of armed force be in response to an armed attack. 34

The proper interpretation and application of Article 51 have been the subject of
much debate. 35 One of the most hotly debated issues has been whether Article 51
simply preserves the right of self-defense as

it

existed

under customary interna-

tional law prior to adoption of the Charter or places further limits

Prior to the adoption of the Charter, the test

most

cited

on

that right.

by the commentators

for

judging whether the use of force was justified as an act of self-defense was that of

US Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the
sity

of that self-defense

and no moment

The words

is

instant,

Caroline case,

i.e.,

whether the "neces-

overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,

for deliberation." 36

"if

an armed attack occurs" have raised the issue

Article 51 has limited the scope of the self-defense doctrine.

as to

whether

Some have argued that

the words should be read narrowly so as to eliminate the possibility of anticipatory
self-defense that other
criteria.

37

There

cause there

is

is

commentators have argued

no need

is

available

to try to resolve this debate for present purposes, be-

no doubt that US and coalition

forces have

and continuous armed attacks by Al-Qaeda and Taliban
and

under the Caroline

that the use of armed force in the

form of drones

is

been subject to numerous
forces based in the

necessary to try to prevent

the continuation of such attacks. Moreover, as President

Obama

the United States "cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists
38

known, and whose intentions are clear," because it
to win a conflict against insurgents if they are able
another country.

20

is

FATA

has recognized,

whose location

difficult, if

is

not impossible,

to retreat to a safe

haven in

John
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appears that the claim that the

CIA use of drones in Afghanistan

incompatible with international law

is

merely having the better

legal case in this

is

not well-founded. But

argument may constitute a pyrrhic

tory if the use of drones results in Al-Qaeda and the Taliban gaining

vic-

more popular

support in Afghanistan and Pakistan and increased recruits for their forces.
In his article Professor Pedrozo denies that the use of drones has resulted in

more popular support for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban or has in any way assisted AlQaeda recruitment efforts. To support his contention, Pedrozo points out that the
arguments of opponents are based on exaggerated civilian casualty figures and usefully notes the results

of various independent studies indicating, inter

alia, that

drone strikes have effectively impaired Al-Qaeda operations and have not aided Al-

Qaeda recruitment
Although the

efforts. 39

results of these studies are encouraging,

I

am

not entirely con-

vinced that they demonstrate the ineffectiveness of Al-Qaeda and Taliban propaganda. For example, although they demonstrate that civilian casualty figures are
exaggerated,

it is

not clear that this message

Afghan or Pakistani government

Muslim men who

or,

is

effectively bought

more important,

are the primary target of Al-Qaeda

home to either the

the large coterie of young

and Taliban propaganda.

who was in charge of US forces in Afghanistan
until he was removed by President Obama in June 2010 because of unacceptable
remarks made about the President's national security team to a journalist writing
General Stanley A. McChrystal,

for Rolling Stone magazine,

responded to pressure from the Karzai government

and human

who

rights advocates

claimed that

US drone and other armed attacks

were resulting in unacceptable numbers of Afghan
rective that placed significant restrictions

civilian deaths

by issuing

a di-

on US troops attacking people suspected

of being militants or destroying buildings used to harbor insurgents. Troops widely

complained that the

restrictions

exposed them to excess

risk

by limiting their

right

When General David H. Petraeus, who was appointed
to replace McChrystal, took over command of American and NATO forces on July
4, 2010, he was faced with a difficult choice. On the one hand, he was sensitive to
the need of his troops to protect themselves. On the other, the restrictions were reto use force in self-defense.

portedly popular with Afghan officials and
that the restrictions

had

is

expand

artillery strikes

on

rights advocates

led to a significant reduction in

At this writing Petraeus
restrictions

human

Afghan

who

claimed

civilian deaths. 40

new tactical directive that will
bombardment but clarify that

reportedly ready to issue a

and

aerial

troops have the right to self-defense. His goal will reportedly be to "persuade the
troops that the unpopular rules will pay off in trust

On

August

1,

won on

the ground." 41

2010, Petraeus distributed counterinsurgency guidelines to

troops. Reportedly, a large part of these guidelines, written
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information side of the war. For example, he writes, "Be

truth. Beat the insurgents

and malign actors

to the headlines."

declarations of success." "Strive to underpromise

go wrong, he says,

tell

the truth: "Avoid spinning,

first

with the

"Avoid premature

and overdeliver."

and don't try to

When

'dress up'

things

an ugly

situation.

Acknowledge setbacks and

then state

how we'll respond and what we've learned." "Live our values," he writes.

"This

is

including civilian casualties, and

failures,

what distinguishes us from our enemies." 42

As was the case when he was

in

command

of

General Petraeus has long understood that there
the conflict in Afghanistan,

that success

One hopes that this

political resolution.

in Afghanistan.

and

US and
is

coalition forces in Iraq,

no purely

military solution to

on the information

side

is

crucial to a

does not prove to be a mission impossible

43

Before turning away from drones to other examples of unmanned systems and

unmanned vehicles,

it

should be noted that on August

3,

2010, the American Civil

Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a suit in a US district
court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against alleged improper US govLiberties

legal representation. 44

ernmental interference with the right of

According to the

complaint, the plaintiffs were retained by Nasser Al-Aulaqi to provide legal representation in connection with the government's reported decision to add his son,

US citizen Anwar Al-Aulaqi, to its list of suspected terrorists approved for targeted
killings.

Regulations of the Office of Foreign Assets Control

for attorneys to provide legal services to

(OFAC) make it illegal

any individual whose

assets

blocked on the basis of his being a terrorist without a license from
absence of such a license
the plaintiffs to

file

it

a lawsuit

on Anwar Al-Aulaqi's
of his

US

legal representation to

father's behalf seeking to pro-

OFAC

an application to provide

Nasser al-Aulaqi as representative of the

al-Aulaqi,

who

remains in hiding" in Yemen. 45

refused to grant the requested license.

The

plaintiffs

interests of his son,

Anwar

that they have a First

In the

citizen son.

July 23, 2010, the plaintiffs submitted to

"uncompensated

OFAC.

would be a criminal offense under OFAC regulations for

tect the constitutional rights

On

have been

contend,

OFAC

among other things,

Amendment right to represent clients in litigation consistent

with their organizational missions.

Elsewhere in their complaint the plaintiffs

make it clear that they wish to "repre-

sent Nasser al-Aulaqi in connection with the government's reported decision to

add

his

plan to

On

son to
file

its list

of suspected terrorists approved for targeted killings" 46 and

a lawsuit to block the

August

30, 2010, the

government's plan.

American

Civil Liberties

Union and the Center

for

Constitutional Rights filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia on behalf of Nasser Al-Aulaqi, on his

22

own

behalf,

and

as

"Next
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Anwar Al-Aulaqi

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

47

US government. In particular, the plaintiff sought a declaration from
the court that the US Constitution and international law prohibit the government
against the

from
carrying out targeted killings outside of armed conflict except as a last resort to protect
against concrete, specific

and imminent threats of death or serious physical injury; and

an injunction prohibiting the targeted killing of US citizen Anwar Al-Aulaqi outside
narrow context. Plaintiff also sought an injunction requiring the government to
disclose the standards under which it determines whether US citizens can be targeted

this

for death.

48

The American
able to

file

Civil Liberties

Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights were

on Mr. Al-Aulaqi' s behalf because
earlier position, granted them a license

this lawsuit

ment, reversing

its

challenging the Treasury's regulations

is,

the Treasury Departto

at this writing, still

do

so.

pending.

The

lawsuit

49

On December 7, 2010, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
Nasser Al-Aulaqi's suit in an eighty- three-page opinion on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. 50
suit

The court ruled that the

plaintiff did

not have standing to bring the

and that the political question doctrine barred the court from considering the

merits of the plaintiffs

suit.

Other Unmanned Systems/Unmanned Vehicles: The Rise of Robotics
Most, some would say too much, of the present focus on the changing character of

weapon systems has been on drones.

arguable that drones are the tip of the ice-

It is

berg and that in the not too distant future they will be replaced by new technological

marvels created by the rising science of robotics. Because of the exponential

growth of robots and their use in armed

conflict, the line

between science and

sci-

ence fiction has become ever more blurred.

Although drones are unmanned
they are controlled by
least

human

UAVs, it is noteworthy that
many of them located in Nevada or at

aerial vehicles, or

operators,

—

normally they are controlled. As noted previously, one of the documents

re-

by WikiLeaks reported that communications were lost with a Reaper drone,
armed with Hellfire missiles and 500-pound bombs, in Afghanistan and it was nec-

leased

essary to order an F-15 fighter aircraft to shoot

it

down to prevent it from crossing

into Tajikistan. 51 There are other examples of military technology running

amok.

For example, in his groundbreaking book, Wired for War, P.W. Singer describes
the following incident:
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its
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morning on October

South African
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12, 2007, the 10th Anti-Aircraft

military's

Regiment

annual Seboka training exercise. The op-

some five-thousand troops from seventeen other units, so the preson to get everything right. But the unit's automated MK5 antiaircraft system,
sporting two 35 mm cannons linked up to a computer, appeared to jam. As a follow-up
report recounts, this apparently "caused a 'runaway.'" The description of what happened next is chilling. "There was nowhere to hide. The rogue gun began firing wildly,
spraying high-explosive shells at a rate of 550 a minute, swinging around through 360
eration involved

sure was

degrees like a high-pressure hose."

The young female officer in charge rushed forward to try to shut down the robotic gun,
computer gremlin had taken
over." The automated gun shot her and she collapsed to the ground. The gun's autoloading magazines held five hundred high-explosive rounds. By the time they were
emptied, nine soldiers were dead (including the officer) and fourteen seriously injured,
52
all because of what was later called a "software glitch."
but, continues the report, "she couldn't, because the

now

on
land, and in and under the sea. An early, and crucially important, use of robots on
land was as part of an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team that was responsible for disarming and disposing of IEDs. The robots involved in this exercise are
called PackBots. They have proven to be very efficient at their jobs, and as a team's
commander quoted by Singer reportedly put it, "when a robot dies, you don't have
As Singer's tour de force makes

clear,

robots are

operating in the

air,

to write a letter to his mother." 53

The use of robots has increased exponentially. For example, in Iraq in 2003,
when the US and coalition forces invaded, there were no robotic units on the
ground. By the end of 2005, they numbered 2,400, and by 2008, they were estimated to reach 1 2,000. 54 Initially, they were used for non-killing purposes, such as
disabling or destroying

IEDs or

drones, they have been used to

for surveillance, but increasingly, like the aerial

kill

enemies and destroy enemy property.

TALON is a robot used in Iraq as part of an EOD team. But its
Foster-Miller Inc., remodeled the TALON into a "killer app," the

For example, the
manufacturer,

Weapons Observation Reconnaissance Detection System, or SWORDS.
The new design allows soldiers to mount various weapons on the robot, including
Special

"an
is

M- 16 rifle, a machine gun, and a grenade or rocket launcher." Another example

the

MARCBOT

(Multi-Function Agile Remote-Controlled Robot). According

to Singer:

One of the smallest but most commonly used robots in
a toy truck with a video

camera mounted on a

$5,000, this miniscule bot

is

Iraq, the

MARCBOT looks like

tiny, antenna-like mast.

Costing only

used to scout for enemies and to search under cars for
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MARCBOT isn't just notable for its small size; it was the first
draw
blood in Iraq. One unit of U.S. soldiers jury-rigged their
ground robot to
MARCBOTs to carry Claymore anti-personnel mines. If they thought an insurgent was
hiding in an alley, they would send a MARCBOT down first and, if they found someone waiting in ambush, take him out with the Claymore. 55
hidden explosives. The

As Singer makes exhaustively clear, there are numerous kinds of military robots in
use, including those with the capacity to kill, on land, in the air, and on or under the
sea.

56

It is clear,

moreover, that their numbers

will

continue to increase. As Singer

notes,

[a]t

a congressional hearing on February 8, 2000,

robotics

on

the

"demand"

came together for military
Senator John Warner from Virginia, the powerful

side.

it

finally all

chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, laid down a gauntlet, mandating
into the Pentagon's budget that by 2010, one-third of all the aircraft designed to attack
behind enemy

lines

be unmanned, and that by 2015, one-third of all ground combat

57
vehicles be driverless.

After the Al-Qaeda terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, according to Singer, one
robotics executive was told by his Pentagon buyers that his

'em [robots]

as fast as

you can."

For purposes of legal analysis of the
in the future raise,
ries:

ety

company should "make

58

legal issues these robots currently or

Darren Stewart has usefully broken them down into two catego-

automated and autonomous. 59 "Automated" has been defined thus:

is

automated when

its

production

machines are given priority over
clearly

is

might

the situation envisaged

is

"[a] soci-

dominated by machines to the extent that

men in the performance of human tasks." 60 This
by Senator Warner's mandate

to the

Pentagon of

"Autonomous" is defined as "self-governing, independent." 61
The crucial difference between the two categories of robots would seem

2000.

that the

automated robots

are, at least theoretically, fully

to be

under the control of a hu-

man being, or to use the military term, there is a "human in the loop." By contrast,
autonomous robots are independent of human control and, some would argue,
because of artificial intelligence have become more

humans and,
sions in war.

as a result, are better positioned to

intelligent,

make

more capable than

crucial life-and-death deci-

62

The problem, as noted by Stewart, is that at present there are no autonomous
weapon systems in use, with the exception of one South Korean system used in the
demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas. 63 Hence, only the automated robots

currently raise issues of the legality of their use. For their part, possible legal issues

involving the use of autonomous robots are currently a matter of pure speculation.
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By definition, automated robots have a human in the loop who has the ultimate
responsibility for what the automated robot does. The human in the loop would
therefore have the responsibility to ensure that in selecting

its

targets a military kill-

ing robot adhered to the principles of the law of armed conflict, including military
necessity, proportionality
failure

and

distinction,

on the part of the robot

to

do

and would

so. It is

suffer the

consequences of a

important to note decisions to shoot

cannot be delegated to a computer.
Perhaps the most tragic example of a failure to rely on
than that of a computer, was the July
the

USS Vincennes

3,

human judgment,

1988 incident involving a patrol mission of

in the Persian Gulf.

On

that day the radar system of the

Vincennes, called Aegis, spotted Iran Air Flight 655, an Airbus passenger

on

a consistent course

rather

and speed and broadcasting a radar and radio

jet,

flying

signal that

The automated radar system of the Vincennes,
however, had been designed for use against attacking Soviet bombers in the open
ocean of the North Atlantic, not for dealing with skies crowded with civilian aircraft like those over the Gulf. The computer system assigned the plane an icon that
on the screen made it appear to be an Iranian F-14 fighter. Singer recounts the
tragic denouement of this incident:
showed

it

Though

to be a civilian aircraft.

the hard data were telling the

human crew that the plane wasn't

a fighter

they trusted the computer more. Aegis was in semi-automatic mode, giving

it

jet,

the least

amount of autonomy, but not one of the 18 sailors and officers in the command crew
challenged the computer's wisdom. They authorized it to fire. (That they even had the
authority to do so without seeking permission from more senior officers in the fleet, as
their counterparts on any other ship would have had to do, was itself a product of the
fact that the Navy had greater confidence in Aegis than in a human-crewed ship without it.) Only after the fact did the crew members realize that they had accidentally shot

down an

airliner, killing all

As Yoram Dinstein

290 passengers and crew, including 66 children. 64

notes, civilian airliners carrying civilian passengers are "sin-

gled out for special protection." 65

example of the

reality that "the

He

cites the

Vincennes incident, however, as an

speed of modern electronics often creates grave

problems of erroneous identification." 66 Singer adds, quoting retired Army colonel

Thomas Adams,

coming weapons "will be too fast, too small, too numerous, and will create an environment too complex for humans to direct." 67
If the "coming weapons" will be too complex for humans to direct, someone, or,
more precisely perhaps, something, will have to take over the job. Here we enter
into the murky world of artificial intelligence, or AI. And here also we move from
that the

automated robotics to autonomous robotics.
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however, debatable, to say the

least,

whether

artificial intelligence will

ever

on their own, such
proportionality and distinc-

progress to the point where robots will be in a position to apply,

of armed conflict as military necessity,

vital principles

tion.

The argument

against artificial intelligence ever progressing to this point

based, at least in part,

on the

possess, the capacity to

draw on

their

reality that robots lack the

make an empathic

moral sense that humans

response, and in general the ability to

humanity.

In his book, Singer quotes a senior military analyst at
leading
that

human

rights

Human

non-governmental organization, to

Rights Watch, a

illustrate the

would be caused by the complete absence of a human element

killing

is

problems

in the targeted

environment:

download international law into a computer. The situations are complicated; it goes beyond black-and-white decisions." He explains how figuring out legitimate military targets is getting more difficult in war, especially as conflict actors
increasingly fight in the midst of civilian areas like cities and even use civilians for

"You

can't just

cover. Citing examples he dealt with in his

a schoolyard,

is it

legitimate to strike?

group of children catch a ride

There

is

own career, he asks, if a tank is parked inside

How about if it is driving out of the village and a

on top? 68

also the tricky issue of accountability for

in his treatise,

"War

crimes, like

all

war crimes. As Dinstein notes

other international crimes, have two constitu-

ent elements: (a) the criminal act {acteus reus) and (b) a criminal intent or at least a

criminal consciousness (mens

red).'"

69

But a robot has no capacity for either a crim-

inal intent or a criminal consciousness.

Moreover, as a practical matter,

it

would

make no sense to apply criminal penalties to robots. Accordingly, even if the day
may come when it will be possible to have fully autonomous robots, it will still be
necessary to have a

human in the loop, at least in a position of command responsi-

would not be totally autonomous but
the commands of a human commander. As Dinstein has instructed:

bility.

In other words, the robots

A commander bears
subordinates to

subject to

criminal responsibility not only for orders that he issues to his

commit war crimes. He is answerable for his

as for his acts of commission.

These acts of omission

acts

of omission as

relate to failure

much

of proper supervi-

commander, designed to ensure that his subordinates do not perwar crimes on their own initiative. Of course, the same commander may be

sion and control by a
petrate

individually accountable twice: once for having given orders to his subordinates to

commit

certain

war crimes, and additionally for knowingly allowing them

other war crimes which go beyond those orders. 70
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To be sure, a commander would not be responsible for a robot deciding on its
own to commit a violation of the law of armed conflict, unless he or she was aware
that such violations

were taking place and was

the necessary effective

such violations.

might be

If

command and

in a position to take steps to exercise

control to prevent or at least bring to a halt

the robot's actions were caused by a design defect, the

a civil action in tort against the

remedy

manufacturer of the robot or perhaps the

software engineer involved in the manufacturing process rather than a criminal

proceeding. 71

II.

One

Challenges Posed by the Use of Force in Cyberspace

challenge posed by the use of force in cyberspace

issue arising out of the so-called

to apply, criminal law

war on

terror:

may be similar to a primary

what is the appropriate

and procedure or the law of armed

conflict?

72

legal

regime

In an essay,

"Computer Network Attacks by Terrorists: Some Legal Dimensions," published in
2002, 1 suggested that "the applicable legal regime becomes international criminal
law rather than provisions of the UN Charter governing the use of force and the
maintenance of international peace and security." 73 My conclusion at that time,
however, was premised on the assumption that the use of force in cyberspace did
not involve State sponsorship of the terrorist attack or any other kind of State in-

volvement

in the attack.

Recent developments

call

into question the validity of this

assumption.

To be

sure, another conclusion

I

reached in

my 2002

essay remains true today:

"may

cause disruption of vital systems

leading to widespread inconvenience, possibly to

some degree of public alarm, but

the majority of computer network attacks

...

do not

directly threaten life."

74

But recent computer network attacks have been

very disruptive indeed. For example, Google, the world's largest Internet search engine,

announced

in January

2010 that

it

had been targeted by hackers

that the attacks resulted in breaches of

its

security infrastructure

Google's intellectual property and other data.

75

What made

in 2009,

and

and

theft of

this attack especially

US government was that Google traced the attacks to hackers operating out of China. 76 Many have insinuated that the Chinese government particidisturbing for the

pated in the attacks, especially because the attacks included the hacking of e-mail

accounts belonging to Tibetan

human

rights activists

and journalists, 77 but there

is

no conclusive evidence of the Chinese government's involvement in the attacks.
China is not the only traditional economic and military adversary of the United
States that has
sia carried

been linked to cyber attacks in recent years. Hackers located in Rus-

out an attack on several of Estonia's government websites in 2007,

prompting many

to

conclude that the Russian government was either formally or

28

John

F.

Murphy

informally behind the attacks. 78

The attacks came in successive waves, first compromising the Estonian government sites, then infiltrating newspapers, television
stations, schools and banks within the country. 79 The Russian government denied
any involvement

in the cyber disruptions,

but the timing was very suspicious be-

cause the attacks occurred the same day that Estonia removed a Soviet- era war

monument from

the center of

its

capital city, Tallinn, a controversial

move

that

was preceded by months of diplomatic tensions between the two countries and
caused protestors in Moscow to stage several protests. 80 The Russian government

was again implicated
structure

in

computer

attacks in 2008

was barraged with "denial of service"

main governmental websites.

81

when

Georgia's Internet infra-

attacks that crippled

many

of

its

As the timing of the cyber attacks coincided exactly

with Russia's military incursion into Georgia, the Georgia government accused
Russia of carrying out the cyber attacks in coordination with

its

physical military

operations. 82

In addition to

US

businesses, vital

tacked in recent years.

computer network

83

US

national defense agencies have been at-

For example, the Department of Defense was the target of

attacks in 1998,

2003 and 2007, when

classified

information

84

The perpetrators of these attacks were deemed "unknown foreign intruders," but many commentators suggested the presence of Chinese or Russian
footprints, especially since these types of attacks on US national defense systems

was

stolen.

are thought to be possible only through foreign State participation. 85
It is,

however,

difficult to

what has engaged
stering

US

respond to cyber attacks when

in the attack.

it is

uncertain

who

or

Hence, the current emphasis appears to be on bol-

cyber security and protecting

US

infrastructure

from intrusions from

criminal hackers, State actors and terrorists. For example, President Barack

Obama

is

continuing to implement the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity

Initiative that
is

was created by the George W. Bush administration. 86 This program

intended to unify the efforts of various government agencies to protect

commercial and governmental cyber

security,

and increase our preparedness

for

potential attacks. Goals for this initiative include building an international frame-

work

to address

computer network

attacks

and the creation of an

identity

agement strategy that would balance the privacy and security

man-

interests

of

individual Internet users.

Despite these efforts, current evidence indicates that the United States
to the task of preventing or mitigating the

damage of a

large-scale

is

not up

computer

net-

work attack. In early 2010 the Pentagon conducted a simulated computer attack
aimed at paralyzing the country's power grids, communications systems and fi-

how the government might respond; the results were not
According to military officers who participated in the simulation,

nancial networks to see

encouraging.

87
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the

"enemy had

all

the advantages: stealth, anonymity

and

No

unpredictability." 88

one could pinpoint which country the attack originated from, thus eliminating the
possibility of

attack

any

retaliatory action,

and the

legal authorization to

was unclear because no one could determine

"if the attack

respond to the

was an

act of van-

dalism, an attempt at commercial theft, or a State-sponsored effort to cripple the

United
If,

States,

and

this

perhaps as a prelude to a conventional war." 89
a big

is

if, it

proves possible to prove that the cyber attack was State-

meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter may arise and, even if it amounts to an armed
attack, the kind of response that would meet the criteria of necessity and proporsponsored, the issue of whether

tionality could

bringing

be

difficult to

it

constituted an

"armed

determine. Presumably,

attack" within the

if

the attack resulted in

down power stations, refineries, banks and air traffic control systems with

resultant loss of

and property,

life

this

sent such destructive effect, the case

would

is less

constitute an

clear.

on Georgia there was no
if any,

lacuna, the Economist suggests that States start talking about
Internet. Talks have already begun, but

creates great instability

particularly

it is

not clear

To remedy this

arms control on the

how successful they will be. In

have tried to identify some of the dimensions of the problem:

In the introduction to this study,
life

loss

rules in cyberspace of

the kind that govern behavior, even warfare, in other domains." 91

I

but ab-

90

As the Economist has recently noted, "there are few,

another forum

attack,

In his article in this volume, Mi-

chael Schmitt has pointed out that in the cyber attack

of life or property.

armed

pronounced

complexity makes

it

it is

in

is

modern

some situations. The rapidity of change is
the technological and scientific arenas whose considerable

and even chaos

difficult for the

ample of this problem

suggested that the rapidity of change in
in

slow-moving treaty process to adapt.

the dispute between the United States

A recent ex-

and Russia over how to

counter cyberwar attacks that could wreak havoc on computer systems and the
Internet. Russia favors

an international treaty along the

lines

of those negotiated for

chemical weapons and has pushed hard for that approach. The United States, however,
argues that a treaty is unnecessary and instead advocates improved cooperation
international law enforcement groups. In the U.S. view,

if

among

these groups cooperate to

make cyberspace more secure against criminal intrusions, this will also make
cyberspace more secure against military campaigns. Trying to reach common ground
over an approach
against

American

is

complicated, given that a significant proportion of the attacks

targets are

coming from China and

Russia. Also, Russian calls for

broader international oversight of the Internet have met strong U.S. resistance to

agreements that would allow governments to censor the Internet because they would
provide cover for totalitarian regimes. The United States argues further that a treaty

would be

ineffective

because

it

can be impossible to determine

if

an Internet attack

originated from a government, a hacker loyal to that government, or a rogue acting

independently. The unique challenge of cyberspace
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deceptive attacks to which they cannot be linked. After computer attacks in Estonia in
April 2007

and

in the nation of Georgia in

August 2008, the Russian government de-

nied involvement and independent observers said the attacks could have been carried

out by nationalist sympathizers or by criminal gangs. Although the United States and
Russia have failed to reach agreement
tacks,

on

the proper approach to counter cyberwar at-

arms control experts say that major governments are reaching a point of no

re-

turn in heading off a cyberwar arms race. 92

The United States and Russia have been talking about the possibility of entering
into a bilateral agreement. Even if they are able to overcome the obstacles to reaching agreement between them, it is highly unlikely it would prove possible to conclude a global agreement. This

impossible to get agreement
the world

community on

is

because since the early 1990s

it

has proven almost

among the now almost two hundred member States of

global treaties to deal with the severest problems facing

humanity, such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, pandemics,
trade protectionism
ficulty,

'rules

and many more. 93 Perhaps

the Economist has suggested

reflecting

an awareness of this

"more modest accords, or even

dif-

just informal

of the road' that would raise the political cost of cyber-attacks." Examples

might include
a deal to prevent the crude "denial-of-service" assaults that brought

down

Estonian

and Georgian websites with a mass of bogus requests for information; NATO and the
European Union could make it clear that attacks in cyberspace, as in the real world, will
provoke a response; the UN or signatories of the Geneva Conventions could declare
that cyber-attacks on civilian facilities are, like physical attacks with bomb and bullet,
94
out of bounds in war

Whether these or other more "modest"
"legal"

steps

would be

effective or lead to formal,

arrangements to establish an arms control regime for cyberspace

is

debatable.

Moreover,

it is

important to recognize that although

terrorist

groups such as

Al-Qaeda are not thought to possess enough technological capability

at present

(without State support) to carry out a major cyber attack that would result in loss

of life and property,

such a threat.

95

it is

envisioned that within the next decade they could pose

Al-Qaeda and

its ilk,

of course, will not recognize the legitimacy of

either modest, informal or formal legal

regime for cyberspace. They also

will

arrangements to establish an arms control
enjoy certain advantages because of the

asymmetric nature of armed conflict in cyberspace. They
cyber attack from any place they

may

will

be able to launch a

be located while disguising their location

through various computer moves. Applying the principles of military necessity,
proportionality and distinction against terrorist cyber attacks will be especially
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when launching

attacks.

Secretary of Defense, recently pointed out

United States enjoy

in

Changing Character of War

may be even more heavily embedded

challenging since the terrorists

population than usual

the

William

Lynn

J.

in the civilian

III,

US Deputy

some of the advantages enemies of the

asymmetric cyber warfare:

The low cost of computing devices means that U.S.

adversaries

do not have to build ex-

pensive weapons, such as stealth fighters or aircraft carriers, to pose a significant threat

A dozen

to U.S. military capabilities.

determined computer programmers can,

if

they

find a vulnerability to exploit, threaten the United States' global logistics network, steal
its

operational plans, blind

weapons on

its

intelligence capabilities, or hinder

its

ability to deliver

Knowing this, many militaries are developing offensive capabilities
and more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to break

target.

in cyberspace,

into U.S. networks.

Some governments already have the capacity to disrupt elements of

the U.S. information infrastructure.

The Internet was designed to be collabohave low barriers to technological innovation;

In cyberspace, the offense has the upper hand.

and rapidly expandable and to
security and identity management were lower
rative

the U.S. government's ability to defend

its

priorities.

For these structural reasons,

networks always

lags

behind

its

adversaries'

networks' weaknesses. Adept programmers will find vulnerabiliand overcome security measures put in place to prevent intrusions. In an offensedominant environment, a fortress mentality will not work. The United States cannot
retreat behind a Maginot Line of firewalls or it will risk being overrun. Cyberwarfare is
like maneuver warfare, in that speed and agility matter most. To stay ahead of its pur96
suers, the United States must constantly adjust and improve its defenses.
ability to exploit U.S.

ties

Later in his essay

Lynn notes

that

it

be necessary to adopt a

will

deterrence, expresses doubts about the feasibility of traditional

and suggests the need

for a

new approach

Given these circumstances, deterrence

new approach

to

arms control regimes,

to international behavior in qi^erspace:

will necessarily

be based more on denying any

on imposing costs through retaliation. The challenge is to
make the defenses effective enough to deny an adversary the benefit of an attack despite
the strength of offensive tools in cyberspace. (Traditional arms regimes w ould likely
fail to deter cyberattacks because of the challenges of attribution, which make verification of compliance almost impossible. If there are to be international norms of behav-

benefit to attackers than

r

ior in cyberspace, they

may

health or law enforcement.)

In short the legal

sponding
success

is

have to follow a different model, such as that of public

97

and technological challenges the United

effectively to the

States faces in re-

asymmetric nature of cyber warfare are daunting, and

not assured. Meeting these challenges
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armed conflict,
offensive power of the US military that affords it such a marked advantage.

forces are forced to adopt a purely defensive posture. In traditional
it is

the

As the various panels

at the

warfare the United States,

conference demonstrated, however, in asymmetric

more

often than not, finds itself on the defensive.

The

and concluding, section of this article considers a few more dimensions of the
asymmetry problem and the impact they have on the chances of US forces succeednext,

ing in their mission.

III.

The Multifaceted Nature of Asymmetric Warfare

As Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg points out, 98 one of a number of possible definitions of asymmetric warfare is that it is warfare where one of the parties to

armed conflict tries to compensate for its perceived disadvantages vis-a-vis the
other party or parties by adopting methods and strategies that are clear violations
of the law of armed conflict, e.g., perfidy, suicide bombings and the use of human
the

shields, especially civilians.

fare

is

What is particularly disturbing about asymmetric war-

that violators of the law of armed conflict gain considerable military advan-

tage in

many

instances

by the adoption of such

tactics

because they can be

extremely effective in countering the normally vastly superior military capabilities
of the other party.

Both in Iraq and in Afghanistan the enemy consists of insurgents

who embed

themselves into the civilian populations, a clear violation of the law of armed conflict.

In Iraq a standard tactic of the insurgents was to use children as

in firefights with
ticle,

human shields

US and coalition forces. In Afghanistan, as noted earlier in this ar-

there have been sharp factual disputes between

NATO

and

local residents

over whether NATO air raids have resulted in civilian deaths, as alleged by the local
residents, or, as
fire

contended by NATO, in the deaths of insurgents

who had opened

on NATO forces before they were killed." Regardless of which side is correct in

this debate, the result

has been a substantial reduction in the number of airstrikes.

General Charles Dunlap, a retired

US Air Force judge advocate,

cision in Afghanistan to sharply reduce the
take.

He

contends that

"it is

number of airstrikes

regards the de-

as a serious mis-

often overlooked that during the surge [in Iraq],

thousands of insurgents were captured or killed by American special operation
forces

and airstrikes. I do believe, firmly, that the much-derided killing and captur-

ing actually was the key to success." 100 In support of his argument

Dunlap adds that

during the Iraq surge, airstrikes increased to

levels.

US

five

times previous

military officers in Afghanistan counter these arguments

special operations raids in

by claiming

that

2010 resulted in the deaths of hundreds of militant

leaders, while the restrictions

on airpower saved Afghan
33

lives

and improved
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government. Others argue that the Iraqis themselves were

relations with the

sponsible for the reduction of violence: Sunni insurgents

Qaeda, and Shiite militias
part,

who embraced

effect."

102

who oversaw

the training of the

during the surge, reportedly stated: "The decisiveness of the surge

came from an aggregate of factors
and

turned against Al-

a ceasefire with the Sunni. 101 For his

James Dubik, a retired lieutenant general

Iraqi military

who

re-

He

—more

like a

thunderstorm than a single cause

believes that General Petraeus will look for the

same aggregate

effect in Afghanistan.

In both Iraq

and Afghanistan, however,

as well as

wide conflict (no longer "war") with Al-Qaeda and
struggle for "hearts
cial

and minds"

And

importance.

more

generally in the world-

affiliated terrorist

or, if one prefers, the

groups, the

"propaganda war"

as indicated earlier in this article,

it

is

of cru-

appears that the

enemy

has been able to counter the advantages that the United States and

normally enjoy. Perhaps the most recent example of this

is

would

its allies

the apparent impact of

mosque should be permitted to be built in the vicinity of where the Twin Towers were destroyed on 9/1 1.
Some exceedingly inflammatory negative remarks about Islam made by some opponents of building the mosque in that vicinity have reportedly resulted in significant increases in the number of recruits for Al-Qaeda. The First Amendment
the current debate in the United States over whether a

protects such remarks, but unwittingly they constitute grist for Al-Qaeda's propa-

ganda
At

mill.

this writing, the

Afghan
cials,

officials

papers are

full

over the results of a

of still another dispute between

NATO airstrike.

103

NATO

and

According to Afghan

offi-

the airstrike hit the election convoy of an Afghan parliamentary candidate,

wounding him and killing as many as ten campaign aides. But the NATO version is
that the strike killed a senior militant leader.

who was

visiting

Afghanistan

at the time,

US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,

reportedly stated that the airstrike tar-

geted and killed a "very senior official" from the Islamic

or

IMU,

a militant

group the United

Movement of Uzbekistan,

States has designated as a terrorist organiza-

NATO officials said that the airstrike killed and injured up to twelve insurgents after NATO forces identified several armed men in a sedan that was part of a

tion. 104

six-car convoy.

Only the sedan was

hit,

they said.

There seems to be no current mechanism in Afghanistan for resolving these
putes over the results of
that, regardless

casualties are

airstrikes.

But there also seems to be

little

doubt

of their veracity, frequent reports of attacks resulting in civilian

undermining the counterinsurgency

tecting the population

Two

NATO

dis-

and shoring up support

effort,

for the

which

is

aimed

at

pro-

Afghan government.

loom large when one is considering the problem of civilian
deaths arising from the armed conflict in Afghanistan. The first, as noted before, is
other factors
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the difficulty in distinguishing between combatants
warfare.

The second,

it is

important to note,

ported that 70 percent of civilians
insurgents.

Yet

it is

who

is

and

civilians in

asymmetric

that the United Nations has re-

die in violence in Afghanistan are killed

by

105

always the United States and

NATO who

are

on the defensive when

claims of civilian casualties are raised. In his concluding remarks at the conference,

Yoram Dinstein deplored this constantly defensive posture. As he pointed out, the
enemy has successfully engaged in lawfare, the use and abuse of legal argument, to
leave the impression that the law of armed conflict demands there be no civilian
casualties. It

does not, of course, and this reality should be aggressively brought

home to the people of Afghanistan and elsewhere.
to

them that the enemy constantly engages

It

should also be brought

home

in lawless behavior and, as pointed out

by the United Nations, consistently kills its own civilians in armed conflict.
Dinstein's call for the United States and its allies to abandon their defensive posture
and take the offense
law of armed
their ilk

is

to demonstrate, stressing their

conflict, the lawlessness

compelling.

and

own efforts to comply with the

brutality of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban

and

106

The enemies in both Iraq and Afghanistan are insurgents, and the United States
and its allies are involved in counterinsurgency in both countries. General Petraeus
was in charge of the counterinsurgency in Iraq and has now assumed a similar role
in Afghanistan. He was, moreover, the primary architect of the 2006 U.S. Army/
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 107 The Manual, regarded as the
"bible" of counterinsurgency, raises the crucial issue of the time required for a

well-run counterinsurgency strategy to work. Sara Sewall, a former Pentagon

offi-

who wrote the introduction to the University of Chicago edition of the manual,
for one is skeptical that the US public will be willing to "supply greater concentracial

tions of forces, accept higher casualties,

fund serious nation-building and stay

many long years to conduct counterinsurgency by the book." 108 In light of current
developments, with the withdrawal of all US combat troops from Iraq amid indications that the Iraqi army and police may not be able to provide adequate security
on their own 109 and a plan to start withdrawing combat troops from Afghanistan
in the summer of 201 1, Sewall's skepticism would appear well justified.
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PART III
THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE
BATTLEFIELD: THE USE OF FORCE IN
CYBERSPACE

Ill

Cyber Attacks as "Force" under UN Charter
Article 2(4)

Matthew C. Waxman*

in Foreign
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn
a 2010
Inrevealed
that in 2008 the Department of Defense suffered "the most
article

Affairs,

significant

when a flash drive inserted into a US miliintroduced malicious software into US Central Com-

breach of U.S. military computers ever"
tary laptop surreptitiously

mand's

classified

government

is

and

unclassified

and

it is

extent

is

from intrusions and, potentially worse, disruptions and

developing

States in the digital age."

To what

1

developing defensive systems to protect military and civilian

electronic infrastructure
destruction,

computer systems. Lynn explains that the US

its

own

cyber- strategy "to defend the United

2

existing international law, including the

UN

Charter, ade-

quate to regulate cyber attacks and related offensive and defensive activities today

and in the future? By "cyber attacks" I mean
stroy

efforts to alter, disrupt,

degrade or de-

computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them. 3

This article examines one

slice

of that legal puzzle: the

UN Charter's prohibi-

tions of the threat or use of "force" contained in Article 2(4). 4

volume

Other writings in this

deal with questions such as Article 51's self-defense provisions

tions of State responsibility,

and regulations

and there

are other international legal prohibitions

that are relevant as well. But Article 2(4)

* Associate Professor

of Law, Columbia

and ques-

Law School.

is

a

good place

to start

—
Cyber Attacks as "Force" under

because

it

upon which most interna-

establishes or reflects foundational principles

tional law regulating international security

tacks are prohibited

the

UN Charter Article 2(4)

by Article 2(4) except

As

sits.

a general matter, military at-

when

in self-defense or

authorized by

UN Security Council. Also as a general matter, most economic and diplomatic

assaults or pressure,

even

if

they exact tremendous costs on a target State, are not

Where along the spectrum in between might cyber attacks
which have some attributes of military attacks and some attributes of non-military
barred in the same way.

pressure

—

Almost

lie?

a

decade ago, in a previous volume of

Dinstein observed of cyber attacks: "The novelty of a
always baffles statesmen and lawyers,
cal

innovation

ties that

there

no insuperable

international law to the novel

amining

weapon

—

many of whom are perplexed by technologi-

[A]fter a period of gestation,
is

Yoram
any weapon

this series, Professor

it

usually dawns

on belligerent par-

difficulty in applying the general principles
"5

weapon

of

This article takes up that claim in ex-

how US officials, scholars and policy experts have sought to adapt the UN

Charter's basic principles.

This analysis yields two descriptive insights.
ing (both inside

and outside the government)

"force" broadly

enough

to include

some

First, it

shows that American think-

inclines

toward reading prohibited

hostile actions that

might be carried out

with bits of data in cyberspace. Although not necessarily inconsistent with interpretations previously dominating

American thinking,

this recent inclination re-

away from the stricter readings of Article 2(4) and related principles
that the United States government defended in the past when it was often the
United States and its allies resisting efforts by some other States to read "force"
flects a shift

broadly or

flexibly.

Second, any legal line drawing with respect to force and modes of conflict has
distributive effects
tions.

on power, and

it is

therefore likely to be shaped

by power

rela-

Because States have different strategic cyber-capabilities and different vul-

nerabilities to those capabilities,

with regard to the

will

be difficult to reach international consensus

UN Charter's application to this problem.
Article 2(4)

Modern

it

legal regulation

specifically Article 2(4),

the

Meaning of "Force"

of force and conflict begins with the

which mandates that

their international relations
integrity or political

and

"[a] 11

UN

Members

Charter, and

shall refrain in

from the threat or use of force against the

independence of any

tent with the Purposes of the

state,

or in any other

United Nations."

6

manner

territorial

inconsis-

Article 51 then provides that

'[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or

44
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collective self-defense if

an armed attack occurs against a

Member

of the United

Nations." 7 Although significant debate exists about the scope of self-defensive
rights to resort to military force,

authorized under Article 51

With

is

it is

generally agreed that the use of military force

not prohibited under Article 2(4). 8

respect to offensive cyber-capabilities

and the

UN

Charter, then, these

provisions raise several major questions: In terms of Article 2(4), might a cyber
attack constitute a prohibited "use of force"? If so, might a cyber attack give rise to a
right to use military force in self- defensive response pursuant to the rights reserved
in Article 51? 9
this

The

latter

question

is

taken up in

more

another

detail in

volume, but because the two provisions operate in tandem

bear in

mind

article in

important to

it is

self-defense remedies here as well.

Global interconnectedness brought about through information technology
gives States

and non- State

weapon. Military defense

actors a powerful potential

networks can be remotely disabled or degraded. Flooding an Internet site, server or
router with data requests to overwhelm

of service" attacks

—can be used

capacity to function

its

to take

demonstrated by an attack on Estonia

down major

(a

—

so-called "denial

information networks, as

country especially reliant on Internet

communications) during 2007 diplomatic tensions with Russia. 10 Private-sector
networks can be

Some

infiltrated,

damaged or

destroyed. 11

experts speculate that the United States

is

heightened risk

at particularly

because of its tremendous economic and military dependency on networked infor-

mation technology. 12 As the Obama administration's 2010 National Security Strategy acknowledged,

[t]he very technologies that

empower

us to lead and create also

empower

those

who

[o]ur daily
would disrupt and destroy. They enable our military superiority, and
lives and public safety depend on power and electric grids, but potential adversaries
could use cyber vulnerabilities to disrupt them on a massive scale. 13
.

Such possibility that massive harm could be perpetrated
physical space, raises questions whether the
tions

and

authorities

.

.

in cyberspace, rather

than

UN Charter's foundational prohibi-

—which were drafted with conventional warfare

in

mind

apply or should apply to such conduct.

The dominant view in

the United States and

Article 2(4)'s prohibition of force

defense apply to military attacks or

among its

involving

and 42 authorize,

armed

has long been that

and the complementary Article 51

armed violence.

14

right of self-

The plain meaning of the text

supports this view, as do other structural aspects of the
Articles 41

allies

respectively, the Security

UN Charter. For example,

Council to take actions not

force and, only should those measures be inadequate, to escalate

45

Cyber Attacks as "Force" under

to

armed

UN Charter Article 2(4)

There are textual counterarguments, such

force.

specific limit to

"armed

as that Article 5 l's

more

attacks" suggests that drafters envisioned prohibited

"force" as a broader category not limited to particular methods, but the discussions

of means throughout the document suggests an intention to regulate armed force

more

than other instruments of power, and this narrow interpretation has

strictly

generally prevailed.

An

alternative view of Article 2(4) looks not at the instrument used but

pose and general

effect: that

it

prohibits coercion. Kinetic military force

is

its

pur-

but one

instrument of coercion, and often the easiest to observe. At various times some

—usually those of the developing world during the Cold War, the "Third
World" — have pushed the notion
"force" includes other forms of
States

or,

that

pressure,

such as political and economic coercion that threatens State autonomy.

15

During

the Charter's early years, debates similar to that over Article 2(4)'s definition of
"force" also played out in the

UN General Assembly over how to define prohibited

The United States and its Western allies pushed a narrow definition
of "aggression," focused on military attacks, while developing States advocated an
expansive definition to include other forms of coercion or economic pressure. 16 A
problem with the latter approach has always been the difficulty of drawing lines between unlawful coercion and lawful pressure, since coercion in a general sense is
"aggression."

ever-present in international affairs and a part of everyday inter-State relations. 17

A

third possible approach toward interpreting Article 2(4)

ples focuses

on the

violation

and defense of

and

related princi-

freedom from interference. Such an approach might

States' rights to

it

protects

tie

the con-

rights; specifically, that

cept of force to improper meddling or intrusion of the internal affairs of other
States, rather

than a narrow

set

of means. Again, during the Charter's early years

was often the Third World pushing
bly resolutions. 18 Aside

mine

mind

UN General Assem-

much

wider interpretation, though

this

approach

possible analogies of cyber attacks to other covert efforts to under-

political or

To whatever
the Cold

expressed in

from the weak textual support for this approach, pragmatic

considerations precluded the
brings to

this view, as

it

economic systems, such

extent Article 2(4)'s

as

propaganda

meaning was

settled

efforts.

and

stable

by the end of

War in favor of a narrow focus on military force, cyber warfare poses chal-

lenges

and

taking

down government or private computer systems share some similarities with

tests the Charter's

kinetic military force,
characteristics

bounds. Offensive cyber attack capabilities such as

economic coercion and subversion,

and are evolving

rapidly.

raises difficult line-drawing questions
legal strategy

The

yet also have

unique

possibility of cyber attacks therefore

and requires re-examination of previous US

toward Charter interpretation.
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Emergent US Interpretation

The examples of competing interpretations drawn from early legal debates over the
UN Charter are useful for two reasons. First, they help show that some fundamental issues

involved in current discussions of cyber attacks are not entirely

new

or

unique to cyber-technology. Modes and technologies of conflict change, and the
law adjusts with varying degrees of success to deal with them. Second, they high-

some subtle but important realignments of US legal- strategic interests.
The United States government has not articulated publicly a general position on
cyber attacks and Articles 2(4) and 51, though no doubt internally the US govern-

light

ment's actions are guided by extant legal determinations developed through inter-

agency deliberation. There

is,

in the

meantime, considerable

momentum among

American scholars and experts toward finding that some cyber attacks ought to

fall

within Article 2(4) 's prohibition on "force" or could constitute an "armed attack,"
insofar as those terms should be interpreted to cover attacks with features

and con-

sequences closely resembling conventional military attacks or kinetic force. The
National Research Council convened a committee to study cyber warfare.

cluded that cyber attacks should be judged under the
jus

ad helium principles by considering whether the

tamount

to a military attack.

19

It

con-

UN Charter and customary

effects

of cyber attacks are tan-

Michael Schmitt, in a seminal

article

on the

topic,

proposes that whether a cyber attack constitutes force depends on multiple factors
that characterize military attacks, including severity, immediacy, directness,

invasiveness, measurability

have proposed similar

come to

tests

and presumptive legitimacy. 20 Other
emphasizing

effects,

21

legal experts

and some policy experts have

similar conclusions in terms of US defensive doctrine against cyber attacks.

Richard Clarke, for example, proposes a doctrine of "cyber equivalency^ in which
cyber attacks are to be judged by their effects not their means. They would be

judged as

if

they were kinetic attacks, and

or other means."

may be responded to by kinetic attacks,

22

Statements by senior US government officials have either hinted that the United
States

would regard some cyber

attacks as prohibited force or declined to rule out

that possibility. In 1999, the Defense Department's Office of the General Counsel

produced an Assessment of International Legal
That report noted:
If we

Issues in Information Operations.

focused on the means used, we might conclude that electronic signals impercepti-

ble to

human

hand,

it

seems

senses don't closely resemble
likely that the international

bombs,

bullets or troops.

community will be more

consequences of a computer network attack than

47

its

mechanism. 23

On

the other

interested in the

Cyber Attacks as "Force" under

It

UN Charter Article 2(4)
armed

further suggested that cyber attacks could constitute

attacks giving rise to

24
the right of military self-defense.

US government

Recent statements by senior

officials

appear consistent with

2010 address, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared

that view. In a

tions to defend

US

inten-

cybersecurity in terms similar to those usually used to discuss

its

military security:

States, terrorists,

and those who would

States will protect

our networks.

.

.

.

act as their proxies

must know that the United

Countries or individuals that engage in cyber

at-

and international condemnation. In an interconnected
world, an attack on one nation's networks can be an attack on all. 25
tacks should face consequences

In testifying before the Senate committee considering his nomination to head

the

new Pentagon Cyber Command,

plained that "[t]here

is

no

Lieutenant General Keith Alexander ex-

international consensus

on

a precise definition of a use

of force, in or out of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations
ferent definitions,
force."

26

He went

and may apply different thresholds

for

may assert dif-

what constitutes

on, however, to suggest that "[i]f the President determines a

cyber event does meet the threshold of a use of force/armed attack, he

mine

that the activity

cising

response."

about

of such scope, duration, or intensity that

is

our right to self-defense and/or the
27

The United

may deter-

it

warrants exer-

initiation of hostilities as

an appropriate

Implicit here seems to be a notion that "force"

effects or

a use of

is,

to

some

extent,

consequences of hostile actions.

States

government probably prefers an effects-based or consequences-

based interpretation of "force" or "armed attack" with respect to cyber attacks for

what

it

prohibits, as well as for

for example,

what

it

does not prohibit. Under such an approach,

computer-based espionage, intelligence collection or perhaps even

preemptive cyber-operations to disable hostile systems would not constitute prohibited force,

because they do not produce direct or indirect destructive consequences

analogous to a military attack. 28 As former National Security Agency Director

Michael Hayden recently remarked, "Without going into great
actually pretty
also a reason

and

good

why

it

at [cyber-espionage]."

will

be

difficult for the

articulate clear legal positions

illicit

force:

29

detail,

Hayden's comment helps

we're

illustrate

United States government to develop

on what sorts of actions

in cyberspace constitute

because the key agencies have divergent policy priorities amid a rapidly

evolving strategic environment.
integrity of US military capabilities;

involving infiltration of foreign

Some

agencies are charged with protecting the

some are dedicated to intelligence collection, often
computer networks and information systems;

some prioritize protecting US civilian infrastructure, including the private sector's;

48
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and others

on transnational law enforcement and enhancing

are focused

These divergent policy

tional cooperation.

probably make

priorities

it

interna-

difficult to

on how broadly or narrowly to draw legal lines, whether to drive toward legal
clarity at all, and whether to engage publicly or diplomatically on these points.
agree

Challenges of Regulating Cyber-"Force"

Even if Article 2(4)
it

would prove

is

some forms of offensive cyber attacks,
apply and enforce that prohibition. The difficulties of

interpreted to prohibit

difficult to

regulating certain types of conflicts in earlier eras of

UN history help demonstrate

these challenges.

Thomas Franck assessed that rapid changes in the way conflict was waged had made its prohibitions
Lamenting

in 1970 the "death" of Article 2(4), Professor

of force obsolete. Whereas "[t]he great wars of the past, up to the time of the San
Francisco Conference, were generally initiated by organized incursions of large
military formations of

one

state

onto the territory of another, incursions usually

preceded by mobilization and massing of troops and underscored by formal declarations of war," Franck observed that

"[mjodern warfare

by-passed these Queensberry-like practices."

movements and coups

insurgencies, rebel

30

.

.

.

has inconveniently

Superpowers routinely supported

against States supporting the other

power with various forms of assistance, including arms. Small-scale wars and subversion and counter-subversion

waged through

local proxies

became a common

mode of superpower conflict, rather than direct, conventional military action. 31 The

UN Charter regime was

ill

equipped to handle conflict that unfolded in these ways.

modes of conflict had outstripped the UN Charter
impose costs on purported violators. Indeed, whatever costs

Franck's concern was that
regime's ability to
Article 2(4)

imposed on conventional military attacks across borders may even have

pushed antagonists toward other modes of conflict. In another volume of this

series

dedicated to what was often referred to as "low-intensity conflict," Alberto Coll

remarked

in 1995 that "[t]he high political, military,

and economic

risks increas-

ingly associated through the course of the twentieth century with open, conventional

war have led many

States

and non-State

violence as instruments of foreign policy."
"the low- intensity conflict scenario

of legitimacy (being

less

is

32

entities to shift to other

forms of

Robert Turner agreed, noting that

selected because

it

provides a colorable claim

obvious)." 33

Questions for conflict in cyberspace then follow: Can Article 2(4)'s constraints
adjust to cyber- capabilities in ways that differentiate
in

illicit

conduct from

legal,

and

ways that help impose costs for non-compliance? Can such interpretations com-

mand the respect of powerful actors

in the international system?

49
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Cyber Attacks as "Force" under

One reason why cyber attacks will be difficult to regulate is that the factual bases
for asserting a violation of 2(4)

51

—

will

—or

armed

a right of

be subject to great uncertainty and

self-defense

difficult to verify.

under

Some

Article

technologies

modes of conflict pose special challenges for international legal regulation because their attributes match poorly with the enforcement mechanisms, which
sometimes include formal processes like UN Security Council review but more ofor

ten involve decentralized assessment
tional bodies

and other

and evaluation by individual

influential international actors.

States, interna-

34

Those who study the problem of legally regulating cyber attacks usually point to
the tricky problem of attribution. That

is, it

will often

and accurately who launched or directed an

attack.

be difficult to discern quickly

35

The nature of electronic

in-

formational infrastructure and the limits of forensic capabilities are such that

may be

impossible

responsible.
identify

an

36

technically

to

link

an attack to the party ultimately

As Deputy Secretary Lynn put it,

Whereas

attack's perpetrator.

and time consuming to

"It is difficult

a missile

comes with

a return address, a

computer virus generally does not. The forensic work necessary
tacker

may take months,

Again, though, this

is

if

identification

is

possible at

all."

new problem

not an entirely

it

similar attribution issues arose in the context of

to identify

an

at-

37

for Article 2(4), because

Cold

War proxy

warfare and

low-intensity conflict. "The small-scale and diffuse but significant and frequent

new wars of insurgency have,"

explained Franck in 1970,

between aggression and

tions

self-defense,

"made

clear-cut distinc-

which are better adapted

to

conven-

tional military warfare, exceedingly difficult." 38 Furthermore, "[w]ith the hit-and-

run

tactics

of wars of national liberation, on the other hand,

to establish convincingly,

when
it."

39

or where the

often difficult even

a pattern of isolated, gradually cumulative events,

round began,

let

alone at whose instigation, or

who won

Unconventional warfare and support for insurgencies and counterinsurgen-

cies often
tile

first

from

it is

by design featured inconclusive evidence of foreign involvement or hos-

action,

and foreign

participation.

40

State antagonists

worked

to

mask, conceal or obscure their

This legal-factual murkiness helps explain why Article 2(4) seemed

form of conflict and why that mode of conflict
the Cold War antagonists: "The covert nature and

so impotent in addressing that
offered an appealing option to

elusive instrumentalities of unconventional warfare

make

under attack to identify the source of the threat and to
tional opinion."
difficult to

41

In other words, once conflict

rally

it

difficult for societies

domestic and interna-

was waged through proxies,

develop international consensus about the relevant

facts, let

it

was

alone legal

violation or justification.

Like proxy conflicts of the Cold War, but to a
is

likely to feature

ambiguous or disputed
50

much larger extent, cyber-conflict

facts

about what exactly occurred,

Matthew C. Waxman
including who committed the electronic intrusion or disruption, and

on whose beConsider again the case of Estonia, in which it took
half they were doing it.
months to compile still murky information about the source of attacks on Estonian
computer networks, and many key facts including ultimate responsibility for
directing or encouraging them
remain subject to debate. 43 Evidence of Russian
involvement was mostly circumstantial and Russian officials denied involvement. 44
42

—

—

There

is

also evidence suggesting that the Russian

non-government "patriotic hackers" to conduct

government may have encouraged

attacks,

and that other

countries, like

may be relying similarly on legions of quasi-private hackers.
The factual haze that plagued efforts to regulate Cold War proxy conflicts will be
45

China,

significantly exacerbated in the cyber-conflict context because of the greater ability

of participants to anonymize or

mask their

identities

and because actions

in cyber

warfare can be so decentralized and dispersed, and often conducted on private
infrastructure. 46
States

Even

if

forensic processes can trace a cyber attack to

its

source,

may be unable to publicize that information in a timely and convincing way,

especially

when

those States are likely to have strong incentive not to discuss the

technical details of informational security breaches or reveal their
to intruders.

47

own capabilities

These are among the reasons that the National Research Council

study concluded that "[wjhile in most conflicts, both sides claim that they are acting in self-defense, cyberconflicts are a particularly messy

and judge such claims."

domain

in

which

to air

48

Like unconventional conflicts of the Cold

War

but to an even greater degree,

or verifiable

may lack clearly discernable starting and end points or easily visible
actions and countermoves. This does not mean that drawing legal

boundaries

impossible.

cyber warfare

is

It

does suggest, however, that efforts to promote clear in-

ternational legal prohibitions, or the accretion of interpretive practice

command-

ing broad consensus, will likely be especially protracted and uncertain.

Power Relations and Regulating Cyber Attacks
The

early history of

and debates about

interpretations of the

UN

Article 2(4) also illustrate that

competing

Charter have always reflected allocations of power.

Those with more power have greater ability to promote through State practice their
preferred interpretation. Moreover, efforts to revise the legal rules
redistributive effects

on power, by

affecting the costs

and

may

have

benefits of using certain

capabilities.

As described above,

a fundamental dispute about Article 2(4) has

from the be-

ginning concerned the prohibition's breadth: does Article 2(4) ban military violence only, or does

it

also

ban other forms of coercion, including economic
51
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coercion? Although
2(4) prohibited a

weak

States of the developing

much broader category of coercion than just military force, 49 that

position never took hold.

The more

means and pushed by

military

world often argued that Article

restrictive interpretation generally

confined to

the United States largely prevailed.

This interpretation suited the United States well during most of the Charter's
history.

The

costs

it

placed on States of resorting

first

to conventional

were high, thereby generally helping to preserve

in a crisis

armed

force

territorial stability

prevent escalation. Meanwhile, the United States could build

its

and

defenses beneath

grow its economy and expand its influence, all
wield its tremendous economic and diplomatic power

the umbrella of nuclear deterrence,
the while relatively free to

without the fear of reciprocal coercion. 50
Against that historical backdrop, a reason that the United States has an interest

but

in regulating cyber attacks

why it will probably be difficult to do so through in-

ternational law, whether interpreting existing treaties or

new

agreements,

legal

(offensive

is

custom or negotiating

because the distribution of emerging cyber- capabilities

and defensive) and vulnerabilities

(in

well as ability to withstand or tolerate attacks)

terms of ability to block actions

may not correspond to the previous

composed of

or present distribution of power

as

older forms of military and

economic might.
Indeed,

some US

structure that

is

strengths rely on informational interconnectedness

global,

mostly private and rapidly evolving, but these strengths are

also therefore inextricably linked to

perts assess that the

some

United States

offensive capabilities,

52

emerging vulnerabilities. 51 Although many ex-

is

currently strong relative to others in terms of

several factors

make the United States

especially vul-

nerable to cyber attacks, including the extensive interconnectivity of

and

critical infrastructure

sector networks.

and infra-

and

its

political aversion to

its

military

heavy regulation of private-

53

Rapidly evolving cyber-capabilities have the potential to alter power balances

among

States because

some

have disproportionately large
bilities.

54

more vulnerable than others, and attacks could
impacts on some countries or their military capa-

are

Developing an offensive cyber warfare capability

than competing economically or militarily with
therefore not surprising to see

oping offensive cyber warfare

As

for other

some

ties, as
sia,

United States

as Russia

well as the degree to

for example, has

in light

be

less costly

stronger States. 55

power

It

is

devel-

56

and China, they may

strategic interests with respect to cyber warfare

differently than the

likely to

regional rogues or aspirants for

capabilities.

major powers, such

much

is

and possible

of their

own

calculate their

legal restrictions

capabilities

which international law constrains

on

it

and vulnerabili-

their actions. 57

Rus-

proposed to the United Nations a draft statement of principles

52

Matthew

C.

Waxman

would prohibit the development of cyber attack capabilities, but

that

time

it is

investing in the development of such tools.

58

Some analysts

in the

mean-

are therefore

skeptical of Russia's sincerity in proposing such agreements, especially given the
difficulties
ties as a

States,

of verification in this arena. 59 China likely sees cyber warfare capabili-

way of

equalizing the conventional military superiority of the United

and the extent to which public and private lines

in

China blur may provide

China additional advantages in the cyber- conflict realm. 60
Again, though, consideration of any proposed

UN Charter interpretation must

account for the processes by which the Charter
forced.

The

likely factual uncertainty

is

interpreted, applied

of alleged cyber attacks and the pressures to

launch responsive strokes more quickly than those

facts

can be resolved may require

urgent policy decision making amid legal ambiguity. The United States
relatively clear standards

some

may prefer

with respect to cyber-actions that have immediate de-

structive effects (at least clear

threats to

and en-

enough

to justify military responses or deterrent

same time

scenarios), while at the

it

may prefer some flexibility or

permissive vagueness with respect to intelligence collection or

some other

intru-

measures in cyberspace, so as not to seriously inhibit those

activities in

which

sive
it

holds comparative advantages.

61

Other

States,

however,

may

see benefits in a

mix of doctrinal line drawing and clarity, in some cases because they are
less constrained internally by law than the United States, or because they contemplate using a different mix of cyber-capabilities, or because they see themselves as
different

potential victims (or innocent bystanders) of actions in cyberspace that they

would hope

to paint legally

and diplomatically

as impermissible aggression.

US legal interpretations and declaratory postures may be seen as part of an effort to sustain a legal order that preserves US comIn this strategic context, emergent

parative advantages. In

some cyber

attacks

moving toward

by emphasizing

their

tary attacks, such interpretations help
costs of its use.

a view of Article 2(4) that

conventional mili-

to others,

At the same time, by casting that prohibition

cle 51, this interpretation
its

effects to

deny that arsenal

some circumstances help justify resort to
threatening

comparable

would prohibit
by

raising the

in terms that

would in

military force in self-defense under Arti-

lowers the costs to the United States of using or

vast military edge.

That any drawing or redrawing of legal lines creates

strategic

winners and losers

make it difficult to reach agreement on legal prohibitions, whether through interpretive evolution of the UN Charter or through new legal agreements. 62 Success

will

therefore depends

on the

ability

of proponents not only to articulate but to defend

those legal lines using various forms of influence. That

is,

the strength of a

new legal

regime to regulate cyber attacks will, as always, depend to a large extent on the
cation of power that cyber-technological developments are reshaping.

53

allo-
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Conclusion

As Professor Michael Reisman reminds
[international law

is still

(particularly for the

us,

which much lawmaking
by unilateral claim, whether

largely a decentralized process, in

most innovative matters)

is

initiated

Claims to change inherited security arrangements

explicit or behavioral.

.

.

.

ignite a

process of counterclaims, responses, replies, and rejoinders until stable expectations of
right behavior emerge.

It is

63

possible, but unlikely, that States will

soon come together and

clarify

through

new legal instruments the permissible bounds of actions in cyberspace. More likely
is

a slow accretion of interpretation as crises unfold

reflecting distributions of

power

in their content

Charter regime's contours around
analysis

is

be

that, to

effective, legal strategy

promote

strategy, including efforts to

and

new forms

intelligence capabilities

amid

and claims and counterclaims,
and

strength,

of conflict.

remold the

A policy upshot

UN

of this

must be integrated with cyber warfare

offensive, defensive, preemptive, deterrent

a security

environment that

is

evolving rapidly

and unpredictably.
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IV
Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and
Self-Defense

Sean Watts*
I.

Introduction

Department of Defense activated the US Cyber
May 2010, the United
InCommand,
consolidating leadership of
previously dispersed military orgaStates

1

six

nizations devoted to cyber operations.

2

To its supporters, Cyber Command repre-

sented a significant accomplishment as congressional misgivings

over the

command's mission, its effects on American citizens' privacy and ambiguous lim3
its on its authority had delayed activation for nearly a year.
These concerns featured prominently in the confirmation of Lieutenant General

Keith Alexander, the President's nominee to lead Cyber

interrogatories, the Senate
tial

mismatch between the

Armed
ability

Services

Committee

Command.

In written

asked, "Is there a substan-

of the United States to conduct operations in

cyberspace and the level of development of policies governing such operations?" 4

General Alexander's response identified a gap "between our technical capabilities
to conduct operations

and the governing laws

"Given current operations, there are
ern

DOD cyberspace operations."

&

Operational

Army Reserve.

.

.

However, he

sufficient law, policy,

and

later observed,

authorities to gov-

6

Law School; Assistant Department Chair, InternaLaw Department, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States

* Associate Professor, Creighton University

tional

." 5
.
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General Alexander's responses often struck such dissonant tones.
unclassified responses generally offered

little legal

reflection,

And while his

he commented in de-

on international self-defense law and cyber operations. 7 His responses portrayed existing law under the UN Charter as adequate to defend US interests from
tail

cyber attack. Further, he indicated the United States would evaluate threats and
tacks in the cyber

same

domain

exactly as

it

would

at-

in other security realms. 8 Yet, the

section of responses noted a lack of international legal consensus concerning

which cyber events

violate the prohibition

of self-defense, suggesting a
tional legal regime.

less

on the use of force or

than coherent structure to

this

activate the right

important interna-

9

Meanwhile, cyber attacks have rapidly migrated from the realm of tech-sawy

doomsayers to the forefront of national security consciousness. 10 One need no longer be an experienced
threat posed

by cyber

programmer or use much imagination

attacks. Incidents

to appreciate the

such as the disruptions experienced in Es-

tonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 provide concrete examples of practices, trends

and potential harm posed by future cyber
Similarly, cyber conflict theorists paint

events. 11

an increasingly lucid picture of the

egy and tactics that will inspire future attacks and shape defensive
strategy

is

efforts.

strat-

Cyber

evolving rapidly, as threat capabilities and tactics shift to exploit newly

discovered vulnerabilities. While defending against massive cyber catastrophes re-

mains a priority
that

for planners, a

growing contingent of cyber theorists concludes

campaigns of diffuse, low-intensity attacks

egy for cyber insurgents and State actors

alike.

offer

an increasingly effective

strat-

Operating below both the focus of

defensive schemes and the legal threshold of States' authority to respond with
force, low-intensity cyber attacks

may prove to be a future attack strategy of choice

in cyberspace.

The confluence of Cyber Command's

activation with publication of details of

recent cyber incidents, as well as insight into emerging cyber strategy, provides an

opportunity to
tional

critically evaluate

General Alexander's assessment of the interna-

law of self-defense as well as the overall significance of the events in Estonia

and Georgia.

Specifically,

it is

worthwhile to consider whether the bargain govern-

ing use of force reflected in the 1945
States today

and

UN Charter

for the future of cyberspace.

is

adequate for the threats facing

Put differently,

will the letter

of the

Charter's use-of- force regime operate as an effective regulation of States' efforts to

secure cyberspace from one another and from non-State threats?

This article argues that the above-mentioned developments in cyber conflict
will greatly strain the existing self-defense legal

work
First,

attacks

(CNA), such

as the Estonian

and Georgian

gaps in the law's response structure

60

regime and cast past computer net-

will

incidents, in a

new light.

prove highly susceptible to

Sean Watts

low-intensity cyber attacks, leaving victim States to chose between enduring

dam-

aging intrusions and disruptions or undertaking arguably unlawful unilateral responses. Second,

and

players, creating a

related,

CNA will produce

a significantly

expanded

cast of

complex and uncontrollable multipolar environment compris-

more States and non-State actors pursuing far more disparate interests than

ing far

CNA are unprecedented conflict levelers. CNA tech-

in previous security settings.

nology

is

inexpensive, easy to acquire

and

use,

and capable of masking

CNA permit otherwise weak States and actors to
low economic and security

commitment

challenge security

cost. Ultimately, these

developments

hegemony

on

restraints

at

will test States'

to the collective security arrangement of the Charter

accompanying

identity.

and

its

unilateral uses of force to a far greater extent than

previously experienced.
Efforts to prevent or defeat massive, debilitating

and resources. However,
of cyber

incidents represent aberrations

hostilities, exclusive legal attention to

placed. Accounting for

more

if such

—important

CNA surely warrant attention
from the majority

such catastrophes

and addressing low-intensity

CNA

to maintaining international order

and

is

surely mis-

are equally

—

if

not

a place for law in

securing cyberspace.

The inquiry begins with
II.

a snapshot of the law governing resort to self-defense.

Self-Defense under the

UN Charter

Legal accounts of self-defense doctrine vary greatly. Debates
anticipatory self-defense,
sal,

14

times

12

collective self-defense,
15

and burdens of proof
it

13

armed

on preemptive and

retribution or repri-

remain highly contentious and relevant to CNA. At

seems each examination of these self-defense subtopics generates

aspects as authors. This section will focus

cerning the doctrine of self-defense:

first,

on two

distinct

as

many

but related issues con-

the relevance of the right of self-defense

to interactions with non-State actors and, second, the threshold of "armed attack"

which

gives rise to the right to exercise self-defense.

The unsettled and evolving

nature of these issues will prevent a definitive account of either, yet will set the
stage for

an

illustration of how low-intensity

CNA may influence the development

of each.

Self-Defense against Non-State Actors

The

plainest

and most widely accepted understanding of the

trays self-defense as

force

by

States.

16

UN

Charter por-

an exception to the nearly comprehensive ban on the use of

by States in their
51 provides one of two enumerated

Article 2(4) forbids the threat or use of force

international relations.

17

Meanwhile, Article
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exceptions, permitting
to

"armed

attack."

tween States

is

18

Member States to take measures in self-defense in response

The relevance of the self-defense exception

obvious. If Article 2(4) regulates the use of force "in

and

tional relations"

most obviously

Article 51

is

.

.

.

interna-

intended as a legal exception, then the event that

activates the right

is

armed

attack

by other

traditionally capable of conducting international relations

Less clear, at least as a legal matter,
applies to

to interactions be-

how,

is

"armed attack" by non-State

if at all,

States, the

only entities

under the Charter. 19

the self-defense exception

actors. Traditionally,

law enforcement

models, not directly influenced by the Charter, have guided State responses to
non-State actors. 20 Yet current international and transnational security environ-

ments, shaped by a dramatic
actors,

21

While

rise in the destructive capacity

strongly suggest a role for self-defense

as a legal

beyond

interactions

UN Charter security regime

matter the

of violent non-State

is

between

States. 22

inapposite to State re-

sponses to non-State actors without links to State actors, such as attacks launched

from

such situations seem unlikely or

terra nullius or international waters,

exceedingly rare.

23

more

Far

based on or launched from

prevalent are hostile activities by non-State actors

UN Member

where the

States' sovereign territories,

Charter's use-of-force regime operates clearly in theory

if

not so clearly in prac-

tice.

A

Two

International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinions address self-defense

fractured

State actors

at least

and incomplete jurisprudence has emerged

to cover the issue.

and non-

under the Charter.

Confronted by decades of attacks from outside

its

territory, Israel, in 2002, be-

gan work on a 450-mile barrier comprised alternately of concrete

walls, fencing,

wire and electronic sensors. 24 Encroaching on Palestinian territory, the barrier
greatly restricted vehicle

and pedestrian

traffic.

In

its filings

for the

2004 Wall advi-

on Palestinian territory as an
The argument was consistent with prior

sory opinion, Israel justified construction of the wall
exercise of self-defense
Israeli assertions to

under Article

51.

25

the General Assembly that self-defense included "the right of

States to use force in self-defence against terrorist attacks." 26

In a split decision, the Court rejected the Israeli claim.
cle 51

had "no relevance"

The advisory opinion

is

The Court

asserted Arti-

27
to interactions with non-State actors such as Palestine.

nearly

summary in

this regard,

providing no interpretive

support, citations to travaux preparatories or examples of State practice.
also left
text

The Court

unaddressed a point raised in Judge Higgins's separate opinion that the

of Article 5 1 does not include any indication "that self-defense

when armed

attack

is

made by a

State."

28

only available

In his declaration, Judge Buergenthal ex-

pressed similar objection to the Court's opinion.

quate weight to the

is

fact the attacks originated

international legal status of that territory.

29
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He argued the Court gave inade-

outside Israeli borders, whatever the
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Further criticism of the advisory opinion 30 focused on the Court's failure to
consider State practice since adoption of the Charter. 31 States have routinely in-

voked self-defense doctrine, and
against non-State actors. Several
resort to

Article 51 specifically, to justify the use of force

commentators have catalogued States' post-Charter

measures in self-defense against non-State actors, including actions taken

by the United States, Israel, Portugal, Russia, Ethiopia and South Africa. 32 These
accounts, and Security Council reactions thereto, paint a portrait of self-defense far

more relevant to efforts against hostile non-State actors. 33
The majority of State practice cited in opposition to

the Wall Court's

work

showcases measures of self-defense alleging varying degrees of host-State support
to the attacking non-State actor. Yet not all

purported exercises of self-defense have

included such links. In 1976, a series of South African intrusions into the territory
of neighboring States to pursue non- State actors were distinct from other exercises

South Africa asserted a right of self-defense absent such

in this important respect.
State involvement.

34

The South African government conceded that the States from

which rebels operated were not complicit; however,
sions as justified in self-defense to continue

Security Council

"hot pursuit"

37

condemned 36 South

its

it

defended its territorial intru-

pursuit of rebel forces. 35 While the

Africa's acts

theory of self-defense, disapproval

and appeared

may be

to

denounce the

attributable in greater

part to the racist policies underlying these measures than to the legality of the

theory

itself.

Ultimately, the
self-defense with

most convincing

its critics'

situation involved

effort to reconcile the

Wall Court's account of

competing claims emphasizes that the

no transnational

interactions.

That

is,

Israeli- Palestinian

owing to

Palestine's fail-

ure to attain statehood, the Wall advisory opinion might be read not to reach the

armed

sue of valid State responses to non-State actors'

another State's territory.

One might then plausibly cabin the opinion to

not involving State actors or their

territories, leaving

self-defense against non-State actors operating
critique persists that a stronger analytical effort
tive legal

attacks that originate

open the

is-

from

situations

issue of exercises of

from sovereign

by the Court to

territory.

Yet the

identify the opera-

framework would have included an exploration of customary norms

reg-

ulating the exercise of self-defense against purely non-State actors.

Only a year after the Wall advisory opinion, the ICJ had an opportunity to revisit
and clarify the issue of transnational self-defense against non-State actors. In

Armed Activities on

the Territory of the Congo,

tions against rebel groups operating

Congo (DRC). 38 Uganda

offered

Uganda defended its

military opera-

from eastern Democratic Republic of the

two justifications

for the attacks,

both grounded

DRC support for anti-Ugandan rebels triggered
Uganda's right of self-defense, including the use of force on DRC territory. Second,
in self-defense. First,

it

argued that

63
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and

alternatively,

Uganda argued

from which anti-Ugandan
defense on

DRC territory.

that the

DRC's

inability to control the territory

Ugandan measures in selfthe Ugandan claims were not

rebels operated permitted

39

Thus

in

some

respects,

unlike the earlier South African arguments rejected by the Security Council.
Surprisingly, the

Armed

Activities

Court did not rule on the lawfulness of

Uganda's self-defense against non-State

actors. Instead, the

Court declined to ac-

cept Uganda's characterization of the operations as defensive in nature, noting that

and scope what would have been necessary to
counter the rebel threat. 40 Curiously, the Court skipped over the traditional threshthe invasion far exceeded in scale

old analysis of whether the right to self-defense had been activated, reaching instead the issue of whether the use of force in question constituted a proportionate

response.

Thus the

in the context

case

left

unaddressed the issue of States exercising self-defense

of transnational operations against non-State actors.

Once again,

the Court attracted criticism for

of self-defense against non-State actors.

should have used the

41

Armed Activities case

its

failure to elaborate

on

the issue

In particular, critics argued the Court
to better explain

how self-defense doc-

To some members

trine relates to issues of State responsibility generally.

of the

Court, the opinion missed an opportunity to clarify the distinct but related stan-

dard of State responsibility for non-State actors' conduct within sovereign
tory, a

matter

self-defense.

left

terri-

uncertain by a prior decision but closely related to the exercise of

42

In 1986, the Court's Nicaragua judgment

announced

a standard for attributing

non-State actors' conduct to States for purposes of self-defense. 43 The Nicaragua

Court ruled that

armed

States exerting "effective control" over non-State actors

attacks within or

from victim

self-defense

from

their territories

States. 44

able limit

on

States' exercise

were subject to lawful measures in

However, the Nicaragua

dard did not fare well in practice, leaving too
of self-defense.

launching

effective control stan-

much ambiguity to operate as a work-

45

Later, a separate

UN-created court,

competing standard for State responsibility. The Armed Activities judgment, however, did little to clarify or adapt the Nicaragua standard. The case offers no
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, offered a
46

substantive clarity concerning the level of State support for hostile non-State actors
that

would

give rise to a lawful exercise of self-defense

Critics of the

by a victim

State.

Armed Activities decision also point to evidence of States' views on

Many regard the Security Council resolutions and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response to the 9/11
self-defense in response to non-State actors.

terrorist attacks

on the United States as authoritative in

ably sufficient in intensity

and

effect to qualify as

prompted both the Security Council and

this respect.

armed

attacks,

48

47

Unquestion-

the 9/11 attacks

NATO explicitly to recite Charter-based
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self-defense as a lawful response.

Condemning

terrorism, as well as threats to international peace

Resolutions 1368

49

and 1373

50

the attacks as international

and

security,

each reaffirmed the United

UN Security Council

States' right to exercise

Recalling efforts to muster Security Council support, William

self-defense.

Howard Taft IV, then

State

culty in establishing that

Department Legal Adviser,

we had

first

"[We] had no

diffi-

a right to use force in self-defense against Al-

Qaeda and any government supporting
voked, for the

recalls,

it."

51

With

similar dispatch,

NATO

in-

time, Article 5 of its organizing treaty with references to collec-

tive self-defense, as well as the

UN Charter self-defense regime. 52 The legal effect of

invoking Article 5 was to regard 9/ 1 1 as an attack upon all NATO

member States. 53

Clearer political statements in favor of applying self-defense doctrine to attacks

by non-State actors are
rity

difficult to

imagine. Scholars have seized on the 9/11 Secu-

Council resolutions in particular as definitive State support for the exercise of

self-defense

under the Charter against non-State

actors. 54

Yet the legal import of the 9/11 political responses is debatable. 55 Security Council

resolutions undoubtedly wield legal force.

to carry out the provisions of resolutions.

fluence

56

and shape legal doctrine or operate

tionable.

57

Under

the Charter, States are

bound

However, the extent to which they in-

as

independent legal precedent is ques-

On one hand, Security Council voting presents States an opportunity to

voice positions concerning resort to self-defense. 58 Discussion preceding votes
resolutions frequently generates detailed expression of opinio juris

on

on

issues con-

cerning resort to self-defense. 59

On the other hand, debate and voting are axiomatically political manifestations,
reflecting

economic, security and strategic

principled legal thought.

Use or

threat of the veto

much

as deliberate

and

by permanent members

fre-

self-interest as

quently prevents resolutions from reflecting comprehensive, majority State views

on legal issues. Further undermining claims to status as law, Security Council practice with respect to self-defense lacks uniformity or regard for precedent. Examining Security Council self-defense practice, Professor Franck identified strong
patterns of inconsistency. 60 Franck observes,

has tended to be

"The actual practice of the UN organs

more calibrated, manifesting a situational ethic rather than doctri-

naire consistency either prohibiting or permitting

all

[self-defense] actions." 61

As promised, the picture of self-defense against non-State actors remains cloudy
despite codified law,

abundant

State rhetoric

and significant proliferation

in attacks.

The ICJ seized neither of two recent opportunities to elaborate on the conditions
under which self-defense operates in States' interactions with non-State actors.
Nor did the Court on either occasion see fit to account for widely recognized State
practice in the area. Thus, a widening

rift

65

has

become apparent between

positive
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law and the Court's work on the one hand and State practice on the other. Unfortunately, this

ambiguity

is

not unique to the issue.

The Threshold of "Armed Attack"
The UN Charter identifies "armed attack"
States' right

dicate the
still

of self-defense.

62

as the event

gives rise to

Member

Accounts of the Charter's diplomatic conference

term provoked considerable back-channel maneuvering.

subject to substantial interpretation, the term

fer a

which

"armed attack"

63

in-

Although

thought to of-

is

comparative advantage over vague customary notions of self-defense. In the

words of Professor Stone, "armed attack"

phenomenon
The

against

which

[the victim State] reacts."

prevailing view characterizes

"an observable

at least limits reference to

armed

64

attacks as a subset of violent acts

within a broader grouping of acts that qualify as uses of force. 65

Though perhaps

tempting, drawing precise parallels between the Article 2(4) prohibition on "use

of force" and the Article 5 1 threshold of "armed attack"

"armed" appears intended

Mere coercion does not
qualify as uses of force.

is

to eliminate lower levels of force

activate the right of self-defense,

68

flawed. 66

Classically understood,

"armed

67

The modifier

from consideration.

if

such

activities

attack" envisions uses of

force producing destruction to property or lethal force against persons. 69
fessor Stone asserts, the

sors

term

self-defense to excuse offensive operations. 70

Graphically portrayed, one might imagine a

compassing uses of force and a smaller
all

the level

As Pro-

also ensures a level of definition to prevent aggres-

from fraudulently pleading

Thus,

even

Venn diagram with

circle

a large circle en-

within representing armed attacks.

armed attacks constitute uses of force, whereas not all uses of force rise to
of armed attack.

Again, the ICJ has weighed

in.

In the Nicaragua case, the Court suggested the

threshold of armed attack involved not merely destruction or invasion but also

consideration of "scale and effects." 71 In addition to

armed invasion by regular
forces, the Court observed, "the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State" to conduct similar armed activities would classify as an
armed attack. 72 It is important to note that the Court did not examine instances
where such bands carried out

activities

not involving arms or failing to produce

destructive consequences usually associated with

distinguished invasions from

weapons or

logistical

mere

armed activity. Rather,

assistance "in the

or other support."

73

the Court

form of the provision of

While conceding that such

activities

perhaps constituted a threat or use of force, perhaps implicating Article 2(4), the

Court concluded routine
right of self-defense.

logistical activities

74

66

would generally not

give rise to the
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The

practical significance of the Charter's

—and the Court's—

tween mere uses of force and more extreme armed attacks
structure.

75

The

is

distinction be-

a gap in response

plainest understanding of the distinction concludes that while

may respond to armed attacks with force, including armed measures of
self-defense, States may not respond with armed violence or even force to mere
States

uses of force. That
force

is,

the Charter's Article 2(4) general prohibition

by States continues

on the use of
an un-

to operate, even against States that have suffered

lawful threat or use of force.

Only armed

attack frees a State

from the prohibition

on the use of force. In this respect, Article 51 operates as an incomplete exception
to the prohibition on the use of force. The prevailing view holds that the Charter
permits States to respond to mere uses of force only with measures of self-help
not themselves rising to a use of force. 76 Thus the Charter reserves reciprocal uses
of force in response to mere violations of Article 2(4) short of armed attack to the
Security Council's response regime. 77

While seemingly a sound textual interpretation, the gap has not aged well. Certainly,

removing

States' authority to

most serious and violent events

is

respond with unilateral force to

in keeping with the spirit

all

but the

and intent of the

Dumbarton Oaks drafting conference of 1945. Yet time and events have proved the
Security Council unable to respond to

many

apparent violations of Article 2(4),

leaving victims of acts falling within the gap either hostage to the flawed Security

Council regime or faced with violating the letter and spirit of the Charter. 78 The gap
proves particularly troubling to States underrepresented, either themselves or by
allies, at

the Security Council.

The recurring

issue of so-called frontier incidents

and

self-defense illustrates

well the contours of the ICJ's struggle to reconcile practice with text. Typically,
frontier incidents are small-scale skirmishes of limited duration

between

States'

armed forces. Christine Gray describes frontier incidents as "the most common
form of force between States." 79 The ICJ has endorsed the legal concept of a frontier incident as falling short of "armed attack." In the same passage of the Nicaragua case cited above to describe the intensity element of "armed attack," the Court
distinguished an armed attack from "a mere frontier incident." 80 Yet the Court offered almost no elaboration and did not revisit the issue in its factual examination
of the parties' respective territorial violations. Critics of the frontier-incident distinction disparage
flict."

81

Still,

its

apparent toleration of "protracted and low-intensity con-

there are signs that important State actors accept frontier incidents as

part of the spectrum of uses of force outside

armed

attack

and thus not giving

to a broader exercise of self-defense, confirming the Charter's response gap.

The gap theory

is

rise

82

not a universally held view. 83 In a separate opinion to the Oil

Platforms judgment, Judge

Simma called the gap theory into
67

question. 84

He posited
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that lawful responses to

armed

force should generally track the acts that provoke

them. While he agreed that only force amounting to armed attack opened the

door to full-fledged

armed

force short of
self-defence."

self-defense,

85

he argued that States are permitted to respond to

attack with "defensive military action 'short

In

Simma advocated a spectrum

of proportional-

Ugandan operations in Armed
Judge Simma would seemingly supplant the Charter's "armed attack"

some ways

Activities,

full-scale

Rather than embrace the gap theory's all-or-nothing approach to

defensive responses to force, Judge
ity.

of

like the

Court's approach to the

threshold with a floating scale of proportionality of action in States' international
relations. It

seems

his standard

is

force matches the intensity, scale
terestingly, a passage of the

satisfied so

long as a State's response to a use of

and duration of the force suffered

initially.

In-

Nicaragua case seems to reinforce Judge Simma's

view, supporting proportionate countermeasures in response to uses of force not

amounting

to

armed

attack. 86

A further response to the gap attempts to shrink the conceptual space between
the use of force

and armed attack by simultaneously

raising the threshold of acts

qualifying as uses of force under Article 2(4), while lowering the bar for acts quali-

armed

fying as

Venn diagram,

attack
this

under

Article 51. 87 Returning to the previously

approach would shrink the

while expanding the circle representing
mize,

if

armed

circle representing

attack.

imagined

use of force

Such understandings mini-

not eliminate, the situations in which States are unable to respond to uses

of force unilaterally while greatly increasing the realm of situations in which they

may employ force

in self-defense.

The gap-shrinking

and Judge Simma's approach may be

effort

to sustain the relevance of the Charter to

modern

useful as efforts

international relations. Casual

reviews of State practice seem to support them. Yet gap shrinking surely demands a
better explanation of the distinct phrasing of the Charter's respective articles.

ultimately, in

some

terpretive debate

sense, the gap-shrinking

approach appears merely to

And

shift in-

back to the meaning of the term "armed attack."

makes no contribution to resolving the persistent amsurrounding "armed attack," namely the intensity, duration and scope

In this way, gap shrinking
biguities

components of the term. And while Judge Simma's approach appeals to intuitive
senses of equity and self-preservation, it is similarly difficult to reconcile with the
letter

of the Charter's concessions of sovereignty, no matter their practical flaws.

Despite their utilitarian merits, neither approach
ter

is

particularly satisfying as a mat-

of textual interpretation, setting up a conflict between principled interpretation

and

realistic practice in the

law of self-defense.

Ultimately, perhaps even

amount of sympathy for views

committed

positivists

must entertain

a

certain

that tolerate a broader range of coercive or forceful

68
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responses from State victims of unlawful uses of force.

New operational norms, not

precisely consistent with the formal security regime of the Charter,

emerged through subsequent State practice.
a

commercial contract but a constitution."

is

appropriate, just as

it is

It

88

may

have

has been argued, "The Charter is not

But surely some

surely true that the bargain struck

level

of determinism

by States through the

Charter reflected meaningful cessions of sovereignty.
Bearing in

meanwhile

mind

the contestable legal issues in self-defense, what

is

happening

in cyber conflict?

The Estonian and Georgian Incidents

III.

CNA practices and their past infre-

Because of the highly classified nature of States'

quency, the earliest legal analyses of CNA resorted to hypothetical or speculative
events. Considering

how

few practical examples these writers had to work with,

early forecasts of the operation of self-defense in

nonetheless impressive.

89

Examples of

CNA

CNA,

if

partly speculative, are

have since proliferated, providing

ready grist for the mills of cyber security and cyber law analysts

alike. Details

of two

recent events in particular, the 2007 Estonian and 2008 Georgian cyber incidents,

have guided a great deal of discussion and policy.
Estonia 2007
In April of 2007, after relocating a Soviet-era

prominent place in the
violent protests

websites.
to

II

memorial from

(DDoS)

attacks swept Estonian

Lasting approximately one month, the

a series of distributed

government and banking

DDoS 92 attacks prevented access

and defaced government websites and halted government e-mail

DDoS

its

capital city of Tallinn, Estonia suffered uncharacteristically

by ethnic Russians. 90 Immediately afterward,

denial of service
91

World War

attacks also interrupted Estonian Internet

traffic.

93

The

banking for portions of several

business days.

The perpetrators of the DDoS attacks found a target-rich environment in Estonia.

More than any other nation of its size, Estonia reflects an information systems society.

94

Wireless Internet, e-banking and web-based government services

Estonia. Internet access
tory.

95

is

in

available in a remarkable 98 percent of Estonian terri-

Home to the popular web-based voice call service Skype, Estonia boasts high

rates of personal Internet usage

duct Internet elections.

government
At

abound

its

e-services.

outset, the

96

and claims

to have

been the

first

Over 500,000 people, nearly half its

country to con-

citizens,

have used

97

2007 Estonian event generated strong emotional reactions. Es-

tonian politicians immediately compared the incident to an invasion and to

69
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conventional military

activity.

98

However, quickly after the true nature of the

inci-

dent became apparent, Estonian authorities realized that by accepted metrics the

amount to armed attack. Although widespread within Estonia and of
month's duration, the event produced chiefly economic and communica-

event did not
nearly a

tions disruptions. Public confidence in

suffered as well, but certainly not
attack. Additionally,

government and electronic

on the scale or in the nature anticipated by armed

because the

DDoS

many

as 178 coun-

another

State, despite

attacks transited as

tries," Estonia never traced responsibility for the events to

lingering suspicion of Russian

services likely

government involvement.

100

In the final analysis,

Estonia attributed the disruptions to patriotic teams of ethnic Russian hackers,

only loosely affiliated with one another. 101

The Estonian response seems
well.

confirm that an armed attack did not occur as

Estonian countermeasures were entirely passive in nature. Estonian techni-

cians replied largely

DDoS attacks.
tions

to

102

by expanding network bandwidth

to diffuse the effects of the

The government focused its later responses on criminal investiga-

and also developing its domestic penal law to

ism and intrusions.

103

better account for cyber terror-

Estonia seems at no point to have given serious thought to

resorting to measures of self-defense under either the Charter or the

ington Treaty.

104

Nor, given

its difficulties

NATO Wash-

attributing the attacks, does

it

seem

it

could have.

The Estonian cyber incident undoubtedly sounded an alarm for the international community. But while the event provoked calls for cooperative cyber forensics and criminal law enforcement, very little of the incident generated lessons or
insights with respect to self-defense. Legal analyses conclude almost

unanimously

that the event did not give rise to the right of self-defense. 105

a year later, a

Only

would sound the same alarm and inspire comparable discussion,
would immediately shed no greater light on self-defense and CNA.

similar incident
yet

Georgia 2008

Although

in a

de facto sense independent since 1991, the Caucasus region of South

Ossetia has remained

all

the while part of the Republic of Georgia in a legal sense.

In 2008, after an increase in Ossetian separatist activity, Georgia attempted to reassert control

of the region. 106 These operations provoked a swift and militarily deci-

sive intervention

by Russian

air

and armored

forces. 107

Before the physical invasion, Georgian government websites suffered a series of

DDoS

attacks. 108

The Georgian

presidential website

was out of

service for

more

than 24 hours, then experienced manipulation including defacement of the President's image. 109

By the date of the Russian physical invasion, websites belonging to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, the National Bank and several
70
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DDoS attacks. 110 The day following the
invasion, Georgia's largest bank was also struck. All told, the DDoS operations conGeorgian news outlets had already suffered

tinued for nearly a month, long outlasting kinetic hostilities and even postdating a
ceasefire.

111

In terms of information technology, Georgia was
tively

no

Estonia. In fact, the rela-

underdeveloped Georgian information infrastructure

may

have mitigated

112

economic and otherwise, of the incident.
While Georgia's highly
concentrated distribution nodes simplified the attackers' task, Georgians did not

the impact,

on government web-based or e-services. The greatest impact of the incident appears to have been reputational and related to restricting information
flow between the government and its citizens during the invasion crisis. 113
rely heavily

For purposes of characterizing the Georgian cyber incident as an armed attack,
coincidence with the Russian physical invasion complicates legal analysis. The incident preceded, or

more

likely constituted part of, a

sion that undoubtedly qualified as an

armed

conventional military inva-

attack. 114

Yet isolated from the

succeeding kinetic measures, the cyber aspects of the Georgian incident were of

minimal scope and intensity. At its worst, the cyber incident disrupted banking activities

and limited communications between the Georgian government and the

population.

No loss of life, physical injury or destruction of property was directly

attributable to the cyber operations. Perhaps the

most

interesting legal issues aris-

ing from the Georgian cyber incident concern timing of self-defense

and whether

the cyber disruptions could have been interpreted as an indication of

armed

imminent

attack.

But the conclusions one can draw regarding the exercise of self-defense in the
realm of pure cyber operations are limited. Similar to the Estonian episode, Georgia never identified conclusive evidence of Russian

government

responsibility for

conduct of the disruptions. Also, the cyber incidents alone do not seem to have

Had the physical invasion not followed, the Georgian cyber incidents would likely have left Georgia in much the same place as 2007
risen to the level of armed attack.

Estonia: inconvenienced (though comparatively less so), vulnerable, angry

embarrassed.
elaborate

And

while, at

first

impression, neither incident appears useful to

on the details of self-defense doctrine, each maybe a useful foreboding of

future trends in

CNA likely at some point to implicate self-defense.

While neither incident reached the threshold of armed
in

and

terms of security seem

real.

Classifying these events as

attack, the costs of each

mere communications

disruptions or interference seems not to capture the function and importance of

computer networks

in the information age. 115 If the Estonian

attacks did not cripple either State or
certainly reduced public confidence

and Georgian

DDoS

produce damage to property or persons, they

and exposed critical vulnerabilities. The chaos
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and confusion of the Georgian cyber attacks may even have

facilitated or set favor-

able conditions for Russian physical attacks. After these incidents,

ask whether failure to produce physical
these incidents

damage or

on the lower end of a conflict spectrum and whether such events are

more powerful

States

would have exercised

IV. Low-Intensity

A

fairly

injury really justifies placing

aberrations or indications of the future of cyber conflict.

ask whether

one might

One might

also seriously

similar restraint.

Cyber Strategy

growing strand of cyber scholarship suggests the Estonian and Georgian

inci-

dents are harbingers of future cyber conflict. Within a broader spectrum of cyber
attack, strategists highlight low- intensity cyber warfare as

an increasingly prevalent

and threatening form of conflict. By exploiting intrinsic tactical advantages,
as

CNA have great poten-

weaknesses in Western military thinking, low-intensity

tial

to abuse narrowly conceived

gencies

and

attacks

hampers

models of conflict to the advantage of cyber insur-

States. Failing to perceive

targets'

violence.

treat the threats

posed by low-intensity

how such

attacks not only exploit tactical

at-

and

may also leverage the legal gaps identified previously.
commonly uses a conflict spectrum keyed to levels

but

Military doctrine
116

and

long-term security and plays into the hands of the

tacker. This section briefly explains
strategic advantages

as well

Along the cyber variant of the spectrum, low-intensity

CNA

of

distin-

guish themselves from their high-intensity counterparts in two important respects.
First,

low-intensity

intensity

CNA.

low-intensity

Specifically, in addition to

CNA

restraint in scale

CNA add a dimension of concealment not apparent in highconceal their

and scope. In the

effects.

masking the identity of the

They accomplish

this largely

attacker,

through

attacker's ideal scenario, the victim of low- intensity

CNA is unaware of the damage to the target system. In other words, successful lowintensity CNA never awaken a sleeping giant.
Low-intensity CNA also differ from the majority of high-intensity CNA in their
ability to frustrate correlation. In the

event they are detected, successful low-intensity

CNA should appear to the victim as unrelated or isolated events.
targets,

spreading effects and timing attacks in apparently

vent the target from perceiving the larger-scale,
effort

more

7

Selecting varied

random sequences

pre-

threateningly coordinated

of the attacker. Inability to correlate reduces the likelihood of response by the

victim, despite cumulative reductions in capacity

the "death by a thousand cuts"
In addition to being distinct

and

! 1

is

apt.

and

efficiency.

to

CNA are tactically
low-intensity CNA are

from other CNA, low-intensity

strategically attractive for several reasons. Tactically,

less likely to

The analogy

118

provoke debilitating responses from
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targets.

Because the target

is

often

Sean Watts

CNA may provoke

no response. Even if the victim becomes aware of the attack's effect, the isolated damage
may be so limited that a response is simply not worthwhile. As a kinetic
counterexample, the immense scale of the Al-Qaeda 9/11 attacks forfeited this tac119
tical advantage, greatly compromising the organization's long-term capacity.
unaware the attack has happened

Operating below the

target's

at

all,

low-intensity

response threshold, low-intensity attacks avoid this

blunder, simultaneously enjoying relative impunity and preserving the utility of
the attacker's cyber tools for future operations.
Strategically, low-intensity

low- intensity

CNA may

also

prove a wise

effort. Low-visibility,

CNA may be effective to retard a target's economic, social and tech-

nological development. Such developmental constraint might easily yield long-

term payouts in

strategic competition. In a struggle for technological

supremacy, even a
prove decisive.

slight

and military

advantage in efficiency or conversion capability

may

120

Low-intensity CNA are also highly feasible. In general, cyber operations are often
far less
is

expensive than traditional military operations. 121 The technology required

widely available and

nel.

eral

relies to a great extent

on automation

rather than person-

Low- intensity CNA compound these advantages that CNA enjoy as a genmatter. As one theorist observes, "You can do a simple attack against a lot of

122

computers.
really

Or you can do

a sophisticated attack against a few computers. But

it is

hard to do a sophisticated attack against a lot of computers, especially an

tack that

would achieve a meaningful

at-

military objective." 123

Further enhancing feasibility, low-intensity CNA permit incorporation of unafor even unsophisticated actors. Non-State actors such as cyber militias in-

filiated

creasingly populate cyberspace, offering services for profit or political sympathy. 124

Enlistment

maybe as simple as offering a personal computer, Internet access and

a web browser. 125 "Hacktivist" involvement in low- intensity
effects

CNA not only diffuses

but also strengthens efforts to launder the sponsor's identity as the source of

attack. 126

A victim might easily misinterpret well-masked hacktivist attacks as un-

related acts of vandalism rather than a concerted effort to degrade capacity or
security.

In addition to these very practical advantages, advocates of low- intensity

base their arguments on flaws in military theory.

Modern Western

CNA

military

thought has long rested on bifurcations of peace and war, notions of military and
civilian separation. 127 Classic military

theory reserves military action to escalations

of hostile conduct between parties above recognized thresholds of violence. 128 Military legal disciplines reinforce the

war-peace and military- civilian distinctions.

The law governing the conduct of hostilities, or jus
civilian bifurcation

in hello, captures the military-

through the targeting principle of distinction. 129 Similarly, the
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law of war

reflects the

war-peace distinction through pervasive chapeau or

application threshold provisions as prerequisites to operation of the law. 130
vast majority of the positive jus in bello only operates in
States. Recalling the jus

ad helium outlined in section

assumption with respect to

hostilities

and

I,

armed

conflict

The

between

one detects a similar bipolar

self-defense.

Under

the Charter regime,

armed attack has occurred, unleashing the use of force, or something short
of armed attack has occurred, restricting responses to peaceful means short of
either

force.

Cyber

theorists contrast these

Western traditions with notions of conflict that

understand military action as part of a general and continuous strategic competition between powers rather than as an exception to peace. 131 If Western powers re-

gard as legally extinct Clausewitz's characterization of war as a continuation of
politics,

competing views continue

this tradition,

to carry Clausewitz's torch. Consistent with

work by two Chinese People's Liberation Army officers urges an ap-

preciation of an unrestricted understanding of warfare extending into informational,

commercial, currency and media realms. 132

Cyber conflict theorists argue that Western military thought's blind spot for unconventional and low-intensity hostilities renders States susceptible to abuse. Failing to perceive pinprick attacks as part of an enemy's expanded conception of
conflict frustrates correlation
States' military

and delays defensive

and media, gain
ideally suited to

crucial strategic

and

communication, currency exchange, trade

tactical advantages.

Low-intensity

CNA are

pursuing such advantages.

Finally, low-intensity

CNA are attractive because they leverage seams in devel-

States' national security

enterprise, low-intensity

work

Actors acquainted with

response thresholds and willing to extend their activities into tradi-

tionally civilian realms, such as strategic

oped

efforts.

response structures. Particularly if directed

at private

CNA may successfully evade government computer net-

defenses. Moreover, private sector victims

sector authorities to preserve investor

may not

and consumer confidence. Industries con-

cerned with maintaining client privacy or trade secrets
to underreport low-intensity

report attacks to public

may be

especially inclined

CNA.

The operational environment of cyberspace may not be the only incentive to
low-intensity non-State actors' tactics. The law may incentivize such operations as
well.

Cyber operations

just

below the "use of force" threshold or even

between "use of force" and "armed attack" become
that limit States' lawful responses to the latter.

in the space

attractive considering views

The Wall advisory opinion's view

by non-State actors surely fosters a sense of
impunity or insulation from retribution or response. For example, one might

that self-defense

is

irrelevant to attacks

imagine a protracted and diffuse campaign of cyber frontier incidents, designed to
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harass

and

frustrate a target

but also designed to remain below the

measures in self-defense.

for

If

legal threshold

economic, communications and psychological

ef-

no matter how profound, don't trigger the right to respond with force, much
less the armed attack threshold for use of self-defense, CNA seem a particularly apt
means for imposing such effects to harm or at least harass and weaken States. This
is especially the case if the strict legal view that limits the use of force to "armed
fects,

attack" holds true.

In the end, coupled with emerging cyber doctrine, the Estonian and Georgian

on important new meaning. The arguments for low- intensity,
low- impact cyber operations suggest they may no longer be the realm of criminals
and economic saboteurs but rather deliberate strategies to influence the international security environment. Informed by a broader conception of cyber strategy
and conflict theory, the Estonian and Georgian incidents might indeed mean
something more to States and implicate self-defense and security in ways not obviincidents might take

ous

at the

time of each, with important implications for the Charter's doctrine of

may no longer be able to afford to treat such incidents as mere
communications disruptions. States may very well look to mea-

self-defense. States

criminal acts or

sures in self-defense as a response to such events, notwithstanding their failure to

comport with

traditional understandings of "armed attack."

the future of the

The implications

for

UN Charter self-defense regime maybe grim.

V. Conclusion:

The Impact of Low-Intensity
Legal Regime

CNA on the Self-Defense

Scholars have built impressive careers predicting the demise of the Charter's security

regime. 133 In 1970, Professor

Thomas Franck argued

that the Article 2(4) use of

mocked States from its grave. 134 He asserted that new forms of attack
made the notions of war on which the Charter was based obsolete, while State pracforce regime

tice

eroded

States'

mutual confidence in the system. 135 Addressing

Franck presciently identified wars too small and wars too large to
51.

136

Ultimately, Franck indicted incongruence between the

tional security system

imagined legicide 137

and the national

—perhaps

the very

question to General Alexander.

fit

self-defense,

within Article

norms of the

interna-

interests of States as the perpetrator of his

same concerns

that motivated the Senate's

138

So, are the laws regulating resort to force,

and

specifically self-defense,

out of

synch with planned cyber capabilities and strategies? Or more precisely, does the
Charter's self-defense doctrine leave States adequate authority to respond to the
full

range of CNA threats they face?
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The answer depends,
section

II

on the version of self-defense one adopts. As
universally adopted codification and decades of

in large part,

demonstrated, despite a

jurisprudence and State practice, the doctrine of self-defense remains highly indeterminate. If General Alexander expressed satisfaction with the state of the law, his

was

confidence grounded in a very broad and permissive understanding of

likely a

the doctrine. Informed

or seek to define

by views that regard the Charter's response gap

skeptically

away, one might indeed express satisfaction with the range of re-

it

sponses available to State victims of CNA. Espousing a similar view, the

Department Legal Adviser recently offered
doctrine as

it

relates to lethal overseas

US

State

a vote of confidence in self-defense

counterterrorism

efforts. 139

Yet such permissive views of self-defense suffer the textual shortcomings of
their forebears. 140 Christine

purely legal terms.

141

Gray

asserts that States rarely

Her evaluation

is

difficult to

post-Charter world States defend nearly
future

may

square with claims that in the

uses of force as self-defense. 142 Yet the

prove Gray's observation increasingly accurate. Recent State expres-

sions appear particularly vague
stinct, rights
143

regulation.

all

speak of self-defense in

and open-textured, grounded

in notions of in-

of survival and natural law rather than positivist models of conflict
Increasingly,

that self-defense includes
threats. Practice

is

it

all

seems States have resurrected pre-Charter notions

means necessary

for self-preservation against

all

offered to the exclusion of positivist expressions of law, rather

than as a vehicle for elucidating or understanding it. Even committed international

law sovereigntists must detect discomfiting, pre-Charter

On

the other hand,

if

realist tones.

one adopts the narrower view of self-defense, including

the apparent textual response gap between use of force and

proffered mismatch between law and capacity

eral's

larly

with respect to low-intensity

would deny

CNA,

What emerges
to the positive jus

attack, the gen-

may indeed be

real.

and

restrict effective action

by politics.

appears to be a choice of threats. Either one accepts a real threat

ad heliums claim to law, or one accepts very real threats to

security as a trade-off for preserving legal idealism. Neither reflects well

ture of the law. Each constitutes a
If past

Particu-

State victims appear hostage to law that

resort to proportionate countermeasures

to a security regime paralyzed

armed

mismatch

in

its

own

States'

on the

fu-

sense.

predictions of the demise of the Charter's security regime, such as

Franck's, have proved exaggerated, 144 low-intensity

As Franck's

critics

CNA may vindicate them yet.

point out, the international security environment of the twentieth

century likely profited from the Charter's limits through undetectable instances of
restraint. 145

frain

from

The argument claims

the Charter regularly influenced decisions to re-

resort to force but unlike decisions to use force, restraint leaves

76

little

in

Sean Watts

the

way of observable

evidence. Yet the prospect of low- intensity

CNA is likely to

change the calculus of these decisions.

anonymous and effective weapons, States find a greatly altered international security game. The low barriers to entry into CNA, and particu146
larly low- intensity CNA, greatly increase the number of potential players.
Just in
terms of frequency of occurrence, the number of instances in which States will be
called upon to evaluate whether resort to force or measures in self-defense is justiWith

these cheap,

fied or necessary increases.

Further, as the Estonian
actors

may be

and Georgian episodes

effective proxies for States in

be a persistent feature of future

CNA.

still

It

suggest to many, non-State

appears non-State actors will

CNA. And for non-State

actors operating

on

their

own behalf, modern hostilities offer few levelers on the order of CNA. CNA are tremendous force multipliers and are abundantly available. Low- intensity CNA offer
the potential for catastrophic effects against asymmetrically developed and

resourced States. Conversely,

many

non-State actors are simply retaliation- and

even deterrence-proof, offering defenders
Thus, low-intensity

little

in the

way of targets.

CNA not only increase the population of attackers but also

the pool of potential defenders. This

is

true in

two

senses. First, as the

Georgian

event shows, even States with rudimentary information systems capacity present
ripe targets for
acts,

CNA. More States present themselves as potential targets of hostile

increasing in absolute terms the opportunity

will erupt.

and likelihood

that hostilities

Second, more States are likely to participate themselves in

CNA for the

same reasons that more non-State actors are. Thus in a CNA security environment,

more States will possess means to respond to attacks or, more important, to events
short of armed attack yet sufficiently disruptive or annoying to provoke a hostile
response.

On

a related note,

defense,

CNA may

means of

and equally disruptive

to restraint in the exercise of self-

permit more States to "go

self-defense,

CNA may free

States

it

from

alone."

As a more

reliance

on

attainable

collective security

arrangements. In contrast to the twentieth century's bipolar security environ-

ment, CNA's low barriers to entry

may lead to

a multipolar system of lone actors.

Decisions whether to resort to self-defense will lack the temperance and restraint
that collective security arrangements have offered. Thus, low-intensity

CNA may

topple preexisting vertical arrangements of States into a level or horizontal array

of power.

CNA rearrange the cast of actors in the security environment in a more
literal way. CNA render geography largely meaningless. States previously insulated
Finally,

from armed attack by distance or terrain enjoy no such benefits
ders

and neighbors do not determine one's cyber
77

in cyberspace. Bor-

security. Rather, in

an ironic
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sense, susceptibility to attack

may be a function of the extent to which a State relies

on the very information technology that is targeted. As information systems proliferate the target environment becomes richer, increasing the frequency with which
must make decisions about exercising

States

The preceding

factors suggest critical consequences for the viability of self-

defense doctrine. As low-intensity

and

self-defense.

CNA increase the pool of defenders,

targets, opportunities for disparate or

attackers

even idiosyncratic views or approaches

to self-defense will also proliferate. Low-intensity

CNA will

generate conflicting

accounts of self-defense doctrine with respect to applicability to non-State actors

and the "armed attack" threshold,
collective self-defense.

It is

as well as other issues

ominously

clear that the

such as anticipatory and

phenomena

that

prompted

Franck to pronounce the death of the Charter security regime are not merely also
present in

CNA;

they are present in far greater degrees.

Few of the developments,

legal or technical, outlined in this article

portend a

stable or effective international self-defense regime. Rather than evince satisfaction

with the bargain struck in 1945, emerging views on self-defense, such as that expressed by General Alexander, likely reflect altered understandings of limits

freedom of action. The

States'

defense are

effects

on the

integrity

on

and viability of the law of self-

compounded if one extrapolates the opportunity to interpret and apply

self-defense doctrine to the vast cast of actors, State

While surely motivated

in part

and non-State,

in cyberspace.

by legitimate perceptions of very real

threats, these

views are highly susceptible to producing a chaotic, dangerous and multipolar security environment. Faced with the daunting prospect of persistent low-intensity

CNA,

ruling views

on

self-defense

may quickly become

from the Charter's security regime. Understood

in fact entirely untethered

in light of emerging low-intensity

CNA doctrine, the Estonian and Georgian events become highly relevant to the development of self-defense law. One can

easily imagine,

a law of self-defense that resorts to the Charter's
to

and might already conjure,

regime in

name

only, revealing

have been as Stone posited, one of many "vain attempts to abolish power."

it
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V
Cyber Operations and the Jus

in Bello:

Key Issues

Michael N.Schmitt*

On

August

7,

2008, Georgian forces launched attacks into South Ossetia, in-

cluding against Russian troops

who were

in the

breakaway region

as

The jus ad bellum issues surrounding the conflict remain controversial. However, it is incontrovertible that once Georgian and Russian forces
became embroiled in hostilities against each other, an international armed conflict
"peacekeepers."
1

subject to the jus in bello (international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of

armed

conflict)

had begun.

numerous defacement and denial of service cyber operations were directed against Georgian entities. 2 The cyber targets included the
websites of the President; Parliament; Foreign Affairs, Defence and Education
ministries; domestic and foreign media; banks; and private Internet servers and
During the

conflict,

blogs. For instance,

defacement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website

in-

cluded the posting of a collage of photos of Adolf Hitler and Georgian President

Mikheil Saakashvili. Similarly, the

site

of the National Bank of Georgia was re-

placed with one depicting twentieth- century dictators together with Saakashvili.

On average, each operation lasted two hours. Although no physical damage or injuries

were reported, the disruption of services proved severe. In particular, the

Georgian government found
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itself

Law,

unable to broadcast information about the
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University, United
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conflict

and Georgian banks went

off-line, as a

self-imposed precautionary mea-

sure, for ten days.

The

As with

identity of the originators of the operations remains uncertain.

those against Estonia the previous year, most of the operations were traceable to

Russia but there was no conclusive evidence that the Russian government con-

ducted the attacks or was otherwise involved therein. While certain of them were
traceable to Russian

"pwned," that

is,

government computers, the

possibility that they

were

taken over for the purpose of mounting attacks, cannot be ruled

out. Nevertheless, that a website containing potential

malicious software, StopGeorgia.ru,

came on

Georgian cyber targets and

line within

hours of the commence-

ment of hostilities aroused suspicions of governmental involvement.
Foreign governments and private sources promptly assisted the Georgians.
Google provided hosting services for Georgian

sites,

an important contribution in

The Georgian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs websites were moved to US and Estonian servers, while the Polish
President made his website available for posting Georgian government informa-

light

of

advanced

its

security.

tion about the conflict. Despite these efforts, the attacks significantly disrupted the

operation of the Georgian cyber infrastructure.

As the Georgia case

cyber operations have

illustrates,

become embedded

in

modern warfare. This article examines three central IHL issues raised by cyber operations mounted during armed conflicts: the principle of distinction, direct participation

by civilians

to explore the jus

in hostilities

and

classification of conflict. It

makes no

effort

ad bellum, which is addressed by companion contributions to

volume of the International Law Studies. As the normative

this

architecture governing

must be cautioned that the conclusions
drawn are those of the author alone and somewhat tentative. However, attention is
drawn to the ongoing efforts of a group of international experts working under the
cyber operations remains indistinct,

auspices of the

Manual on
will

NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to craft a

the International

help clear

it

much

Law

of Cyber Warfare? Said manual, albeit soft law,

of the legal fog of cyber warfare.

Cyber Operations and the Principle of Distinction
Article 48 of Additional Protocol

I

requires the parties to a conflict to "at

distinguish between the civilian population
objects

tion,

and combatants and between

and military objectives and accordingly direct

military objectives." 4 In doing so,

it

restates the

IHL

times

civilian

their operations only against

customary law principle of distinc-

which has been labeled by the International Court of

"cardinal" principles of

all

Justice as

one of two

(the other being the prohibition of unnecessary
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suffering). 5 It

is

incontrovertible that the principle applies to cyber operations con-

ducted during an armed

conflict.

The devil, however, is in the details. Note the term "operation" in Article 48. Its
use would at first glance appear to prohibit any cyber activity directed against civilians or civilian objects. Yet operations aimed at the civilian population are not uncommon during armed conflict, the paradigmatic example being psychological
operations, which are generally deemed lawful unless they cause physical harm or

human

suffering.

Subsequent

articles resident in

Additional Protocol

shed light on the founda-

I

tional intent of the principle of distinction. In particular, they "operationalize"

by setting forth restrictions, prohibitions and requirements that are typ-

Article 48

framed in terms of "attacks." Article 51.1 exemplifies

ically

tion. It states that the "civilian

this operationaliza-

population and individual civilians shall enjoy

general protection against dangers arising from military operations," but goes

on

to note that " [t] o give effect to this protection, the following rules

be

observed in

all

circumstances."

The

.

.

shall

.

rules include the prohibitions

on making

attack ," 6

conducting

the civilian population or individual civilians the "object of
7

"indiscriminate attacks" and engaging in "attacks against the civilian population

or civilians
inate"

byway of reprisal." 8 Article 51

by reference

to

also illustrates the notion of "indiscrim-

two types of operations. The

treats as a single military objective a

first is

"an attack

.

.

.

which

number of clearly separated and distinct mili-

tary objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar

concentration of civilians or civilian objects." 9 The second
principle of proportionality,

is

an expression of the

which bars "an attack which may be expected to

cause incidental loss of civilian

life,

damage

injury to civilians,

to civilian objects,

or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated." 10

Other

articles take the

same approach.

Article 51's protection of civilians, forbids

tack"

and

making

limits attacks to military objectives.

ited to attack, destroy,

remove or render

survival of the civilian population,"

against the natural environment
"

Article 52, the property counterpart to

12

11

civilian items the "object

Article 54 notes that

it is

"prohib-

useless objects indispensible to the

whereas Article 55 prohibits

by way of

of at-

reprisals."

13

a

[a]ttacks

Article 56 provides that

made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may
cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe loss among the civilian
[w]orks or installations containing dangerous forces

population." 14

It

.

.

shall

not be

further provides that "[o]ther military objectives located at or in

the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be
the attack

.

may result in

similar consequences. 15
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A central component of the principle of distinction

that "[i]n the conduct of

is

military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, ci-

and

vilians

civilian objects." 16

Despite the reference to "operations," the norma-

meaningful aspects of the attendant requirements are

tively

attacks. Indeed, the article itself

"those

article,

who

is

plan or decide

titled

and are not subject to

objects

the choice of means

and

"refrain

"precautions in attack." According to the

upon an

feasible to verify that the objectives to

be attacked are neither

and methods of attack"

17

"take

in order to

from deciding to launch an attack"

that

civilians

minimize

parent" that the intended target

not a military objective or

given of attacks which
permit.

21

When

may

and

affect the civilian

"effective

ian objects."

harm 18

becomes ap-

if the strike

would run

advance warning

shall

be

population" should circumstances

considering possible targets, and choice

is

possible between

on which may be expected to cause the least danger to
22

civilian

if it

without forfeiting military advantage, "the objective to be selected
attack

civilian

maybe expected to violate the

must be canceled or suspended

counter to proportionality limitations,

nor

feasible precautions in

all

rule of proportionality. 19 "Attacks

20

"do everything

attack" are required to

special protection,"

is

terms of

set forth in

shall

them

be that the

civilian lives

and civil-

None of the provisions of Article 57 maybe interpreted as "authoriz-

ing any attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects." 23

The

focus on attacks appears again in the following article, which imposes an obligation

on defending

parties to take "precautions against the effect of attacks" in order to

safeguard civilians and civilian objects. 24

The emphasis on

restricting military operations

by reference

repeatedly in other chapters of Additional Protocol
are not to be
tives

For example, medical units

made the "object of attack" may not be used to "shield military objec-

from attack" and must be

military objectives

located,

do not imperil

those hors de combat due to

from

I.

to attacks appears

whenever

their safety."

wounds

possible, so that "attacks against

25

Prohibitions exist on

making

or surrender and individuals parachuting

a disabled aircraft an object of attack. 26

Combatants are obligated

to "distin-

guish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack

or in a military operation preparatory to attack" 21 and "[i]t
attack,

by any means whatsoever, non-defended

As should be apparent, the reference

localities."

is

prohibited ... to

28

to operations in Article 48

must be

inter-

preted as bearing on a particular type of operation, an attack. Operations not

amounting to an

attack,

such as psychological operations, are generally accepted as

lawful.

But what

is

tainly reflects

an attack? Article 49 of Additional Protocol

I,

in a provision that cer-

customary understandings of the term, defines attacks

lence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence."
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Committee of the
Red Cross's (ICRC) Commentary to Article 48, which notes that "the word operation should be understood in the context of the whole section; it refers to military
operations during which violence is used." 30 That Additional Protocol I and its ofoperations and violence

ficial

is

further revealed in the International

commentary define both operations and attacks by reference to the notion of

violence further strengthens the conclusion that application of the principle of distinction generally depends

tion during

armed

on an attack having occurred and that an attack is an ac-

conflict that

is

violent in nature.

Since the plain text of Article 49 appears to require a violent act for qualification
as

an

tions

attack,

by

a strict textual interpretation, non-kinetic operations,

which themselves do not comprise physical

force,

appeared to have been the prevailing interpretation
tocol was drafted.

at the

As noted in Bothe, Partsch and Solf s

Protocol) respected

opera-

i.e.,

would be excluded. This
time the Additional Pro-

(all

involved in drafting the

commentary on the provision: "The term

'acts

of violence' de-

notes physical force. Thus, the concept of 'attacks' does not include dissemination

of propaganda, embargoes, or other non-physical means of psychological or eco-

nomic warfare." 31 Similarly, the ICRC Commentary on Article 49 suggests that "the
term 'attack' means 'combat action.'" 32
It must be remembered that although treaties are to be interpreted "in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to their terms," said interpretations
must be made in "context and in the light of [their] object and purpose." 33 At the
time Additional Protocol
military "attacks"

I

was

drafted, cyber operations did not exist; virtually

employed means that released

all

kinetic energy, as through an

explosion or the force of a bullet striking an individual. While the text of Article 49
is

framed in terms of the nature of the act amounting to an

must have been primarily concerned with
lation. Protection

its

attack, the drafters

consequences for the

civilian

popu-

of the population was the Protocol's central "object and pur-

pose" with regard to the rules of targeting. "Violence" merely constituted useful
prescriptive shorthand for use in rules designed to shield the population

from

harmful effects. Despite being styled as act-based norms (violence), they are in

fact

consequence-based.

The text of Additional Protocol I's various

rules developing the principle of dis-

tinction supports this conclusion. Article 51 sets out the general premise that civilians "enjoy general protection against dangers arising

and bars those
spread terror

acts or threats of violence "the

among the civilian

population." 34

It

from military operations"

primary purpose of which

damage

life,

injury to civil-

to civilian objects," a formula repeated in Article 57. 35

attacks, the precautions

to

also frames the principle of pro-

portionality by reference to expected "incidental loss of civilian
ians,

is

During

requirements of Article 57 mandate selection of methods
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and means of warfare
civilians

may

and damage

in order to

minimize "incidental

to civilian objects,"

"affect the civilian population,"

37

36

loss

of civilian

life,

the issuance of warnings

if

and choosing among potential

injury to

an attack
targets in

on the goal of causing "the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian
With regard to aerial and naval operations, attacks must take all reasonobjects."
able precautions "to avoid losses of Chilian lives and damage to civilian objects." 39
part based
s

In other articles, the

damage"

severe

40

environment

is

protected against "widespread, long-term and

and dams, dykes and nuclear

protected out of concern for "severe

As these examples

among

losses

clearly illustrate,

electrical generating stations are

it is

the civilian population." 41

not the violence of the act that consti-

tutes the condition precedent to limiting the occurrence of

an

attack,

lence of the ensuing result. In other words, the legal prohibition
rather than targeting, protected persons

not be considered novel, for

it

and

is

but the vio-

on

attacking,

should

objects. This interpretation

has always been the case that operations employing

biological contagions or chemicals have been characterized as attacks, even

though

non-kinetic in nature, because their consequences could prove harmful, even
thal.

Thus, Bothe, Partsch and

Solf, despite the extract

above from their

le-

classic

work, correctly defined attacks in a consequence-based fashion by asserting that
the term referred to "those aspects of military operations that
the safety of the civilian population

and the

most

directly affect

integrity of civilian objects." 42

Cyber operations can unquestionably generate such consequences even though
they launch no physical force themselves. For instance, a cyber operation against

an

air traffic

would place

control system

aircraft,

whether military or

civilian, at

Or one targeting a dam could result in the release of waters, thereby endangering persons and property downstream. In neither case would the actual act be
destructive, but in both the consequences would be. Referring back to the requirement of violence, and its development in Additional Protocol I, cyber operations
risk.

can therefore qualify as "attacks," even though they are not themselves "violent,"
because they have "violent consequences."
tion,

is

A cyber operation, like any other opera-

an attack when resulting in death or injury of individuals, whether

ians or combatants, or

damage

to or destruction of objects,

civil-

whether military

objectives or civilian objects.

A

cyber operation that

encompassed
target

is

is

intended, but

in the concept, in

much

the

fails,

to generate such results

same way that

nevertheless an attack in IHL. Similarly,

a

rifle

one expected

would be

shot that misses

its

to cause collateral

damage to civilian objects or incidental harm to civilians would qualify, even if no
harm befell the military objective targeted. This latter point is somewhat unique to
cyber operations since lawful kinetic operations are typically intended to cause the
requisite

harm

to the target, with incidental
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bomb employed
target may not be

the attack, as with civilians caught within the blast radius of a
against a military facility. In a cyber operation, however, the

physically

harmed

damage or
By this

at

all,

yet the operation could nevertheless result in collateral

incidental injury, as in simply opening the floodgates of a
interpretation, the operations against Georgia

were not attacks and

therefore not unlawful under international humanitarian law.

ruption and defacement, but no physical

There

ICRC's

is

harm

They involved

legal division.

Dormann points to

Article 52.2 of Additional Protocol

I,

dis-

to objects or injury to persons.

an alternative approach, one suggested by Dr. Knut
43

dam.

Dormann

of the

the definition of military objectives in

one generally accepted as the correct

articula-

tion of customary law, as support for his position: "military objectives are limited
to those objects

which by their nature,

location,

purpose or use make an

effective

contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military ad-

vantage." 44 Noting that the definition includes "neutralization," he suggests that
"[i]t is irrelevant

way."

45

whether an object

is

disabled through destruction or in any other

In doing so, he dispenses with the requirement for damage, destruction,

death or injury for an action to qualify as an attack. Consequently, the prohibition

on "attacking" civilians and civilian objects extends to cyber operations "targeting"
them. By the Dormann approach, many of the cyber operations conducted against
Georgia would qualify as "attacks" and those targeting civilian systems would be
unlawful under IHL.

The approach

is

not unreasonable in light of the severe non-physical harm that

can be caused by cyber operations.
is

It

responds to concerns that the other approach

under- inclusive. However, Dormann's poses the opposite

would encompass, for instance,
which mere inconvenience resulted,

risk, that

of over-

denial of service attacks, including

inclusivity. It

all

those in

as in the case of blocking a television

broadcast or university website. State practice provides no support for the notion
that causation of inconvenience
trary,

is

intended to be prohibited in IHL.

On

the con-

inconvenience and interference with the daily lives of civilians are a frequent

result of

armed

population are

conflict

and psychological operations directed against the

civilian

common. Dormann is to be commended for identifying the unsat-

isfactory result of limiting "attacks" to those operations causing death, injury,

damage or
It

that

destruction, but his proposed

also relies

may be

remedy goes too

on law that is not directly on point.

Military objectives are those objects

attacked. But the preliminary question

is

conducted or contemplated. Only when that question
tive

does the definition of military objective

to the definition of military objectives

is

far.

come

whether an attack
is

answered

into play.

The

is

being

in the affirma-

issue with regard

what may be attacked, not how or with
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what consequences. Moreover, the

drafters envisioned "neutralization" in the con-

The term was included

encompass

text of

an

for the

purpose of denying the use of an object to the enemy without necessarily de-

stroying

attack.

it."

46

cases involving "an attack

Examples include using landmines to render an area of land impass-

able or firing antipersonnel munitions at

gun crews

to

enemy surface-to-air missile sites to force

to take cover while an air attack against other targets

is

under way. 47

By the principle of distinction, civilian objects may not be attacked during
armed conflict. With respect to cyber operations, one unsettled issue is whether
data resident in computers comprise an "object."

The implications of the answer

momentous. To the extent they do, direct operations against civilian data
would constitute an unlawful attack on a civilian object. Further, any harm caused
to civilian data during a cyber attack on a lawful military objective would have to be
considered in the proportionality calculation and when determining the nature of
are

the precautions required during attack.

No

definitive

characterize

all

answer to

this

question

would appear overbroad

exists. It

to

data as "objects." Surely a cyber operation that deletes an innocu-

ous e-mail or temporarily disrupts a television broadcast does not amount to an
unlawful attack on a civilian object. For instance,

employing electronic warfare to disrupt

civilian

sense to distinguish between such an operation

it is

well-settled that

media

is

lawful.

It

an operation

would make no

and a cyber operation that destroys

data to achieve precisely the same result.

Absent an agreed-upon interpretation in the cyber context,
tread lightly in characterizing data as an object.

two

situations. First,

instance,

some data

in

intrinsic value.

stroyed, the art

is

some

the extent the data are destroyed, so too

money. There are few examples of such data. Second,

some data have
in

Doing so might be appropriate

banking account data are designed to be immediately transformable into

the tangible equivalent, the

and

perhaps best to

are directly transferable into tangible objects. For

money at an automatic teller machine. To
is

it is

An example would be digital art.

as well. Presumably,

it

If the

should be protected as

data are de-

civilian

property

cases as cultural property. But again, such cases are rare.

Generally, data should not be characterized as an object in

terminative question

is

itself.

whether the consequences attendant to

its

Rather, the de-

destruction in-

volve the requisite level of harm to protected physical objects or persons. If so, the

cyber operation constitutes an unlawful attack.

Cyber operations

also bear

on

certain issues regarding application of the concept

of military objectives. Networking means that there

is

a

much

that cyber systems will be dual-use (used for both military

and thereby qualify

and

higher likelihood

civilian purposes),

as military objectives. Similarly, military reliance

and hardware produced

on software

for the civilian population arguably renders facilities
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produce them lawfully targetable war-supporting military

that

objectives.

And,

economy, certain of them may constitute

since cyber systems are essential to the

war- sustaining objects, which the United States, as distinct from most other countries,

characterizes as military objectives. 48

The cyber operations

operations qualify as "attacks" under IHL, since
sulted.

no case did the
no physical damage or injury re-

against Georgia illustrate these points. In

But assuming solely for the sake of analysis that they did, some, such

as

would have been lawful as directed
(although the hacktivists enjoyed no belligerent right to

those against Ministry of Defence servers,
against military objectives

engage in

hostilities in the first place). Others,

of Education and media

facilities,

would have

such as those targeting the Ministry
violated

IHL proscriptions.

Additionally, the operations against Georgia illustrate

cyber operations.

two

practical aspects of

First, it is likely that attackers will target "soft sites," that is, sites

The most vulnerable

that are not well-secured.

are those in the civilian or

security governmental sectors. In future conflicts, attacks
are therefore highly likely. Second, the attacks

appeal of targeting objects that might
category. For instance,

it

fall

on

non-

civilian cyber targets

on the banking system

illustrate the

into the contentious "war-sustaining"

would be simpler and less

risky to

undermine a State's

oil

export capacity with cyber attacks that disrupt storage and distribution than to
physically destroy the facilities

pends. This

is

especially so

and the transportation links upon which export de-

when

a State

is

capable of effectively defending against

traditional kinetic attacks.

Cyber Operations and Direct Participation in

Hostilities

Those who qualify as combatants enjoy the belligerent right of engaging
ties;

no reason

regard.

exists to distinguish

cyber from kinetic military operations in this

However, cyber operations do present some

the rules regarding direct participation
Article 51.3 of Additional Protocol

by

this Section

I,

by

nature.

armed

conflict,

The consequence of the

According to

"civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded

time as they take a direct part in hostilities."
49

difficulty as to application of

civilians in hostilities.

[which addresses the conduct of

non-international

in hostili-

hostilities], unless

A comparable

and the notion

rule

is

is

that civilians

directly participate in hostilities. Additionally,

and

for such

provision exists for

undoubtedly customary in

may be

targeted while they

such direct participants do not

fac-

tor into either the proportionality analysis or precautions in attack requirements.

The question, then, is when do civilians who participate in cyber,
from kinetic, operations become direct participants in hostilities.
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Analysis begins by determining whether the individuals concerned qualify as

members of the armed forces.

If so,

the direct participation rules

do not apply since

may be targeted directly even when not participating in hostilities. In its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, the ICRC has inthey

cluded organized armed groups belonging to a party to the conflict in the category
of armed forces. 50 Although the Guidance has proven controversial in other respects,

51

that

was appropriate

it

armed

among

consensus existed

the experts convened to develop the product

to treat organized

armed groups

in the

same manner

as the

forces for the purposes of targeting law.

But when do hackers and non-military groups engaging in cyber operations

armed groups? By definition, an organized armed group must
be both organized and armed. With regard to the former criterion, the most trouqualify as organized

blesome question

domain, groups

is

whether a group

exist

groups have

many

forth. In fact,

it is

may be

"organized virtually." In the virtual

whose members never have any physical

purposes

—

contact.

social, educational, financial, charitable

Such

and so

not rare for dispersed military personnel to organize themselves

virtually, as in the case

of intelligence sharing.

IHL does not develop the notion of organization to the degree necessary to
come to definitive conclusions regarding virtual organization. The ICRC's Commentary to Additional Protocol

[t]he

term "organized"

is

I

notes that

obviously rather

grees of organization. In the

first

place, this

flexible, as there are a large

should be interpreted in the sense that the

fighting should have a collective character, be

cording to

rules, as

number of de-

conducted under proper control and ac-

opposed to individuals operating

in isolation with

no correspond-

ing preparation or training. 52

Drawing on

this definition, at

one end of the continuum would be those "groups"

consisting of autonomous actors

response to a broad

call to

who

are simply

all

do so from one or more

targeting a State, perhaps in

sources.

They do not operate

under the direction of a particular individual nor does the group have any formal
organizational structure. These groups cannot be
therefore, individuals involved therein

remain

deemed

to be organized, and,

civilians subject to the rules

of di-

rect participation.

who act collectively and cooperatively. Albeit virtual,
group may have a defined command structure and coordinate its

At the other end are those
an online
activities

tools,

—

for instance,

by allocating cyber

targets,

developing and sharing hacker

cooperating in identifying target vulnerabilities and conducting postattack
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damage assessments. There is little justification for excluding groups of this nature
from "armed forces" on the basis of organization.

A possible counterargument is that the requirement of organization is intended
to allow for

enforcement of IHL. However, such an assertion confuses a require-

ment of organization

for the purposes of prisoner of war status

tion as a party to the conflict with the

and

for qualifica-

norms applicable to targeting. As noted in the

Interpretive Guidance,

it

would contradict the
under the more

forces

logic of the principle of distinction to place irregular

armed

protective legal regime afforded to the civilian population

conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war. Therefore, even under the terms of the Hague Regulations and the
Geneva Conventions, all armed actors showing a sufficient degree of military organizamerely because they fail to

.

.

.

and belonging to a party to the

tion

forces of that party.

The

difficult case lies

individuals

who

conflict

must be regarded

as part of the

armed

53

between these extremes, that of an informal grouping of

act with shared purpose.

For instance, they access a

common

website containing tools and vulnerable targets but do not coordinate their attacks.

Whether a group of this nature meets the organization

criterion should

depend on

such context- specific factors as the existence of a formal or informal leadership entity directing

the group's activities in a general sense, identifying potential targets

and maintaining an inventory of effective hacker tools. In most cases,
tion alone

would not

satisfy the organization criterion.

gan to resemble those of a cooperative group,

would

treat said

group

as

it is

However,

collective ac-

as activities be-

increasingly likely that States

an "armed force," rather than a collection of

civilian

direct participants.

An organized group must also be "armed" to qualify as an armed force. The logical

construction of "armed"

understood in IHL. After
certain

all,

is

that the group carries out "attacks," as that term

while certain

members of the armed

forces, or

even

components thereof, may have no "violent" function, the concept of armed

forces

makes no sense

tation

is

in the absence of a group

further supported

purpose of violence. This interpre-

by the notion of "combatants" (who enjoy the belliger-

ent privilege of attacking lawful targets) since they are also defined as
the

is

armed

forces.

or kinetic, the

54

Without a group purpose of engaging

whether cyber

members of an organized virtual group remain civilians to whom the

rules of direct participation apply. Accordingly, a

tions not

in attacks,

members of

amounting

group that conducts cyber opera-

to attacks (whether directed at military or civilian targets)

but a collection of civilians. To the extent the

activities

of individual

the group constitute direct participation in hostilities, they
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become

is

members of

targetable.

Of
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course, the reach of the adjective

term "attack."

vis-a-vis the

The

"armed" depends on the interpretation adopted

Interpretive

Guidance adds two

qualifiers to the

groups, both of which have proven controversial.

armed

forces, the

group must "belong to

notion of organized armed

First, in

order to be treated as the

which requires

a party to the conflict,"

de facto relationship" between the group and a party to the conflict.

least a

55

"at

The re-

lationship can be either declared or "expressed through tacit agreement or conclusive

behaviour that makes

it

clear for

which party the group

requirement has correctly been criticized on the basis that the
geting

is

not the entity for

is

fighting." 56 This

critical issue in tar-

whom the potential target is fighting, but rather against

whom that group is engaged in hostilities. However, assuming for the sake of analysis that the

in

requirement applies,

it

would exclude those organized armed groups

an international armed conflict that might be directing cyber attacks against one

of the parties for reasons other than support of the opposing party. According to
the

ICRC, such

armed

conflict

attacks

might nevertheless amount to a separate non-international

between the group and the target

equally been the subject of criticism.

57

State,

although this approach has

Presumably, the criterion would also ex-

clude patriotic hacker groups unaffiliated with one of the belligerent parties, even

conducting cyber attacks for

its

benefit, because the group's activities

the "agreement" of that party and
to the party

its

under the law of State

actions

would in no other way be

responsibility.

would

if

lack

attributable

58

The second qualifier found in the Interpretive Guidance is that only members of
an organized armed group who have a "continuous combat function" qualify as
members of the armed forces for targeting purposes. 59 A continuous combat function is a duty that would meet the requirements of direct participation if the individual concerned was not a group member. Whether group members engaged in
cyber operations have a continuous combat function depends on application of the
direct participation criteria set forth below.

This criterion

is

controversial, with critics arguing that

it

affords greater protec-

members of organized armed groups, who enjoy no right to engage in hos60
As a general matter the
tilities, than official members of the armed forces, who do.
criterion is no more compelling in the cyber context than in that of physical operation to

tions.

This

is

so because

tinguishing group

it

derives

from concern over the possible

members from

civilians

especially likely during cyber operations, in

launched an operation

may

on the

be,

IHL

61

This prospect

is

which the identity of those who have

be uncertain or where the military and

communities share networks and transmission

may sometimes

battlefield.

difficulty of dis-

civilian cyber

assets. Yet, difficult as distinction

already contains a presumption of civilian status in the

case of doubt, thereby obviating the need to
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function criterion. 62 That presumption would apply equally to those engaging in

cyber

hostilities.

to

no organized armed cyber
have been coordinated, nor is there any com-

pelling evidence of an overarching

group structure. Further, the attacks were not

In the case of Georgia, there appear to have been

groups.

The

attacks

do not seem

"armed" in the sense that they did not cause physical damage to property or injury
to individuals. Therefore, individuals

engaged in conducting them would

have qualified as direct participants in

hostilities,

at

most

who may have been targeted for

such time as they directly participated.

The key

issues regarding direct participation

and

participation

2) the duration of the "for

surround

1 )

the nature of direct

such time" window. The Interpretive

Guidance suggests three cumulative constitutive elements that must be present before

an act amounts to

First,

the act

must "be

direct, as distinct

from

indirect, participation in hostilities.

likely to adversely affect the military operations or military

capacity of a party to an

armed

conflict, or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury or

on persons or objects protected against direct attack" (threshold of
harm). Second, "there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm
likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of
which that act constitutes an integral part" (direct causation). Finally, the act must
be specifically designed to "directly cause the required threshold of harm in support
of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another" (belligerent nexus). 63 In
the cyber context, any act that directly impedes a belligerent's military operations
or capabilities or constitutes an attack on protected persons or objects would qualify as direct participation so long as a nexus existed between the act and the armed
conflict. Examples would include cyber military intelligence gathering, disrupting
enemy cyber networks and manipulating data in the enemy's military systems.
These requirements are generally deemed acceptable, although disagreement
destruction

does exist
old of
one's

at their

harm"

own

margins. 64 For instance,

criterion

capabilities.

it

has been suggested that the "thresh-

be extended to include operations designed to enhance

An example would be developing cyber defenses

fying cyber vulnerabilities in military cyber systems.
ity, is

equally necessary, but

many

critics

would be

raised

if

The second element,

causal-

of the Guidance took issue with

example of assembling improvised explosive devices
objections

or identi-

its

as indirect causation. Similar

the analogous case of developing software specific to

a particular cyber operation or

enemy system were

characterized as indirect, vice

direct, causation.

The major issue presented by the Interpretive Guidance centered on the meaning
of the phrase "for such time," referring to the period during which a direct partici-

pant

is

susceptible to lawful attack.

The phrase has long been
101
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controversy, with critics alleging that

words, while a direct participant
attacked.

deploying to and from an operation, he

However, once he successfully returns home he regains the

from attack that

civilians enjoy, at least until

rectly participate in hostilities.

not a malfunction of IHL,
the direct participant

open

is

created a "revolving door." 65 In other

it

to attack at

66

immunity

such time as he deploys again to di-

Although the ICRC has argued that
point out that

critics

full

may be

it

creates

this

dynamic

is

an imbalance between

and the member of the regular armed forces, since the latter is

any time based

solely

on

his status. In the

view of the

critics,

these

deemed to be directly participating for such time as they regularly engage in acts of hostilities; there should be no periods of immunity from atindividuals should be

tack between the qualifying acts.

Cyber operations bring

no "deployment"
required to

this issue into

at all since

mount

even greater focus.

First,

there

may be

only a computer, and not proximity to the target,

the operations.

The

restrictive interpretation

is

of the for such

time criterion would suggest that the direct participant can only be attacked while
actually launching the operation. This

tions last

is

problematic in that

many

cyber opera-

mere minutes, perhaps only seconds. Such a requirement would

tively extinguish the right to strike at direct participants.

Moreover, the

effec-

effect

of a

may be long-delayed, as in the case of a surreptitiously emplaced
logic bomb. Would the target of such an operation only be entitled to attack the
direct participant while the logic bomb is being emplaced? The problem is that the
cyber operation

very point of these operations
spective, there

would appear

is

to avoid detection. Therefore,

to be

from a practical per-

no window of opportunity

for the victim of an

attack to respond. In the cyber conflict environment, therefore, the only reasonable interpretation of "for such time"

ing which the direct cyber participant

that

is
is

it

encompasses the entire period dur-

engaging in repeated cyber operations.

Cyber Operations as Armed Conflict

means of targeting an opponent, for
the technology necessary to conduct them is cheap and accessible. In particular,
they represent an effective method for a weaker State to strike at a technologically
more advanced, and therefore more vulnerable, adversary. But do cyber operations
comprise "armed conflict," as that term is used in IHL? This is "the" threshold
question, for IHL does not apply in the absence of armed conflict.
When cyber operations are merely one aspect of an ongoing armed conflict,
they must comport with the IHL applicable to that category of armed conflict. For
instance, because the conflict between Russia and Georgia was international in
Cyber operations are a particularly

attractive

character, the ensuing cyber operations were subject to the law of international
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armed conflict. Any operations
if

qualifying as attacks under that body of law would,

directed at civilians, constitute violations of IHL

The

difficult case involves

Rather,

it

IHL

cyber operations that take place in the absence of

Can they constitute an armed conflict, and, if so, what type? Un-

kinetic hostilities.
fortunately,

and war crimes.

treaty law does not define the phrase

"armed

conflict" per se.

only expands on the two subcategories of armed conflict, international

and non-international armed conflict.
As to international armed conflict, Common

Article 2 to the four 1949

Geneva

Conventions is traditionally viewed as the proper articulation of the scope of inter-

armed

national

which may

conflict: "all cases

arise

of declared war or of any other armed conflict

between two or more of the High Contracting

plaining the article's reach, the ICRC's

Parties." 67 In ex-

commentary thereon notes

that

and leading to the intervention of members
meaning of Article 2, even if one of
the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the
conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating
[a]ny difference arising between two States

of the armed forces

forces.

The

is

an armed

conflict within the

68

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has like-

wise opined that "an armed conflict exists whenever there

is

resort to force between

States." 69

This threshold must not be confused with that of an "armed attack," the condition precedent for acts in self-defense under the jus ad bellum. 70

The

International

Court of Justice (ICJ) described armed attacks in the Nicaragua case

as involving

frontier incident." 71

Under
IHL, however, an "international armed conflict" commences whenever an armed
exchange between States occurs, regardless of the scale and effects of the hostilities.
Applied to cyber operations, it is clear that any operation by or attributable to a
State that results in damage to or destruction of objects or injury to or death of individuals of another State would commence an international armed conflict. This
is because they constitute attacks under IHL. More problematic from a classification of conflict point of view are cyber operations causing no damage or injury, but
instead merely inconvenience, disruption, disorder or irritation. The results of
certain "scale

and

effects,"

which excluded "a mere

such operations might nevertheless be severe, as in significant interference with the

economy, transportation system or other

One

possibility

is

critical infrastructure.

to limit international

armed

conflict to situations in

"attacks" have occurred. Since attacks are "acts of violence,"

comport with the

fact that

IHL only

applies once a conflict
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which

doing so would

"armed," as well as
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ICRC Commentary's

armed forces. Although uncontested occupation and detention also constitute armed conflict while
harming neither persons nor objects, 73 they both rely on the possibility of enforcement through the use of force. By this interpretation, non-destructive computer
with the

reference to intervention by the

network exploitation, espionage, denial of service attacks and other invasive but
non-destructive cyber operations would not initiate an

lemma

is

attacks

might

that in practice States targeted

on

netic attacks

by non-destructive,

armed

treat the operations as

armed

conflict.

The

di-

yet otherwise severe,

conflict that justified, for instance, ki-

their enemies' military objectives

and combatants.

A second possibility for classification of events involving cyber operations is one
based on the more liberal
tions targeting civilians
ically

damaged or

Dormann

definition of attacks,

which includes opera-

and civilian objects irrespective of whether they were phys-

injured. Because directing operations against protected persons

or objects constitutes an attack by this interpretation, an international

armed con-

would commence once a State or those under its control launched them. However, the position is arguably over-inclusive in that by focusing on the target of an
operation, it has no means to distinguish non-destructive "attacks" from nonflict

destructive military operations that

fail

to qualify as attacks, such as lawful psycho-

logical operations directed at the civilian population.

Both approaches have merit, the former
ings of IHL, the latter in that

it

would respond

derstanding is under-inclusive since
to

in

which IHL would not apply. As

it

it

its fidelity

to received understand-

to concerns that the traditional un-

admits of highly disruptive cyber operations

stands, though, the former represents lex lata,

the latter lexferenda.

A

major complication

is

the current prevalence of cyber operations by non-

State actors, as in the case of the Georgia-Russia conflict.

take

Such actions will

typically

on the character of the kinetic conflict under way and be dealt with by the rele-

vant rules of targeting, especially those governing direct participation by civilians
in hostilities.

However, a

classification

conducted by non-State actors

The

in the

dilemma

arises

when

cyber operations are

absence of related kinetic operations.

issue of attribution of a non-State actor's acts to a State

ditional test

was

case. There, the

set forth

by the International Court of

Court articulated the

United States participation, even
ing, training,

tion of

its

operation,

complex. The

Justice in the

"effective control" test.

if preponderant

is

It

tra-

Nicaragua

held that

or decisive, in the financing, organiz-

supplying and equipping of the contras [Nicaraguan guerrillas], the selec-

military or paramilitary targets,
is still

insufficient ... for the

and the planning of the whole of

its

purpose of attributing to the United States the

committed by the contras .... All the forms of United States participation mentioned above, and even the general control by the respondent State over a force with a
acts
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high degree of dependency on

it,

would not

in themselves

mean, without further

evi-

dence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary

human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the

applicant State. Such acts could
committed by members of the contras without the control of the United States.
For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in
principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed. 74
to

well be

This

test

was reaffirmed by the Court

although the

test is often cited

in Nicaragua

was

By

in the

Congo and Genocide cases. 75 However,

with regard to conflict classification, the actual issue

State responsibility for alleged actions of the contras.

contrast, the Appeals

Chamber of the ICTY

dealt with the issue of conflict

held

classification directly in Tadic. Explicitly rejecting the effective control test,

it

that the authority of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the Bosnian Serb

armed

groups "required by international law for considering the armed conflict to be international

was

overall control

going beyond the mere financing and equipping of

such forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of
military operations." 76

The debate over the applicable standard remains unsettled. Nevertheless, there
is no question but that a State may be responsible for the actions of non-State actors and that such responsibility may result in the existence of an international
armed conflict. Therefore, when a State directs particular cyber attacks by nonState actors {Nicaragua) or (perhaps) participates in general planning and supervision (Tadic) of such attacks, an international armed conflict comes into being between the target State and the State exercising control over the attackers. By
contrast, no armed conflict commences when a State simply tolerates or sympathizes with cyber attacks emanating from its territory, although the State may be in
breach of its international legal obligation to "police"

used to the detriment of other

States.

its

territory to ensure

it is

not

77

Determining whether a cyber operation conducted in the absence of kinetic
operations comprises non-international

Common

Article 3 to the

armed

conflict

Geneva Conventions

conflicts as those that are "not of

international

armed

conflict

is

styles

is

more

non-international

an international character."

that

which occurs between a

armed groups or between such groups. Two

challenging

criteria exist

78

armed

Specifically,

State

still.

non-

and organized

—organization

and

intensity.

Organization has been dealt with earlier with regard to qualification as an organized armed group vis-a-vis the rules of direct participation. The criterion would
rule out

any attacks mounted by either individual "hackers" or groups of hackers

who lack the necessary degree of organization as non-international armed conflict.
105
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Such attacks would therefore be governed by domestic criminal law and
rights

norms, not IHL. As to "virtually" organized groups, the analysis

human

set forth

above would apply. To the extent the group in question qualified as an organized

armed group, the first criterion for non-international armed conflict would be met.
Non-international armed conflicts must also evidence a certain degree of intensity.

Unlike international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict

quires

more than mere limited hostilities.

tensions, such as riots, isolated

similar nature" are excluded

ICTY

and

In particular, "internal disturbances

and sporadic

acts of violence

from the ambit of such

conflict.

and other
79

re-

acts of a

According to the

armed conflicts involve "protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State," 80 a definition embraced by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and present in the Statute of the International
in the Tadic case, non-international

Criminal Court. 81
This criterion would keep most cyber attacks (in the absence of kinetic operations)

from qualifying

tracted requirement

as non-international

would

their destructiveness.

armed

conflict. In particular, the

pro-

rule out individual or sporadic attacks irrespective of

Moreover, non-destructive cyber operations would,

as dis-

armed conflict at all. Given the intensity criterion, they certainly would not with regard to non-international armed conflict.
The result is that cyber attacks conducted against a State must be quite intense before constituting a non-international armed conflict.
cussed, be unlikely to even qualify as

It

should

finally

non-international

be noted

armed

that,

although Additional Protocol

conflict for States party thereto,

it

II

also addresses

only applies

when an

organized armed group involved in the conflict "exercise [s] such control over a
part

of

a State's territory that

operations."
State

would

82

it

can "carry out sustained and concerted military

Obviously, a group conducting solely cyber operations against a

fail

to

meet

this

requirement.

Concluding Thoughts
This article has but scratched the surface of the
ing application of

IHL

many problematic issues surround-

to cyber operations. Three were singled out for attention

The dilemma is that IHL was crafted during a
period in which the cyber operations were but science fiction. However, today no
modern military enters the battlespace without at least some reliance on computers and computer networks. For the modern military, cyber capabilities represent
both force multipliers and vulnerabilities. And as demonstrated in the case of the
and of these none was

fully resolved.

Georgia-Russia conflict, civilian cyber assets are an especially attractive target
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not only for militaries, but also for individuals or groups intent on involvement in
the conflict in question.

IHL must respond to the challenges posed by this new technology. The past decade has witnessed numerous efforts, in particular by the Naval War College, to
identify challenges posed by cyber warfare to the extant norms of IHL, and to international law more generally. 83 Today, practitioners and scholars are increasingly
sensitive to the challenges, such as those set forth in this article, of applying IHL to
cyber operations. 84 Hopefully, the next decade will witness their resolution by the
legal,

operational and policy communities.
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Who May Be Held? Military Detention
through the Habeas Lens

Robert M. Chesney*

Who

lawfully

may be held in military custody without criminal charge?

seems a simple question, and in some

that matter

most at the moment

not simple

at

all.

settings

it is.

But in the settings

—counterterrorism and counterinsurgency—

The very metrics of legality

It

it is

are disputed in those contexts, with

sharp disagreement regarding which bodies of law are relevant and what

if

any-

thing each actually says about the detention-scope issue.

This problem has been with us for some time.

US

It

has lurked in the background of

detention operations in Afghanistan since 2001 l and in Iraq since 2003. 2

central, of course, to the controversies

surrounding the use of detention

at

It is

Guan-

tanamo and in the United States itself. 3 More than one hundred thousand individuals have

to an

been detained without criminal charge across these

immense amount of scholarship, advocacy and

markably, however, the question of

who

lawfully

settings,

4

giving rise

litigation

along the way. Re-

may be

detained remains

unsettled in important respects.
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The problem

exists

along two distinct dimensions, only one of which do

dress in this article. First,
is

through the Habeas Lens

we have indeterminacy at

I

ad-

the group level insofar as there

disagreement with respect to whether any authority to use military detention

that the

US government may currently possess extends to any entities other than al

Qaeda and the Taliban, and

also insofar as there

them

for

disagreement regarding which

Qaeda or the Taliban so as to be indistinpurposes of this inquiry. 5 Even if we had agreement re-

entities are sufficiently affiliated

guishable from

is

with

al

garding which groups are relevant for purposes of the detention issue, however,

indeterminacy also manifests

at the individual level insofar as

we

also lack agree-

mix of conditions that are necessary or sufficient to justify the
detention of a particular person. My aim in this article is to shed light solely on this

ment regarding

the

individualized set of questions.

That we lack consensus with respect to individualized detention
constraints despite nearly a decade's

and

worth of litigation and debate to some extent

our preoccupation with other questions associated with military deten-

reflects

above

tion,

criteria

all

the seven years'

war over the habeas

Guantanamo detainees. Yet even prior to the resolution of that
dispute in the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Boumediene v.

in relation to the

jurisdictional

jurisdiction of federal courts

6

Bush, 7 courts did have several occasions to address the detention-scope issue; they
just did

not develop a consensus as a

result.

On

the contrary, they splintered

sharply in those cases, advancing an array of incompatible views regarding the applicable law. 8

Many
district and circuit court judges have had a chance to address who lawfully may be
Matters have improved to some extent in the aftermath of Boumediene. 9

detained in the context of the
flect a

inal

litigation.

Their decisions re-

consensus that the government does have authority to detain without crim-

charge in at least

some circumstances, and that

these circumstances at a

sons

Guantanamo habeas

who

are "part

of

al

minimum
Qaeda or

include at least

(at least for

some

most of the judges)

scenarios involving per-

the Taliban (whether the consensus extends to

membership in other groups is much less clear). But beyond these points disagreement reigns.
Whether a person is "part of a group may be an administrable inquiry in the
context of a regular armed force, but it does not map easily onto scenarios involving clandestine non-State actors with indistinct
tures.

As

do not

a result, judges

who

necessarily agree as to

agree that

and unstable organizational

struc-

members of such groups may be detained

what conduct actually counts

as

membership

in this

And the judges most definitely have not reached consensus with respect to
whether detention lawfully may be used in the distinct situation in which a nonmember provides support to these groups. Indeed, the executive branch itself now
context.
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appears divided on the propriety of using support as a stand-alone detention predicate.

Perhaps most remarkably, an apparent consensus as to the relevance of the

laws of war to these questions recently

came unglued, with

a divided panel of the

D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals declaring that the matter should turn exclusively on

domestic law considerations 10 and a subsequent assertion by a majority of the active

judges of that court in turn declaring that assertion to be dicta. 11

All of which
ter in practice?

tions in the

is

interesting in the seminar setting, but does

any of it actually mat-

That is not a frivolous question. By and large the merits determina-

Guantanamo habeas

cases have turned

on the

government's evidence (or lack thereof), and not on the
government's notional detention authority.
jurisdiction has not (yet)

12

legal

sufficiency of the

boundaries of the

For better or worse, moreover, habeas

been extended to overseas military detention operations

involving non-citizens at locations other than Guantanamo, 13 and thus one might

be tempted to conclude that any problems resulting from the judiciary's persistent
inability to resolve the detention-scope question will

be confined to a

finite

and

shrinking set of cases.
the question of who lawfully

maybe detained matters a great deal in actual practice. As a threshold matter, the two premises mentioned above may prove
to be incorrect. Much Guantanamo habeas litigation is yet to come, and it may well
In

fact,

be that future cases will turn on

this

very issue. Similarly, the precise boundaries of

habeas jurisdiction have not yet been fixed; though currently jurisdiction does not
extend to Afghanistan, that question remains the subject of live litigation. 14 Even

if

those premises remain valid, however, other considerations ensure the relevance of
the detention-scope question.
First,

the answers judges give to this question have spillover effects

beyond the

15

They overhang any other detention operations
conducted under the rubric of the same underlying detention authority, regardless
of whether those operations are subject to judicial review; government and military
lawyers will not simply ignore judicial pronouncements regarding the scope of that
authority, and may be expected to advise commanders and policymakers accordingly. By the same token, judicial decisions regarding the notional scope of detenimmediate context of habeas.

tion authority

may apply by extension to questions of targeting with lethal force in

the field pursuant to that

same authority, notwithstanding that targeting decisions

ordinarily are not directly subject to judicial review. 16 Future conflicts unrelated to

9/11

may

also

be impacted. The judges in the habeas litigation

at

times have in-

cluded in their analyses interpretations of key terms and concepts from both inter-

—such
necessary and appropriate
—
national

and domestic law

as "direct participation in hostilities"

force"

armed

that will be relevant in

conflicts.
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not

and

all

"all

future
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Taking

of this together,

all

through the Habeas Lens

we can see that the judges

in the

habeas litigation are

not merely deciding whether to grant the writ in particular cases. They have be-

come, for better or worse, the central
critical

US government

—and ultimately unavoidable—

institution

engaged in the

task of tailoring the laws governing mili-

tary activity to suit the increasingly important scenario in

which

States classify

clandestine non-State actors as strategic threats requiring a military response.

The paper proceeds

in three parts.

I

begin at a high level of abstraction in Part

I

by drawing attention to two strands of debate that greatly complicate the task of determining whether particular detention criteria are forbidden, required or permitted

by

law:

(i)

disagreement regarding which bodies of law actually apply in a

particular instance,
say, if anything,

and

when

(ii)

disagreement as to what a particular body of law has to

comes

it

to

employing particular

criteria in a detention

standard.

Against this backdrop, Part

II

provides a comprehensive descriptive account of

how judges since 2002 have addressed the question of individual detention criteria,
emphasizing that which has been settled and that which remains in dispute. In
brief,

judges largely (though not entirely) agree that detention authority lawfully

extends to persons

who are functional members of al Qaeda, the Taliban or associ-

membership means in this setting or
whether detention authority also extends to non-members who provide support to
ated forces, but they do not agree as to what

such groups. Part

III

tainty truly matters
it

concludes with a discussion of whether this lingering uncer-

(it

does,

on many levels) and,

if so,

what should be done about

(legislation, preferably).

L Contested Metrics of Legality
Nearly a decade has passed since the United States began employing military de-

Qaeda and
Nonetheless, the question of who lawfully maybe held in that manner

tention without criminal charge in circumstances relating to
Taliban.

anyone

— remains the

Before examining

al

the

—

if

subject of bitter disagreement.

how litigants and judges have attempted to

agreements in the habeas

setting,

it is

resolve these dis-

worth pausing to describe why,

at a

high level

of abstraction, the parties to these debates so often appear to be speaking past one
another. There are two overarching problems that contribute to that state of affairs.
First,

there

is

disagreement

at the

actually apply to this question.

mestic law?

(IHRL)?

Law of armed

threshold with respect to which bodies of law

Should

it

be answered solely with reference to do-

(LOAC)? International human rights law
"domain" debate. Second, with respect to each of

conflict

We might call this the

these potentially applicable bodies of law, there
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disagreement as to what

if
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anything

it

has to say regarding which detention predicates and constraints are

necessary or permissible.

We might call this the "content" debate.

do not propose to settle the domain and content debates here, nor even to engage them in a comprehensive way. Rather, my goal simply is to orient the reader to
I

their basic features.
straints

Combined with the typology of detention predicates and con-

provided in the preceding Part,

this will

equip the reader to fully appreciate

the points of consensus and disagreement emerging from the habeas litigation

discussed in Part

A. The

II.

Domain Debate: Disagreement Regarding Which Bodies of Law Apply

Which bodies of law are relevant with respect to the detention-scope question? The

may depend on the circumstances, and thus it
may be most accurate to say that there are many answers to it rather than just one.
answer to

this question

of course

But in any event, the candidate
constitutional),

1.

LOAC

legal

regimes include domestic law (statutory or

(or international humanitarian law)

and IHRL.

Domestic Law

At one extreme, the question of who lawfully may be held might require
domestic law analysis.

September

18,

about the topic

On this view, for example, one might first consider what the

2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 17

—

or, if you prefer,

a direct source of detention
that

solely a

(AUMF)

has to say

what might be gleaned from the Constitution

power

18

—and then

as

take note of any other limitations

might be derived from the Constitution, other

statutes, or prior

US caselaw. If

the government's claim of detention authority is consistent with these sources, the

debate ends.

Of course,

treaties are part

of domestic law in the sense that the Constitution

makes them supreme law of the

land. 19

Thus the "domestic-only" viewpoint does
not necessarily exclude consideration of LOAC and IHRL instruments. Insofar as
those treaties are not self- executing or have been "unexecuted" by a subsequent
statute, however, some argue that they are relevant solely in a diplomatic sense. 20
At least with respect to IHRL instruments, moreover, the US government has long
maintained the position that they simply do not apply to US government conduct
occurring outside of formal

US territory. 21

In any event, the notion of a purely domestic approach to determining the legal

boundaries of detention authority is no mere academic invention. As we will see in
Part

II

below, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals adopted precisely this view in

January 2010 decision Al-Bihani

v.

Obama. There
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are,

however, other models.

its
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The Law of Armed Conflict
The second model accepts the

through the Habeas Lens

2.

LOAC. On

directly

LOAC might matter in either of two ways, one weak and one
the weak view, LOAC must be considered when interpreting the

this view,

strong. First,

AUMF

on

(or, for that matter,

ample, one would look to

tively,
its

"all

right,

22

interpreting the scope of authority conferred

Consistent with the Charming Betsy canon, for ex-

LOAC in order to flesh out the meaning of the AUMF's

necessary and appropriate force" as

on the strong view,

own

when

by the Constitution).

language

than just the diplomatic relevance of

legal rather

it

relates to detention. 23 Alterna-

LOAC might be treated as a legally binding constraint in

independent of the best reading of the underlying domestic source

of authority.
It is

not clear that the difference between the weak and strong models matters in

The

the context of the scope-of-detention issue.

underlying domestic source
interpretation, thus

is

difference might matter

so clear that there

no occasion

is

for a

making the weak but not the strong model

where the

LOAC-based

inapplicable. But

that hardly seems to be the case here, given the relative lack of clarity of the
tic

sources involved. Applied in this setting, in other words, both the

LOAC

strong models would direct us to look to

domes-

weak and

to define the scope of the

government's detention authority.
All that said,

LOAC

is

not automatically relevant in in

rather, applicable in circumstances of

"armed

all

circumstances.

conflict." 24 In order to

It is,

determine

LOAC's field of application, one must identify and define the scope of "armed contasks that generate considerable disputes. Some scholars reference funcflict"

—

tional criteria involving the duration, intensity and nature of the violence at issue, 25

while others also emphasize the formal categorization of the asserted "enemy" in

terms of its status as a

one accepts that a

insurgent group." 26 Even

"state, nation, belligerent, or

state

when

of armed conflict justifying application of LOAC exists in

one particular location, moreover, there

considerable disagreement as to

is

whether and when any resulting rules can or must be applied in relation to persons
in geographically distinct locations. 27 Indeed,

no exaggeration to say that the
most fundamental divide separating the legal positions of the Bush and Obama administrations from the views of critics in the international law community has to
do with the propositions that (i) the activities of al Qaeda rise to the level of armed
conflict in places other than Afghanistan

armed

it is

and

(ii)

conflict in Afghanistan permits reliance

Qaeda-related individuals in other locations.
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in

on

any event the existence of

LOAC

concepts against

al
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3.

International

Human Rights Law

The third model tracks the second, but looks to IHRL rather than LOAC. That is to
say, one can advance both a weak (interpretation-based) and strong (independentforce) model of IHRL's relevance to the scope question.
Either way, the key point of departure for debate regarding the relevance of

IHRL

involves the question of extraterritoriality. For present purposes, the

relevant

IHRL

(ICCPR),

29

treaty

is

the International Covenant

on

Civil

and

most

Political Rights

which, as discussed below, contains language relating to detention. 30

Article 2 of the

ICCPR

provides that a

on persons "within

protections

its

member

territory

State

bound

is

and subject

to

its

ICCPR

to confer

jurisdiction." 31

The

United States has long construed this language literally, such that ICCPR rules govern within the United States but not elsewhere. 32

Many

other States (including

many European allies), in contrast, construe that same language to encompass any
person subject to a member State's practical control regardless of geographic location, as

does the

Council). 33

An

UN

Commission on

its

Rights

(now

the

Human

Rights

interpretive standoff results, with great risk of outright misunder-

standing insofar as either side
share

Human

fails

to appreciate that the other simply does not

view.

Even if one accepts the US position regarding the geographically bounded reach
of the ICCPR, however,
side

US

territory, after

IHRL issues might still arise. Not all detentions occur out-

all.

On three occasions after 9/11,

States held persons in military custody within the

United

for example, the

United States

itself.

34

And in the

wake of the Supreme Court's Rasul and Boumediene decisions emphasizing the
unique degree of US control at Guantanamo, debate may yet arise as to its status
vis-a-vis the

ICCPR's

jurisdictional provision. In

only possible source of an
tain

norms comparable

turn

may require

not the

found in the ICCPR. The question then becomes

entails a

comparable geographic boundary, and

this in

inquiry into the existence in the overseas setting of a pattern of

State practice supported

—

misunderstanding

4.

is

IHRL obligation. Customary international law may con-

to those

whether any such norm

any event, treaty law

is

by opinio

juris.

The room

for debate

—and hence

for

ample.

Deconfliction

The discussion grows still more complicated once one accounts for the potential of
the LOAC and IHRL models to overlap and conflict with one another. This potential overlap has occasioned an immense amount of scholarship, with some characterizing the situation as encroachment by IHRL
for good or ill
on the
35
traditional domain of LOAC.

—
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Here we confront the question of lex specialis. In brief,

lexspecialis

is

a choice-of-

law concept in which the more specifically applicable body of law governs in the
event of overlap. 36 Unfortunately, a variety of views exists regarding just what that

—enough

prompt the International Law Commission
37
The US government, for its part,
to undertake an effort to clarify the question.
takes the view that LOAC constitutes lex specialis in all circumstances of armed
concept means in practice

such that

conflict,

ations.
all

38

it

Some have

to

entirely occupies the field to the exclusion of

IHRL

consider-

taken a different view, treating lex specialis not as preempting

reference to another

body of

law, but rather as requiring the provisions of a

competing body of law to be construed

harmony with
view, would be

in

the rules provided by the

dominant body of law; IHRL, on that
applicable yet would be
39
conformed to LOAC in its particulars. Some might argue for a third position,
moreover, a rights-maximizing approach in which the controlling rule is whichever one that most advantages the rights of individuals, as opposed to advantaging the discretion of the State. One might also contend for a specificity-oriented
approach in which the governing rule is, literally, whichever rule speaks with
greater specificity to the fact pattern (whether

it is

more rights-protective or not). 40

Deconfliction of LOAC and IHRL, in short, requires resolution of a complex and

entrenched debate.

As

if this

were not enough complexity,

of course possible that the best an-

it is

swer to the relevant-body-of-law inquiry will vary depending on the circumstances.

That is,

it

may be that in one location LOAC plainly is relevant and IHRL is

not, while in other locations the reverse

is

true

and in

still

another location

it

might

be that the question turns partially or entirely on domestic law instead.

B.

The Content Debate: Disagreement Regarding the Rules Themselves

Unfortunately, the opportunities for confusion and disagreement are not confined
to the threshold determination of which

body or bodies of law

had consensus on that question, an equally intransigent

set

matter. Even

we

if

of disagreements

emerges within each domain when we turn to the question of what that body of law
has to say,

if

anything, regarding the particular

constraints that a State can or perhaps

Note

must

mix of detention

predicates

and

use.

that in the abstract there are several possible

outcomes when one seeks

to

determine what rule a particular body of law supplies with respect to the detention-

body of law may provide

and

scope

issue. First, the

that

narrower than the scope of detention authority asserted by the government.

is

Or the
ity as

reverse

may be true;

the rule

the government asserts.

a determinate

discernible rule

may permit at least as much detention author-

One can

expect litigants to emphasize one or the

other of these positions. But there are other possibilities. Most notably,
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body of law is simply indeterminate on the question of scope. In that case,
an important question arises regarding the default state of affairs. Does the absence
of a rule constitute an absence of affirmative authority for the government to exercise detention power? Or instead does it constitute an absence of constraint on the
that the

government's exercise of such powers? This too can be a point of disagreement.
nally,

may be

it

aforementioned

1.

that the

possibilities

most complete answer involves
depending on the circumstances.

Fi-

a blend of the

Domestic Law

how these possibilities map onto the domestic law sources relevant
to the substantive- scope question. One might begin with the September 18, 2001
AUMF, 41 which introduces a series of interpretive issues.
The AUMF does not refer expressly to detention. Of course, it also says nothing
express about killing or any other particular kind of military activity. What it does
Consider

first

authorize

is

the use of "all necessary and appropriate force." 42

threshold question as to whether
ity at

all.

is

a

should be read to confer any detention author-

In the case of citizens, moreover, that inquiry

tence of a 1971 statute
shall

it

Thus there

is

complicated by the exis-

—the Non-Detention Act—providing

that "[n]o citizen

be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to

an Act of Congress," 43

as well as the Civil

War-era precedent Ex parte Milligan

in

which the Supreme Court employed broad language in the course of holding that a
civilian

could not be subjected to a military commission

were open.

trial

where

civilian courts

44

Assuming this obstacle is overcome, the next task is to determine against whom
this authority may be directed. Here, the AUMF does a bit more of the work, as it
refers to "those nations, organizations,

mines were responsible for the 9/11
ties.

45

The Bush administration

and persons"

whom

attacks, as well as those

the President deter-

who harbor such enti-

exercised this authority by identifying

the entity responsible for the attacks

and the Taliban

as

al

Qaeda

having harbored

it,

as

the

Obama administration has continued that position, and there does not appear to
46

be any serious doubt that

it

was appropriate to do

AUMF refers at least to al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Thus

it

seems

settled that the

we had consensus regarding precisely which entities fall within the scope
AUMF, however, we would still have to grapple with disagreement at the

Even
of the

so.
47

if

individual level.

predicates

The

AUMF

and constraints

is

entirely silent with respect to the

mix of detention

that suffice to link a particular person to an

AUMF-

covered group, for purposes of detention or otherwise.

AUMFs (and declarations of war, for that matter). 48 Yet
no one in prior conflicts thought such silence to be significant. Why does it matter
This

is,

in fact, typical of

121

Who May Be Held? Military Detention
so

much now?

most prior

First,

through the Habeas Lens

conflicts involved nation-States as the

enemy;

who

hence the question of detention largely arose in relation to enemy soldiers

were both readily identifiable (through uniforms and through their overt presence

on a conventional battlefield) and eager to actually be identified (in order to ensure
prisoner-of-war (POW) treatment and qualification for the combatant's privilege
49
to use force). Second, even

hostilities

where prior conflicts involved a substantial amount of

with guerrilla forces

States resolved

—

as in

Vietnam

any incipient detention

motely resembling the scrutiny that

—

the question of

how

the United

issues simply did not receive anything re-

arises

today

(let

alone litigation). Matters are

otherwise in relation to the use of detention under the

AUMF, to say the least, and

thus the question of individualized detention predicates and constraints

more

significant than in the past.

No

on

other domestic law sources suffice to prevent debate and disagreement

these points. Congress, for
least

far

is

not directly. The

nificant

first

its

part, has

not returned to the question of scope,

post-AUMF legislation

to address detention in

way was the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA),

50

any

at

sig-

which among other

things addressed the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear challenges to individual

detention decisions at Guantanamo. 51 The
stantive standard as to

DTA did not purport to

who maybe detained,

define a sub-

however, but rather invited the D.C.

Circuit Court of Appeals to consider in particular cases whether the government's
assertion of detention authority was compatible with the "Constitution

the United States."

and laws of

52

The Military Commissions Act of 2006

(MCA

2006) came closer. 53

It

did not

purport to define the category of persons subject to detention without charge

under the

AUMF (or otherwise). It did, however, define the personal jurisdiction

of the military commission system. Specifically,
try cases involving

any

alien constituting

it

an "unlawful enemy combatant." 54

defined that phrase in turn to encompass any person
regular

armed forces

lawful belligerency),
hostilities

fully

.

.

.

falls

into

one of three

against the United States or

and materially supported

belligerents"; or

(iii) "is

who

is

It

not part of a State's

group obeying the traditional conditions of

(or a militia- type

and who

commissions could

stated that

its

categories:

co-belligerents";

hostilities against the

part of the Taliban,

al

(i)

"has engaged in

(ii)

"has purpose-

United States or

its

co-

Qaeda, or associated forces." 55

The MCA 2006 thus introduced a series of necessary and sufficient conditions to
bring a person within the jurisdiction of the
tions that were

narrowed only

Commissions Act of 2009
"unlawful

emy

slightly

(MCA

new war-crime

trial

system

—condi-

with the subsequent passage of the Military

2009). 56

The

MCA

2009 replaced the verbiage

enemy combatant" with the less baggage-laden phrase "unprivileged en-

belligerent." 57

It

kept the criteria relating to participation in hostilities and
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material support of hostilities. 58

Qaeda

It

also kept the "part

—thus omitting the

of

test,

but narrowed

to

it

pertain only to

al

risdiction over

an individual solely on the ground that he was part of the Taliban or

an associated

force. 59

MCA 2006

The

alternative of establishing personal ju-

and

MCA 2009

arguably shed some light on the substantive-

scope question, but for at least two reasons they do not suffice to end debate.
neither statute actually purports to speak to that question.

60

First,

Perhaps they nonethe-

do so by implication, on the theory that the boundaries of personal jurisdiction
the military commission system must extend at least as far as the boundaries of

less

in

the authority to detain without criminal charge. But

it is

not obvious that the two

questions have such a relationship to one another; one might expect the scope of

personal jurisdiction to be wider than baseline detention authority in
spects

and narrower

Second, the

some

re-

in others.

MCA criteria themselves are underspecified. In terms of predicates,

the criteria include both past conduct considerations (including both personal in-

volvement in

and an

hostilities

and the provision of support

associational status test (the "part

to

AUMF-covered groups)

of test). The "part of test is not further
room

calibrated, however, leaving considerable

for disagreement. This

is

an im-

portant omission given the diffused, evolving and informal organizational structure of non-State actors such as al Qaeda. 61

the

As

for potential constraints, moreover,

MCA criteria are silent with respect to considerations of geography and timing.

Complicating matters, some observers

may take the position that the ambiguity

of these statutes constitutes an implied delegation of authority to the executive to

—and perhaps

provide whatever further criteria maybe required
utive

also that the exec-

branch is entitled to deference from the judiciary in the event that its exercise

of that authority should become subject to judicial review. 62 This too becomes a
point of departure for debate, as would any claim that the Constitution

some combination of Article II powers, presumably)
tion authority independent of what
statute.

As to the latter argument,

it

may be

measure under the Article

II

some degree of deten-

conferred by the

suffices to

associated with the language of the

confers

AUMF

itself (via

AUMF or any other

note that the problems of ambiguity
surely arise in equal

if

not greater

authority rubric.

The Law of Armed Conflict
Assume for the sake of argument that

2.

LOAC is relevant in at least some post-9/1

circumstances involving detention. Unfortunately,

comes

to individual detention predicates

When

it

comes

and

armed

conflict

—

i.e.,

123

too

is

underspecified

when

it

constraints.

to the scope-of-detention issue,

relation to international

it

LOAC

is

most determinate

in

an armed conflict involving on each
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side at least

one High Contracting Party

tional setting, the full range of Geneva
a host of provisions that expressly

to the

through the Habeas Lens

Geneva Conventions. In

Convention protections

applies,

that tradi-

63

including

contemplate the use of non-criminal modes of

detention in military custody.

Under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GPW), for example, we find two articles confirming that a State may hold prisoners of war in custody without charge during hostilities. 64 GPW, Article 4, more-

who

over, provides a detailed definition as to

may

be detained without

any person

much

qualifies for

controversy).

Among

POW status (and hence

other things, this includes

who

(i)

is

a

member of the armed

(ii)

is

a

member of an

forces of a party;

irregular unit that obeys the four conditions of lawful

belligerency (having a

command

hierarchy, wearing a distinctive sign,

bearing arms openly and obeying the laws of war); or

is

(iii)

a

member

of regular armed forces belonging to a government that the

detaining State does not recognize. 65

The

central concept in each instance

is

membership. And

of

as

noted above, the

some contexts can
be a difficult concept to apply. Not so in this setting, however. The concept of
membership in structured armed forces presents few definitional issues. The use of
concept of membership (or being "part

a group) at least in

uniforms and the likelihood that a captured

member of such a group willingly will

concede such status in order to obtain the benefits of

POW

treatment further

reinforce clarity.

When
tional

a person does not qualify for

armed

conflict,

criminal charge.

On

it

POW status in the context of an

interna-

does not follow that he or she cannot be detained without

Geneva Convention

the contrary, the

Protection of Civilian Persons in

Time of War (GC)

expressly contemplates a non-

criminal regime of "security internment" for persons

nonetheless pose a threat to security in relation to an
the security internment provisions of the

Relative to the

who

armed

are not
conflict.

POWs, but
And while

66

GC are largely silent with respect to the
Committee of
omission was intentional

individualized criteria for triggering this authority, the International
the

Red Cross's commentaries on the

on the

part of the drafters,

who thought it best to leave the question of scope to the

discretion of the detaining State

opinion that

GC note that this

this authority

—though the commentaries themselves

offer the

might be applied, as one example, to intern individuals
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GC framework, in

based on their membership in a dangerous organization. 67 The
short, endorses

something in the nature of a generalized future dangerousness

in-

and does not demand particular forms of prior conduct or associational

quiry,
status.

If the

armed

question of detention authority arose only in the context of international

and scope of detention authority might generate little debate. Of course we might still have debates regarding the labels to be apconflict, then, the existence

and the resulting benefits

plied to detainees,

to be given them. In the event of a spy

or saboteur, for example, one might debate whether the person should be treated
as a

POW or a security internee, or perhaps instead placed in an interstitial cate-

gory for unprivileged belligerents. 68 But there would be

little

doubt

capacity to detain without charge given the existence of express

as to the basic

and sweeping

treaty language.

For armed conflicts that are not international in the sense described above,
however, the situation is quite different. Prior to 1949, no

LOAC treaty instrument

purported to apply beyond the confines of an international armed
1949 Geneva Conventions broke

new ground by

conflict.

including a single article

The

—

so-

—imposing

a handful of baseline humanitarian

protections for persons in the hands of the

enemy during such conflicts. Additional

"Common

called

Protocol
States

II

Article 3"

subsequently expanded upon those protections (though the United

not party to that instrument). Neither instrument explicitly confers sub-

is

stantive detention authority,

nor does either purport to limit or deny such

authority.

The

resulting opportunities for disagreement are considerable.

Some

construe

the silence as fatal for any effort to rest the existence of detention authority

LOAC,

let

view, both authority

(domestic,

LOAC

alone to use

IHRL

and

to define the scope of that authority.

definitional scope

or both).

70

69

On

on

that

must derive from other bodies of law

Others, however, contend that the absence of

affir-

on the theory
that LOAC on the whole is best understood to be a restraining body of law. 71 On
this view, anything that can be done in an international armed conflict a fortiori
can be done as well during non-international armed conflict including use of
the detention principles noted above. 72 Alternatively, some might take the posimative constraint

is

equivalent to an authorization by omission,

—

tion that

some form of affirmative

LOAC supplies it
national setting).

(again

LOAC authority is needed,

and

that customary

by analogy to the forms recognized by treaty in the

For those drawn to either of the

latter

two arguments, further

issues emerge. In-

sofar as a State seeks to bring to bear detention authority akin to the

power

to detain

inter-

73

members of the enemy armed
125

force, for

GPW-based

example, applying the

—
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"membership" concept
relatively disorganized

The

affair

when used

in connection with

non-State actors such as insurgencies or terrorist networks.

POW definition in GPW, Article 4 will not provide much assistance in that ciron the assumption of an organized armed
uniforms and the like.

cumstance, predicated as
a

not be a simple

will

through the Habeas Lens

command

hierarchy,

Of course,

a State

force with

it is

might seek to avoid such definitional

difficulties

by instead

analogizing to the more-sweeping detention authority associated with security

internment under the GC. But the very feature that might make
the lack of any particular substantive criteria

objections

no doubt

will

be muted

combat violence; the United

States

if

—

is

this attractive

sure to invite objections. Such

the context involves sustained, large-scale,

employed security internment to detain tens of

thousands of individuals in Iraq over the years following the international armed
conflict

and occupation phases

in

2003 and 2004, without engendering any serious

objections regarding the existence

pattern continues
rity

this

on

and scope of

its

detention authority, and this

UN Secu-

a small scale today long after the expiration of the

Council resolutions that for a time provided an ad hoc positive law blessing for
arrangement. 74 But one should expect the opposite

if

instead the setting in-

volves only episodic violence of a type not as readily associated in the public's

with combat and an

minate in

enemy

structure

its

"force" that

non-hierarchical or otherwise indeter-

is

and boundaries. In

that case,

arguments emerge

whether the threshold of "armed conflict" has been crossed in the
and, even

if so,

mind

whether the broad discretion associated with the

as to

instance 75

first

GC security in-

ternment system makes sense in the context of this particular form of violence.

3.

International

Though IHRL

Human Rights Law

refers to a diverse array

norms, for present purposes

norm
the

it

of treaties and international customary law

suffices to focus attention

in particular: the prohibition of arbitrary detention

ICCPR.

76

Article 9 provides that

all

as are established

not hold a person in custody at

its

treaty

and one

contained in Article 9 of

persons have a "right to liberty" and thus a

State shall not deprive a person of liberty "except

dance with such procedure

on one

by law." 77 That

own whim

claim that detention in that circumstance

is

on such grounds and

as

is

in accor-

to say, a State

may

opposed to doing so based on a

authorized by law.

Or at least it may not do so ordinarily. The ICCPR also provides that in the event
of a public proclamation of an emergency "which threatens the
States

life

of the nation,"

may "take measures derogating" from certain ICCPR obligations,

the prohibition

on arbitrary detention.

78

Then

again, the United States has not in-

voked the derogation option (presumably because the
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is
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ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially and that LOAC in any event controls over the ICCPR by virtue of the lex specialis principle, as discussed above).
Assuming that Article 9 is applicable, then, the question arises whether US government claims of detention authority after 9/11 might violate that norm. The US
that the

government presumably would argue that military detention conducted under the
auspices of the

AUMF satisfies Article 9, on the theory that the AUMF is a "law" es-

tablishing the "grounds" for such detention. In response,
Article 9 contemplates only criminal

there

is

substantial reason to

one might contend that

law as a source of detention authority, but

doubt that Article 9 requires such an approach. 79

Assuming that some degree of non-criminal detention is compatible with Article 9
one

(or, if

prefers,

with an equivalent customary

norm

against arbitrary deten-

we then reach the question whether the government's claim of some particular mix of detention predicates and constraints in some way violates IHRL. Here,
however, IHRL seems not to have anything particular to say; neither the ICCPR,
nor any other IHRL treaty to which the United States is a party, nor any customary
tion),

norm

of IHRL purports to offer a substantive definition of non-criminal de-

tention authority. 80

II.

Habeas Litigation and the Scope of the Detention Power

Against the backdrop of uncertainty described in Part
gled for nine years to identify the

I,

federal courts have strug-

mix of detention predicates and constraints per-

missibly defining the substantive scope of the government's military detention

authority at the level of the individual.

The range of

resulting disagreements

is

remarkable.

My aim in this Part is to provide a relatively comprehensive descriptive account
of these doctrinal disputes.

I

proceed in semi-chronological fashion, beginning

with the often-overlooked habeas opinions associated with the three individuals

who were held as "enemy combatants" within the United States after 9/11 and then
moving on to a review of the pre- and post- Boumediene Guantanamo habeas opinions. The survey documents considerable and persistent points of disagreement.
A.

The First Wave of Detention Criteria Caselaw: Hamdi Padilla and Al-Marri
y

For several years following 9/11, the judiciary largely was preoccupied with ques-

Most detainees were non-citizens captured abroad and held outside the United States, after all, and as a result did not
have a clearly established right to seek judicial review until the Supreme Court conclusively resolved that question in its 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush. Nonetions of jurisdiction, not substantive law.

theless,

judges did have occasion to address the matter of individual detention
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predicates

and constraints

in a

handful of cases in the pre-Boumediene era, including

a trio of cases involving detainees held in the
in a

1.

combat

United States (one originally captured

and two captured

setting abroad,

through the Habeas Lens

The Scope of Detention Authority

in the

in Relation to

United States

itself).

Conventional Battlefield

Captures Involving the Taliban

The

sole post-9/1

1

instance in which the

Supreme Court of the United

addressed the substantive-scope issue to any serious extent
in

which a majority of the Court concluded that

ular, serving as

an arms-bearing

(i)

is

Hamdi

v.

associational status

member of a Taliban

military unit

—

States has

Rumsfeld

—

y

in partic-

sufficed as a

detention predicate at least where the detention occurred on the field in Afghanistan

and while combat operations continue in that location, and

izen does not

Yaser

exempt a person from being subject

Hamdi had come

Northern Alliance forces

Hamdi was

into

in the

(ii)

being a US

cit-

to such detention authority.

US custody in Afghanistan after being captured by
fall

of 2001. The United States

initially believed that

a citizen of Saudi Arabia, but learned after bringing

him

to

Guan-

had been born in Louisiana and hence could claim to be a US
citizen as well. As a result he was moved to a detention facility inside the United
States, and he no longer faced the jurisdictional hurdles then preventing other
Guantanamo detainees from obtaining habeas review.
Hamdi's case presented a relatively easy fact pattern from the viewpoint of the
substantive-scope issue. He was not alleged to be an al Qaeda member or associate, and he was not captured in circumstances seemingly unrelated to conventional armed conflict. Rather, the government claimed, he was an arms-bearing
fighter for the Taliban who had been captured with his unit and his weapon while

tanamo

that he

fleeing the battlefield in Afghanistan.

present purposes the important point

Hamdi denied
is

that this

was

true,

but for

that the allegations cleanly presented the

question whether a person meeting that description lawfully could be held with-

out criminal charge.

The

fact pattern actually

posed two distinct substantive-scope questions.

did the government have authority to detain any person in this situation

bearing arms for the Taliban in Afghanistan? Second,

if

to be a

US

citizen?

The Supreme Court

—

i.e.,

the government did have

such authority as a general proposition, would the answer change

happened

First,

if

the person

splintered in response to these

questions.

A plurality of the Court in an opinion by Justice O'Connor upheld both the government's notional assertion of some authority to detain, as well as
authority extended at least to Hamdi's alleged circumstances

provided a

fifth

—and

vote for these conclusions in a separate opinion.
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claim that such
Justice

Thomas

To begin with, the

—
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plurality

framed the issue

—

AUMF as construed in light
applicable;

to detain,

conflict in Afghanistan

conflict in

i.e.,

the plurality focused

no treaty-based detention provision appeared

Hamdi was not

by

a question of domestic law informed

on the meaning of the
of the law of armed conflict. 82 As to the existence of

reference to international law

some authority

on

as turning

directly

held as a prisoner of war or security internee, and the

by 2004 no longer appeared

to be

an international armed

any event. Nonetheless, the plurality concluded that detention was a

traditional "incident" of warfare

and

thus, presumably, a necessary part of what-

body of customary LOAC principles might govern in this setting. 83 As for who
precisely might be detained as a result, the plurality concluded that detention
ever

authority at least extended to persons
past conduct

and

who engaged in a particular combination of

associational status: bearing

unit in Afghanistan.
tive incapacitation,

84

arms

as part of a Taliban military

Emphasizing that the point of military detention

is

preven-

moreover, the plurality expressly rejected the idea that deten-

tion might be justified

on

the collateral ground that a person

may possess

useful

intelligence.

The

plurality pointedly did not express

detention authority in other settings.

tended beyond the Taliban to

al

It

any view

as to the existence or scope of

did not say whether detention authority ex-

Qaeda.

It

did not address the power to detain per-

sons captured outside of Afghanistan, or persons who did not literally bear arms on
a conventional battlefield.

It

merely observed that the "legal category of enemy

combatant has not been elaborated upon

in great detail,"

and that the "permissible

bounds of the category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are
presented to them." 85 The plurality did caution, however, that its "understanding
is based on longstanding law-of-war principles," and that "[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that

formed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel."

2.

al

The Scope of Detention Authority
Qaeda

in Relation to

in-

86

Domestic Captures Involving

The Hamdi decision left open more questions than it answered. What conduct
other than bearing arms on the battlefield might count as membership in an
AUMF-covered group justifying detention? Would membership continue to be
sufficient if a

to al

person were to be captured outside Afghanistan, or

Qaeda rather than the Taliban? Could conduct

especially providing material support

aside

if the

linkage was

from membership

—provide an independent

sufficient condi-

tion for detention in any location?

The cases of Jose Padilla and Ali Salah Kahleh al-Marri provided an early opportunity to address some of these loose ends. Unlike Guantanamo detainees, but like
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through the Habeas Lens

Yaser Hamdi, both were in a position to seek habeas review with
jurisdictional disputes. Padilla

was an American

sleeper agent

who had come back to

citizen captured in

on the ground

eventually taken into military custody

little

that he

in the

Chicago and

was an

al

was arrested

United States and then later transferred to military custody based on

leged role as an

Qaeda

al

Qaeda

the United States to assist or even personally

participate in terrorist attacks. Al-Marri, a Qatari citizen, likewise
side the

way of

sleeper agent. Neither,

it

initially

in-

his al-

appeared, was directly

connected to the conventional battlefield in Afghanistan or to the Taliban.

The

moved forward quickly. Indeed, the substantive detention
was before Judge Michael Mukasey of the Southern District of

Padilla litigation

authority question

New York by December of 2002. 87 As an initial matter, he found that the President
had general authority

to use military force against al

Qaeda

as a result of both the

AUMF and Article II of the Constitution, and that the substantive scope of the resulting detention authority could be determined at least in part

LOAC

(at least insofar as

LOAC

form of

treaties to

to

which the United

88

LOAC, Judge Mukasey concluded, permits the
detention without charge of persons who qualify as either lawful or unlawful combatants. 89 He did not elaborate the conditions necessary to show that a person fits
States

into
ful

a party,

is

such as

GPW).

takes the

by reference

one or the other category; that is, he did not specify whether lawful and unlaw-

combatancy turns on conduct,

the notion that Padilla should be
citizen or because

status or both.

He did, however, expressly reject

exempt from detention simply because he was

he was captured within the United

States,

and he

jected the notion that detention authority extends only to persons

bore arms on a conventional
Padilla appealed,

the Second Circuit.

and in

91

battlefield.

late

For Judges Pooler and Parker, the

and his arrest within the United States

tional battlefield.

Court's

been

actually

critical facts

—

i.e.,

were

Padilla's

away from a conven-

In that specific scenario, they concluded, the Constitution re-

power

to detain be conferred expressly

by

statute,

not implicitly. 93

in this view, lacked sufficient clarity. 94

This set the stage for Supreme Court review, or so
ever, the

who

2003 prevailed in a decision from a divided panel of

92

The AUMF,

implicitly re-

90

status as a citizen

quires that any

a

Court avoided the

issue. In

it

appeared. In the end, how-

an opinion issued simultaneously with the

Hamdi ruling, the Court held that the petition in Padilla's case should have

filed in

South Carolina (the state in which Padilla was held at the time he filed)

rather than in

New York (the state in which he initially had been held). 95 Litigation

thus had to begin

On remand
Circuit's

anew

at the district

to the District of

court

level.

South Carolina, Judge Floyd adopted the Second

view that detention authority did not apply to an American captured in

the United States (absent a clear statement from Congress of its intention to convey
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such authority), and then added an additional reason to believe Padilla in particular

could not be detained. 96 The phrase

AUMF, he argued,

"all

necessary and appropriate force" in the

should be construed rather

literally;

any exercise of force must

no adequate non-military alternative is available. Padilla could not be detained militarily, on this view, because he could be
(and indeed for a time had been) incapacitated instead through the civilian crimi-

be "necessary" in the

strict

sense that

nal justice system. 97

A few months later, a Fourth Circuit panel reversed, albeit on somewhat unexpected grounds. 98 Referencing the

Hamdi

plained that the ultimate question

whether the

LOAC,

is

plurality opinion, Judge Luttig ex-

AUMF,

confers detention authority in a particular case.

point as to a Taliban
Padilla litigation

member

had seemed

captured in the

field in

to present the question

as

99

construed in light of

Hamdi had

settled the

Afghanistan, whereas the

whether the same

result

ob-

Qaeda member captured far from conventional combat. But as restated in the Fourth Circuit's opinion, Padilla's fact pattern looked much more like
that in Hamdi after all. Padilla, Judge Luttig emphasized, had received military
training at an al Qaeda facility in Afghanistan and was present there as part of an
armed al Qaeda unit serving the Taliban at the time of the US military intervention
after 9/1 1. 100 The only notable difference between Hamdi and Padilla, in this view,
was that the latter managed to evade capture until far from the battlefield. 101 This
was no reason to deny the government's detention authority in the panel's view,
tained for an

al

when the capture occurred within the United States. 102
Once more the stage seemed set for Supreme Court review. What would have

even

occurred next remains a mystery, however, as the government soon transferred

him in Florida. The move preand prompted a manifestly unhappy Judge

Padilla back to civilian custody in order to prosecute
cipitated criticism in

some

quarters,

Luttig to vacate his earlier opinion
as the vehicle for fleshing

on the merits. Nonetheless,

Padilla's special role

out the substantive law of detention had come to an end.

Going forward, it seemed that it would be the contemporaneous al-Marri litigation
that tested the boundaries of detention authority.

Like Padilla, Ali Salah Kahleh al-Marri initially pursued habeas relief in the

wrong jurisdiction, and

no judge addressed the merits in his case until
2005. 103 Eventually he refiled his petition in South Carolina, and like Padilla his
case came before Judge Floyd. As noted above, Judge Floyd in early 2005 had construed the

as a result

AUMF not to provide detention authority in Padilla's case, and since his

opinion addressing the same issue in al-Marri's case came
later

—before

down just a few months

the Fourth Circuit reversed Judge Floyd's Padilla ruling

doubt expected a similar

result.

But

it

—al-Marri no

turned out otherwise. Judge Floyd drew a

sharp distinction between citizens such as Padilla and non-citizens such as al-Marri,
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notwithstanding the

on

this view,

latter's

had been not

through the Habeas Lens

lawful residence in the United States. 104 Citizenship,

just

an important but a necessary condition of Judge

Floyd's earlier, strict reading of the

AUMF.

For non-citizens, Judge Floyd would

insist

on neither express statutory language conferring detention authority nor a

strict

reading of "necessity" such that military detention

criminal prosecution suffices as an alternative.

thus emerged alongside that of Judge

105

is

not available when

Judge Floyd's Al-Marri opinion

Mukasey in Padilla as broad endorsements of

detention authority away from the conventional battlefield.

Approximately one year later, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit yet again

The panel majority, written by Judge Motz, framed its analysis, at least at
outset, in terms of a domestic law consideration that would not necessarily apto non-citizens captured outside the United States. Specifically, Judge Motz

versed.

the

ply

re-

106

emphasized that al-Marri, though a non-citizen, was lawfully present in the United
States at the time of his arrest

Amendment Due
meaning of the

and hence able

Process Clause.

Fifth

107

to invoke the protections of the Fifth

The manner

Amendment,

which she elaborated the

Amendment in this context, however, had sweeping implica-

tions for the scope of the government's detention
Fifth

in

power even in other settings. The

she explained, generally precludes detention other than pursu-

number of narrowly defined exOne such exception is the power to detain an enemy combatant during

ant to criminal conviction, subject only to a fixed
ceptions.

108

war, 109 and the boundaries of that category must be ascertained by reference to

The court's analysis of the Fifth Amendment issue thus became a vehicle
for staking out a position regarding LOAC's general approach to the substantivescope issue a position that would carry implications for any detention carried out
under color of LOAC, regardless of whether the detainee had Fifth Amendment

LOAC.

10

1

—

rights or access to judicial review.

What precisely did the panel conclude with

respect to

LOAC's treatment of the

detention question? The opinion began by asserting that
rules for

LOAC

"provides clear

determining an individual's status" as either a "combatant" or a "civilian"

in the context

of international armed conflict. The panel asserted that civilians

were categorically

immune from

military detention without criminal charge,

ing to account for the security internment regime provided in the

fail-

GC. 111 LOAC,

the panel concluded, contemplated detention solely for combatants.

As

to

who

constituted a combatant, the panel looked to

GPW, Article 4, which

detention with

POW status.
eligibility for POW

ants" only those

who fight for the military arm of a nation-State, not just any armed

defines eligibility for

group.

1

,3

112

That

is

status,

to say, the panel equated eligibility for

adding that

LOAC

treats as

"combat-

Indeed, the panel added, there simply was no such thing as "combatant"
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status

—and hence no LOAC-based detention authority—outside

international

This was

armed

fatal to

conflict.

the context of

114

the attempt to detain al-Marri.

Hamdi had been

detainable in

arm of the

Taliban, with

theory because of his alleged affiliation with the military

the Taliban functioning as the de facto government of Afghanistan. Padilla's
bility ultimately rested
least,

even

if

on the same ground (according

not Judge Floyd).

115

eligi-

to the Fourth Circuit at

Al-Marri, in contrast, was a "mere"

Qaeda
At most

al

member with no alleged prior role as a de facto Taliban battlefield fighter.
he was someone associated with the enemy in a ^on-international armed conflict in
which there simply was no LOAC-based detention authority. No al Qaeda member
could be detained, on this view, absent the coincidence of having been in the
in Afghanistan in a context that could be described as bearing

Taliban

—whether

later

arms

field

for the

captured in the United States or not.

The government successfully sought
en banc review, resulting in a reversal of the panel by a narrow margin and a profound splintering of opinion regarding the substantive bounds of the government's detention authority. 116 Four judges, in a new opinion by Judge Motz,
But the al-Marri

litigation

was not

over.

—

endorsed the panel's original rationale. 117 Five other judges disagreed,

albeit for

different reasons.

Judge Traxler, in an opinion joined in relevant part by Judge Niemeyer, concentrated

on the language of the AUMF

itself,

and

in particular

on

its

reference to the

use of force against "organizations" as well as "nations" found to be linked to the
9/11 attacks. 118 In their view, the

AUMF reflects a legislative intent to permit mili-

tary force against al Qaeda, above
limits

that

on how such

force

119

They did not dispute

that

LOAC defined

might be employed, but rejected the panel's conclusion

LOAC permitted detention

arm of an

all.

actual nation-State.

only

when

dealing with

members of the

military

120

Judge Williams, in a separate opinion joined by Judge Duncan, offered a view
that

was simultaneously broad and narrow. Like Judge Traxler, Judge Williams

jected the claim that the detention authority conferred

by the

AUMF

re-

should be

arm of a government. But whereas
Judge Traxler suggested that LOAC imposed no such limitation, Judge Williams
accepted that the panel's approach "may very well be correct" as a statement of
LOAC; he simply did not think that any such LOAC-based restraints survived the
read to apply only to

members of the

military

AUMF's explicit reference to the use of force against "organizations" as well as "nations" linked to the 9/11 attacks. 121 Interestingly, however, Judge Williams in an-

other sense did define detention authority narrowly. Rather than refer to mere

membership
under the

in or association with

an enemy force

as sufficient to justify detention

AUMF, he advanced a conduct-based criterion: one must "attempt []
133

or
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cngage[]

i

through the Habeas Lens

122

on this model.
Further complicating
moreover, Judge Williams (somewhat inconsistently) held open the pos-

force" in order to be subject to detention

matters,

enemy

n belligerent acts against the United States" on "behalf of an

sibility that

detention authority might not continue to exist

was no longer engaged

Then we have

in conventional

when the United States

combat operations

in Afghanistan.

123

the distinctive opinion of Judge Wilkinson. 124 His analysis began

relatively conventionally, exploring

whether the

AUMF on its own terms plausibly

could be read to limit detention authority to members of government-sponsored

who

armed

forces or persons

ther

broad terms nor the

such

its

limits,

he concluded.

literally

fought on a conventional battlefield. 125 Nei-

legislative intent giving rise to

it

could be squared with

126

Next, Judge Wilkinson considered whether the broad scope of detention authority seemingly conferred

by the AUMF could be reconciled with any applicable

constitutional limitations given that al-Marri

United

States.

127

constitutionally

had been lawfully resident

in the

Hamdi, Judge Wilkinson observed that the government
may detain persons who count as "enemy combatants." 128 The
Citing

task at the heart of the constitutional inquiry, therefore,

was

to identify the con-

129

"enemy combatant" category.
Toward that end, Judge Wilkinson
reasoned that one must look to "traditional law of war principles." 130 LOAC was

tours of the

own force," he cautioned. But it mattered nonetheless because it
"informs our understanding of the war powers in Articles I and II and of the enemy
"not binding of its

combatant category." 131

Having

clarified his

lengthy discussion of

LOAC's treatment of

so,

Judge Wilkinson proceeded to a

the detention question. 132 In accord

without reference
— and
the GC — Judge Wilkinson accepted

with Judge Motz

framework in

motivation for doing

likewise

to the security

that

internment

LOAC permitted detention

without criminal charge solely for combatants, not for

civilians. 133

He

differed

sharply from Judge Motz, however, with respect to the scope of the combatant category.

Whereas Judge Motz

effectively

equated combatancy with

eligibility for

POW status, Judge Wilkinson accepted the government's contention that some individuals lose their eligibility for POW status by flouting LOAC yet nonetheless remain "combatants" subject to targeting and detention.
On that view, POW
134

status

is

not the measure of combatancy, nor was any "single factor" a necessary or

sufficient condition to establish that status. 135

The most one could say, Judge
Wilkinson argued, was that the category "traditionally included 'most members of
the armed forces'" as well as "those 'who associate themselves with the military arm
of the enemy government,'" 136 and that key indicia included self-identification
through the wearing of uniforms, involvement

in the

party to the conflict or presence on the battlefield.

134

137

command

structure of a
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At

point in his analysis, however, Judge Wilkinson introduced a distin-

this

LOAC

guishing proposition: that

is

evolving in the face of asymmetric warfare

and mass-casualty terrorism, bringing with
cept of combatancy.
tegic context exist in

138

He

relationship,

had "consistently accommodated changes
tional relations."

140

In our

own

era,

corresponding change to the con-

embraced the proposition that law and

expressly

dynamic

it

139

and argued that

in the

stra-

LOAC in particular

conduct of war and in interna-

he observed, war was becoming

"less a state-

based enterprise," with the diffusion of destructive technologies enabling super-

empowered non-State

actors to pose a strategic threat to States. 141 "Thus," he

concluded, "while the principle of discrimination and the category of

combatant surely remain a

vital part

enemy

of the law of war, they most definitely must

accommodate the new threats to the security of nations." 142
All of which raised two questions. Precisely how should LOAC evolve? And
through which institutional mechanisms should such evolution be effectuated or
recognized?

As

to the latter point, Judge

Wilkinson contended that the elected branches of

the government already had expressed their opinion of the matter

cluding "organizations" in addition to States in the AUMF's
at the outset

gal

of the opinion that the time had

framework to accommodate

proceeded
this

could be done.

own

perspective as to

how best

Going forward, he argued, the inquiry into combatant status

ought to turn on a three-step inquiry: a combatant

(1) ... a

a new, tailored le-

LOAC to the evolving strategic climate, 143 and he

at this point in his analysis to offer his
144

But he also stated

text.

come to "develop"

by expressly in-

is

a person

who

is

member of (2) an organization or nation against whom Congress has declared

war or authorized the use of military force, and (3) [who] knowingly plans or engages
in conduct that harms or aims to harm persons or property for the purpose of furthering military goals of the

The Wilkinson
test,

enemy nation

test, in short,

or organization. 145

combines a membership inquiry with a conduct

thus arriving at a result not unlike that advanced by Judge Williams. As to

membership, Judge Wilkinson conceded that identifying a sufficient degree of
association with a non-State actor would be more difficult than, say, ascertaining
citizenship. 146 Nonetheless,

he argued, the concept could be measured with

refer-

ence to criteria such as "self-identification with the organization through verbal
or written statements; participation in the group's hierarchy or
ture; or

command

struc-

knowingly taking overt steps to aid or participate in the organization's ac-

tivities." 147

As

for the additional requirement of involvement in hostile conduct,

Judge Wilkinson suggested that

this criterion

135

would encompass both those who
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literally

engage in

hostilities

through the Habeas Lens

and those who merely engage

in preliminary steps to-

would not also reach the
members of an enemy organization otherwise (and hence would not encompass
an al Qaeda doctor, for example). 148
The net result of the Traxler, Williams and Wilkinson opinions was a five-vote
ward such

acts (as

with a "sleeper

cell"),

majority rejecting the proposition that the
solely as to those

who

it

AUMF conferred

detention authority

fought for the armed forces of a government or those

The
whether membership in

had fought on a conventional
ever, with respect to

but that

battlefield.

five-vote block did not agree,

who

how-

a non-State organization such as al

Qaeda must be joined with hostile individual conduct in order for detention authority to attach, and it was unclear what the four-vote block associated with the
opinion of Judge Motz might think of that proposition.
The al-Marri litigation would shed no further light on these questions. The Supreme Court did grant certiorari in the case, but as had happened with Padilla previously, the government at that point mooted the case by transferring al-Marri to
civilian custody to face criminal prosecution
prompting the Supreme Court to
vacate the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remand the case to be dismissed as
moot. 149 Thus ended the last of the suits challenging the government's detention
authority in the exceptionally complicated
and exceptionally uncommon context of US citizen detainees and other persons captured inside the United States.
Some things seemed to have been settled along the way, others not. The judges
uniformly agreed that the AUMF conferred some detention authority, including at
even US citizens captured on the
least the authority to reach Taliban fighters

—

—

—

—

battlefield in Afghanistan.

Some

Beyond

this,

—

however, the judges disagreed sharply.

rejected the proposition that the authority could extend to al

individuals, while others took the contrary view.

Among those

Qaeda-linked

accepting that de-

tention authority could extend to the context of al Qaeda-related captures,

thought membership in

al

Qaeda a sufficient condition

argued that membership was necessary but not

for detention, while others

sufficient,

and

of knowing conduct associated with violence was also required.

found membership

was

that

some showing

Among those who

sufficient or at least relevant to the analysis,

relatively little discussion of just

some

moreover, there

what the indicia of membership in a non-State

Qaeda might be. None of the judges, finally, had occasion to address
the scenario in which a person was not a member of an AUMF-covered group but
actor like

al

had provided material support

to one.

The Second Wave of Detention Criteria Caselaw: The Guantanamo Cases
The end of domestic-detention litigation did not mean that courts going forward
would have no further opportunity to consider these debates. The same questions
B.
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of course arise in relation to the vastly more frequent scenario in which the military
has detained non-citizens captured and held overseas.

1.

Boumediene
Guantanamo in January 2002 and

Contesting the Substantive Scope of Detention Authority in

Between the opening of detention operations

at

summer of 2004, the ability of non-citizens held there to obtain judicial review

the

was sharply contested. That contest ended for a brief period in
June 2004, however, when the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush held that the federal

via habeas corpus

habeas corpus statute conferred jurisdiction as to the claims of the Guantanamo
detainees.

Not long

thereafter,

Congress enacted the

first

of two statutes designed

in part to overturn the statutory holding in Rasul, thus reviving the debate over ju-

between the Guantanamo detainees and

risdiction that stood

judicial consider-

—including arguments about

ation of any merits issues they might present

boundaries of detention authority.
beas litigation had

150

moved forward in

the legal

Yet in the months before Congress acted, hafederal court in

Washington, D.C., with two

cases proceeding to the merits.

would come together in the Supreme Court under the
name Boumediene v. Bush. At the district court level, however, they remained
quite distinct. One came before Judge Leon, who resolved the petition in the govUltimately, these cases

ernment's favor without addressing the substantive scope of the government's

came before Judge Green, who took

detention authority. 151 The other

the con-

trary view.

Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Judge Green
Guantanamo were entitled to the protections

In a January 2005 decision titled In re

concluded that the detainees held

at

of the Fifth Amendment notwithstanding their status as non-citizens captured and
held outside the United States. 152 This of course raised constitutional questions re-

garding the actual process the detainees had been afforded. But
stitutional

on

.

.

.

also raised a con-

question regarding the substantive scope of detention authority

asserted by the
litigation

it

government in the following sense. 153 One group of detainees in the

had argued

membership

that the Fifth

in anti-American organizations rather than

supporting the use of violence or
agreed, writing that

Amendment precludes detention

it

harm

on

against the United States."

would violate due process

if

the

"based solely

actual activities
154

Judge Green

government were

to hold a

person "solely because of his contacts with individuals or organizations tied to
rorism and not because of any terrorist
or undertook himself."

155

ter-

activities that the detainee aided, abetted,

In that respect, Judge Green's opinion was akin to the

view expressed by Judge Wilkinson in Al-Marri; for both judges, detention could
not be predicated on membership alone, but must include some showing of
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knowing involvement
tion in violence).

in violent activities

through the Habeas Lens

(though not necessarily direct participa-

156

would be some time before another judge would address the substantive

It

scope of detention authority in the context of a Guantanamo habeas claim. By the

time the decisions by Judges Leon and Green were before the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, Congress had enacted the Detainee Treatment Act, which purported to
eliminate statutory habeas jurisdiction

—thus

reviving the pre-Rasul jurisdictional

debate, albeit with a twist. Instead of eliminating

all

DTA cre-

judicial review, the

mechanism pursuant to which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
could review individual detention decisions at Guantanamo in order to determine
whether the military's screening system complied with the "Constitution and laws
of the United States" and whether the military had actually complied with its own
screening rules in a particular case. This model appeared to leave the D.C. Circuit
ated an exclusive

in a position to consider the legal
thority,

but

at the

same time the

boundaries of the government's detention au-

DTA

appeared to eliminate the habeas review

system that had provided Judge Green the occasion for her ruling.

—including many of
Judges Leon and Green— argued

Several detainees

the individuals involved in the cases be-

that this arrangement

fore

was unconstitutional,

reasoning that the Constitution required the existence of habeas corpus jurisdic-

Guantanamo and

tion at

quate substitute. That

that the D.C. Circuit review alternative

much

is

was not an ade-

widely appreciated, as their arguments did

Many are not aware, however, that these litigants
simultaneously pressed the substantive question of who lawfully may be detained,
ultimately prevail in Boumediene.

and

that this question

was briefed and argued to the Supreme Court alongside the

jurisdictional issue.

The

lead petitioners in Boumediene did not focus their arguments

Green's determination that the
rather than a
trated

Due

membership-based

on LOAC-based arguments

on Judge

Process Clause required a conduct-based

157
Instead,
test for detainability.

they concen-

would constrain the government's deten-

that

tion authority irrespective of whether a particular detainee could claim Fifth

Amendment

protections. Their

argument began with the premise

that

LOAC de-

fined the outer boundaries of whatever detention authority the United States

had. 158 Next, the petitioners argued that
tus in relation to
ting,

armed

conflicts

LOAC does not recognize combatant sta-

between States and non-State

actors; in that set-

they contended, everyone counts as a civilian. 159

One might have
Motz

in the

expected them to stop

at this point,

Al-Marri panel decision to the

ject to military detention.

effect that civilians

But they did not do

138

echoing the view of Judge

so.

On

simply are not sub-

the contrary, they conceded

Robert M. Chesney

that

some

civilians

could indeed be detained consistent with

LOAC. 160 But which

ones?

The

petitioners invoked the "direct participation in hostilities"

(DPH)

test, ar-

guing that any civilian could be detained to the extent that he or she had engaged in

DPH is a LOAC principle associated with the question of who maybe tar-

DPH. 161

geted with lethal force, reflecting the notion that whereas a "combatant"
targeted at

all

times so long as not hors de combat, a "civilian"

ally be targeted unless that

person

is

engaged in DPH.

may be

may never intention-

DPH is not, in other words, a

concept traditionally associated with detention authority. Nonetheless, in the context of a non-international

armed

conflict involving a clandestine

network the

members of which sought to obscure their identity, the idea of using DPH as a sorting standard had a certain appeal as a limiting principle for detention authority.

From

this

point of view, their argument was rather in the

spirit

of Judge Wilkin-

son's effort to craft a more-tailored understanding of "combatant" for use in the

same

setting, except that in this case the

LOAC

what

context.

argument was framed

as a description of

already requires as a binding rule of international law in this

162

Even assuming the Supreme Court was amenable

in principle to using the

DPH

standard as the measure of detainability, a problem remained. Famously, the pre-

meaning of DPH is the subject of fierce and protracted disagreement. 163
The petitioners would have to tread carefully in crafting their position on

cise

point. If they

pushed

for too

narrow a

definition, they

might alienate those

bers of the Court inclined to recognize a relatively broad
thority. If they

confirm their

on the

As an

initial

amount of detention

detainability. Ultimately,

broad

and perhaps

au-

surprisingly, they erred

definition.

matter, they conceded that immediate personal involvement in

conventional battlefield-type actions counts as direct participation. 164 That
is

mem-

advanced too broad a conception, on the other hand, they might

own

side of a

this

much

common ground for most, if not all, participants in the larger DPH debate. They

did not stop there, however. They also endorsed the view that a person can be

deemed perpetually engaged in DPH
status

—

—

in effect, waiving the protections of civilian

DPH on a repeated basis (a position rather like the
function" theory of DPH advanced by the International

insofar as he engages in

"continuous combat

Committee of the Red Cross, among others). 165 The petitioners added that this status would extend to leadership figures in al Qaeda, moreover, and most remarkably of all they suggested

who

might even extend to those actual members of al Qaeda

are subject to the group's direction

offered a test that
tion

it

—and

and

control. 166 In short, the petitioners

would leave the government with

—

targeting

a substantial

authority, while excluding those

139

who

amount of detenat

most provide
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Qaeda or the Taliban (presumably
the government at most could prove them to be in

support on a relatively independent basis to
the petitioners reasoned that

through the Habeas Lens

al

the latter category). 167

Notwithstanding

this invitation, the

chose to say nothing

at all

Supreme Court

in

Boumediene ultimately

about the question of detention standards, neither en-

dorsing nor rejecting Judge Green's objection to membership-based detention or
the Boumediene petitioner's
left

for the district courts to

DPH-based argument. 168 All of this instead would be
sort out in the coming wave of habeas litigation.

Boumediene
Much has occurred in the Guantanamo habeas litigation during the two and a half
years since the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene. The federal district court
2.

Contesting the Substantive Scope of Detention Authority after

in

Washington, D.C. has resolved the merits

vidual

and

Guantanamo

detainees, rinding for the

for the detainee in twenty-one.

be appealed.
level,

Of the

in habeas cases involving forty indi-

nineteen cases

government

Many of these rulings have been or may yet
won by the government at the district court

the D.C. Circuit has reached the merits in

and reversing and remanding

in nineteen instances

169

five,

affirming in four instances

for further consideration in

one other. 170 Of the

twenty-one cases won by the detainee at the district court level, the D.C. Circuit has
reached the merits in two, reversing with instructions to deny the writ in one instance 171 and reversing and remanding for further consideration in another. 172

Many

of these appellate decisions are themselves

all

the subjects of unresolved

and so the circumstances remain

petitions for certiorari,

In addition to

now

of

this,

in flux. 173

the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals very shortly after

Boumediene held that the government lacked authority to detain a group of seventeen Chinese Uighur detainees, because their alleged affiliation with the East

Movement did not bring them within the scope of the AUMF. 174
That ruling came under the auspices of the DTA, rather than the habeas corpus reTurkistan Islamic

view mandated weeks

earlier

by Boumediene^ 75 but the

result in

any event was a

defeat for the government.

For the most part, these decisions have turned on evidentiary

issues.

That

is,

they turn on questions such as whether and to what extent to credit certain kinds of
evidence, and above

all

whether the

suffices in a particular case to

tainee

is

who

collective

impact of the government's evidence

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a de-

the government claims

him

to be. 176 But along the way, the judges

have had several occasions to grapple with the substantive-scope questions

open by the combination of Hamdi,
predictably, they have disagreed

on

Padilla,

Al-Marri and Boumediene. Perhaps

several key points.

140

left

Robert M. Chesney

The

first

section

below surveys a handful of conflicting cases considering

whether future dangerousness should be treated
tention. For the time being at least, the

as a necessary condition for de-

answer to that question

is

no.

The next sec-

up a line of cases illustrating a strong consensus to the effect that
membership counts as a sufficient condition for detention, but also revealing considerable disagreement both as to the actual meaning of membership and whether
support independent of membership can serve as an alternative sufficient
tion takes

condition.

a.

Rejecting Personal Dangerousness as a Necessary Condition.

2009,

15,

Obama that the government may not conregardless of whether he or she was a member or

Judge Ellen Huvelle held in Basardh
tinue to hold anyone in custody,

On April

v.

supporter of a relevant group at the time of capture, where the person

is

not

likely

The September 18, 2001 AUMF "defines the
Executive's detention authority in plain and unambiguous terms," she asserted,
and "does not authorize the detention of individuals beyond that which is neces." 178 Reasoning that
sary to prevent those individuals from rejoining the battle
Basardh had no prospect of rejoining any enemy of the United States as a result of
"widespread public disclosure" of his cooperation with American interrogators,
Judge Huvelle concluded that he must be released. 179
This approach amounts to the imposition of a particular kind of "future dangerousness" condition, above and beyond whatever criteria might be required to justo "rejoin the

enemy"

released.

if

177

.

tify

detention in the

judges.

Two

district

first

b.

.

instance. It did not prove popular, however,

among other

judges explicitly rejected this aspect of Basardh, 180 and

significantly the D.C. Circuit eventually did the same. 181
this aspect

.

of the substantive-scope issue has been

more

For the time being, then,

settled.

Contesting Membership and Support as Sufficient Conditions. The bulk of

the post-Boumediene cases dealing with the substantive-scope question have fo-

cused on the role of membership and independent support as sufficient conditions
for detention. Notwithstanding earlier claims to the contrary by Judge

Green

in In re

Guantanamo Detainee Cases and Judge Wilkinson in Al-Marri, these opinions reflect
widespread agreement

among

the judges that associational status alone

membership in an AUMF-covered group
tify

detention. Consensus breaks

meaning of membership, and

—

dependent support

i.e.,

group by a non-member

—can

when

it

comes

it

comes

to fleshing out the

to determining

the provision of material support to an

—can

whether

in-

AUMF-covered

serve as an alternative sufficient condition.
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i.e.,

serve as a sufficient condition to jus-

down, however, when

likewise

—

Who May Be Held? Military Detention
These issues arose

initially

before Judge Leon, presiding over the merits hearing

Boumediene petitioners themselves on remand from

for the

victory. 182 In

their

Supreme Court

October 2008, he issued an opinion characterizing both the petition-

and the government

ers

through the Habeas Lens

as

having urged him to "draft" his

standard regarding the boundaries of detention authority.

183

own

preferred legal

This he refused to do,

arguing that his role instead was merely to determine whether the administration's
position was consistent with a pair of domesticlegal considerations: the

AUMF, and

any further authority the President might have under the "war powers" of Article II
of the Constitution. 184 Without substantial elaboration, Judge Leon concluded
that the government's two-track standard

There things stood when the
2009.

Obama

was compatible with both. 185

administration

came

into office in early

On the second day of his administration, President Obama initiated a major

review of detention policy by giving an interagency task force six months to assess
the

range of options associated with the capture, detention,

full

and

disposi-

and counterterrorism operations. 186 But

tion of persons in the context of combat
litigation deadlines

trial

pay no respect to plans for carefully paced policy deliberations,

when

Long
before the mid-2009 deadline for completion of the interagency review, the adminparticularly not

istration

was obliged

thority to
also
It

years of jurisdictional litigation precedes the merits.

to

make

clear not only

whether

it

intended to defend

employ military detention without criminal charge

what substantive detention standard
did this on

March

13,

it

believed

it

had

at

its

au-

Guantanamo, but

a right to invoke.

when the Justice Department's Civil Division filed
the Hamlily litigation. To the surprise of some, the

2009,

a brief before Judge Bates in

Obama administration continued to assert authority to detain without charge, and
to do so pursuant to a standard not much different from the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal standard of the Bush administration. To be
the baggage-laden nomenclature of "unlawful

sure,

enemy combatant"

it

eschewed

in favor of

an

acronym-less, generic reference to those persons subject to detention pursuant to
the September 18, 2001 Authorization for
pressly

embraced the relevance of LOAC

that authority.

Use of Military Force. And

it

also ex-

for purposes of defining the particulars of

Those particulars turned out to be much the same as before, however,

including preservation of the two-track approach encompassing either

members

or

The only substantive difthat independent support must be

supporters of al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated groups.
ference was the qualification

—or

clarification

—

"substantial" in order to trigger eligibility for detention, thus eliminating any argu-

ment

that de minimis support

might

suffice to

support detention.

Before Judge Bates had the chance to address the merits of the revised position
in Hamlily,

Walton

Judge Walton did so in Gherebi

rejected the

argument

that

LOAC
142

m

Obama. As an initial matter, Judge
provides no detention authority at all

v.

Robert M. Chesney

outside of international
accordingly. 188

armed

conflict,

and

that the

AUMF should be construed

LOAC, he argued, is best viewed as a restraining body of law rather

than an authorizing body of law. 189 Thus, though

it is

true that

Common Article 3

has no express language affirmatively authorizing detention, this merely showed
that

LOAC

imposes no restraints on

armed

international

Any restraints

who

may be

lawfully

detained in non-

conflict.

must come from some other body of law, including the
AUMF itself. In Judge Walton's view, however, the AUMF most certainly did confer at least some detention authority. " [W]henever the President can lawfully exerinstead

cise military force, so, too,

rather than death."

can he incapacitate the enemy force through detention

190

That position, of course, was not enough to

settle

the legal boundaries of

AUMF-based detention authority. Judge Walton next had to confront the question
of who counts as the "enemy force" when you are not contending with another
State's

army. Borrowing from the approach of the petitioners in Boumediene, the

detainee in Gherebi urged Judge
detainability.

191

to adopt

DPH

measure of

as the

But he did not advocate the same conception of DPH

Boumediene petitioners.
civilian status

Walton

Specifically,

as

he rejected the notion that the protections of

might be waived on a sustained basis through continuous participa-

tion in hostilities, thus eliminating the need to determine whether a person

gaging in

had the

was en-

DPH at a precise point in time. 192 Furthermore, the petitioner in Gherebi

added that it would not be enough just to show that a person had engaged in DPH;
in addition, he argued, the person

must also have been "part of an organized armed

some independent actor. 193
end Judge Walton rejected the invitation

force" rather than

In the

sion of the

DPH

to adopt

one or another ver-

standard as a necessary condition for detainability

—though he

did not refrain from stating in dicta that the continuous-combat-function conception of DPH "while perhaps not quite broad enough,

answer," and that

cover

"all

if

he were to accept the

members of the armed

tion of hostilities."

DPH

forces of the

is

a step

toward the right

standard he would construe

enemy

... at all

it

to

times for the dura-

194

He did agree, however, that membership in an organized armed force is a neces-

—indeed, he concluded

sary condition for detention authority
cient condition as well.

195

that

it

was a

suffi-

His argument in support of this conclusion turned on

the notion that the combatant category did indeed exist in non-international

armed conflict. 196 Again noting his view that LOAC is merely restrictive in nature,
and hence that silence on a point does not deprive a State of the power to act in a
particular way, Judge Walton explained that the silence of Common Article 3 with
respect to the existence of a "combatant category" did not mean that no such
143
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category could be recognized in the non-international armed conflict setting. 197
Explicitly equating targeting

bers of the

armed

enemy armed

and detention

authority, he asserted that the

mem-

force can be attacked at any time in non-international

conflict "and, incident to that attack, detained at

any time." 198

In recognizing the existence of a category of detainable combatants in the noninternational conflict setting, Judge Walton's opinion in Gherebi was contrary to

the views expressed by the Second Circuit in Padilla

and Judge Motz in Al-Marri.
this ground for detention, his

By accepting that membership alone might establish
opinion was contrary to Judge Green's in the In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases
(though, to be

fair,

Judge Green's position against association status as a permissi-

ble detention predicate rested

on the premise that the detainee had a Fifth Amend-

ment Due Process right to invoke). And to the extent his opinion rejected the need
to show a detainee had personally had involvement in hostile conduct, it seemed
contrary as well to the views expressed by Judges Williams and Wilkinson in the
Fourth Circuit's en banc opinion in Al-Marri. It was most akin, if anything, to
Judge Mukasey's original Padilla opinion, and perhaps also to the concurrence of
Judge Traxler in Al-Marri.
In any event, Judge Walton's approach at
friendly one, insofar as

whether
defines

this

was

it

demanded only

in fact a flexible or

armed

conflict

blush appeared to be a government-

a showing of associational status. But

narrow standard

"membership" and "armed force"

in a conventional

first

depends on

how one

relatively clear

meaning

really

—concepts with

between the armies of States, perhaps, but most

certainly not in the context of conflict with a clandestine non-State

network with

indeterminate organizational conceptions.

As

to this question, Judge

"criteria" set forth in

tute "templates

"armed
is

force."

Walton turned

explicitly to

GPW, Article 4 and Additional

from which the court can glean

199

it is

Protocol

adherence to

pretense of doing so. Taken
in these provisions

literally,

their

Article 43 consti-

least,

because

criteria for recognition as

LOAC— and whatever else

and the Taliban, they neither comport

I,

stating that the

certain characteristics" of an

This was a challenging approach, to say the

anything that Articles 4 and 43 emphasize as

force,

LOAC,

LOAC

an armed

Qaeda
nor make any

one might say about

conduct with

if there

al

then, Judge Walton's reference to the criteria

would produce precious

little

in the

way of combatant deten-

tion authority in this particular context. But Judge Walton's opinion did not highlight the

implicit

LOAC-adherence language in
emphasis on the existence of a

these articles. Instead, he highlighted their
hierarchical

command

whose memcombatants, Judge Walton then

ing formal organizational structure as the hallmark of an
bers might constitute detainable (and targetable)

144

structure. 200 Treat-

armed

force

Robert M. Chesney

concluded that the ultimate inquiry
sort

of structured'

is

whether the person in question had "some

role in the 'hierarchy' of the

Judge Walton did seem sensitive to the

enemy force." 201

difficulties

inherent in

mapping

that

model onto the context of decentralized networks such as al Qaeda, emphasizing that one must not be too rigid in looking for formal proof that a person occupied such a position. 202 He noted that there usually will not be membership
cards or uniforms. 203 The "structured role" test, he explained, may turn instead
on a particular functional inquiry: did the person "receive [] and execute [] orders" from the "command structure"? 204
But there was a further qualification. Judge Walton explained that it is not
enough that a person was part of the chain of command of the organization-as-awhole. Rather, the person must be part of the specific chain of command associated
with "the enemy force's combat apparatus." 205 To be sure, Judge Walton was trying
to make the point that even a logistics officer for al Qaeda could be detained if part
of al Qaeda's military chain of command. 206 And he did also explicitly recognize
that a person

may well be

who

at

one point in time was performing a non-military function

subject to orders to shift to a military function after

should not be treated as a non-combatant.

embrace the notion of

essarily

207

all,

and hence

Nonetheless, this approach did nec-

distinct "military"

and

"civilian"

wings in such

groups, with the personnel of the latter at least sometimes lying beyond the reach of
the

AUMF

for

any purpose, including not

just detention authority

but also the

authority to target with lethal force.

In this way, Judge Walton's opinion in Gherebi at least partially supported the

government's assertion that the AUMF conferred authority to detain the members
of groups such as

al

Qaeda and the Taliban. As

for the government's claim that the

AUMF also conferred authority to detain independent supporters of such groups,
accommodating. He did not

however, Judge Walton was

less

claim. But he did insist that

any support-based detention must comply with the

directly reject that

"structured role" test described above, which effectively folded the support inquiry
into the

membership standard after all. 208 Put simply, no purely independent sup-

porter could be detained under that test (or, presumably, targeted with lethal
force).
flict

A contrary reading, Judge Walton asserted, would cause the AUMF to con-

with

LOAC, and he was

unwilling to impute such a reading to the statute ab-

sent a clearer showing of legislative intent to accomplish such an end. 209 In this

way, Judge Walton broke with the more accommodating approach of Judge Leon.

Obviously Judge Walton's approach embraces the relevance of LOAC and the

premise that the United States in
international

LOAC

armed conflict

has to say about

at last

—and he

who may

some current settings

is

involved in non-

offers a highly specific interpretation of what

be detained (or targeted) as a

145

result.

Indeed,

Who May Be Held? Military Detention
driving
tion,

through the Habeas Lens

home the point that his reasoning applied as much to targeting as to deten-

he routinely cross-references targeting authority as turning on the exact same

standards.
Just a

few weeks

ruling in Hatnlily.

after

210

Judge Walton's opinion in Gherebi, Judge Bates issued his

For the most part, his analysis followed Judge Walton's.

He

LOAC permitted detention based on membership status

agreed, for example, that

even in the non-international conflict setting, notwithstanding the lack of affirmative treaty

language to that

bership" boils

down

to

effect.

211

And he agreed, too, that in this context "mem-

whether the individual "receives and executes orders or

directions" as part of an

AUMF-covered group's command

structure. 212 Unlike

Judge Walton, however, he did not distinguish between the military and non-military

wings of an organization, and thus did not
military-specific chain of command.
to the

Mukasey opinion

213

restrict eligibility to

persons subject to a

Hamlily, in other words, appears

more akin

in Padilla and, perhaps, the Judge Traxler opinion in Al-

Marri.

Whether Judges Walton and Bates differ with respect to non-members who
provide substantial support to AUMF-covered groups is less clear. On one hand,
Judge Bates concluded that

such a person (though

LOAC

like all the

simply does not permit military detention of

other judges to address this question, he did not

address the potential relevance of the security internment option that would be

armed conflict). 214 On
the other hand, he noted that membership in organizations such as al Qaeda may
be more of a functional than a formal concept, and that conduct that one might deavailable in such circumstances in the event of international

scribe as independent support could well be conceived instead as evidence of func-

membership in some instances. 215 That said, even a functional member must
still be shown to be part of the group's chain of command in order to be detained
under the Hamlily model; truly independent supporters may not be detained no

tional

matter

how important their aid might be to

the group. 216

non-members
may not be detained, and consistent as well on the point that membership ultimately turns on participation in a chain of command. They appear to differ, howGherebi and Hamlily thus are best as consistent on the point that

ever, with respect to

whether detention authority

is

limited to the "military" chain

—

command within an organization though the magnitude of that difference
very much depends on how strictly one defines "military" in this context.
of

Adding

to the confusion, other district judges subsequently disagreed with

another regarding whether there

is

a

genuine difference between Gherebi and

Hamlily. Judge Hogan, for example, has argued that there
ference. 217 Judge Kessler,

the Gherebi approach.

218

one

on the other hand,

states that there

Meanwhile, Judge Urbina

146

is

in

not a substantial

is,

Hatim

v.

dif-

and that she prefers

Obama articulated

Robert M. Chesney

an understanding of the chain-of-command

test that

very likely differs from what

219

Walton or Judge Bates had in mind.
In Hatim, Judge Urbina stated that he adopts the Hamlily standard, including
the notion that detention authority turns on whether the person in question occueither Judge

pied a role within a relevant group's chain of

command. 220 According

to

Hatim,

however, merely notional status within a chain of command was not enough; one

must have
this sense,

actually

obeyed

and hence

specific orders in the past in order to

to be detainable.

221

be a

member

Thus, according to Judge Urbina,

it

in

was

not enough for the government to prove that a person knowingly attended an

al

Qaeda training camp and that the individual believed that in doing so he or she
had effectively joined al Qaeda. 222 It maybe that Judges Bates and Walton, or other
judges following the Gherebi and Hamlily standards, might interpret the chain-ofcommand test in the same fashion. It seems equally if not more likely, however,
that they would not.
In any event, the nuanced disagreement among Judges Walton, Bates and Urbina,
if disagreement there truly was, became moot once the chain-of-command question
came before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. In a series of cases in 2010, the Circuit has expressly rejected the proposition that one must be part of any chain of
command let alone that of the military wing of an organization in order to

—

—

member subject to military detention under the AUMF.
The Circuit first made this point in Al-Bihani v. Obama, 223 in January 2010. In
that case, a divided panel offered a number of important observations regarding
the lawful scope of detention authority. To begin with, the majority opinion by
Judges Kavanaugh and Brown broke sharply with most of the prior detention cases
by concluding that LOAC simply has no bearing on the question of who lawfully
may be detained without criminal charge in this setting. 224 That is to say, Al-Bihani
broke new ground in the habeas litigation by holding that only domestic law
qualify as a

sources should be considered in the course of determining the legal bounds of

detention authority.

Absent reference to LOAC, however,
to be construed?
level,

As noted, the

but almost no guidance

how was the broad language of the AUMF

AUMF itself provides some guidance at the group
at all at the individual level.

Other domestic law

sources would be needed, therefore, in order to address what conduct or status sufficed to link a person to

an AUMF-covered group for detention purposes.

And ac-

cording to the majority in Al-Bihani, the personal jurisdiction provisions found in
the

MCA 2006 and MCA 2009 provided the necessary guidance. 225

Those provisions

clearly stated that military

commissions may entertain pro-

who are members of AUMF-covered groups and also
those who are non-members but who nonetheless provide support to such groups.
ceedings against non-citizens
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Asserting that a person subject to military commission prosecution under the two

MCAs a fortiori would be subject to detention under the AUMF, the panel majority
in Al-Bihani

concluded that independent support thus constitutes a sufficient con-

dition for detention separate

covered group.

and apart from proof of membership

in

an

AUMF-

226

meaning of membership, the panel majority rejected the view advanced by Judge Walton in Gherebi, Judge Bates in Hamlily and Judge Urbina in
Hatim to the effect that proof of membership requires some kind of participation
227
But if the chain-of-command test did not define
in a group's chain of command.
As

for the

membership, what

criteria

remarkable points.

First,

would? Here the opinion was less

clear,

except as to two

Al-Bihani asserted that a person should be deemed a

member and hence subject to detention in the event that he attended a training
camp sponsored by an AUMF-covered group. 228 Second, it raised the possibility
AUMF-covered
group's recruitment process might also constitute adequate evidence of membership and detainability. 229 These statements were dicta and hence not binding on
the district court, yet they certainly signaled a broad conception of membership
that merely having stayed at a guesthouse associated with an

arguably broader than anything previously endorsed in the habeas litigation, either
before Boumediene or since.

Subsequent decisions by the Circuit largely reinforced Al-Bihani. To be sure,

some of Al-Bihani

y

s

punch was

diluted

by the

fact that a

majority of the active

judges of the Circuit declared the panel's views about the irrelevance of international law to

be mere

course of "denying" en banc review. 230 The dicta-

dicta, in the

fication of that aspect of the panel opinion did not necessarily

undermine the sup-

port and membership aspects of the earlier decision, however, as the panel had also

observed that
sive."

231

More

it

found "Al-Bihani's reading of international law to be unpersua-

significantly,

subsequent Circuit decisions have reinforced key

as-

pects of the Al-Bihani panel opinion.
First,

the

unanimous opinion

and Judges Tatel and Garland

—

in

Awad

v.

Obama 232

restated the point that

chain of command in order to be detainable.

membership, of course, but membership

233

—by Chief Judge

Sentelle

one need not be part of a

This would be useful evidence of

also could

be shown by proof that a per-

son self-identified as part of an AUMF-covered group or was captured in circumstances

amounting

to fighting

on behalf of such

a group. 234

And

in

Barhoumi

v.

235

Obama,
Judges Tatel, Ginsburg and Kavanaugh joined to state once again that
the chain-of-command test is not a necessary condition for detention, though it
happened to be satisfied in that case and did count as a sufficient condition. 236
Neither Awad nor Barhoumi provided the D.C. Circuit with an opportunity to revisit

or refine Al-Bihams favorable treatment of independent support as a distinct
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ground

for detention.

Many thought that the next decision

Bensayah

v.

Obama

—

would do so. Bensayah himself was the last of the original Boumediene petitioners,
the only one whom Judge Leon found was subject to detention after remand from
the Supreme Court. And as noted above, Judge Leon had expressly approved reliance on independent support as a ground for detention in that case. Indeed, he had
found Bensayah subject to detention not
stead for having provided support to

al

of would-be fighters to Afghanistan).
therefore, that the appeal

would

Qaeda member, but inthe form of facilitating the travel

for being an al

Qaeda

A

(in

casual observer might have assumed,

oblige the D.C. Circuit to give further consider-

ation to the sufficiency of independent support as a detention ground.

A more rigorous observer, on the other hand, would anticipate that the Circuit's
would focus on the membership ground instead. Several months earlier,
Charlie Savage of the New York Times had reported the existence of a "pronounced" disagreement among "top lawyers in the State Department and the Pentagon," as well as the Justice Department and other agencies, with respect to "how
decision

broadly to define the types of terrorism suspects who
as

maybe detained without trial

wartime prisoners." 237 According to Savage's account, the debate arose

when

the government was obliged to develop

Hamlily.

238

changes to
tain

its

revised detention position in

As noted above, the government ultimately chose
its

position, but did not

initially

abandon the claim

that

it

to

make some

had authority to de-

both members and non-member supporters of AUMF-covered groups. This

did not end the internal debate, however, but instead merely delayed

it

until such

time that the administration might be faced with the choice of whether to defend a

on independent support grounds. 239
The need to develop a position on appeal in the Bensayah

specific case

litigation,

Savage

wrote, provided just such an occasion:

The arguments over the case forced onto the table discussion of lingering discontent at
the State Department over one aspect of the Obama position on detention. There was
broad agreement that the law of armed conflict allowed the United States to detain as
wartime prisoners anyone who was actually a part of Al Qaeda, as well as nonmembers
who took positions alongside the enemy force and helped it. But some criticized the
notion that the United States could also consider mere supporters, arrested far away, to
be just

as detainable

without

trial as

enemy fighters. 240

Assuming the accuracy of this account, then, the specific dispute involved the conjunction of the independent support ground with the use of detention authority
away from the conventional battlefield. Savage reported that the State
Department's newly arrived Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, championed the view "that
for captures

there

was no support

in the laws of war" for the claim of detention authority in that
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circumstance, while the Defense Department's General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, disagreed. 241 Savage indicates that the question

was then put

to the Justice Depart-

ment's Office of Legal Counsel, which eventually produced an equivocal

memorandum

"stating that while the Office of Legal

Counsel had found no prece-

dents justifying the detention of mere supporters of Al Qaeda who were picked up far

away from enemy

forces,

it

was not prepared

to state

any

definitive conclusion." 242

Nonetheless, a position was needed for the Bensayah appeal. 243 According to
Savage's account, the solution was to "try to avoid that hard question"

"changing] the subject"

in Bensayah. Rather than

—

by

defend the decision below on

upon by Judge Leon i.e., that Bensayah could be detained because he provided support to al Qaeda the government would instead seek
affirmance on the ground that Bensayah was a functional member of al Qaeda. 244
And thus the Justice Department's Civil Division came to make a most unusual filing on the eve of oral argument in the case, explaining to the court in a brief letter
the

ground

that the

relied

"Government's position

is

whether Bensayah was functionally

that this case

'part

judgment can and should be affirmed
that the internal debate

the

Government

AUMF,

as

is

had not

yet

not foreclosing

—

of

solely

al

is

best analyzed in terms of

Qaida, and that the district court's

on

that ground." 245 In an indication

been resolved, however, the

its

letter

added that

right to argue in appropriate cases that the

informed by the laws of war, permits detaining some persons based on the

enemy forces, even though such persons are not
The Government continues to defend the lawfulness

substantial support they provide to

themselves "part

of those forces.

of detaining certain individuals who provide substantial support to, but are not part
al

Qaida or the Taliban.

of,

246

At the time he wrote, Savage did not know how this strategy would play out with
the D.C. Circuit. Nonetheless, he concluded his account with a perceptive observation regarding the larger significance of the issue:

"The outcome of the yearlong de-

bate could reverberate through national security policies, ranging from the

number of people the United States ultimately detains to

decisions about

who may

be lawfully selected for killing using drones." 247

Some
Obama.

nine months

24 *

But

it is

later, in late

far

from

the independent support

June 2010, the Circuit reversed in Bensayah

clear that the

government's decision not to advance

argument caused that outcome, nor

constraints entered into the analysis. In addition to limiting
peal,

the

government

also

had decided not

inculpatory statements that had been

v.

its

that geographic

legal

theory on ap-

to continue to rely

made by another

detainee.

The

on

certain

latter

move

appeared to be the decisive one. The panel held that the remaining evidence did
not suffice to prove that Bensayah had engaged in the recruiting and logistical
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support

activities that the

government had

alleged,

and hence

that the govern-

ment had failed to show that Bensayah was a functional member of al Qaeda. By
the same token, presumably, this same body of evidence would not have sufficed
even if the government had advanced its original independent support theory. In
any event, the litigation continues; the Circuit remanded the case not with orders
to grant Bensayah's petition, but rather for Judge Leon to reconsider the merits,
including any new evidence of functional membership that the government might
put forward.

Thus we are left with an unusual state of affairs. After the majority of the district
judges to consider the question rejected the proposition that the government lawfully may assert authority to detain independent supporters of AUMF-covered
groups, the Circuit took the contrary view. In the meantime, however, the executive

branch

for the

appears to have become internally divided on the question, and

moment appears

the matter
cally

itself

—

at least

disinclined to take advantage of the Circuit's position

where the independent support occurs

remote from a conventional

on

in a place geographi-

battlefield.

The Circuit has not had an opportunity to weigh in on the independent support
question since Al-Bihani and Bensayah. The next two circuit opinions instead
touched lightly on other aspects of the substantive- scope issue. Shortly after
Bensayah, for example, the Circuit in Al Odah v. Obama affirmed the detention of
an individual on membership grounds. 249 The most notable aspect of the case, for
present purposes, was the fact that the opinion by Chief Judge Sentelle and Judges
Rogers and Garland restated Al-Bihani
alone might well be sufficient to

grounds. Then, two weeks

Al Adahi

v.

Obama found

camp and guesthouse

later,

s

suggestion that training

make out

camp attendance

on membership
Judges Randolph, Henderson and Kavanaugh in
the case for detention

that evidence of a detainee's attendance at a training

constituted powerful evidence of functional membership,

and sharply criticized a

district

judge for suggesting otherwise. 250

In contrast, the Circuit has had a chance since Bensayah to

—on the question of geographic constraints

only implicitly

membership-based detention. In Salahi
panel dealt with a Mauritanian detainee

v.

Obama,

in

comment

—

albeit

at least in the context

November

of

2010, a circuit

whom the government alleged to be an al

Qaeda member but who was not captured in Afghanistan nor alleged to have been
involved in combat in or near Afghanistan (at least not after the early 1990s). 251
The appellate panel expressed no concerns about the theoretical assertion of detention authority in such circumstances, but instead remanded so that the district
court could reweigh the evidence under a different standard. Implicit rejection of

geographic constraints in the membership setting, of course, does not compel the

same with respect

to detention based solely

151
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Now Clear and That Which Remains Contested.

As a

result of

the foregoing string of D.C. Circuit decisions, an important aspect of the govern-

ment's detention authority appears

settled, at least at a

high level of generality and

at

moment. Specifically, the Circuit has developed a broad consensus to the
effect that membership in an AUMF-covered group is a sufficient condition for detention. But other questions remain. What precisely counts as membership in a clandestine, diffused network such as al Qaeda? Does independent support provide an
alternative ground for detention? Does the location of a person's capture or underlying activities matter under either the membership or support criteria?
With respect to the detailed meaning of membership, some things have been
made clear while others remain uncertain perhaps inevitably so. The cases do establish that proof of participation in a formal chain of command would be suffileast for the

—

cient but

not necessary to demonstrate membership. They are relatively

is

moreover, that training camp participation
ship, if not a sufficient condition to
albeit

with

some

least

less force, that

the

tion

do so on

highly significant to prove

its

for guesthouse attendance in at

contexts. Absent those elements, however,

to

depend upon the

it

remains unclear which

of an AUMF-covered group distinguish

affairs

who can be detained from those who cannot.

would seem

member-

own, and the cases further suggest,

same may be true

forms of involvement with the
those

is

gestalt

In that circumstance, the ques-

impression conveyed by the totality of

the circumstances, measured against unspecified

—and

potentially inconsistent

metrics of affiliation held by particular judges. Consider, in that regard, the

which Judge Bates summarized the task

*

clear,

way in

in a recent, post-Al-Bihani opinion:

[T]here are no settled criteria" for determining who

is

or an associated force. "That determination must be

"part

of the Taliban, al-Qaida,

made on

a case-by-case basis

by using a functional rather than formal approach and by focusing on the actions of
the individual in relation to the organization." The Court must consider the totality of
the evidence to assess the individual's relationship with the organization. But being
"part

of

the Taliban, al-Qaida, or an associated force requires

edge or intent."

"some

level

of knowl-

252

Even when the training camp or guesthouse elements are present, moreover,
is

not clear that they will always

suffice.

Indeed, one of the

first district

it

court

opinions to emerge against the backdrop of the Circuit's interventions directly
challenged the relevance of guesthouse attendance, arguing that the connotations

of guesthouse attendance vary depending on the house in question and that

dence

On

at the

guesthouse

in that particular case

resi-

was not necessarily inculpatory. 253

the other hand, another recent district court opinion gives substantial weight

to the fact that a detainee attended a Taliban-controlled guesthouse, particularly
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when viewed

man money,

in

combination with evidence that a Taliban recruiter gave the

and a ticket for air travel, and that the man twice went
and received a weapon from a person who likely was a

a passport

near to the front lines
Taliban member. 254

Note that similar disagreements could yet emerge
ing

camp

variable. Like guesthouses, training

provenance and connotations. Some
the Taliban, but not
attribution

should

at least

255

in terms of their

were or are operated by

al

Qaeda or

may arise that raise difficult questions of
Of course, it maybe that no further refinement of the

membership

is

possible in this setting,

and

that the status

maximum when it comes to defining this criterion

represents the realistic
it

camps can vary

were; fact patterns

all

and inference.

variables defining

clearly

in connection with the train-

be possible to

clarify the

quo

(though

geographic question).

In any event, the status quo certainly has not settled the separate question of

whether detention

may be predicated on a showing of independent support to an

AUMF-covered group
limited to persons
for that matter

—nor whether,

who were

whether

it

if

such a criterion

legitimate,

it

must be

captured or acted in certain geographic locations, or

must be confined

to only certain types of support or to

support rendered with certain specific mental
Finally, the question

is

states.

of geography continues to loom large in the substantive-

scope debate. Recent litigation associated with alleged plans to conduct a targeted
killing

of an American citizen in Yemen, on the ground that the individual was an

operational leader of al
as to

whether LOAC's

Qaeda in
field

the Arabian Peninsula, has sharpened the debate

of application

is strictly

fined battlefields of a conventional nature or

if,

limited to geographically de-

instead,

any LOAC-related au-

some enemy- affiliated personnel wherever
they may travel (or, more narrowly, to such persons when they are located in denied or ungoverned areas). 256 The question is at least as pertinent in the detention
context. As noted above, at least two of the Guantanamo habeas cases thus far
Bensayah and Salahi involved detainees with remote or no linkages to any traditional battlefield, and the judges in those instances expressed no particular concerns on that point
though they did not expressly address the issue. The earlier
thority to use force attaches to at least

—
—

experience of the Al-Marri litigation, meanwhile, suggests there
cial

may yet be judi-

disagreement on the point.

Overarching

all

these questions, finally,

is

the lingering disagreement regarding

which bodies of law actually govern. The Al-Bihani panel opinion sought to resolve

by forbidding reference to LOAC and other forms of international law.
Though the Circuit majority subsequently neutered that claim by declaring it to be
this dispute

dicta,

it

did not go so far as to issue a contrary holding to the effect that any such

body of law does

actually apply. In

any event,
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body of law applies does not ensure agreement as to what that body of
law requires when it comes to selecting and calibrating the variables that combine
to form the individualized detention standard.
a particular

Emerging Law Governing Detention Criteria

HI. The Significance of the

In the

wake of this descriptive account, several questions arise.

First,

does

actually

it

matter that the habeas process has not yet resolved the disagreements and unan-

swered questions noted in Part

II?

Second,

does matter,

if this

is it

preferable to

simply be patient, leaving the matter in judicial hands, or instead should Congress
intervene with legislation?

A.

Do the Disagreement and Uncertainty Matter?

The

persistence of disagreement

and unresolved questions regarding the substantive-

scope issue in the habeas litigation
uncertainty and disagreement

is

problematic on

may prove

many

levels. First,

the

many as-

significant with respect to the

yet-undecided Guantanamo habeas cases. True, the vast majority of the Guan-

tanamo habeas

cases to this point have turned

tions of evidentiary sufficiency.
ill-fated

was

Only Basardh,

on other

issues

—above

all,

ques-

which Judge Huvelle made an

in

attempt to limit detention authority to circumstances in which a person

likely to

cause

harm

if

released, clearly turned

on an

issue involving the scope

of detention authority that the judge in question was prepared to recognize. But

much more

habeas litigation

dispositive for

is

to

some Guantanamo

how many cases may yet
yet halfway through.

come, and hence
detainees.

No

this

question

for sure precisely

seems

we

it

likely that

are not

We cannot know at this point whether the substantive-scope
If

it

does become central in these

future cases, the continuing uncertainty surrounding the question

from both the detainee and the government
detainees.

Whether

on whether the United

this will

States

is

problematic

perspectives.

Second, the pool of habeas cases eventually

ever,

yet prove

one can say

proceed to the merits, but

question will remain marginal to the merits.

Guantanamo

may

may encompass more

come to

than the

pass most likely depends,

how-

resumes the practice of taking long-term cus-

tody of individuals captured outside of States in which conventional armed
conflict

is

occurring. This issue has been tested to

some extent in the context of Af-

ghanistan. Attorneys representing a group of US military detainees in Afghanistan

have been attempting for several years

now to

establish habeas jurisdiction over

detention operations there. They met with mixed success at the district court

with Judge Bates holding that non-Afghans

may pursue

habeas

relief if

level,

captured

outside of Afghanistan and brought there for detention by the United States,
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whereas none of those actually captured in Afghanistan could do
cuit panel subsequently reversed

attributes of a facility

that the

on the

first

so.

257

A D.C. Cir-

point only, explaining that

"all

of the

exposed to the vagaries of war are present in Bagram" and

US detention facility in Afghanistan

in "territory under neither the de facto

(then at Bagram, today in Parwan)

nor de jure sovereignty of the United

is

States

258

and within the territory of another de jure sovereign."
The court did not, however, close the door to habeas jurisdiction entirely. The panel went out of its way to
observe that there was no evidence in this case that the detainees had been brought
into Afghanistan in order to evade judicial review, as their transfer occurred long

before Boumediene rendered

Guantanamo

subject to judicial review. 259

The panel

warned that if "such manipulation by the Executive" were proven in a future case,
the outcome might be different. 260 In the course of remanding that case to Judge
Bates for further proceedings, moreover, the Circuit noted that
ferent view even in that very case should

it

might take a

dif-

new evidence emerge regarding the nature

of US detention operations in Afghanistan.

Given that the United States
in the transfer of control over

is

its

the Afghan government (just as
tion operations in Iraq to the

United States

them

is still

actively

engaged in a process meant to culminate

long-term detention operations in Afghanistan to

we

already have transferred control of our deten-

government

and absent evidence

there),

in the business of capturing persons elsewhere

to Afghanistan for purposes of long-term detention,

it

that the

and bringing

must be

said that the

prospects for an extension of habeas to Afghanistan are increasingly slim notwith-

standing these caveats. The
tion, therefore,

is

more

significant lesson

from the Afghan habeas

that courts going forward likely

would be

litiga-

receptive to an

extension of habeas to any location should the United States in the future resume
the practice of taking and maintaining military custody of individuals captured

outside of a traditional battlefield context.

It

may be

that the United States will

avoid that practice in the future, substituting some combination of rendition, hostnation detention, 261 targeted
place.

But

if

killing, surveillance,

prosecution or inaction in

its

the practice of long-term detention for non-battlefield capture re-

emerges, so too will the questions surrounding habeas jurisdiction.

Even
still

if habeas

jurisdiction remains limited to

Guantanamo, however, there

are

other reasons to believe the uncertainty associated with the substantive-scope

jurisprudence to be problematic. Most significantly, the struggle over
held matters not only for those detainees

who may be

who already have or may one day receive

the right to seek habeas review but also for any detention operations that ultimately

depend upon the same underlying
if

legal authority

—

judges determine in the habeas setting that the

groups or

fact patterns,

i.e.,

the

AUMF

AUMF.

is

to say,

extends only to certain

commanders and policymakers must
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whenever acting under that same authority

—whether

subject to ha-

beas review or not. In practical terms, this means that the habeas jurisprudence can

and presumably

will

all

AUMF-based

detention operations

detention operations in Afghanistan

specifically all

detentions beyond
review. Civilian

Guantanamo

—even

—including

though very few

are or likely ever will be subject to direct habeas

government lawyers advising policymakers, and military judge ad-

vocates advising
this

impact

commanders

in the field,

have an obligation to take account of

caselaw in the course of devising policy and procedure regarding

who may be

when

carrying out

detained prospectively and what standard should be employed

screening of detainees post-capture. In this way, the detention-scope jurispru-

dence arising out of Guantanamo could come to impact a far greater number of detainees. Unfortunately,

policymakers and commanders

regarding the boundaries of their authority, yet have

at the

little

moment lack clarity

choice but to proceed in

shadow of this uncertainty.
Making matters worse, spillover effects from the Guantanamo habeas might not
be limited to detention operations. The effects may extend to AUMF-based targetthe

ing decisions as well. That

decision to
tain

kill

is

to say, the detention-scope debate

under color of the

AUMF as much

it

may overhang

the

overhangs the decision to de-

under that authority.

The point is not an immediately obvious one; the power to kill and the power to
detain are by no means coextensive. But they need not be coextensive in order for
the Guantanamo habeas litigation to impact the legal bounds of targeting authority

AUMF is the transmission mechanism. Say that in the course
of the habeas litigation, courts ultimately determine that the AUMF must be conelsewhere. Again, the

members of al Qaeda and the Taliban who have received military-style training. Assume further that a commander subsequently
desires to launch a missile from a drone into the window of a car being driven in
Yemen by a local man whom he believes to act as a fund-raiser for al Qaeda but
whom he also knows has not sworn an oath to al Qaeda or attended any training
camps. The strike on its face would not be an exercise of force supported by the
strued to apply only to sworn

—

AUMF, whatever its consistency with LOAC or IHRL.
It

may be that the strike could yet be justified, but the important point for pres-

would be clouded by the narrowing
construction of the AUMF produced via the habeas litigation. Thus military operaent purposes

is

that the issue at the very least

tions not directly subject to judicial review 262 nonetheless

may be impacted indirectly by the development of detention-scope jurisprudence. And as in the
detention context, the dynamic matters not so much because it exists, but rather
because

it is

transmitting uncertainty.
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Finally, the
fact that the

habeas litigation

may also generate

spillover effects

by virtue of the

judges in the course of resolving the detention-scope issue have en-

gaged with concepts that are both contested and

likely to arise in future, unrelated

most obviously the case with respect to the
episodes in which judges have grappled with the meaning of "direct participation
in hostilities" in an effort to clarify the scope of the government's detention
contexts involving military force. This

is

DPH for this purpose are considered above.
For now, the important point is that when courts do make use of DPH in this way,
authority.

The merits of referencing

they maybe obliged to define this deeply contested concept.
their opinion will matter at least to

that

And once they do this,

an extent in any subsequent context in which

LOAC concept matters—without regard to whether that subsequent context
AUMF. Any

armed conflict implicating the
DPH question which is to say, any future armed conflict henceforth would
take place in the shadow of that earlier opinion. Much the same might be said for
frequently employed statutory language like "all necessary and appropriate force,"
has anything to do with the

future

—

—

moreover.

B.

Should Congress Intervene?

Assume for the

sake of argument that the emerging habeas jurisprudence does in-

deed involve a substantial degree of disagreement and uncertainty with respect to
individualized detention criteria, and that this disagreement and uncertainty are

important in relation to future cases and to other, collateral matters.

It

does not fol-

low automatically that Congress should step in with legislation designed to address
the situation.

One might oppose legislative intervention on the ground that the process of refining the law in this area should be left in the
all,

hands of the judiciary. Judges,

routinely disagree about fine points of law concerning

complex

subjects,

after

and

smooth out such discrepancies in the
traditional common law fashion. This is, in fact, the argument advanced by a pair
of advocacy groups Human Rights First and the Constitution Project in a document titled Habeas Works: Federal Courts' Proven Capacity to Handle Guantanamo Cases: A Report from Retired Federal Judges. 263 The report contends that the

the appellate review over time will tend to

—

—

"lower courts are steadily progressing toward a workable detention standard," 264

and denies

that judges have to "draft" a substantive standard or otherwise are en-

gaged in a "lawmaking" process.
gues,

is

What the judges

are doing instead, the report ar-

merely "interpreting and applying" the detention standard established by

Congress and the President in the AUMF as informed by the laws of war. 265 To the
extent that the report acknowledges any variation
izes that variation

among the judges,

it

character-

benignly as the mere "gradual exploration and shaping of the
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detention standard," in traditional

concludes that "there

is

no reason

to

through the Habeas Lens

law-like fashion. 266 Habeas Works

doubt the

ability

of the three-level federal

court system to develop a substantive detention standard." 267

That

last

lustrates,

claim no doubt

is

correct.

As Judge Wilkinson's opinion

common

And

so too

law process in theory can smooth out the

many

actually arise

when

judges undertake to do

case-by-case adjudication to develop and
tracts

and the

whether
details

Al-Marri il-

judges can undertake to develop detention standards meant to conform

to the peculiarities of the non-State-actor context.

the

in

like.

But

would be

it

this

is

a straw

much

this,

amend

man

no one doubts

that

disagreements that

as courts in the past

used

substantive rules for torts, con-

argument. The important question

is

better for Congress to play the primary role in crafting the

of the detention standard.

There are several factors to consider in thinking about

this question. First,

one

could select between these approaches based on the normative desirability of the
substantive standard one believes

On

is

close inspection, however, the

most

likely to

be produced in the end by each.

two options may be

close to a

wash along

this

dimension.

Those who would prefer
to detain

might

Congress most

at first

likely

on the government's capacity
disfavor legislation on the theory that

to see greater restraints

blush be inclined to

would adopt

a

broad detention standard and that the judi-

upon a more constrained approach. Proponents of a
broad standard, by the same token, might favor legislation for the same reason. The
Democratic-controlled Congress in 2009 and 2010 persistently used the power of
the purse to make it more difficult for the President to close Guantanamo, after all,
and the Republican takeover of the House in 2010 might be expected to tilt Congress still further toward erring on the side of facilitating rather than restraining
ciary over time will settle

military detention. But careful consideration of the trends in the caselaw described

would be unwise to assume that the judiciary in the end
will adopt narrower tests. The sequence of D.C. Circuit opinions in 2010, beginning but by no means ending with Al-Bihani, if anything suggests the contrary.
in Part

II

suggests that

it

And though many of the Circuit's decisions are now the subject of pending certiorari petitions,

it

would be

foolish to

assume that the Supreme Court

will

both take

up the substantive-scope question and adopt more constrained positions with
spect to

it;

Justice

Solicitor General,

Kagan

is

re-

recused from these cases in light of her recent role as the

and Chief Justice Roberts and

Justices Scalia,

Thomas and Alito

are unlikely to be interested in such a narrowing approach.

Fear

of,

or desire for, a broad detention standard accordingly does not point

clearly in favor of or against legislative intervention.

might one bring to bear

in

What

other factors, then,

developing a well-considered position on the question?
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Second, one could focus on the democratic pedigree of the resulting rule

That

is,

one might favor

set.

because the lawmaking process

legislative intervention

would do more to contribute to a national debate and public engagement on the
question, and the resulting rules would in any event bear a superior stamp of democratic legitimacy. In response,

one might note that we routinely have

relied

on

common law processes to develop and refine rules in other important settings. But
it is

not clear

we

ever have

done so

in a context that

impacted contemporaneous

military operations to this extent. Here, the question at issue

is

one that speaks

di-

who is it that the United States
purports to be at war with? A strong argument can be made that the United States
has a moral obligation to engage in a forthright national debate on this subject if we
rectly to

an issue of pressing national concern:

are to have military detention at

rather convincing.

just

indeed, that argument has been made, and

all;

Third, one might favor or disfavor legislation
in light of
aries

my argument that

of detention authority

is

on grounds of speed and

bound-

harmful. For example, one might argue that

legisla-

more quickly than

process of common law development. That process, after
the initial decision

by Judge Mukasey

This

—

is

all,

end anytime soon. Anticipating

the ongoing

dates back at least to

in Padilla in late 2002,

and does not seem

Habeas Works argues that

this concern,

—and thus some need

some amount of residual ambiguity
cation

finality

lingering uncertainty regarding the precise

tion will settle the substantive-scope question

likely to

it is

268

for case-by-case clarifi-

invariably will remain even in the event of a legislative intervention. 269

true,

but the reduction in ambiguity via a statute

reduce the total amount of work

left

if carefully

designed could

to be accomplished through the habeas lens.

Then again, an inartfully drafted statute could achieve the opposite by introducing
entirely new ambiguities and undoing points of consensus already established
through the existing habeas jurisprudence.
Fourth, one might take account of the fact that legislative rulemaking as a
general proposition

is

more

easily revisited

than rules derived through the ha-

beas process. Should experience demonstrate that a statutory definition of the

bounds of detention authority

is

too broad or too narrow, that definition can be

revised in the ordinary course of further legislation. Inclusion of a sunset provi-

sion in legislation, moreover, could guarantee periodic reassessment. Judicially
crafted rules are not so readily altered, however.

than proactive.
take

It

must have

judiciary

is

reactive rather

a case or controversy in order to have the occasion to

up a question, and hence the opportunity

detention authority

The

may or may not be

to revise the substantive scope of

there even

if

the existing standard proves

unwise. Even assuming a proper case arises, moreover, the time lag between the

beginning of a case and final judgment by the

159

last

court to consider the matter
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if it is
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necessary for the Supreme Court to inter-

vene in order to limit or reverse precedent.

These

factors, taken together, incline

me

to think that legislation

on the

substantive-scope question would in fact be desirable, at least in the abstract. In
particular,
•

it

would be

desirable to have express statutory language that

confirms that membership in an AUMF-covered group

is

a sufficient condi-

tion for detention;
•

provides that participation on such a group's chain of command, knowing

attendance at a military- style training

camp operated by such a group and perhaps

other factors constitute substantial but not dispositive evidence of membership;
•

articulates a

mens

the individual not only
active participant in

rea standard for

knew the

membership, such

identity of the

and thereby

its affairs

as a

requirement that

group but intended to become an

to facilitate, directly or indirectly, the

unlawful ends of the group; 270
•

on whether the provision of support independent of
a sufficient condition to justify detention, and articu-

takes a clear position

membership can count as
lates a corresponding mens rea element such as intent to facilitate,
rectly, the group's unlawful use of violence; and
•

specifies

detention

directly or indi-

whether there are any geographic limitations as to the availability of
limiting detention to persons captured outside the United States,

(e.g.,

or limiting support-based detention to persons captured in connection with

com-

bat operations).
All that said,

the fact that in

any serious discussion of legislative intervention also must account for

no

plausible scenario

scope question. Rather,

if it

would Congress address only the

reaches this question at

all,

substantive-

Congress almost certainly

would simultaneously address any number of other related matters, including the
procedural and evidentiary rules associated with habeas review. Depending on
what one expects Congress to produce on those issues, then, even someone who
supports the idea of legislation on the substantive-scope question may conclude
that legislation on the whole is undesirable.
*

*

*

We lack consensus regarding who lawfully may be held in military custody in the
contexts that matter most to

and counterinsurgency. More
question.

US

national security today

litigation arising

it

i.e.,

counterterrorism

to the point, federal judges lack consensus

They have grappled with

years have dealt with

—

it

periodically since 2002,

and

on

this

for the past three

continually in connection with the flood of habeas corpus

out of Guantanamo in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's 2008
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decision in Boumediene

dence

is

v.

Bush. Unfortunately, the resulting detention jurispru-

shot through with disagreement

on points large and small. As a result, the

precise boundaries of the government's detention authority
spite the passage

into

US

of more than nine years since the

first

remain unclear de-

post-9/11 detainees

came

custody.

We should not be surprised at this disagreement. The conflicting efforts of the
judges reflect the fact that the very metrics of legality are deeply contested in this
setting.

We

do not agree which bodies of law should govern

in the first instance

we did, we then encounter indeterminacy and plausible disagreement
with respect to what each body of law actually has to say, if anything, about the
detention- scope question. Making matters worse, these difficulties arise in a conand, even

if

text in

which familiar

sures,

making

about the

it

frameworks experience substantial evolutionary pres-

difficult to distinguish descriptive

legal limits

comes easy to

legal

and normative arguments

of the government's authority. Against this backdrop

it

be-

one another, much

see that the judges at times are speaking past

as

occurs in the larger public debate.

Understandable or not, though,

this state

of affairs

is

problematic.

Most

obvi-

Guantanamo habeas litigation uncertain for both the government and the detainees. More significantly, however,
the failure to resolve the detention-scope question casts a shadow across an array of
military activities that are not directly subject to habeas review. The mixed proously,

it

renders the prospects for success in the

nouncements overhang detention operations in Afghanistan that are not subject to
habeas review, insofar as those detentions depend on the same underlying claims
of authority that undergird the government's position in the
tion.

on

Guantanamo

litiga-

And by the same token, the habeas caselaw may have the same spillover effect

targeting operations

Pakistan,
It is

Yemen and

—

i.e.,

the use of lethal force

—

in places as varied as

Somalia.

important to bring these disagreements, their causes and their conse-

quences to the surface, and to push for their resolution. The
tion, after

all,

is

litigation will

not conclude for years to come. The use of de-

tention in Afghanistan will persist for

posed end of combat operations
detainees continues to exist,
strikes

administra-

not going to abandon the use of military detention. The

Guantanamo habeas

drone

Obama

and otherwise,

—

—even

some time. Even in Iraq

a small population of US-controlled military

and will do so
will

after the sup-

for

some

time. Uses of lethal force, via

continue with respect to

al

ous spots around the world for the foreseeable future. Were

Qaeda

it all

to

targets in vari-

end tomorrow,

moreover, we could still expect future situations to arise in which another adminis-

employ military detention in a setting involving terrorism or
surgency, giving rise to the same set of issues.

tration decides to
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Simply put, the problem

is

ularly in the perception that

through the Habeas Lens

—

embedded in our evolving strategic context particnon-State actors have become increasingly empow-

some can pose a strategically significant threat. Insofar as law
context exist in dynamic relationship with one another, then, the

ered, to the point that

and

strategic

question
later,

tions

not whether the law will adapt to these circumstances.

is

more or less appropriately. The question,
we will rely upon to mediate that process.

It will,

instead, concerns

sooner or

which

institu-
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93. Id. at 718.
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Mat 719-24.

542 U.S. 426 (2004) The dissent by Justice Stevens did offer the view
that Padilla's detention could not be sustained on the merits if the government's justification for
95.
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Rumsfeld v.
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Padilla,

on the

.

desire to interrogate him. See

id. at

465 ("Executive detention of subver-
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ever,
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sought habeas review in
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360 F.3d 707 (7th
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Id. at 175.
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175-76.
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Id. at

1
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Id. at
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with international law, but concluding that the

AUMF

is

sufficiently clear so as to

trump any

contrary customary law rule).

But see id. at 288 (emphasizing allegation that al-Marri was a member of al
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Id. at 3
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that the "advance
live in

& Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 2114).

He made this point clear at the very outset of his opinion, in fact, observing

and democratization of technology proceeds apace" and

large swaths of

urban landscapes can be leveled

in

an instant."

some recognition of these changing circumstances," must
warfare."
1

40.

that, as a result,

"we

an age where thousands of human beings can be slaughtered by a single action and where
293.

The law must "show
nature of modern

Id.
1 4. See also id. at 3 1 9. Note that Judge Wilkinson elsewhere in the opinion quotes
from Philip Bobbitt's Shield of Achilles, a central text supporting the proposition of a

Id. at 3

expressly

Id. at

"reflect the actual

168

Robert M. Chesney
dynamic relationship between law and

strategic context

—not

to

mention the notion that non-

State actors engaging in mass-casualty terrorism strongly implicate that relationship. See
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this line

id. at

of argument.
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the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which in effect
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punishment of membership

United

States,
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violate the Fifth
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155. Id. at 476. Redactions in the opinion

make it

difficult to

determine more about her rea-

soning, but the context strongly suggests that she was particularly concerned that the govern-

ment might be detaining

individuals strictly for their intelligence value. See

id. at

477.

was not surprising that Judge Green would make a point of attempting to restrain the government's capacity to detain based on associated ties. During oral argument in the
case, she had posed a series of hypothetical questions to the government attorney with the
apparent aim of clarifying the government's conception of the outer boundaries of the ostensible authority to detain on the basis that a person provided support to an AUMF-covered group.
Specifically, she asked whether this detention criterion would be met by a "little old lady in Switzerland" who was duped into providing funds to a charity group that turned out to be an al
Qaeda front. One might have expected the attorney to answer no, as this fact pattern at a minimum does not involve inculpatory mens rea. But it did not turn out that way. The government
attorney insisted, incredibly, that all were detainable. The moment would go on to dubious immortality in Judge Green's published opinion, not to mention becoming a standard citation in
the secondary literature; it would be hard to overestimate its iconic value as a symbol for those
who feared that the post-9/1 1 assertion of detention authority had become detached from any
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21, 2010) (involving detainee Adnan Farhan Abd al Latif); Almerfedi v. Obama (D.D.C. July 23,
2010) (involving detainee Hussain Salem Mohammad Almerfedi); Abdah v. Obama (D.D.C.
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208. 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69-70.
209. Id. at 69-70 & n. 17.
210. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
211.

See

212.

Id. at 75.

id.

at 73.

213. See

id.

214. See

id. at

75-76.

id. at

76-77.

id. at

75-77.

215.

See

216. See

Anam v. Obama,

Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that Hamlily is "not inconsistent" with Gherebi, and that any apparent difference "is largely one of form rather than
217. See

653

F.

substance").

Odah v. Obama, 648

218. See Al
219.

See 677

220. See

F.

id. at

Supp. 2d

See

id.

at 6-7.

222.

See

id.

passim.

224.

1,

6-7 (D.D.C. 2009).

(D.D.C. 2009).

590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
id. at 871-72.

See

225. See

id.

226.

See

id.

227.

See

id.

228.

See

id. at

229. See

at

872-73.

873

n.2.

id.

230. See Al-Bihani
231.

Supp. 2d

5-6.

221.

223.

1

F.

v.

Obama, 619 F.3d

1, 1

(D.C. Cir. 2010).

See590F.3dat871.

232. 608 F.3d

1

(D.C. Cir. 2010).

10-12.

233.

See

id. at

234.

See

id.

235.

609F.3d416(D.C.

236.

See

237.

Charlie Savage,

id. at

Mar. 28, 2010,

at

Cir. 2010).

424-26.

Obama Team

Is

Divided on Anti-Terror Tactics,

NEW YORK

TIMES,

Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/us/politics/29force.html

?pagewanted=all.
238.

See

id.

239.

See

id.

240.

Id.

241.

Id.

242.

Id.

243.

See

id.

244. See

id.

245.

Boumediene

v.

Obama, No. 08-5537 (D.C.

Cir. Sept. 22,

2009)

(letter

from Sharon

Swingle of the Justice Department's Civil Division to the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit), at
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(D.D.C. Dec.
257. See Al

8,

v.

Obama
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We may yet also see litigation involving the scope of detention authority involving US
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tion." See Press Release,
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direction or control

—

so-called "proxy deten-

ACLU of Southern California, ACLU/SC Suit Seeks Information on U.S.

'Proxy Detention' of American Citizen in the U.A.E. (Aug. 18, 2010), available at https://
www.aclu-sc.org/releases/view/103037.
262. The American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights recently
made waves by filing a suit challenging the government's claim of authority to use lethal force
against Anwar al-Aulaqi, an American citizen alleged to be a member of al Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula. See supra note
ingly rare.

5.

That

suit

is

remarkable precisely because such litigation

exceed-

No earlier suit seeks to preclude the use of lethal military force against a particular in-

dividual. Prior attempts to restrain the

at a

more

Cambodia and

Laos,

government from exercising military force

general level, such as efforts to stop the use of military force in Vietnam,
largely

is

And at least for the time being, so too has
Obama (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2010) (dismissing complaint on

foundered in the face of justiciability objections.

the al-Aulaqi litigation. See Al-Aulaqi

v.

standing and political question grounds).
263. Human Rights First, Habeas Works: Federal Courts' Proven Capacity to
Handle Guantanamo Cases: A Report from retired Federal Judges 13-16 (2010) [hereinafter Report from Retired Federal Judges] available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
,

wp-content/uploads/pdf/Habeas-Works-final-web.pdf. In the interest of

full
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Works criticizes a report I coauthored with Benjamin Wittes and Rabea Benhalim in
which we contend that the judges in the habeas cases have been left by Congress and the President to craft most of the substantive and procedural law governing the habeas proceedings. See
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The Changing Character of the Participants
in

War: Civilianization of

Warfighting and the Concept of "Direct
Participation in Hostilities"

Charles Garraway*

The

fact that the

that
flict,

is

nature of conflict has changed

being asked

particularly as

it

is

is

not in dispute. The question

how this has affected the traditional law of armed con-

has developed in the

modern era. Modern codification of the

law began almost simultaneously on opposite sides of the Atlantic. In the United
States,

during the Civil War, Dr. Lieber drafted the Lieber Code, designed for the
1

Unionist forces. Meanwhile, in Europe, Henry Dunant, following his experience

dream of providing succor to the
emanation of this was the Geneva Convention

the Battle of Solferino, was working to

victims of armed conflict.

The

first

at

fulfill

his

of 1 864. 2

What was of particular interest in both these initiatives is the emphasis on those
who took a direct part in hostilities. In both Europe and the United States, conflict
was

restricted to defined geographical areas.

meant

that this could be so.

* Associate Fellow at

the

Human

Thus there was,

Chatham House on

The

limits

for the

on the range of weaponry

most

the International Security

Rights Centre, University of Essex.

part, a clear distinction

Programme and

a Fellow of
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between the
in hostilities

forces

"battlefield"

in

War

and other areas, and between those who took a direct part

and those who did

and did not involve the

not. Battles

were largely

civilian population.

set pieces

At the

between armed

first battle

of Bull

Run

in

came down from Washington in order to take vantage
points on the surrounding hills. They thought they were entirely safe but even
then, they learned a sharp lesson as, to their total surprise, the Union forces were
routed and the civilians found themselves caught up in the ignominious retreat.
As weaponry increased in power, the battlefield turned into the battlespace. The
growing range of artillery and of airpower meant that no longer could war be limited to armed forces. Civilians were becoming involved, at first as victims of the
new weaponry as occurred in the area bombings of the Second World War, and
then as participants. As war became all-encompassing and the difference between
front lines and rear areas began to evaporate, total war involved the mobilization of
the whole population. Some were in the armed forces; others went into other occupations supporting the war effort, e.g., working in ammunition factories or transJuly 1861, civilian sightseers

port units.

One

of the key principles of the law of armed conflict has always been that of

distinction; a clear separation
hostilities

and those who

and those engaging

is

don't.

to be kept

between those who take a direct part

Those who don't are protected from

in conflict are required to take

all

in

direct attack

feasible precautions in the

choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event
to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian

damage

On the

to civilian objects.

life,

and destruction or

injury to civilians

other hand, the growing involvement of civil-

ians in activities relating to conflict in itself caused difficulties.

The dilemma was met in 1977 by
enjoy protection from attack "unless and for such time
ing line to be drawn?

Where is the divid-

a provision that civilians
as they take a direct part

in hostilities." 3

Until comparatively recent times, the distinction between direct and indirect
participation in hostilities

working

was comparatively uncontroversial.

in industries supporting the

military objective, this might not be too

much

was agreed that

ammunition factories, did
the factory itself would remain a

war effort, such

not amount to "direct participation," though, as

It

as

of a protection.

On the other hand,

who committed "acts which by their nature and purpose are intended to
cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces" 4 were seen
those

as taking a direct part in hostilities

and thus losing

their protection.

the nature of warfare has changed, so have the participants.

many

However,

Now,

as

in the

armed forces sometimes
seem to be almost in a minority. The complexity of weaponry has led to a growing
number of civilian contractors hired to maintain, repair and in some cases even

battlespace, there are

different actors.
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Unmanned

combat vehicles can be operated by
thousands of miles away from the conflict area. The cost of

operate equipment.

personnel situated

aerial

maintaining military personnel has also led to the contracting out of many support
functions, particularly logistics.

meant
has

The merging of

that rear area security, often in the past carried out

now

and

front lines

by

rear areas has

civilian personnel,

developed into a major industry so that private military and security

companies bid for contracts

all

over the world in areas where they will be operat-

ing in areas of conflict.

Even the nature of fighting forces has changed. While in international armed con-

armed forces continue to predominate, there are an increasing number
of armed groups and even individuals who involve themselves in the hostilities. In
non-international armed conflict, one party is by definition "irregular." How does
flict

regular

the principle of distinction apply to

Linked to

human

this

is

rights law.

all

the growing overlap

Some continue to

international law are indeed separate

new actors in the battlespace?
between the law of armed conflict and

these

argue that these two separate parts of public

and there

is

no

overlap.

However, for most,

members of the Council of Europe and thus subject to
European Convention of Human Rights, 5 that is no longer even an arguable

particularly States that are

the

position.

How then do the protective provisions of human rights law, which do not

contain the same distinctions between civilians and direct participation, being
technically applicable to

all,

apply in situations of armed conflict?

To complicate matters still further, the lines between conflict and law enforcement have themselves become blurred. Terrorism, which in the past was looked
upon as a domestic problem to be dealt with under the law enforcement paradigm,
has become ideological "warfare" extending across international boundaries. Terrorists

have acquired weaponry and equipment, the power of which would be the

envy of many

States.

All these factors have led to increasing strain

on

the laws of war as

we know

them. Are the restraints of the Geneva Conventions "quaint" and "obsolete" in this

"new paradigm"? 6 Or are we merely seeing a development of previous types of warfare which do not affect the underlying principles?
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) realized at an early stage
after 9/11 that the principle

of distinction might be under threat and that

it

was neces-

sary to seek to establish guidelines to assist governments to differentiate between those

who are protected from direct attack and those who are not. At the center of this issue
is the phrase "taking a direct part in hostilities." Who qualifies as a "civilian"? What is
the meaning of "direct part"? What are the consequences of losing protection?
In conjunction with the TMC Asser Institute, the ICRC established an expert
process in 2003 to see

if

answers could be found to these questions. The experts
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War

held five meetings between 2003 and 2008 but, although there was

ment, that agreement did not extend to

many of the

hard cases where the differences came to the

fore.

key

Humanitarian Law. The ICRC made
8

it

in

As

usual,

agree-

it is

the

7

At the end of the process, the ICRC decided to issue
ance on the Notion of Direct Participation

issues.

much

its

own

Hostilities

Interpretive Guid-

under International

plain that the Interpretive Guidance "is

widely informed by the discussions held during these expert meetings but does

unanimous view or majority opinion of the experts." 9
Unanimity would have been difficult as, on some of the key issues, the division
was wide and the views strongly held on all sides. Indeed, a number of the experts,
particularly those who held government positions (though all experts took part in
their private capacity), felt it necessary to withdraw from the process as the nature
of the Interpretive Guidance became clear. As a result, the Interpretive Guidance has
been highly controversial and subject to strong criticism. 10 At the same time, Dr. Nils
Melzer, the ICRC's author of the Interpretive Guidance, and others have defended
not necessarily

reflect a

the text. 11

But what

is

particularly in

The first issue is on the definition of "civilian,"
non-international armed conflict. The Interpretive Guidance holds
the debate about?

armed groups of a party to the conflict do not qualify as civilians.
However, in non-international armed conflicts, because of the difficulty in defining members of such groups and the risk that "membership" might then lead to
persons who were members of political or social wings of such groups losing protection, "members" are limited only to "individuals whose continuous function it
12
To some, this
is to take a direct part in hostilities {'continuous combat function)."
was going too far in that it created a new group of individuals who were not "combatants," since there is no combatant status in non-international armed conflict,
but who were no longer classed as "civilians." To others, it did not go far enough, in
that "continuous combat function" did not properly equate to the regular armed
that organized

forces

opposed to the group. Those

in support functions

cook or even lawyer, who might be considered
regular

armed

forces,

would normally not

"continuous combat function"

as

such as the

logistician,

"combatant" members

qualify as legitimate targets

if

in the

under the

test.

In relation to the constitutive elements of direct participation in hostilities, the
Interpretive
states:

Guidance suggested three cumulative conditions. The relevant section

13

In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act

lowing cumulative

criteria:
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The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capac-

1

ity

of a party to an armed conflict

tion

on persons or

or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruc-

objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm),

and

must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result
either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and
2.

there

the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of
3.
harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent
nexus).

These three constituent elements, threshold of harm, direct causation and belliger-

may be

ent nexus,
proval.

thought to be helpful and seem to have received general ap-

While there may be differences on the edges such

human shields come within

"direct causation,"

14

as

whether voluntary

the concepts themselves

seem

to

be well grounded both in existing law and in practice.
Perhaps the most controversial part of the Interpretive Guidance has proved to

be the third

part,

namely, the consequences of the loss of protection.

It states

in

Recommendation IX that
[i]n addition to the restraints imposed by international humanitarian law on specific
means and methods of warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions that may
arise under other applicable branches of international law, the kind and degree offeree
which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack
must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose

in the prevailing circumstances.

This has been interpreted by

15

some

as introducing a rule of graduated use of force

whereby lethal force may only be used, even against combatants, only if it is "actually necessary."

The Guidance includes

a quote

from Jean

Pictet that

by capturing him, we should not wound him; if
we can obtain the same result by wounding him, we must not kill him. If there are two
means to achieve the same military advantage, we must choose the one which causes
[i]f

we can put a

the lesser

A number
this as the

ian law

evil.

soldier out of action

16

of experts in the process, mainly from government backgrounds, saw
introduction of a

human

humanitar-

They argued that no such rule existed in law in
interpretation was that a combatant who had the right to

and vigorously opposed

that the traditional

rights standard into international

it.
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conduct

geted at any time and in any place.
to

do

War

accordance with the law of armed conflict also could be

hostilities in

was possible

in

so,

It

was accepted that on many occasions, where it

capture might be a preferable option but

it

was not a rule of

There were also concerns over the use of the word "actually." Did

law.

duce an ex post facto element into the decision-making process?

If the

kill

this intro-

"armed" per-

son facing the soldier turned out to have no bullets in his weapon, was
necessary" to

tar-

it

"actually

him?

The debate has been bitter and the issues have sometimes become confused. The
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics published a Forum
consisting of four articles by critics from Canada, the United States and the United
Kingdom of the Interpretive Guidance, all of whom had been involved in the expert
process. 17 The same volume published a lengthy riposte to the critics by Dr. Melzer. 18

What seems
bate,

clear

one which

that the Interpretive Guidance has launched an extensive de-

is

be continued in

will

However, while

direct participation

zation" of warfare, there are a

One

ten.

is

this

volume of the "Blue Book"

may seem

number of other

series.

to be the key to the "civiliani-

issues

which should not be forgot-

the growing use of private companies to

fulfill

considered to be military tasks. Increasingly, as mentioned

what were previously

earlier,

Western forces

are outsourcing specific functions to such companies. Logistics are

now heavily re-

liant

on

civilian contractors,

whether

it is

the cook

who

provides the food in the

mess tent or the weapons technician who provides an in-theater repair capability
for a

complex weapons system. Transportation

became

is

now heavily civilianized and this

a factor in the direct participation debate.

the growing

number of companies providing

These can range from

government

static

However, more problematic

security in

is

complex emergencies.

guards for civilian businesses to bodyguards for senior

officials.

How far can or should such companies become involved in military activities?
What

are the limits

on

their participation

and

to

what extent does the contextual

situation change the status of the personnel? Is training of military personnel in a

peacetime environment acceptable but not in a country racked by conflict? Where
are the dividing lines?

The

regulation of private military

and

security

companies has been a matter of

concern to governments and indeed to responsible companies within the industry.

An

initiative

by the Swiss government in cooperation with the ICRC led

signing on September 17, 2009 of the
tional Legal Obligations

vate Military
initially

Montreux Document on Pertinent

to the

Interna-

and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Pri-

and Security Companies during Armed

Conflict. 19 This

document,

signed by seventeen States, led to efforts to develop an international code of

conduct that would

set forth

norms and standards
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some form of accountability mechanism. These efforts, which
included an active collaboration of members of the private security industry with the
security services with

Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control

of Armed Forces and the Geneva

Human

Rights, resulted in the

Academy of International Humanitarian Law and
International Code of Conduct for Private Security

November 20 10 20

Service Providers in

Underlying all of these discussions

signed by fifty-eight companies.
is

the even

lationship between the law of armed conflict
aries

between law enforcement and armed

more fundamental issue of the re-

and human

conflict

rights law.

As the bound-

become increasingly blurred,

it

know which is the predominant paradigm.
Traditionally, the law of armed conflict and human rights law have been seen as
separate and distinct. One was the law of war and the other the law of peace. Never

becomes harder

for the soldier to

no longer can be upheld. Quite
apart from the problems of delineation across the spectrum of violence, the two systems of law have also deliberately sought to expand their own spheres of influence.
the twain should meet. However, that separation

At the end of the Second World War, in keeping with the

traditional divide, the

law of armed conflict belonged almost exclusively to international armed conflict

—war between

some provisions

States. In 1949, the first tentative steps

non- international armed

to

Common Article 3.

21

conflicts

were made to extend

through the

At the same time, the United Nations in

its

medium

of

attempts "to save

succeeding generations from the scourge of war" sought to "reaffirm faith in fun-

damental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men

and women and of nations large and small." 22 In December 1948, the

General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights. 23 Although "universal," no direct mention is made in the Declaration of time of war.

It is

for the Protection of

tember 1953)

24

only in later documents such as the European Convention

Human Rights of November 1950 (entering into force in Sep-

and the International Covenant on

1966 25 that there

is

reference to wars

and

states

Civil

and

Political Rights

of

of emergency.

Common Article 3 is important because it extended only small parts of the law
of armed conflict into non-international armed conflict. These parts dealt with the
protection of individuals ("Geneva law") and not the conduct of hostilities

("Hague law"). However, that has
that led to the adoption of the

now

changed. In the Diplomatic Conference

two 1977 Additional Protocols

to the 1949

Geneva

Conventions, detailed proposals were put forward to extend the "Hague-type" provisions introduced in Additional Protocol

I,

26

and thus applicable only

to interna-

27

armed conflict, into Additional Protocol II, dealing with non-international
armed conflict. For the most part, these attempts were unsuccessful and Additional

tional

Protocol

II

contains primarily "Geneva-type" law. However, the tide was already
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turning and today there

is

apply across the board to
tional

conclusion that almost

War

an increasing trend for law of armed conflict

all

Humanitarian Law,

in

28

all

treaties to

The ICRC's study Customary Interna2005, supported this trend, coming to the

types of conflict.

published in

now

"Hague-type" law was

applicable to

all

conflicts,

both international and non-international.

At the same time, the International Court of Justice 29 and a number of human
rights bodies, 30 in particular the

firming that

human

rights

European Court of

law applied

Human

Rights, 31

at all times, including in

were con-

times of conflict

and public emergency, subject only to derogation and

to the relationship

human

lex specialis. Unfortunately,

rights

law and the law of armed conflict as the

while the principle seemed to be established, the devil, as always,
the nature of the relationship between
conflict has not

human

rights law

is

between

in the detail

and

and the law of armed

been adequately defined.

The extension of "Hague-type" law into non-international armed conflict itself
causes difficulties. Whereas "Geneva law" is primarily concerned with the interests
of victims and thus tends to give primacy to the interests of humanity over military
necessity, "Hague law" is more of a balance. It is accepted in the law of armed conflict that in conflict there will be damage to civilian property and civilian lives will
be lost. However, the principle of proportionality seeks to keep this damage and
loss

of life within reasonable bounds, taking into account the nature of conflict.

Human rights law sits reasonably comfortably alongside "Geneva law" but less
comfortably with "Hague law." The concept of balance
rights law, particularly in those areas that are of most

is

more

limited in

importance in

human

conflict.

Thus

the rules for the use of force in the law of armed conflict are difficult to reconcile

with the right to

While

life

conflict

under human

was a

rights law.

distinct activity conducted, for the

civilian locations, these divergences

manner

human

rights

critical

may be

away from

and need

to be resolved.

32

in

In-

law and the law of armed conflict in a

and coherent

that provides a comparatively seamless

the spectrum of violence

part,

were reasonably unimportant. However,

"wars amongst the people," they become
deed, the reconciliation of

most

set

of rules across

the challenge of the next generation of interna-

tional lawyers.

The

civilianization of warfighting poses

many

challenges to the accepted legal

Some of the work being done and the concepts being explored are exthese following contributions by the members of the panel I chaired.

framework.

amined

in

Much, however, remains to be done. Unless the problems and challenges are recognized and faced, they will never be met and resolved. The characteristics of conflict

may

be changing but that does not

mean

changing too. The laws of war have stood the
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down

is

the centuries,
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adapting as required to meet

new

situations.

The

essential balance

between hu-

manity and military necessity has underpinned the regulation of conflict through

new challenge, each "new paradigm." Our
task is to ensure that that balance is maintained in the world as we face it in the first
those centuries, adjusting to meet each

quarter of the twenty-first century.
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VIII
Direct Participation in Hostilities and the

Law of Armed Conflict
and Human Rights Law

Interoperability of the

Fran^oise
I.

There

an ongoing debate

is

J.

Hampson*

Introduction

as to

how

to

make

armed conflict
The International

the law of

(LOAC) and human rights law (HRsL) interoperable.
Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC's) Interpretive Guidance on
rect Participation in Hostilities

under International Humanitarian

cated that process. 1 This article seeks to explain

propose possible solutions.

opening

fire. It

examination,

there

is

a

Law has

problem and

available to

necessary to identify a range of assumptions and assertions

analysis will be based. Certain distinctions within

LOAC

how

the decision to open

fire is

will

analyzed under HRsL. Options

make LOAC and HRsL interoperable will be considered before

Department of Law and

Human Rights Centre,

then

article will

suggesting a solution.

*

to

only deals with the specific issues of targeting and

be explored, because of their impact on the rules on targeting. The
then examine

compli-

does not address the issue of detention. 2 Before embarking on that

it is first

on which the

It

why

the Notion of Di-

University of Essex, United Kingdom.

finally

DPH and the Interoperability ofLOAC and Human Rights Law
IT.

Assumptions and Assertions

This section identifies certain issues relevant to the discussion that, for reasons of
length,

it

will

not be possible to discuss in any

detail.

The Applicability ofLOAC Does Not Have the Effect of Making HRsL
Inapplicable 3

There

is

overwhelming evidence to support this general proposition, including two

advisory opinions and one judgment in a contentious case of the International

Court of Justice

(ICJ).

applicable,

LOAC

means and

also

is

4

The ICJ has suggested

the lex specialist

It is

that,

when both

bodies of rules are

unclear as yet both precisely what this

how it is to be operationalized. 6 While the United States and Israel

have argued that the applicability of LOAC displaces that of HRsL,
likely that

they can claim to be "persistent objectors."

it

appears un-

7

One of the most important implications of the co-applicability of LOAC and
HRsL is that bodies charged with monitoring compliance with HRsL would appear
to have the

competence

to assess

HRsL

whether a

killing

was

a breach of

HRsL, even

if

ofLOAC. The bodies in question include
not only monitoring mechanisms that owe their authority ultimately to the United
they have to interpret

Nations Charter, such as the

in the light

UN Special Procedures mechanisms,

8

toring bodies established under treaties. Those likely to have the
practice are treaty bodies,

binding legal judgments
This does not

mean

—

but also moni-

most impact

which can receive individual complaints and
in other words, the three regional

in

deliver

human rights courts. 9

that the opinions of other bodies, notably the

Human

Rights

Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are not
important. 10 The jurisdiction of the regional human rights courts may be limited
on other grounds, most notably the uncertain scope of the extraterritorial applicability of HRsL.

The Scope of the
Unlike the

Extraterritorial Applicability of HRsL

first issue, this

States have to apply their
least in the case

question

is

far

from

settled.

11

It

appears to be clear that

human rights obligations in territory that they occupy, at

of stable or settled occupation. 12

human
detainees. 13 What

It is

also well established that

States have to apply their

rights obligations to persons in their physical

control, such as

is

man

is

the extent to which a State's hu-

rights obligations apply to acts within the control of State agents

harm

to the victim

Such

a situation arises

at

not clear

X from

is

foreseeable but the victim

when

not within their physical control.

armed forces of State A in State B deliberately fire
hundred yards or intentionally strike a building in

the

a distance of eight

is

where the

188

Frangoise J.

State B,

knowing

that there are a

Hampson

number of civilians

inside,

even

if

they do not

know their names. 14
This issue, unlike the previous question, arises purely as a matter of HRsL;
has nothing to do with the co-applicability of
those

human

rights treaty bodies

LOAC.

whose competence

"within the jurisdiction" of the respondent State.

15

only arises in the case of

It
is

it

limited to alleged victims

The

UN

Special Procedures

and the Inter- American Commission of Human Rights, in exercising its functions
under the Organization of American States Charter, are not subject to such a limitation. 16

To date, this restriction on the scope of jurisdiction has been most signifi-

cant in the case of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHRs) and, to a lesser
extent, the

UN Human

conflict in,

and occupation

Rights Committee. Important cases, arising out of the
of,

Iraq in and after 2003

and the

conflict

between

Georgia and Russia in 2008, are currently pending before the former body.
clarify that Court's currently

incoherent caselaw.

17

It

found between two equally objectionable extremes.
State should not

ing within
It is

sions

its

It

may

requires a rational path to be
It

seems self-evident that a

be allowed to do extraterritorially what

it is

prohibited from do-

own borders.

equally obvious that a State should not be found responsible for acts, omis-

and situations over which it exercises no control. An important distinction

HRsL,

between positive and negative obligations, might be relevant in

that

in

this

By "negative obligations" is meant the obligation to respect a right, usually
by not doing something prohibited. The State also has an obligation to protect individuals from the risk of a right being violated. This requires the State to take measures to protect the individual from potential harm at the hands of State agents or
third parties. It represents a positive obligation to protect. The nature of certain
rights means that the positive obligation can only be fulfilled by the State exercising
the type of control it is expected to have in national territory. The delivery of the
right to education requires machinery for setting up schools, training teachers,
context.

paying teachers and providing various materials.

It is

self-evident that State A, en-

gaged in a military operation in State B, cannot deliver such a right to the population.

The

situation

would be

different if the

armed

forces

were in

effective control

of part of the State's territory over a significant period of time and failed to address

anyway the educational needs of the population, or if State A's forces, present in
State B with the consent of the State, failed to protect schools from foreseeable at-

in

tack. This

While that

might suggest that the only relevant
is

territory.

it is

which

is

situational control.

inadequate to address certain situations

Take the example of State A, which

State B, but

one of

when
undertake an act that it could not do lawfully in its own

certainly relevant,

the State freely chooses to

test is

is

engaged in a military operation in

not in control of the territory in which
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fighting. Its

armed
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on

X at

They are not in
physical control of X. They are, however, in control of the acts of the armed forces
whose behavior is decisive in determining whether or not X is killed. The issue conforces deliberately fire

a distance of eight

hundred

yards.

cerns a negative obligation, the obligation not to use potentially lethal force except
in defined circumstances.

to deliver the right;
It

its

The

State does not require elaborate

machinery in order

agents simply have to refrain from opening

should be remembered

that,

while

much

fire.

of the discussion of the issue con-

cerns the control exercised by the State acting extraterritorially, the treaty language

does not require the alleged perpetrator to be within the control of the

State. It re-

quires that the victim should be within the jurisdiction of the respondent State.

should also be remembered that the question here

should be analyzed in terms of HRsL or
If it is not, certain

all.

It

not whether the situation

is

LOAC but whether HRsL is applicable at

human rights bodies do not have jurisdiction.

If they

do have

The body then has to determine
whether its analysis of HRsL has to be undertaken in the light ofLOAC. That might

jurisdiction, a

second and separate question

arises.

mean that there was a violation of HRsL only if there were a violation ofLOAC. In
effect, but not in form, the human rights body would then be enforcing LOAC. It
could only do

so,

however,

if it

had jurisdiction.

This article will not discuss the issue further but

throughout the subsequent discussion.

It

must be borne

it

in

mind

has significant implications for the extent

of the problem of co-applicability.

The Geographical Scope of the Applicability ofLOAC
Historically, there

seems to have been an assumption that

LOAC applied through-

out the territory of the State involved in the conflict or in whose territory the conflict

was occurring. 18 In the case of international armed

geographical limitations on the scope of applicability

(IACs),

conflicts

ofLOAC may be achieved in

other ways. For example, during the Gulf War 1990-91, the coalition forces appear

not to have targeted roads and bridges in Iraqi Kurdistan. They were not used to
contribute to the Iraqi military effort and their destruction or neutralization would
therefore not have delivered a definite military advantage. 19 In IACs,
preferable to

assume that

may be

it

LOAC applies throughout the relevant territories and to

use the definition of a military objective to limit the geographical scope of the fighting

on

a factual basis.

The situation
icantly different,

in the case of non-international

whether the State

is

armed conflicts (NIACs)

a party to the conflict or not. 20

important that forces needing the protection of
important that a

LOAC

should get

is

signif-

Although

it, it is

it is

equally

LOAC paradigm should only be used when it is necessary.

Emer-

gency measures that are genuinely required are usually accepted, however
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by the majority of the population. That population is, however, likely
be alienated by reliance on emergency measures not perceived to be necessary.
On that basis, NIAC rules should apply to those parts of the territory in which

reluctantly,

to

righting

is

occurring and to conflict-related activities in other parts of the territory.

Imagine, for example, that there

is

a conflict in

one province of State A.

It

intro-

duces internment or administrative detention as an emergency measure. That

should not apply to the detention of individuals in other provinces, unless an individual

is

detained there on account of activities in the province where the conflict is

occurring.

The caselaw of the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

(ICTY) suggests support for both the general applicability of
the territory

and

also a

more

LOAC

throughout

restricted geographical scope for the applicability of

NIAC rules. A study of State practice, at least with regard to NIACs within the ter21

might suggest a more

ritory of the State,

pression,

restrictive

approach. As a matter of im-

when a conflict is only occurring in part of its territory, a State often only

declares a state of emergency in those parts of national territory affected by the conflict.

22

That

may be

principally the product of domestic, notably constitutional-

law, concerns or of HRsL, but that
applicability of LOAC.

The process of

would not exclude

its

possible relevance to the

23

establishing

customary law in NIACs

is

than in IACs. In IACs, the whole of the relevant discourse

That

mestic law

likely to

is

is

more complicated

through the vocabu-

the principal source of international legal obligations. 24

lary of LOAC.

is

far

be of limited relevance, particularly to

Do-

extraterritorial

conduct. 25 In the case of internal NIACs, the constraints on the conduct of the domestic authorities are principally articulated through domestic law and HRsL.

Confining emergency measures to the parts of the territory where the conflict
occurring and conflict- related activities elsewhere
favored by

human

had

currently

rights bodies dealing with derogation during states of

gency. 26 Initially, the
the threat

may be the approach

is

emer-

ECtHRs emphasized that, in order to justify derogating at all,

to be to "the

life

of the nation" as a whole. 27 This might have been

thought to imply that the conflict had to be occurring everywhere, thereby justifying the applicability of

LOAC

everywhere.

More

recently, the

dressed the situations in Northern Ireland and southeast Turkey.
the argument raised that the

ECtHRs
28

has ad-

At no point was

two States could not derogate because the conflict was

only occurring in part of their territories. At the same time, when dealing with cases
arising in other parts of the respective States, neither the State itself nor the

Court

suggested that they should apply the emergency measures in those other areas.

When the applicability of LOAC depends, among other elements, on the level or
intensity of the violence, as

is

the case with
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Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol

of 1977,

II

the applicability can vary at different times. That

may be

it is

already the case that

relevant

when determin-

ing whether a geographical limitation to the applicability of NIAC rules

is,

in prin-

ciple, acceptable.

In the rest of the article,
eas of the territory in

will

it

which the

be assumed that

conflict

NIAC rules only apply to the ar-

occurring and to conflict-related issues

is

elsewhere. In other parts of the territory, domestic law, including relevant
rights obligations of the State, will

human

be applicable.

The Function of Legal Rules in Situations of Armed Conflict
The law does not exist to remove the decision-making authority of the military
commander from him. The law determines the bottom line, below which conduct
is unlawful. Just because conduct is not unlawful does not make it wise or apt for
achieving the military purpose. It is possible that a commander could be prosecuted on this basis, under national military law, for action that did not constitute
an international crime. 29

The

flip

side of these propositions

scenario. In

normal circumstances,

order paradigm.

30

it

the behavior of the person targeted.

is

inappropriate as a bottom

on opening fire

should be taken as a

It is

is

based on a law and

last resort

and based on

most situations of armed conflict, that

may well be that most of the time and in most

of the territory, even during an emergency, a law and order paradigm
ate,

but in other situations

it

will

just as in

peacetime

a

many situations

it is

for

in every-

on opening fire to

one's interest, including that of military forces, to limit decisions

interest,

appropri-

which they are to be applied and

which they have been designed. In other words,
law and order paradigm, in

is

not be. Rules are more likely to deliver the desired

result if they are suited to the situation in

a

a best-case

dependent on the immediacy and severity

at the time. In

line. It

on

that the law cannot be based

a decision

That means that

of the threat that person poses

is

of armed conflict

it is

in everyone's

including that of the civilian population, for such decisions to be based on

LOAC paradigm.
These principles need to inform the operationalization of the relationship be-

tween HRsL and LOAC. To assert an unrealistic protection of civilians
of armed conflict based on

HRsL is not likely to enhance their protection but rather

to result in unrealizable expectations

tion of the rules
unrealistic, this
tice.

This

is

on the

is

part of the

on the part of civilians and

armed

forces. If

some

not to argue that at the

law and order paradigm

in

will

first

sound of gunfire

which an armed

conflict

in increased viola-

rules are perceived to be

likely to lessen respect for those rules that

HRsL. The circumstances

in situations

can be applied in prac-

LOAC

paradigm should replace a

be considered further below. All that
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is, first,
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that there are circumstances in

NIACs when LOAC is the more appro-

paradigm and, second, just because the law allows a soldier to open

fire

does

not mean that it is necessarily the right thing to do in a particular situation in which

LOAC is applicable.
III.

Distinctions within

LOAC Relevant to the Rules on Targeting
and Opening Fire

Three distinctions need to be considered here:

first,

that

between Hague law and

Geneva law; second, that between treaty law and custom; and, third, that between
the literal meaning of "direct participation in hostilities" (DPH) and the ICRC's
Interpretive Guidance.

Hague Law and Geneva Law
Before 1977 and the adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conven-

on international armed conflicts, any discussion took the distinction between Hague law and Geneva law for granted. The rules
were usually to be found in different treaties, making the distinction both necessary and relatively straightforward. The usual way of describing the substantive
content of the rules was that Hague law dealt with means and methods of fighting
and Geneva law with the protection of victims who were, by definition, in the power
of the other side. In fact, the rules were even more distinct than this might suggest.
Hague law and Geneva law functioned differently as legal subsystems. This was a
product of the issues with which each dealt, but it went much deeper than that.
For reasons of brevity, it will be necessary to discuss the differences by way of
sweeping generalizations. Even if they may be subject to criticism, that does not
mean that there is not an essential truth at their heart. Hague law is directed to the
military operator. It guides his decision making at the time. It deals principally with
the places where, and times when, fighting is occurring. The rules tend to identify
the considerations that must be taken into account and provide guidance as to how
they are to be balanced, rather than simply prohibiting a particular outcome. 31 The
tions of 1949, particularly Protocol

I

rules are a detailed articulation of general principles,

such as the principles of dis-

and military necessity.
Geneva law, on the other hand, is focused on the actual or potential victim,
rather than the perpetrator. Many, but by no means all, of the issues that it ad-

tinction, proportionality

certain

away from the immediate field of battle. The law tends to prohibit
results or outcomes, usually by requiring certain forms of behavior. The

bottom

line

dresses arise

to be

much

and the most appropriate behavior
closer in the case of

in a particular situation are likely

Geneva law than Hague
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law. If

Hague law

is
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principally directed at the individual operator,

Geneva law appears

to focus

more

on the obligations of a party to the conflict. Geneva law provides answers or required outcomes, but Hague law provides tools enabling the operator to arrive at an
answer

in a specific situation.

To

that extent,

Geneva law appears

of situations, rather than specific ones. The nature of Geneva law

mesh with HRsL than

to address types

may make it eas-

Hague law. If, in the case of Geneva
law, it is a question of finding an accommodation between LOAC and HRsL, in
the case of a significant portion of Hague law it is a matter of making a choice.
ier to

That

is

is

the case with

a product not only of the content of the rules but also of the nature of the

separate legal subsystems.

The internal logic of the two subsystems is therefore significantly different, with
considerable implications for their functioning as systems. This

is

sumptions, qualifications and limitations contained within the
the

Geneva Conventions

is

the protection of victims,

tions to a rule have the nature of exceptions

it

It

rules. If a goal

may mean

seeks rather to establish a balance,

of

that qualifica-

and suggests that they should be

preted restrictively. This would reinforce the parallel with HRsL.

overarching goal.

reflected in pre-

inter-

Hague law has no

one between humanitarian

To that end, there can be no default position

considerations and military necessity.

or presumption in favor of either side of the equation.

The

rule itself contains the

no appeal to military necessity outside the formulation of the
matter of law, there can be no appeal to humanitarian concerns
There is no need to interpret limitations 32 restrictively. They

balance. There can be
rule. Equally, as a

outside the rule.

should be given their natural meaning.
Additional Protocol

I

appeared to merge Hague law and Geneva law.

however, possible to "merge" two
It

set

of rules and to produce an entirely new type

of rule, but that was not done. Rather, Protocol
visions of a

which
1949,

is
is

not,

of rules that function in quite different ways.

sets

might be possible to change each

It is

I

contained some sections and pro-

Hague-law type and some of a Geneva-law type. Additional Protocol II,

largely a

development of Common Article

principally an

type provisions, unlike

3 of the

example of Geneva law, but

it

Geneva Conventions of

does contain some Hague-

Common Article 3.

The specific question being explored in this article is targeting and the decision
to open fire. Is that a matter of Hague law or Geneva law? While it might be
tempting to see civilians at risk from the fighting as an additional class of victim
to be protected under Geneva law, it is submitted that that analysis is flawed. The
categories of victims protected by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 share two
characteristics. They have been adversely affected by the armed conflict and they
are vulnerable because they are in the

does not, by and

large, affect the

power of the other

conduct of
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side. 33

hostilities,

Their protection

although

it

will

be
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necessary to divert resources that could have been used for other purposes to ef34
Civilians in
fect their protection.

need of protection from the fighting do not

fit

within this framework. Their vulnerability arises not from the adversary but from

They need protection from their own side as much as
from the enemy. Any measures to improve their protection will have a direct impact on the conduct of hostilities. In other words, rules on targeting and opening
fire form part of Hague law, even if part of their object is the protection of the cithe fact of the fighting.

vilian population.

The Distinction between Treaty Law and Customary Law in LOAC
Treaty

Law

Geneva Law. There

is

detailed

law- type issues in IACs. There
applicable in

NIACs, with two

and extensive provision
is

fairly detailed

Geneva-

provision for such issues in treaties

significant exceptions

the status of members of opposing organized

in treaty law for

—grounds

for detention

and

armed groups. This is a logical conse-

quence of the situations in question. Domestic law, possibly emergency law,
available to deal with the

NIACs.

No

logically

grounds for detention,

sovereign State claiming a

at least in the case

monopoly on

making the

To do

so

would be

of internal

the lawful use of force can

admit that organized armed opponents have a special

other than unlawfully.

is

status or are acting

to recognize the belligerency, thereby

conflict effectively subject to the

IAC

rules.

Geneva-type rules across the very low threshold of

Geneva Conventions of 1949. Those basic rules

There are some

Common

NIAC

Article 3 of the

are further developed in situations

that cross the significantly higher threshold for the applicability of Additional

Protocol

II.

Hague Law. The situation is very different in the case of Hague law. Again, there is
detailed regulation of the means and methods of fighting in treaties applicable in
IACs. There are no treaty rules of a Hague-law type in Common Article 3 NIACs,
however, and only very basic provisions in NIACs to which Additional Protocol II
is applicable. The one exception is rules on specific conventional weapons, where
the recent trend in treaty law is to make the same rules applicable in IACs and
NIACs. 35 The treaties do not explain whether NIACs refer to all such conflicts or
only those that cross the threshold of Additional Protocol
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Customary Law

Geneva Law. Assuming that the ICRC's Customary International Humanitarian
Lawi7 study, reinforced by the caselaw of the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Statute of the International Criminal Court in
the specific field of criminal rather than

civil obligations, offers a fairly

guide to customary law rules of a Geneva-law type, there
treaty provisions

to exclude rules

is

a close

match between

and customary law in both IACs and NIACs. Again,

on grounds

for detention

and the

accurate

it is

necessary

armed oppo-

status of organized

nents in the case of NIACs.

Hague Law. The

situation

is

very different in the case of Hague-law rules. There

a significant overlap in treaty

and customary law rules of a Hague-law type

but not in NIACs. The caselaw of the

ICTY and ICTR and the

in

is

IACs

Statute of the Inter-

national Criminal Court, together with the customary law study, suggest that there

and detailed customary

are extensive

rules of a

Hague-law type

NIACs, even

in

though there are no or only rudimentary treaty provisions. In reaching such conclusions, not

one of those sources distinguishes between Common Article

and Additional Protocol

II

NIACs. This

Hague-law-type treaty rules in
treaty law

when

a

ditional Protocol

is

Common

3

NIACs

surprising given that there are

Article 3

NIACs. They only appear

no
in

NIAC crosses the very high threshold for the applicability of AdII.

The most remarkable

legal

source in this respect

is

the Statute

of the International Criminal Court, the only source based on inter-State negotiation.

The

negotiators took as their criterion for inclusion in the

that the act was regarded as a war crime in

the Statute of Hague-law

war crimes

in

list

of war crimes

customary international law. 38 The list in

NIACs

is

much

shorter than that in IACs

and, most notably, does not include launching an indiscriminate or disproportion-

The negotiating States are likely to have been influenced by the customary war crimes in NIACs "discovered" by the ICTY and ICTR. It is nevertheless
surprising that in the definition of NIACs in the Statute no distinction is drawn between Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II situations. 39 It would be rash
ate attack.

to

assume

that the Statute of the International Criminal

distinction

no longer matters. The

NIACs, they went out of
higher than

Common Article 3.

ary law study
larly

their

is

last

Court

is

evidence that the

time that States elaborated general rules for

way to create a threshold of applicability much
Nor should it be assumed that the ICRC's custom-

not controversial. In

fact, that is far

from being the

case, particu-

with regard to Hague-law-type issues. 40

It is

suggested that alleged customary

not bear a close relationship to the

NIAC

rules of a

Hague-law type

that

do

NIAC treaty rules should be handled with some
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The problem is not that such rules risk posing an undue and unwarranted obligation on States; 41 it is rather that the alleged customary rules may imply a shift
from a law and order paradigm to an armed conflict paradigm at an inappropriately low level of disruption. Since Geneva-law rules are focused on the protection
of victims and bear a significant similarity to the approach of HRsL, their applicacare.

bility at the
is

Common Article 3 threshold does not appear to be too problematic. It
customary rules of Hague law that give

specifically

particularly,

it is

rise to this difficulty.

More

LOAC rules that permit action to be taken, rather than LOAC rules

that prohibit attacks against certain types of targets or the use of certain weapons,
that cause the problem.

When

the alleged applicability of customary

Hague

rules in a

NIAC means

that objects indispensable to the civilian population cannot be targeted or that

anti-personnel land mines cannot be used, there

such a rule and HRsL. The situation
ary

Hague

rules in

member

being a

function

—

by

havior. Mistakes

if the

no

conflict

between

applicability of custom-

of

of an organized armed group exercising a continuous combat

by reference

to status

his behavior. 42 In low-intensity

be made worse

likely to

very different

clearly

NIACs means that an individual can be targeted by virtue

in other words,

threat posed

civilian

all

is

is

and

if

—

rather than

armed

conflicts, the situation

armed forces target by reference to

"collateral casualties"

may be

even

on account of the

status rather than be-

less well tolerated

population than in high-intensity NIACs. The issue

is

is

by the

not whether armed

armed violence during an emergency, but
whether whatever forces are used are applying rules based on a law and order paradigm or an armed conflict paradigm.
forces can be used to deal with organized

Consider the example of "Bloody Sunday." 43 For the sake of argument,

let

us

happened today; second, that the situation in
(London)Derry is to be characterized as coming within Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions; 44 and, finally, that it is lawful under LOAC rules to open fire
against an individual because of his membership in an organized armed group exercising a continuous combat function. 45 Since the armed forces are unlikely to
have membership lists of illegal organized armed groups, a membership test has to
be understood as referring to presumed membership. It is not clear how that is to
be determined. Can it seriously be suggested that it would be appropriate if international law allowed the British armed forces to open fire against any presumed
member of the IRA, irrespective of what he was doing at the time? Would it be sufficient if international law gave them that authority but a commander chose to act
within greater restrictions than the law allowed and ordered his forces only to open
assume,

first,

that the events

fire in self-defense? 46

In other words, should such discretion have been allowed to a

military commander or should international law have required
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law and order paradigm? That
plicability of customary

Literal

II

alleged ap-

in those of sufficient

applicable.

Hostilities"

and the

47

who

at least in

the case of IACs, there exist only two possible

LOAC in relation to the law on the conduct of hostilities:

under

civilian.

persons

Protocol

NIACs, rather than

up by the

Guidance

According to treaty law,

and

all

Meaning of "Direct Participation in

Interpretive

statuses

rules in

make Additional

intensity as to

The

Hague

the kind of problem thrown

is

combatant

The term "combatant" does not describe persons who

are entitled to fight.

A

combatant has the

is

doing

at the

time he

is

killed.

but

right to kill and, equally,

can be killed by opposing combatants by virtue of having that status. 48
matter what he

fight,

It

does not

Only combatants can be targeted

The only other people who can be the target of attack are
persons who are taking a direct part in hostilities. The status of combatant exists
only in IACs. While it is readily understandable that members of an organized
armed group are not regarded as combatants, implying as it does an entitlement to

by virtue of status

fight, this

State's

alone.

does raise an interesting question about the status of members of the

armed

forces. 49 If there

Although an individual has no
he

is

no combatant

is

status in

right in international law to participate in a

not committing an international crime by doing

likely to

NIACs, are they civilians?

so,

but obviously he

be committing a crime under domestic law. Similarly, he

an international crime

if he kills

a

NIAC,

will

very

is

not commit

member of the State's armed forces or a member

of another organized group, but he will commit an international crime
breaches the rules on the conduct of hostilities by intentionally killing a

if

he

civilian,

for example.

The treaty rule that addresses DPH is the same in IACs and NIACs.

Civilians en-

joy the protection afforded against the effects of hostilities "unless and for such

time as they take a direct part in

hostilities." 50

Whatever the

difficulties

regarding

the time during which a person can be attacked or the conduct that constitutes

"taking a direct part,"

makes him
tus.

who

Two

it is

clear that the

person has to be doing something that

a target of attack. In other words, that

different types of

can be targeted.

First,

depends on behavior and not sta-

problems confront armed forces trying to determine
the situations in which

armed

have evolved significantly since 1977. "A continuous
ties into civilian

ians with

shift

forces find themselves

of the conduct of hostili-

population centres has led to an increasing intermingling of civil-

armed

actors

and has

facilitated their

closely related to military operations." 51

involvement in

A more

recent

activities

phenomenon

more
is

the

outsourcing of traditionally military functions. This could result in people appearing to be

members of the

military

and

to be
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when

that

is

not,
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in fact, the case. Alternatively, people could appear to

be involved in military

activities.

be civilians but also appear to

In other words, the factual situations in which

members of the armed forces find themselves are increasingly confused. This must
make it difficult to apply any rule, even if they knew what the rule meant.
The second difficulty concerns the formulation of the rule itself. What is the
period of time covered by "unless and for such time as"?

when does
tinction

it

end?

Which

activities constitute "participation"

does

start

it

and what

and

the dis-

is

between direct and indirect participation?

It is likely

that there

is

an additional element of frustration and that

content of the rule. Imagine that there
actively participating in hostilities,

character as to enable detention
get

When

is

significant evidence that

but the evidence

is

with the

X has been and is

not of a quantity, type or

on a criminal charge. The armed forces cannot tar-

X unless they catch him in the act of participating,

sponsible for

is

even though he

may be

re-

many deaths.

In these circumstances,

it is

ICRC

not surprising that the

sought to

clarify the

meaning of the rule. 52 The Interpretive Guidance was the product of extensive consultation with experts who were consulted in their personal capacity, but is exclusively the responsibility

to IACs,

is

of the ICRC.

Much of the content, particularly in

relatively uncontroversial. In

non-IAC

the case. In those instances, the Guidance

sometimes conflicting standpoints.

53

The

is

situations,

however, that

very controversial

clarification

relation
is

not

from various and

of the constitutive elements

of direct participation and of the beginning and end of direct participation will not

What will be examined is the withdrawal of civilian stafrom members of organized armed groups in NIACs and its implications for

be considered further here.
tus

the interoperability of LOAC

and HRsL.

The Interpretive Guidance treats civilians differently in IACs and NIACs. Since
an IAC by definition involves at least two States on opposing sides, there is no
shortage of "parties" to such a conflict. The Interpretive Guidance restates the usual
test for

combatant

tection

from attack

status.
if

54

All other persons are civilians but they

they take a direct part in

hostilities.

may forfeit pro-

In other words, loss of

on the behavior of the individual. The Interpretive Guidance
clarifies both the meaning of direct participation and also the time during which
protection is lost. These clarifications have implications for loss of protection by
civilians in IACs, but loss of protection is still dependent on behavior.
The situation with regard to NIACs is very different. A person is no longer to be
regarded as a civilian if he is a member of an organized armed group of a party to
the conflict. Members of an organized armed group constitute the armed forces of
protection depends

a non-State party to the conflict

and

consist only of individuals

who

exercise con-

tinuous combat functions. 55 This clearly means that an individual can be targeted
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on account of his status as a presumed member of such a group and not on account
of his behavior

at the

time he

is

targeted.

a result of the clarification of "unless
tion,"

it is

Given the greater

and

flexibility

for such time as"

and

introduced as

"direct participa-

not clear why it was thought necessary to address the status of a fighter in

NIAC at all. After all, no change appears to have been introduced to the status of a
civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities in an IAC. That possibly represents an
oversimplification. In an IAC, civilians who belong to an armed group that does
a

not belong to a party to a conflict can indeed only be targeted
part in hostilities.

even

if

if

they take a direct

Many such groups will, however, belong to a party to the conflict,

they do not form part of

its

regular

armed

forces.

That party, which

is

by

definition a State, will have responsibility in international law for the conduct of
forces. 56 In other cases, the

armed group may belong to a party that is
not a State but which is involved in an armed conflict against a party to the IAC.
The Interpretive Guidance suggests that in such a case two armed conflicts will be
occurring in parallel; an IAC between two States and a NIAC between the nonState party and one of the States parties. In that case, who can be targeted will be determined by the Interpretive Guidance principles applicable in NIACs. 57 If anythose

armed

thing, that reinforces the point that the impact of the Guidance proposal only arises
in

NIACs.

The

principal justification suggested for denying civilian status to

members of

organized armed groups exercising continuous combat functions, while not also
granting

them combatant status,

is

the principle of distinction. 58 There

and those who

is

a need to

armed forces of a party to
the conflict. It is said that Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
implies that both the State and non-State groups have armed forces. 59 Less convincingly, it is argued that Additional Protocol II makes a distinction between
those who take a direct part in hostilities and the forces that are capable of conducting sustained and concerted military operations. 60 The Interpretive Guidance acknowledges that it is difficult to establish the membership of an organized armed
group, in contrast to membership of the armed forces or other official armed
group. 61 It is difficult to see how "continuous combat function" can be established
other than by conduct, in which case we are driven back to a behavior test. It should
be emphasized that loss of status does not depend on membership of a party to the
conflict, or even of membership of an armed group belonging to such a party. It is
also necessary to establish that the individual exercises a continuous combat
distinguish between civilians

act like the

function.
Superficially,

it

might appear that the proposal supports the principle of the

equality of belligerents, in that both parties are recognized as having
In fact, however, the

armed

forces.

members of an organized armed group exercising continuous
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combat functions lose civilian immunity from

attack but

do not gain the privileges

of a combatant.
It

tion

could, perhaps with equal plausibility, be argued that the principle of distincis

based on the idea that there are only two statuses in

ant and that of civilian.

62

LOAC:

that of combat-

A combatant is someone who has the right to take part in

the hostilities and who therefore has the right to

kill

opposing combatants. Anyone

who is not a combatant, therefore anyone who does not have those rights, is a civilmembers of organized armed groups must be civilians unless the
opposing party recognizes their combatant status. Immunity from attack could be
lost but only on the basis of the individual's behavior.
The Interpretive Guidance just refers to NIACs and does not distinguish between
Common Article 3 NIACs and Additional Protocol II NIACs. That is why the
"Bloody Sunday" example discussed earlier represents a problem. The Interpretive
Guidance approach would be easier to defend if it were restricted to situations
ian. In that case,

above the threshold of applicability of Additional Protocol II,

at least

with regard to

the level and nature of the violence. 63

At present, there are two principal
rule

and uncertain

facts.

temporal and functional

difficulties for

Other aspects of the
issues. It is

armed forces:

Interpretive

Guidance address the

why it was thought

not clear

the scope of the

necessary to ad-

dress the question of status before determining the impact of those clarifications.

The bigger

difficulty

is

uncertainty about the

facts. It is

hard to see

how the

Guid-

ance helps there. The ability to target by reference to status depends on the ability to
establish that the person targeted

was a member of an organized armed group

belonged to a party to the conflict and the person
function within the group. This

such a determination

is

is

likely to

to be based

on

fulfilled a

target of an attack, the
ally

continuous combat

pose a real challenge to armed forces

fact rather

Guidance emphasizes

if

than a vague hunch.

Perhaps as a counterweight to the withdrawal of
fighters, the Interpretive

that

that,

civilian status

when an

from

certain

individual can be the

kind and degree of force used must "not exceed what is actu-

necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circum-

stances." 64

The Interpretive Guidance suggests that, in circumstances when it would
not increase the risk to the opposing armed forces or to other civilians, the threat
posed by the individual might be neutralized by measures short of the use of lethal
force, notably detention. 65 It

confusion.

66

is

submitted that

this represents

Key features of a law and order paradigm are,

first,

dangerous category
that force

is

used as

a last resort and, second, that priority should be given to an attempt to detain.

The

armed conflict paradigm, as far as Hague-type rules are concerned, is that there is no obligation to detain. An individual can be targeted by virtue of his status, irrespective of what he is actually doing at the time, or on the basis
essential feature of an
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of his behavior

at the time.

As

combination of a right to use

a matter of law, the

deadly force and a requirement to use the

minimum force necessary would appear

67
to be incoherent.

submitted that there

It is

would

the relationship between

A

LOAC

terms.

It

have the additional benefit of making easier the operationalization of

also

IV.

a better solution, even in purely

is

LOAC and HRsL.

Comparison of the Basis for Opening Fire under HRsL and LOAC

As indicated above, the majority of human
ings without defining the term.

rights treaties prohibit arbitrary kill-

The meaning

to be given to "arbitrary"

becomes

apparent through an examination of the practice of treaty bodies in exercising
their

monitoring functions and particularly through the caselaw arising out of

individual complaints. In this context,

the report to the
dicial,
It is

also relevant to consider the analysis in

UN Human Rights Council of the Special Rapporteur on Extraju-

Summary or Arbitrary Executions. 68
clear

from the caselaw that the prohibition on arbitrary

strictly in the case

opening

for

it is

of deaths resulting from the acts of State agents.

fire is

ited circumstances,

It is

be interpreted more broadly.

the agent could justify opening

he poses, rather than the

fire

risk

it

is

applied

The only basis

It

if his

on account of the general

behavior

is

not dangerous

lethal force has to

force.

be a

It

would,

at the time,

last resort.

Human Rights (ECHR)

defines exhaustively the only circumstances in

had to potentially lethal

might, in lim-

might be possible to argue that

for the Protection of

71

it

his behavior at the time. 70

posed by

he cannot be detained. The use of potentially

The European Convention

conceivable that

against an individual

however, be necessary to establish why,

usual in that

69

the behavior of the individual at the time, including the risk

posed by the individual to himself or others.

risk

killings

which

All those circumstances are based

resort

is

un-

may be

on a law and

or-

der paradigm, and are based on the behavior of the individual at the time. Further-

more, the
but that

test is

it is

State take

not that the use of potentially lethal force

absolutely necessary.

72

is

reasonably necessary

In addition, the Convention requires that the

measures to protect the right to

life.

This has been interpreted, in the case

of planned operations, as requiring security forces to take measures to try to prevent the need to resort to potentially lethal force 73 and to protect other civilians in
the vicinity

from the risk of being injured or killed. 74 This can

result in the State

being

held responsible for a death that resulted from the use of inappropriate weapons. 75
All the treaty bodies require
lethal force

and

both lawful grounds for resorting to potentially

also that the force

used be proportionate. This does not
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proportionality as
ate to the risk

it is

understood in
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LOAC but that the force used is proportion-

posed by the individual

76
at the time.

The analysis has so far considered the requirements of HRsL in a "normal" context. The question arises of how the rules are modified, if at all, by the existence of a
situation of emergency or armed conflict. All the treaty bodies, other than the

ECHR, provide that the prohibition of arbitrary killing is non-derogable. Prima facie,
means that it applies also in such situations. It is, however, possible that the
meaning of "arbitrary" has sufficient flexibility to apply in a different way in such
situations. There appears as yet to be no human rights caselaw involving killings
arising out of circumstances in which LOAC indisputably applies a status test
in
this

—

other words, in IACs. There are relevant cases currently pending before the

ECtHRs. There is, however, caselaw arising out of situations
tive

in

which the Interpre-

Guidance would suggest that targeting by reference to status

legitimate

is

—

in

NIAC, of a member of an organized
armed group exercising a continuous combat function. The author is not aware of
other words, the targeting, in every type of

any such situation where the State invoked
for

opening

fire.

On

LOAC or the State claimed such a basis

the contrary, States have argued, successfully or otherwise,

that the behavior of those targeted justified the resort to potentially lethal force

and/or that the force used was proportionate.

The

ECHR is again different in that it provides, "No derogation from Article 2,

except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war
this provision."

77

.

.

.

shall

be made under

This either represents a possible derogation or a defense.

has ever invoked the

article,

No State

even where the alleged violation of Article 2 occurred

during the course of an armed conflict to which

Common Article 3

of the Geneva

Conventions was arguably applicable.
It is

submitted that human rights bodies appear to be wedded to a behavior

Even assuming that they wish
both

to give effect to the directions of the ICJ that,

and

when

LOAC and HRsL are applicable, they should apply LOAC as the lex specialis,

they are likely to be reluctant to go back on existing caselaw, either in
ally

test.

NIACs gener-

or specifically in the case of NIACs between the threshold of Common Article 3
that of Additional Protocol

The

basis of targeting in

II.

LOAC will be

set

out baldly here, since

it

has already

been the subject of discussion. In IACs, there appears to be a close relationship between the rules of treaty law and customary law. Under both, the following
targeted

by virtue of their

party to the IAC,
levee en masse.

ther as interpreted

members of the armed forces of a
belonging to that party and members of a

status as combatants:

members of a

Others

may be

militia

may only be targeted if they take a direct part in hostilities, ei-

on the basis of treaty law or as interpreted

terpretive Guidance.
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In the case of NIACs, there

some

allege to

may be

be customary law.

targeted

and on what

ventions. That presumably

marked difference between treaty law and what
Under treaty law, there is no guidance as to who

a

is

basis

Common Article

under

to be regulated

falls

3 of the

Geneva Con-

by domestic law and HRsL. Where

NIAC crosses the much higher threshold necessary to make Additional Protocol
II applicable, a person may only be targeted for taking a DPH. A person cannot be

a

by virtue of his

targeted

An

status.

analysis of the position

under customary law requires

a distinction to be

drawn between customary law without the Interpretive Guidance and customary
law taking it into account. The expansive view, based on the Customary International

Humanitarian Law study, the caselaw of the ICTY and ICTR, and the provi-

sions of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, suggests that in
a person can be targeted only

same

as the

he takes a direct part in

hostilities.

This

NIACs

is

not the

human rights test based on the threat posed by the behavior of the in-

dividual at the time, but

human

if

all

rights bodies to

it is

at least

based on behavior.

accommodate themselves

It

might be possible for

to that slight widening of the

concept of threat, particularly those bodies applying a prohibition of "arbitrary
killings."

The

picture changes

that basis, a person

if

we

take account of the Interpretive Guidance.

may be targeted in

all

direct part in hostilities or because he

is

NIACs

On

on account of his taking a
member of an organized armed group

a

either

belonging to a party to the conflict and exercising a continuous combat function.

That

last

tion in

element involves targeting on the basis of status and doing so in a situa-

which human

rights bodies

troversy, a behavior test.

That

is

have hitherto applied, without apparent con-

likely to

complicate rather than to

operationalization of the relationship between

V.

A human

facilitate

the

LOAC and HRsL.

Conclusion

rights body, trying to give effect to the principle articulated

by the

ICJ,

LOAC is applicable. It then has to decide what LOAC
says. In order to identify the relevant LOAC rule, it has to characterize the armed
conflict as an AC or a NIAC. If it is an AC, the possible distinction between treaty
LOAC and customary LOAC is unlikely to be of major importance. That is not the

has to decide

first

78

whether

I

I

case in relation to

NIACs. The human

rights

only apply treaty law, in which case there

is

body needs to know whether it should
a significant difference

between

situa-

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and those in which Additional Protocol II is applicable. On the other hand, if they are to apply both treaty
tions within

and customary
customary

law, they have the unenviable task of determining the content of

NIAC

rules.

The arguments

as to the content of customary
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are not for academics in ivory towers, dancing

on the head of a pin; they have con-

siderable practical importance.

submitted that

It is

human

rights bodies are likely to see themselves as having

four options:

(

1

They could regard LOAC as silent with regard to the basis for targeting in
low-intensity armed conflicts, therefore applying their usual test under
human rights law and limiting the application of DPH to conflicts in
which Additional Protocol II was applicable. 79 This would still involve
the application of a behavior

peacetime

(2)

slightly different

as the basis for targeting in all

involve the application of a behavior

ent one from the peacetime

(3)

but a

one from the

test.

They could apply DPH
still

test,

test,

NIACs. This would

but again a

slightly differ-

test.

They could regard LOAC as silent with regard to the basis for targeting in
low-intensity armed conflicts, therefore applying their usual test, but in
this instance

applying both

DPH

and

a status test

(member of an

orga-

nized armed group exercising a continuous combat function) in situations in

(4)

which Additional Protocol

II

was applicable.

They could use DPH as the basis for targeting in low-intensity armed
conflicts and apply both DPH and a status test in situations in which Additional Protocol II was applicable.

The one thing that human
of a status

test in

rights bodies are unlikely to accept

low- intensity armed conflicts. 80 That

the Interpretive Guidance proposes with regard to

groups exercising continuous combat functions.

is,

is

the application

however, precisely what

members of organized armed
The Interpretive Guidance has

LOAC and
HRsL. The Interpretive Guidance makes it clear that it is only addressing LOAC and
therefore complicated, rather than

made easier,

not other bodies of rules. 81 That

unhelpful since the majority of States have obli-

gations under both

is

the relationship between

LOAC and HRsL. There would appear to be little point in sug-

gesting that States can target

by reference

to status in

all

NIACs

if

HRsL precludes

that possibility, at least in the case of low-intensity armed conflicts. 82

ation in

national

which such a

and only if HRsL was not applicable extraterritorially in the
circumstances. 83 The Interpretive Guidance should either have confined

NIAC,

particular

LOAC rule would conceivably be relevant

The only situwould be a trans-

if
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targeting by status to situations in

not used targeting by status at

which Additional Protocol

II

was applicable or

all.
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Clara Sandoval eds., 2010); EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
1 1

rial

Applicability of International

(Fons

Coomans

& Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004); Michael

Dennis, Application of Human
Conflict and Military Occupation, 99
J.

Armed
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (2005); Michael
Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of

J.

Dennis

&

Andre M.

Surena, Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Times ofArmed
Conflict and Military Occupation: The Gap between Legal Theory and State Practice, 13 EUROPEAN

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 714 (2008); Nigel Rodley,
bility in

Armed

The Extraterritorial Reach and Applica-

Conflict of the International Covenant on Civil

Dennis and Surena, 14 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS

and Political Rights: A Rejoinder

to

LAW REVIEW 628 (2009). See generally NOAM

LUBELL, EXTRA-TERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS (2010).
12.

Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note

4,

J

1

12;

Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.
posed on States Parties

to the

Armed Activities,

31,

supra note

4,

^ 216; U.N.

Nature of the General Legal Obligation Im-

Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.l3

(May

26, 2004);

v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 52/1979 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Views of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/ 1979 (July 29, 1981);
Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 12, 2005) (Grand Chamber).

Loizidou
13.

14.

Bankovic and Others

v.

Belgium, 2001 -XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, reprinted

in

123

International Law Reports 94 (2001).
undertakes to respect and to ensure
15. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2.1 ("Each State Party
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction"); ECHR, supra note 9, art. 1
("The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction"); ACHR,
supra note 9, art. 1 ("The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and
freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and
full exercise of those rights and freedoms"). There is no jurisdictional clause in the African Char.

ter,

supra note
16.

it

.

.

9.

This does not

mean that extraterritoriality will be of no significance to such bodies, since

may have an impact in relation to

State responsibility for positive obligations outside national

territory.

The English courts are required, under the Human Rights Act 2000, to take account of
ECtHRs. In The Queen on the Application of"B" & Others v. Secretary of State
the
Foreign
and
Commonwealth Office [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1344 [59] (unreported, Oct. 18,
for
2004), a case that concerned the actions of consular officials in Australia, the Court of Appeal had
17.

the caselaw of the
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.
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difficulty in reconciling the decisions

of the

ECtHRs in

Bankovic, supra note 14, and Ocalan, supra

13. In Al-Skeini& Others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911 [222],
High Court had difficulty in reconciling the decisions of the ECtHRs in Bankovic and Issa &
Others v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., Chamber, Admissibility Decision (May 30,
2000); Issa and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 567 (2004).
18. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, fflj 68-70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); The
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, HH 635-36 (Sept. 2, 1998).
19. The destruction, capture or neutralization of an object has to offer a definite military advantage in order for the thing to be a military objective as defined in Article 52.2 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1 2 August 1 949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims

note

the

of International
col

I].

Had

Armed

Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Proto-

the roads and bridges been so used, they

would have become

military objectives. In

other words, the advantage of using the definition of "military objective" to determine the geographical scope of applicability of

20.
say,

The

LOAC is that it

depends on the

facts

and the conduct of the

than a potentially arbitrary geographical yardstick.

parties, rather

treaty rules appear to have

been designed for situations of internal NIAC, that

is

to

an armed conflict within a State either between that State and one or more organized armed

State. The treaty language
means that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is capable of applying to an
armed conflict in State B between State A and an organized armed group based in and fighting
from State B. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in

groups or between such groups themselves within the territory of a

Armed Forces in the Field art.

3,

Aug.

12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3

1

14,

75 U.N.T.S. 3 1 Convention for the
;

Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
Sea

art. 3,

Aug.

12, 1949,

Prisoners of War

art. 3,

at

6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of

Aug.

12, 1949,

Protection of Civilian Persons in

6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the

Time of War

art. 3,

Aug.

12, 1949,

287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] Additional Protocol
.

II

6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.

of 1977 cannot be applicable in

it requires the State party to an armed conflict to be the same State as the
one in whose territory the conflict is fought. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
1 2 August 1 949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts

such a situation since

art. 1,

21

June

8,

1977,

"Certainly,

1

125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol

some of the provisions

are clearly

bound up with

II].

the hostilities and the geo-

graphical scope of those provisions should be so limited." Tadic, supra, note 18, J 68.
22. E.g., the United Kingdom in relation to Northern Ireland and Turkey in relation to the
situation in southeast
23.
cial

decisions that

When

Turkey

in the late 1980s

and

early 1990s.

This raises the question of how to establish customary law in NIACs. Are domestic judi-

may not be

LOAC but purely on domestic law relevant as a source?
appropriate to look at a situation in which LOAC appears

based on

trying to establish custom,

is it

to be applicable

and then

or nature, or

the only relevant information evidence of international rules of a

is

to

examine any evidence of the existence of rules, whatever their source

thought to be applicable? See
(Jean-Marie Henckaerts
24.

With

I

type

xxv-xlv

& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) & infra note 40.

the possible addition of

HRsL and

are unaffected by the existence of the

armed

Law Commission on

Armed

guide/ l_10.htm

LOAC

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

the Effects of

(last visited Jan.

1

7,

20 1

other areas of international law insofar as they

conflict, see the

Conflicts

1 ).
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on

ongoing work of the International

Treaties, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/

Franqoise J.

It is likely

25.

to be

Hampson

more relevant to measures taken domestically on account of the IAC, e.g.,

evacuation or detention of enemy aliens.

The ECHR, supra note 9,

26.
art. 4,

art. 15;

ACHR, supra note 9, art. 27, and ICCPR, supra note 10,
may be an emergency within a State of such a

expressly envisage the possibility that there

character as to require the State to take exceptional measures and to prevent

it

from applying

ordinary measures in the usual way. The treaties provide that, in such a situation, the State may
modify the scope of certain of its human rights obligations, subject to procedural requirements
with regard to notification. The process is known as derogation. Certain rights are nonderogable (e.g., the prohibition of arbitrary killings under the ICCPR and the ACHR, and of torture under all three treaties; see further infra). Even potentially derogable rights may have a nonderogable core. For example, a derogation to the usual requirements with regard to detention
may justify a longer than usual period before a detainee is brought before a judicial officer or
administrative detention but it will never justify enforced disappearances. See generally U.N.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.ll on
Art. 4 ICCPR, If 16 (2001); Hampson, supra note 3, 492-94.
27. Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ffl| 28-29 (1961).
28. Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 1 1209/84, 1 1234/84, 1 1266/84 & 1 1386/
85, 1 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 (1988) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, App.
Nos. 14553/89 & 14554/89, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 29 (1993); Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur.
Ct.

H.R. 2260.
29.

if in an IAC a commander gave the order that armed forces could only open
and a member of the armed forces deliberately killed a combatant who did not

For example,

fire in self-defense

pose a threat to him, the soldier has not acted in violation of LOAC but could be punished for
disobeying a lawful order.

Under most HRsL, the test is whether a killing is arbitrary. What is arbitrary in peacetime is not the same as that which is arbitrary in time of
conflict. The caselaw of human rights bodies suggests that peacetime killings are analyzed in
terms of a law and order paradigm. Article 2 of the ECHR is different and unique in that it sets
out the only grounds on which a State may resort to the use of potentially lethal force. Those
grounds are based on a law and order paradigm. See further note 71 infra and accompanying text.
usually the case under domestic law.

30.

That

31.

An obvious exception is the absolute prohibition

and the

is

civilian population.

The

distinction

of intentional attacks against civilians

between Hague-law prohibitions and Hague-law

permissions will be considered further below.
32.

E.g., "for

reasons of imperative military necessity" and "unless circumstances do not

permit."
33.

An exception is Geneva Convention IV, supra note 20, Part 2, which addresses the "gen-

eral protection

34.

E.g.,

of populations against certain consequences of war."

evacuating and caring for the

wounded and sick, and

using

members of the armed

run prisoner of war camps.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
forces to
35.

Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in 19

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1523

Amended Article 1 made the Convention as a whole and therefore all its protocols applicable in both IACs and NIACs. Amendment to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Doc. No. CCW/CONF/II/2 (Dec. 21, 2001). A subsequent
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V), Nov. 27, 2003, U.N. Doc. CCW/MSP/
2003/2, was therefore applicable in both IACs and NIACs from the start. That change had already
(1980).
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been made with regard to the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), Oct. 13, 1995,
U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.I/7 (Oct. 12, 1995) as a result of the 2001 amendment and the Amended
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices

(Amended Protocol II), May 3, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-1 (1997) was applicable in both
IACs and NIACs from the start as a result of Article 1.2 of the Protocol.
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, reprinted in 36
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1507 (1997) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions,
Dec. 3, 2008, 48 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 357 (2008) prohibit the use of the weapons
defined in those treaties in all circumstances, therefore in both IACs and NIACs.
The significance of the distinction between Hague-law prohibitions and Hague-law permissive rules will

36.
is

There

be considered further.
is

a real difficulty in

making the weapons

rules applicable in

both situations, but

it

not attributable to the distinction between prohibitions and permissions in Hague law, rather

paradigm confusion between law and order/law enforcement and an armed conflict paradigm. Certain weapons that are traditionally used and have an important role to play in law enforcement are prohibited in IACs, most notably expanding bullets and riot control agents, such
as tear gas. The increasing complexity of modern conflict, sometimes characterized as "threeblock warfare," results in different rules being applicable in different situations at the same time.
The difficulties to which that gives rise in practice are likely to be exacerbated if the clear distinction between what is permitted and prohibited in different situations and paradigms becomes
blurred. An example of such confusion is Resolution RC/Res.5 adopted at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute on June 8, 2010, which adds to the list of war crimes in NIACs "(xv)
Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard
to the

envelope which does not entirely cover the core or

is

pierced with incisions." Resolutions and

Declarations adopted by the Review Conference, http://212.159.242.181/iccdocs/asp_docs/

ASP9/OR/RC-1 l-Part.II-ENG.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 201 1).
The difficulties would be reduced if the changes were confined to situations in which Additional Protocol II is applicable, since an armed conflict paradigm is more clearly applicable in
such situations than those in which the level of violence comes within Common Article 3 but not
Additional Protocol II. It should be noted that, in some circumstances, Additional Protocol II
will not be applicable for a different reason. If State A is engaged in an armed conflict in State B
against a non-State armed group based in State B, Additional Protocol II is not applicable since
the State in whose territory the conflict is being fought is not a State party to the conflict. Nevertheless, the level

might be

of violence and the degree of organization and control of the non-State actor

sufficient to satisfy the high threshold of Additional Protocol II

were

it

not for this bar-

Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 23.
Knut Dormann, War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International

Criminal Court,

rier to its applicability.

37.
38.

with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes, in 7

UNITED NATIONS LAW

341, 345

(Armin von Bogdandy

MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF

& Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2003). The one

exception was anything addressing the recruitment or use of child soldiers, which was an example of
progressive development.

It

appears to be universally acceptable as a

rule, if

not in the observance.

Court art. 8.2(d) & (f), July 1 7, 1998, 2 187 U.N.T.S.
90. Interestingly the definition of "an armed conflict not of an international character" differs
slightly as between the list of criminalized violations of Common Article 3 and other
39.

Statute of the International Criminal

criminalized violations. In the case of the former, the

of internal disturbances and tensions, such as

list

of crimes "does not apply to situations

riots, isolated
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and sporadic

acts

of violence or other

Fran$oise J.

acts of a similar nature." This reflects Article 1.2

Hampson
of Additional Protocol

II

of 1977. In the case of

war crimes in NIACs not based on Common Article 3, the definition in Article 8.2(f) starts in the
same way but continues, "It [paragraph 2(e)] applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups." The reference to "protracted" is not to be
found in Common Article 3 itself but is one of the elements thought necessary to constitute an
armed conflict by the ICTY, as reflected by the judgment in the Tadic case, supra note 1 8. It is not
clear whether this is simply intended to serve as a definition of a Common Article 3 NIAC (in
which case why was the same text not included in subparagraph d?) or whether it is intended to
create a new threshold in the case of war crimes not based on Common Article 3. If the threshold
is different, it would explain why it is not used in subparagraph d. It is not clear whether the
threshold

is

higher or merely different.

John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the InternaCommittee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007). See generally PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ICRC STUDY, supra note 6. The study has been challenged on a variety of grounds. Some have
questioned the nature of some of the materials used as evidence of State practice. Others have
questioned the sufficiency of the evidence used to establish the existence of a rule. Yet others accept the manner in which a rule is formulated but challenge the accuracy of the commentary.
41. While the focus in this text is on the responsibilities of States, since only States (and arguably quasi-State entities) have legal obligations under HRsL, it should not be forgotten that the
applicability of customary LOAC rules of a Hague-law type across the threshold merely of Common Article 3 would have implications for non-State organized armed groups.
40.

tional

INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 1. See further discussion infra pp. 198-202, The
Meaning of "Direct Participation" in Hostilities and the Interpretive Guidance.
43. See REPORT OF THE BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY (2010), available athttp://report.bloody
-sunday-inquiry.org/. The author has chosen to call the city of Northern Ireland where the
events of Bloody Sunday occurred, known as both Deny and Londonderry, (London)Derry, so
as to accommodate both the Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist views of the name.
44. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom denied that the situation in Northern Ireland ever crossed the threshold of Common Article 3. Many members of the
Army Legal Services appear to be of the view that at certain times and in certain places the situa42.

Literal

tion did cross that threshold.
45.

Proposed

as the test in all

Guidance, supra note

1,

NIACs

in the Interpretive Guidance. See

INTERPRETIVE

at 36.

At the time, as a matter of domestic law, the armed forces only had the same authority as
a policeman to open fire and that was based on a law and order paradigm.
47. The term "combatant" is used in Additional Protocol I (e.g., Articles 43 and 44) and replaces the use of "belligerent" in Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
46.

annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2227 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. Article 50 of Additional Protocol I effectively de-

who

The terms are therefore mutually exclusive
and no one can fall in between the two. Combatants include not only members of the regular
armed forces, but also members of a militia who satisfy the requirements of Article 43 of Additional Protocol I or Article 1 of the Hague Regulations, supra, and members of a levee en masse
under Article 2 of the same treaty.
fines civilians as

persons

48. Additional Protocol
fact

I,

are not combatants.

supra note 19,

art. 43.2.

of fighting or for killing opposing combatants.
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49.

Interpretive Guidance, supra note

50. Additional Protocol

I,

supra note 20,

l,

at 27.

art. 51.3;

Additional Protocol

II,

supra note 19,

art.

13.3.

51.
52.

Interpretive Guidance, supra note l, at 1 1.
The Interpretive Guidance is clear that it is not intended to and does not effect any change

in the law. See,

e.g., id.

at 19.

For detailed scrutiny of the Interpretive Guidance, see Forum, The

53.

ICRC

Interpretive

Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 637 (2010).

Law, 42

The whole

issue

is

devoted to the Guidance. This

article criticizes

dressed in other writings, which tend to focus on an exclusively
54.

a

it

from

a standpoint not ad-

LOAC perspective.

See supra note 47.

55.

Interpretive Guidance, supra note

56.

Id. at 23.

57.

Id. at 24.

58.

Mat 27-28.

59.

Id, at 28.

60.

Id. at 29.

61.

Id. at

62.

Article 50. 1 of Additional Protocol

l,

at 27.

32-33.
I,

in effect, defines a civilian as

any person who

is

not

combatant.
63.

will

See

comment

in supra note

36 on the circumstances in which only

be applicable, notwithstanding the existence of a

threshold of Additional Protocol

level

Common

and nature of violence

Article 3

as to satisfy the

II.

64.

Interpretive Guidance, supra note

65.

Id. at 81.

l,

at 82.

See generally W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC "Direct Participation in Hostilities"
No Mandate, No Expertise and Legally Incorrect, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF
International Law and Politics 769, 801-2 (2010).
67. In certain circumstances, it may make operational sense to say that armed forces are free
66.

Study:

by reference to status but, if an opportunity arises to detain, they should do so, whether
in the hope of obtaining intelligence or to assist in the "battle for hearts and minds." That is not
the same as combining the two elements. The default position is the targeting test. Detention is
merely an alternative option. See also Parks, id. at 809.
68. Alston Report, supra note 8. Since the mandate of Professor Alston, the Special Rapporteur preparing the report, contains no requirement that the victim be within the jurisdiction of
the State, his comments on the extraterritorial applicability of the obligation to protect the right
to target

to

life

are not of direct assistance in determining the scope of applicability in the case of treaties

is no reason to have any such reservation in relation to the
meaning to be ascribed to "arbitrary." The mandate is generally interpreted as covering similar
ground to Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), and Article 6 of the ICCPR, su-

containing such a requirement. There

pra note

10. In

other words,

it is

Office of the United Nations

not limited to executions but extends to killings generally. See

High Commissioner

for

Human

Rights, International Standards,

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/standards.htm
69.

See, e.g.,

Comm.,

37th

Husband of Maria Fanny Suarez de Guerrero

Sess.,

No. R.l

1/45,

P

12.2,

(last visited Jan. 17,
v.

Colombia,

U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) (1982);
(ser. A)fflj 147-50 (1995).

United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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2011).

Human

Rights

McCann

v.

.
.

.

Fran$oise /.

Hampson

Those concerned with the relationship between LOAC and HRsL in the context of targeted
killings have paid considerable attention to "the targeted killings case." Public Committee
against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCI 769/02, Judgment (Dec. 13, 2006), 46
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373 (2007), available at http://elyon 1 .court.gov.il/files_eng/
02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
It should be noted that the Israeli court went out of its way to stress the very particular context
which the case arose, that is, occupied territory adjacent to the territory of the occupying
power. See generally William J. Fenrick, The Targeted Killings Judgment and the Scope of Direct

in

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 332-38

Participation in Hostilities, 5

Potentially, that could include behavior

70.
ties

(2007).

which constituted direct participation in hostili-

but which did not represent a threat to others
71. Article 2 of the ECHR provides:

at the time.

1

Everyone's right to

2.

Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article

life shall

be protected by law

when it results from the use of force which

no more than absolutely necessary:

is

(a) in

defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to
prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the pur-

pose of quelling a

riot or insurrection.

72.

McCann v. United Kingdom, supra

73.

Id., 1HJ

74.

Ergi v. Turkey, App.

75.

Gulec

76.

Noam

note 69,

149.

v.

No. 23818/94, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 388 (1998).

Turkey, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121,

Lubell,

77.

ECHR,

78.

Francoise

supra note
J.

71 (1998).

If

Human

Challenges in Applying

International Review of the Red Cross

Human

If

192-94.

Law

Rights

to

Armed

Conflict,

87

737, 745-46 (2005).

9, art. 15.2.

Hampson, The

Law and
INTERNATIONAL

Relationship Between International Humanitarian

Law from the Perspective
Review of the Red Cross 549 (2008).
Rights

of a

Human

Rights Treaty Body, 90

When the conflict is of the requisite intensity for Additional Protocol II to be applicable,

79.

but it is not applicable because the conflict occurs in the territory of a State not a party to the conflict, it

should be treated as an Additional Protocol

scope of this

article to

to replace "its
80.

armed

consider whether Article
forces"

by "the armed

1.1

II

conflict for these purposes.

of Additional Protocol

forces of a

High Contracting

II

It is

beyond the

should be amended

Party."

See generally David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-judicial Exe-

cutions or Legitimate

Means of Defence?,

16

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

171

(2005).

Interpretive Guidance, supra note l at 1 1
"Low-intensity conflict" is used so as to exclude situations in which only Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions is applicable, not on account of the limited intensity of the violence, but because the State in whose territory the conflict is fought is not a party to the conflict. See
81

,

82.

supra notes 36 8c 79.
83.

The

reference here

is

to a conflict in the territory of State

B between the armed

forces of

A and a non-State actor in State B. Where State A is assisting State B in an armed conflict
against a non-State actor, State A is acting extraterritorially but the conflict is not transnational.
State

If the

consent of State B

is

the basis for the presence of State A, State B

under HRsL, to ensure that any State
tions.

assisting

it

may have the obligation,
human rights obliga-

should respect State B's

No issue would arise for State B as to the scope of the extraterritorial applicability of HRsL.
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As

the

Introduction

number of unmanned systems to support military operations has pro-

liferated over the past decade, so too

their use in conventional warfare

have the

legal issues associated

with

and the "war on terrorism." Between 2000 and

number of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the US Department of Defense (DoD) inventory jumped from under fifty to over six thousand. By March
2010, the number had increased to over seven thousand. 2 In fiscal year 2009, UAS
conducted over 450,000 flight hours; the number of hours in 2010 was expected to
exceed 550,000. 3 To support this increasing reliance on unmanned systems, the Air
Force is expanding the number of UAS pilots and air operations staffers from 450 to
1,100 by 20 12. 4 In 2009, the Air Force trained more UAS pilots than fighter pilots. 5
Today, unmanned systems are being used across the entire spectrum of opera2008, the

1

tions,

from

their traditional role of intelligence, surveillance

(ISR) to an emerging role of offensive strike operations.

and reconnaissance

UAS have clearly become

weapon of choice to target terrorists and other militants in isolated locations
within Pakistan and Yemen. In 2007, for example, there were only 5 UAS attacks in
Pakistan. 6 The number of aerial attacks increased to 36 in 2008, and during the
first year of the Obama administration the number jumped to 53. 7 During the first
the

* Associate Professor, International

Law Department, US Naval War

College.
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to

months of 2010, UAS have conducted 60 attacks in Pakistan. 8 If the current
pace continues, the number of UAS attacks could well exceed 150 in 2010.
The importance of the relationship between the use of unmanned systems and
the law is not lost on our military and civilian leaders. At a session on unmanned
four

November

naval technologies at the Brookings Institution in

2009, the Chief of

Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, acknowledged that "as
systems become ubiquitous on the

modern battlefield in everything from targeting

to disrupting the flow of enemy information

that

unmanned

.

.

.

,

there are going to be legal issues

come up and issues related to the law of war." 9 Four months later, the State De-

partment Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, defended the

Obama administration's use of

UAS to engage terrorist targets in Pakistan and elsewhere, indicating that "U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles,

comply with

Not everyone

all

applicable law, including the laws of war." 10

agrees, however, that the use of unmanned systems to attack ter-

rorist targets outside traditional

sistent

with international and domestic law.

examined
•

"combat zones,"

like

Some

Afghanistan and Iraq,

is

con-

of the criticisms that will be

in this paper include:

The United

States

is

not engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda or any

other militant group. Terrorist attacks are criminal acts that must be addressed

with law enforcement measures, not armed attacks that give
tary force in self-defense.
tional

human

rights

The use of force

in this context

is

rise to the

use of mili-

governed by interna-

law (IHRL), not international humanitarian law (IHL).

Because armed drones are warfighting, not law enforcement,

tools,

they

may not

be used to strike terrorist targets outside the combat zone.
•

Targeting individual terrorist leaders constitutes an unlawful extrajudicial

killing in violation

of IHRL, as well as the ban on assassination under Executive

Order (E.O.) 12333.
•

Conducting

UAS

strikes against terrorist targets within the territory

of an-

other nation without the consent of that nation violates Article 2(4) of the

UN

Charter, which restricts nations from using force against the territorial integrity or
political
•

independence of any

Even

if the

State.

right of self-defense applies, the use of UAS to attack terrorist tar-

gets outside Afghanistan

and Iraq violates the IHL principles of military necessity,

proportionality and distinction.
•

(e.g.,

If

the United States

is

engaged in an armed

conflict, civilian

UAS

operators

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives) are unlawful combatants and

may not participate in

hostilities.

Only lawful combatants have

during an armed conflict.
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UAS strikes may only be conducted against civilians who have taken a direct
part in hostilities. Although acts of terrorism may cause harm, most do not meet
•

the criteria for direct participation in hostilities (DPH). State responses to these
acts

must conform

to the lethal force standards applicable to self-defense

and law

enforcement.
•

The use of advanced weapons systems

is illegal

in lethal operations against terrorists

under international law.

Armed Attack or Threat ofAttack by Non-State Actors and the

II.

Right of Self-Defense

Opponents to the use of drones outside of Afghanistan and Iraq argue that the "war
on terrorism" is a myth because al-Qaeda's actions and US responses thereto "have
been too sporadic and low- intensity to qualify as armed conflict." 11 They cite Prosecutor

v.

Tadic and Additional Protocol

II

(AP

II)

to support their position. In

Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia determined

that an

"armed

conflict exists

States or protracted

wherever there

is

a resort to

armed violence between governmental

nized armed groups or between such groups within a state."

armed

vides that

conflicts

similar nature."

force between

authorities

AP

12

II

and orga-

similarly pro-

do not include "situations of internal disturbances and

tensions, such as riots, isolated
13

armed

and sporadic

and other

acts of violence

acts of a

These opponents further argue that an armed military response

to a terrorist attack will almost never

meet the requirements for the lawful

exercise

of self-defense, because "terrorist attacks are generally treated as criminal acts

not armed attacks that can give rise to the right of self-defense."
argue that the use of military force "long after the terror act
character

and becomes unlawful

.

14

.

.

.

.

.

They additionally
loses

its

defensive

15

reprisal."

These arguments are incorrect as a matter of law and are clearly not supported

by

State practice. Foremost, they ignore the fact that

more innocent

victims have

died at the hands of terrorists since 9/11 than on the battlefields of Afghanistan

and Iraq combined. These numbers do not include the thousands of innocent
ians killed

by al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other militant groups

Iraq since 2002. These figures also

rorist attacks

been

successful.

in Afghanistan

do not take into account the

ber of deaths and injuries would have been

To argue

civil-

fact that the

and

num-

much higher had several planned ter-

that al-Qaeda's actions have been too

armed conflict is disingenuous, at best.
Al-Qaeda operatives have attacked US embassies and consulates, US naval vessels,
US military bases, the Pentagon and the US financial center in New York. With
operations in over sixty countries, al-Qaeda has trained, equipped and supported
sporadic and low-intensity to qualify as an
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a potent
States

armed

and

its

force that continues to plan

interests

worldwide on

to

Combat Terrorism

and execute

attacks against the United

a scale that requires a proportionate military

response. Despite coalition successes in Iraq, Afghanistan

and around the world,

al-Qaeda continues to pose a significant and imminent threat to the United States

and
is

its allies.

far

from

In short, the

armed

conflict against the organization

and

its affiliates

over.

The opponents' arguments likewise disregard the fact that the law regarding
armed attacks by non-State actors and the application of IHL (i.e., the law of armed
conflict (LOAC)) to these armed groups have evolved dramatically since the mid1990s, particularly after 9/11. Based on actions taken by the UN Security Council,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization of American

the

States

(OAS)

after the 9/11 terrorist attacks,

State actors can engage in

now

it is

an armed attack that gives

well recognized that non-

rise to

the right of national and

collective self-defense.

A.

Armed Attacks by Non-State Actors

On September

11, 2001, terrorists associated

into the twin towers of the

cial jets

Pentagon and a fourth
mostly

ple,

civilians,

with al-Qaeda crashed two commer-

World Trade Center (WTC), another jet into the
thousand peo-

in a field in rural Pennsylvania. Nearly three

were

killed

and thousands of others were

injured.

Immediately following these brutal and unprovoked attacks, the Security Council

determined that al-Qaeda, a non-State actor, had conducted an armed attack

against the United States, giving rise to the right of individual

defense under Article 51 of the Charter.

16

and

collective self-

Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001)

further determined that the 9/11 attack, "like any act of international terrorism,"

was a "threat
take

bat

all

all

and

to international peace

and expressed

security"

necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of

forms of terrorism."

.

.

.

a readiness "to

[9/11],

and to com-

17

NATO soon followed suit, invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the
first time in its history. Article 5 provides that if a NATO ally is the victim of "an
armed attack" each and every member of the alliance will consider that act as an
armed attack against all members and will take actions they deem necessary in
collective

(emphasis

A few weeks later, recalling the inherent right of individual and collecself-defense, the OAS adopted a resolution on September 21 acknowledging

added).
tive

self-defense to assist the ally that has been attacked

18

that the 9/11 attack against the United States
states

and

was an attack "against

that in accordance with [Article 3 of]

Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)

.

.

.

,

all

.

.

American

the Inter-American Treaty of

States Parties

reciprocal assistance to address such attacks

220

.

all

and the

.

.

.

shall

threat of

provide effective

any similar attacks

"

.
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against

any American

state

." 19
.

.

.

The

resolution further decided that "the States

Parties shall render additional assistance

each other ... to address the September
rorist acts"

20

thorization to
necessary

1 1

attacks,

and

to the United States

and

to

also to prevent future ter-

(emphasis added).

Domestically, the

all

and support

US

Congress responded by adopting a joint resolution

Use Military Force (AUMF)

—

—Au-

that authorized the President "to use

and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons

he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
occurred on September

11, 2001,

or harbored such organizations or persons, in order

to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the

nations, organizations or persons"

subsequently "recognized the

terrorist attacks that

21

United States by such

(emphases added). The

US Supreme Court

AUMF as the functional equivalent of a declaration

of war" in the Hamdi and Hamdan decisions and the 2010 National Security Strat-

egy continues to

reflect the

view that the United States

is

"at war with

and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United
and partners."

.

.

.

States,

al-Qa'ida,

our

allies,

22

Based on these international and domestic authorities, the United States com-

menced military operations in self-defense against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Of note, military operations against non-State
actors are consistent with prior

US

practice.

Throughout

its

history, the

engaged in a number of armed conflicts with groups that

States has

ognized as sovereign nations in such conflicts as the
Philippine Insurrection and

Vietnam War

US

(Viet Cong).

Civil
23

it

United

has not rec-

War, Indian wars,

The question today

is

whether these historical precedents and the 2001 authorities remain viable in 2010,

and whether they (along with the inherent right of self-defense) can be extended to
apply to terrorist forces that continue to plan and conduct acts of aggression
against the United States
Clearly, the
rity

Council,

and its allies outside the borders of Afghanistan and Iraq.

answer to both of these questions

is

yes.

Following 9/11, the Secu-

NATO and OAS all determined that the United States had been "at-

tacked" by al-Qaeda, giving rise to the right of national and collective self-defense.

These determinations are consistent with the plain language of Article 5 1 of the

UN

Charter, which simply refers to

"nothing
if

.

.

.

shall

armed

attacks against a

member

State

(i.e.,

impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense

an armed attack occurs against a

Member

of the United Nations" (emphasis

The Charter does not require that the attack be conducted by a nationState. Moreover, none of these organizations placed temporal or geographic restrictions on the use of force in self-defense. On the contrary, the opposite is true.
added)).

Resolution 1368 specifically decided that any act of international terrorism
a threat to international peace

and

[is]

.

.

security" (emphasis added). Moreover, the
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resolution expressed a readiness "to take

all

to

Combat Terrorism

necessary steps

... to

of terrorism" not just the 9/11 attack (emphasis added). The
larly

combat

all forms

OAS resolution simi-

provided that the States parties would provide assistance and support to the

United States to address the 9/ 1
against

any American

NATO

attacks, as well as "the threat of any similar attacks

1

state ... to prevent future terrorist acts"

And

while

they

deemed necessary to

simply decided that
assist the

all

member

(emphases added).

States should take the actions

United States following the 9/11

attacks,

it

not limit that assistance to a particular country or military operation. Likewise,

though the

AUMF adopted by Congress focuses on the nations,

did
al-

organizations or

persons that planned, authorized, committed or aided the 9/11 attacks (or har-

bored such organizations or persons), the law does not place any temporal or geographic restrictions on the use of force.
use

all

It

simply provides that the President can

necessary and appropriate force against those responsible for the 9/11 at-

any future

tacks "in order to prevent

acts

of international terrorism against the

United States by such nations, organizations or persons" (emphasis added).
Despite the use-of-force measures authorized by these international and regional organizations, as well as the

US Congress, opponents to the use of drones to

and Iraq nevertheless argue that these
authorities are dated and that use of force based on continued reliance on these
authorities has lost its defensive character and amounts to unlawful reprisals. Assuming for the sake of argument that the opponents are correct in saying that the
United States is not at war with al-Qaeda and that the 2001 authorities have somehow lapsed, that does not end the debate. The inherent right of self-defense still
attack terrorists outside of Afghanistan

provides an adequate legal basis to use lethal force against terrorist targets in Pakistan

and elsewhere

that demonstrate a continuing

attack against the United States

B.

and

its

and imminent

threat of armed

interests.

The Inherent Right of Self-Defense

Customary international law,
that

all

as reflected in Article 5 1

of the

UN Charter, recognizes

nations enjoy an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

Included within this right
nation to protect

is

itself from

the right of anticipatory self-defense

it

would be inconsistent with the

purposes of the Charter if a nation was required to absorb a

weapon of mass

right of a

an imminent attack where peaceful means are not rea-

sonably available to prevent the attack. 24 Clearly,

9/11 or a

—the

first strike, e.g.,

another

destruction attack, before taking necessary and propor-

tionate military measures to prevent an

imminent attack by an armed aggressor. In

this context,

"imminent" does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.

As indicated

in the

2006

US

National Security Strategy:
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[T]he

first

duty of the United States Government remains what

it

always has been: to

American people and American interests. It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all
elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction
and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainly remains as to the time and
protect the

—

place of the enemy's attack

To

forestall

or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States

necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense.
States will

not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats.

that nonmilitary actions succeed.
text for aggression.

will, if

The United

Our preference is

And no country should ever use preemption as a pre-

25

The determination of whether an attack is imminent is therefore based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known at the time real-time intelligence,
heightened political tensions, previous and current threats by the aggressor, pat-

—

tern of aggression/attacks, stated intentions of the aggressor, etc.

The pivotal question today is whether the ongoing activities of al-Qaeda and its
supporters continue to pose an imminent threat to the United States and its allies
that would justify the use of armed force in self-defense to preempt future attacks
against US interests at home and abroad. If one examines past and current acts of
aggression committed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates against the United States and
its allies,

the answer to that question

Since the

first

on the

attack

terrorist attacks against the

is

clearly yes.

WTC in

1993, there have been over seventy major

United States and

deaths of over five thousand people, most of

its allies

whom

that have resulted in the

were innocent

civilians. 26

These deaths exceed the total number of US soldiers killed in action in Afghanistan

and Iraq since the beginnings of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Iraqi

Freedom. 27 Over sixty of these incidents have occurred since 9/11, resulting in

over sixteen hundred deaths and thousands of others injured. These numbers

would be much higher
been

killed

if you

count the thousands of innocent

by al-Qaeda and the Taliban

—such

in Iraq

civilians that

and Afghanistan or had

have

several

December 1999 plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport,
the December 2001 failed "shoe bomber" attack, the foiled attack on a British airliner in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, the August 2006 plot to blow up ten planes
bound for the United States, the June 2007 failed car bombings in London, the December 2009 failed "underwear bomber" attack and the May 2010 failed bombing
planned attacks

in

Times Square

as the

—been

successful.
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It is

clear

from these incidents

threat to the United States

and

tacks against the United States
a

to

Combat Terrorism

that al-Qaeda continues to pose an

and continues

its allies

and US

interests.

imminent

to threaten large-scale at-

For instance, in November 2008,

former senior Yemeni al-Qaeda operative told the London-based Al-Quds Al-

Osama bin Laden was planning an

Arabi newspaper that
States that

would outdo 9/11 and

around the world

that al-Qaeda

that will lead the next

attack against the United

was reinforcing "training camps

wave of action against the West." 28

In June

2009, Al-Jazeera television broadcast a message from bin Laden that threatened

Americans with revenge for supporting Pakistan's military offensive to expel the
Taliban from Swat Valley. 29 Six months

Nigerian

later, a

man (Umar Farouk

Abdulmutallab, the "underwear bomber") with links to al-Qaeda attempted to
an explosive device on board a Northwest Airlines

ignite

on board as the plane prepared to land

in Detroit

flight

with 278 passengers

on Christmas

day. 30 Fortunately,

the device failed to ignite, but bin Laden nevertheless claimed responsibility for

US embassy in Yemen was closed
An attack on the embassy in 2008

the attempted bombing. 31 In January 2010, the
in response to

ongoing threats by al-Qaeda. 32

had killed nineteen, including an eighteen-year-old American woman. 33 In March
2010, Al-Jazeera aired a tape in which bin Laden threatened to

captured by al-Qaeda
the alleged

May

2010, a naturalized

it

was

and fireworks

"clear that this

US

in

Times Square.

was

a terrorist plot

citizen

bomb
35

from Pakistan,

on May

4.

During

According to Attorney General Holder,

aimed

at

murdering Americans

his interrogation,

then-recent

visit.

in

one of

by the Federal Bureau of

he admitted his role in the

tempted attack and that he had received explosives training
37

Faisal Shahzad,

that contained gasoline, propane,

the busiest places in the country." 36 Shahzad was arrested
Investigation

Mohammed,

attack. 34

unsuccessfully attempted to ignite a car
fertilizer

any American

the United States executed Khalid Sheikh

if

mastermind of the 9/11

In early

kill

at-

in Pakistan during a

On June 21, Shahzad pled guilty to ten criminal counts, includ-

weapon of mass destruction, and indicated that until the
United States "stops the occupation of Muslim lands and stops killing the Muslims ... we will be attacking [the] U.S." 38 The Pakistani Taliban immediately took
ing the attempted use of a

credit for the attack

and there

is

now

evidence that the group was intimately in-

volved in the failed attack. 39 Several additional suspects have been arrested in Pakistan, including

an executive (Salman Ashraf Khan) of a catering company that

routinely organizes events for the

US embassy, and three Pakistanis were taken into

custody in the United States for their suspected roles in the attack. 40
In

mid-May, Indonesian

police foiled an al-Qaeda plot to assassinate President

Bambang Yudhoyono and other senior government officials at the upcomIndependence Day (August 17) celebrations in Jakarta. The plan also included

Susilo

ing
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attacking hotels

and

arresting a large

number of suspected

killing foreigners

—

in particular, Americans. In addition to

militants at an al-Qaeda training

Aceh, the Indonesian police also seized a large

number of assault

of rounds of ammunition and jihadist literature.

rifles,

camp

in

thousands

41

And on May 17, 2010, Iraqi security forces announced they had arrested a
known al-Qaeda militant, Abdullah Azam Saleh al-Qahtani, who was planning an
attack at the World Cup in South Africa and on June 26, 2010, a Pakistani suspect
in the 2008 Mumbai attacks was arrested in Zimbabwe when he tried to cross into
Kenyan passport. 42 Finally, on July 11, 2010, the Somali
insurgent group al-Shabab, which has ties to al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for a
coordinated attack that killed more than seventy people, including a number of
South Africa with a

false

foreigners (one was an American), that were watching the final

Cup on outdoor screens

in

Kampala, Uganda.

match of the World

43

In discussing the ongoing terrorist threat against the United States and
Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell told Congress in

2008 that al-Qaeda was "improving the last key aspect of its
the identification, training

and positioning of operatives

its allies,

November

ability to attack the

Western recruits,

[i.e.,

cluding American citizens] for an attack on the homeland."

US:

44

in-

According to a study

by the New America Foundation, "between 100 and 150 Westerners are believed to
have traveled to the [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]
45

FATA in 2009" to train

new recruits will be able to move around
the United States and Europe more easily and be more difficult to detect than tradi-

with Taliban militants.

Arguably, these

tional foreign operatives.

There

is

also

growing evidence that al-Qaeda's anti-American/anti-Western

ideology has been adopted by a number of Islamist extremist groups in Europe and

North America. 46

A Pennsylvania woman

(Colleen LaRose,

a.k.a.

Jihad Jane), for

example, was indicted in March 2010 for "conspiracy to provide material support
to terrorists

and

kill

a person in a foreign country." 47 LaRose conspired with five

unnamed coconspirators to,
South Asia and Europe
travel to

.

.

.

"men online to wage violent jihad in
women online who had passports and the ability to

inter alia, recruit

[and]

and around Europe in support of violent jihad." 48 According to the indict-

ment, LaRose believed that "her physical appearance would allow her to blend in
with

many people." 49 A second US

citizen,

Jamie Paulin Ramirez, was indicted in

April 2010 for her involvement in the conspiracy with Jihad Jane. 50 Irish police

have since arrested seven additional individuals involved in the conspiracy. 51
In June 2010, a federal grand jury in Houston indicted Barry Walter Bujol, a
citizen

from Hempstead, Texas,

for attempting to provide material support to al-

Qaeda, including personnel, money, prepaid phone cards,
tioning systems,

cell

US

phones and

SIM

restricted publications
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on the

effects

of
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military

weapons

Combat Terrorism

to

UAS) in Afghanistan. 52 On the same day, an Ohio couple
and Amera A. Aki, dual US-Lebanese citizens, were arrested

(e.g.,

from Toledo, Hor

I.

for conspiring to provide material support to Hezbollah. 53

And on

June

5,

2010,

New Jersey men (Mohamed Mahmood Alessa and Carlos Eduardo Almonte)

two

Kennedy International Airport as they attempted to board separate planes for Somalia. The two men intended to join al-Shabab and receive training in Somalia in order to kill American troops. 54 Finally, to further illustrate the
ability of al-Qaeda to recruit and direct terrorist operations in the West, on July 8,
2010, Norwegian officials announced the arrest of three al-Qaeda operatives for
their roles in plotting a foiled 2009 New York subway attack and planning to blow
up a shopping center in Manchester, England. 55
In response to continuing al-Qaeda activities and threats aimed at US interests
at home and abroad, President Obama indicated in November 2009 that terrorist
were arrested

at

networks

al-Qaeda remained the greatest threat to

like

US

security. 56 Similarly,

Secretary of State Clinton stated in February 2010 that the greatest threat to the

United States was transnational non-State

terrorist

menting that al-Qaeda was a "very committed,

networks

like

clever, diabolical

al-Qaeda,

com-

group of terrorists

who are always looking for weaknesses and openings." On March 9, 2010, the
US Maritime Administration issued an advisory that warned ships transiting the
Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden along the coast of Yemen that
57

al-Qaeda remains interested in maritime attacks in these waters and that the
attacks could be similar in nature to the attack against the

M/V Limberg

USS Cole (2000) or the

(2002), "where a small to mid-size boat laden with explosives

was

detonated in the vicinity of the targeted ships." 58 The advisory further indicated,

however, that

"it

cannot be ruled out that the extremists

may be capable of other [,]

more sophisticated methods of targeting, such as the use of missile[s] or projectiles
to target ship[s] such as the mortars used to target a Navy ship in Jordan in
2005." Finally, a May 2010 Department of Homeland Security memo indicates
that "the number and pace of attempted [terrorist] attacks against the United
States over the past nine months have surpassed the number of attempts during
any other previous one-year period" and that
strikes within the

warning.

terrorists will

United States with "increased frequency" and with

the threat posed by terrorists, al-Qaeda

US

force with the capability

interests

disposal.

"little

or no

^

In short, despite the substantial progress that has been

mined

attempt to conduct

abroad

The

at

and

and intent

its affiliates

to strike the

made toward eliminating

remain a potent and deter-

US

mainland,

every opportunity with the most destructive

militant groups continue to train

and equip

its allies

means

at their

their fighting forces in

order to plan and execute devastating attacks against the United States and
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around the world. Under these circumstances, international law allows the United
States to preemptively use proportionate force in self-defense to eliminate the con-

tinuing and

imminent

by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.
Whether one agreed or disagreed with the former Bush administration's initiatives
threat posed

following 9/11, the President's statement in 2004 regarding the war

on

terror can-

not be ignored:

The war on terror is not a figure of speech. It is an inescapable calling of our generation.
There can be no separate peace with the terrorist enemy. Any sign of weakness or retreat simply validates terrorist violence and invites more violence for all nations. The
only certain way to protect our people is by early, united, and decisive action. 60
.

.

.

Until the threat

is

effectively eliminated, the

force in self-defense against al-Qaeda

manned

and

its

United States can continue to use

supporters, to include the use of un-

systems.

some of the Bush administration's policies with regard to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration appears to
have adopted the Bush approach to the use of drones in Pakistan and elsewhere.
On March 24, 2010, Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh delivered the
keynote speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law (ASIL). In part, Mr. Koh discussed the strategic vision of international law that
Despite disagreements with

Obama administration was attempting to implement, what he called "The Law
of 9/1 1: detentions, use of force, and prosecution." 61 In defending US targeting of

the

terrorists in Pakistan

and elsewhere, Mr. Koh indicated that,

as a matter of interna-

United States is engaged in an "armed conflict with al-Qaeda,

tional law, the
as the Taliban

and associated

as well

forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks,

and

may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international
law." 62 Mr. Koh further emphasized that al-Qaeda continues to pose an imminent
threat to the United States: "[A]l-Qaeda has not

United

States,

and indeed continues

abandoned

to attack us."

63

its citizens,

to use force, including lethal force, to defend

geting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders

III.

Lawful Targeting of Belligerents

Opponents

v.

intent to attack the

Accordingly, he continued,

"the United States has the authority under international law,
to

its

who

and the responsibility

itself,

including by tar-

are planning attacks." 64

Extrajudicial Killings/Assassination

to the use of drones argue that

IHRL is the governing body of law that

must be applied when using deadly force against terrorists outside the traditional
combat zone. They further argue that IHRL prohibits extrajudicial killing. Under
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an IHRL/law enforcement construct, deadly force should only be used as a
sort to save lives

and only after

lesser

deadly force, an attempt should be

means have

made

failed.

Accordingly, before using

to capture the terrorist or allow

an opportunity to surrender. They argue that the use of UAS to target

him/her

terrorists in

Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere violates the IHRL prohibition on
killing, as well as the US ban on assassination in E.O. 12333.

Pakistan,
dicial

last re-

These arguments incorrectly assume that the United States

extraju-

not engaged in an

is

armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the targeted terrorist groups do not pose an
imminent and continuing threat to the United States, either of which gives rise to
the inherent right of self-defense. In short, nothing in E.O. 12333 or
restricts the lawful

use of force in self-defense against an

enemy belligerent

leged or unprivileged) or against a group that poses an
threat to the United States

A.

and

IHL/LOAC
(privi-

imminent or continuing

its interests.

The Assassination Ban under E.O. 12333

Assassination of foreign nationals has been prohibited as a matter of US domestic
policy since 1976
that

when

President Ford signed E.O. 11905. Section 5(g) provides

"no employee of the United

States

to engage in, political assassination."

65

Government shall engage in, or conspire
The reference to "political" assassination

was dropped by the Carter administration
cally prohibit "assassination." 66

E.O. 12333.

67

ted for political purposes.
killing

An identical prohibition is found in section 2. 1 1

Although "assassination"

term involves the intentional
of foreign public

68

in E.O. 12036, opting instead to generi-

killing (or

is

of

not defined in the executive orders, the

murder) of a targeted individual commit-

The purpose of E.O. 12333

is,

therefore, to prevent the

purposes.

It

does not, however, limit

officials for political

the lawful use of force in self-defense against terrorists or other groups that pose

an imminent or continuing threat to the security of the United States and
zens.

It is

widely recognized that

forces of a State or civilians
ties

its citi-

69

—may be

enemy belligerents

—whether members of

and non-State actors

lawfully targeted

and

of military necessity and proportionality.

Therefore, the

IHL

principles

ambush by US

and downing of the Japanese aircraft, over Bougainville, on April

1

8,

aircraft

1943, carrying

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese commander of the Pearl Harbor

was not considered an assassination, but rather
combatant

—

tion to attack

a legitimate military target.

71

a lawful attack

was not considered

killed

attack,

on an individual

Likewise, President Reagan's authoriza-

Moammar Gadhafi's home in Libya following the

theque bombing that

armed

directly participating in hostili-

killed at all times, subject to the
70

the

an American service

member and

a violation of the executive order's
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because Gadhafi was a legitimate military target. 72 During the

(e.g.,

Gulf

War

command and control targets, including 260

(1991), coalition aircraft targeted 580

leadership targets

first

Saddam Hussein's palaces and places that he frequented). 73

These attacks were not considered as violations of the assassination ban. Similarly,
President Clinton authorized missile attacks against the Iraqi Intelligence Service

Mukhabarat) headquarters on June 26, 1993 after he was informed that
Kuwaiti forces had foiled an Iraqi-sponsored assassination attempt against former
(the

President George

H.W. Bush. 74

Five years later, President Clinton again authorized cruise missile strikes,

on this

occasion against a chemical plant in Sudan and al-Qaeda training camps in Af-

bombed the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing
and injuring over 4,500 others. 75 None of the strikes authorized by

ghanistan after terrorists

224 people

President Clinton were considered violations of E.O. 12333. Finally, following
9/11, the

Bush administration concluded that the assassination ban did not prevent

the United States from targeting terrorist leadership and

command and

capabilities in self-defense. 76 This determination

used to justify the 2002

was

later

control

targeted killing of Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a senior al-Qaeda leader, in Yemen

by a CIA drone. 77
Similarly, since 9/1

tion 1368 (2001) a State
terrorist groups. It

is

equally clear that under

1, it is

UN Security Council Resolu-

may use force in self-defense against acts of aggression by

also clear

the Charter that a nation

under customary international law and Article 5 1 of

may

use force in self-defense against the imminent or

continuing threat of attack by these groups. Therefore, killing al-Qaeda

and other militants who
States

to

members

are engaged in ongoing acts of violence against the United

and its allies, and who have the capabilities and stated intentions to continue

conduct such attacks in the future,

is

an

act of self-defense, not

murder, hence

not assassination.

Based on the increased number of drone attacks authorized by President

Obama
Obama

against suspected terrorist targets in Pakistan's

FATA,

it

administration has taken a similar approach to that of

appears that the

its

predecessor. 78

The administration's position on the issue of assassination was clearly articulated
by the State Department Legal Adviser at the ASIL meeting. During his keynote address,

Mr. Koh stated that

individuals who are part of

.

.

.

an [enemy] armed group are belligerents and, therefore,

lawful targets under international law.

[A] state that

is

.

.

engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense

quired to provide targets with legal process before the state
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[Ujnder domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems
cable laws of

war

—

—

consistent with the appli-

for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders

when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does
not constitute "assassination." 79

B. Extrajudicial Killing

1.

under International Law

Reports and Correspondence of the Special Rapporteur to the

UN Human

Rights Council

Summary

or Arbitrary

Executions (hereinafter Special Rapporteur) submitted a report to the

UN Human

In January 2003, the Special Rapporteur

Rights Council indicating that a

on

Extrajudicial,

November 2002 UAS

strike that killed six al-

Yemen was a "clear case of extrajudicial killing." 80 Despite finding that (1) the government of Yemen had approved the attack; (2) the militants
(including a senior al-Qaeda official, Abu Ali al-Harithi) had been involved in the

Qaeda

militants in

attacks

on the Cole and the French

oil

tanker Limburg; (3) prior attempts to appre-

hend the suspects had been unsuccessful; and
ity to

"governments have a responsibil-

protect their citizens against the excesses of non-State actors or other

authorities" the Special
States

(4)

Rapporteur determined that the actions by the United

and Yemen violated IHRL and IHL. 81

In August 2005, a

new Special Rapporteur

(Philip Alston) sent a letter to the

government requesting information on the use of UAS

US

Haitham
al-Yemeni, a senior al-Qaeda figure, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border on May
10, 2005. The Special Rapporteur reiterated the view that questions of IHL fall
squarely within his mandate and that "efforts to eradicate terrorism must be undertaken within a framework" governed by IHRL, as well as IHL. 82 Dissatisfied
with the

US

port to the

response to the August

Human

letter,

Rights Council in

to target

and

kill

the Special Rapporteur submitted a re-

May 2009

alleging that the

United States

is

using drones to engage in targeted killings on the territory of other States and that
these attacks have caused a

number of civilian

alleged that the United States

garding the legal basis for

its

had been evasive

targeting decisions

casualties.

in

Mr. Alston additionally

responding to his questions

and urged the Obama administra-

tion to reconsider the previous administration's "positions

necessary transparency and accountability" for
to receive a response

its

and move to ensure the

drone program. 83 Having

from the new administration, Mr. Alston took

failed

his case to the

"court of public opinion." In October 2009, he reiterated his position in a

York Times

randomly

article stating that "the

killing

United States must demonstrate that

people in violation of international law through
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on the Afghan border" and that the US refusal to respond to UN "concerns that the
use of drones might result in illegal executions was an 'untenable' position." 84
2.

US Responses

The United

to the Special

States

Rapporteur

responded to the January 2003 al-Harithi report on April 14 of

that year, indicating that "inquiries related to allegations
tary operation

conducted during the course of an armed

stemming from any miliconflict

.

.

[did]

.

not

fall

within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur" and that the United States dis-

agreed with his conclusion that "military operations against

enemy combatants

could be regarded as extrajudicial executions by consent of Governments." 85 In

support of its position, the United States pointed out that military operations con-

ducted by a government against legitimate military targets

like

al-Qaeda were gov-

erned by IHL/LOAC, which allows enemy combatants to be attacked unless they

have surrendered or are otherwise rendered hors de combat. The
ther emphasized that the United States was at

response fur-

war with al-Qaeda and

related ter-

networks and that, despite coalition successes around the world, the war was

rorist

from

far

US

over.

tively trained,

With operations in more than sixty countries, al-Qaeda had effecequipped and supported armed forces that have planned and exe-

cuted attacks worldwide against the United States "on a scale that far exceeds
criminal activity." 86

More

tional attacks against the

armed

attack

by US

important, al-Qaeda terrorists continued to plan addi-

United States and

its allies

forces. In conclusion, the

and were,

United States stressed that the mili-

tary operations conducted against the United States

both before and

therefore, subject to

after 9/11 "necessitate a military

and

its

nationals

by al-Qaeda

response by the armed forces of

would "permit an armed group to wage
while precluding that state from defend-

the United States"; to conclude otherwise

war unlawfully against a sovereign
ing

itself."

state

87

The United

States submitted a similar response to the Special Rapporteur's letter

requesting information regarding the killing of Haitham

Afghanistan border in

May 2005.

Recalling

its

al- Yemeni

April 2003

letter,

on the Pakistan-

the United States

reemphasized that legitimate military operations conducted by a government dur-

armed conflict do not fall within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur and
that the conduct of such operations is governed by IHL/LOAC. For the reasons
previously stated in 2003, the United States reiterated that it was engaged in a continuing armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the military operations conducted
and planned against the United States and its nationals by the terrorist organization both before and after 9/11 necessitated a military response. The US response
then went on to rebut the Special Rapporteur's position that his mandate included
issues arising under IHL/LOAC. In response to the Special Rapporteur's assertion
ing an
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Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly resolutions in re-

cent years referred explicitly to IHL, the United States pointed out that the mention

of IHL in these resolutions

is

ernments and "does not

impart upon the Special Rapporteur a mandate to con-

sider issues arising

.

.

.

under" IHL/LOAC. 88 The

Special Rapporteur's

argument

urged governments to take

IHRL and IHL,

in the context of suggestions or

all

that General

US

response similarly rejected the

Assembly Resolution 59/197 (2004)

necessary and possible measures, in conformity with

to prevent loss of

life

during armed

The United States
mandate of the Spe-

conflicts.

pointed out that the Resolution did not expand or modify the
cial

admonitions to gov-

Rapporteur, but rather urged governments to take action, while directing the

Special Rapporteur to continue to operate within his mandate. Finally, in response
to the Special Rapporteur's assertion that "every single annual report of the Special

Rapporteur since

at least

1992 has dealt with violations of the right to

life

in the

armed conflicts," the United States
noted that "while the Special Rapporteur may have reported on cases outside of his
mandate, this does not give" him the competence to address such issues. 89
context of international and non-international

Regarding the scope of the Special Rapporteur's mandate,

it is

also

important

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1982/29, which
appointed the first Special Rapporteur to examine the questions related to summary or arbitrary executions, empowers the Special Rapporteur to consider matters involving armed conflict or IHL. 90 Similarly, nothing in General Assembly
to note that nothing in

Resolution 60/251, which created the

Human

Rights Council as the replacement

Commission on Human Rights, grants the Council competence over matregarding IHL in general, or armed conflict in particular. 91 Moreover, the

for the
ters

Council

is

established as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly; matters af-

fecting international peace

and

security, aggression

and the use of force

in self-

defense are under the cognizance of the Security Council, not the General

Assembly.

3.

Obama Administration's Position

As evidenced by the Koh speech, the current administration's position on the legality

of using

UAS to target al-Qaeda operatives in areas like the FATA parallels that

of the previous administration:

[I]n
flict

all of our operations involving the use offorce, including those in the armed conwith al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, the Obama Administration is

committed

... to

conducting ourselves

spect to the subject of targeting,
it

has certainly been

.

.

.

it is

With reand
the considered view of this Administration
in

accordance with

my experience during my
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practices, including lethal operations

comply with

all

conducted with the use of unmanned aerial

applicable law, including the laws of war.

[A]s a matter of international law, the United States

.

is

in

vehicles,

.

an armed

conflict with al-

Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under inter-

As a matter of domestic law, Congress authorized the use of all necessary
and appropriate force through the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF). These domestic and international legal authorities continue to this day

national law.

[A]l-Qaeda has not abandoned

intent to attack the United States,

its

and indeed

continues to attack us. Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the
authority under international law, and the responsibility to
including lethal force, to defend

its citizens,

to use force,

including by targeting persons such as high-level

itself,

al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks

[T]his

is

a conflict with an organized ter-

plans and executes its attacks against us and our allies while hiding
enemy that
among civilian populations. That behavior
makes the application of international
[T]his
law more difficult and more critical for the protection of innocent civilians
rorist

. . .

.

.

.

Administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure
that these operations are

ing

.

.

.

conducted consistently with law of war principles, includ-

the principle of distinction

.

operations against al-Qaeda and

.

.

and

.

.

.

the principle of proportionality

—including

conducted with the use of unmanned

aerial vehicles

—

great care

is

In U.S.

lethal operations

associated forces

its

taken to adhere to

and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objeccollateral damage is kept to a minimum.

these principles in both planning
tives are targeted

and

that

.

[individuals who are part of such an
ful targets

under international law

against specific individuals

fails

self-defense

is

armed group are belligerents and, therefore, law[S]ome have argued that the use of lethal force
and thus constitutes unthat is engaged in an armed conflict or in legiti-

to provide adequate process

lawful extrajudicial killing. But a state

mate

.

not required to provide targets with legal process before the

may use lethal force

[S]ome have

[also]

state

argued that our targeting practices violate

domestic law, in particular, the long-standing domestic ban on assassinations. But under

domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems
of war

—

—

consistent with the applicable laws

for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders

self-defense or during

an armed conflict

is

when acting in

not unlawful, and hence does not constitute

"assassination." 92

IHRL in the War on Terrorism
As discussed above, human rights advocates argue that targeting decisions in the
war on terrorism are governed by both IHL and IHRL. The US government, on the
C. Application of IHL v.

enemy
belligerents, including al-Qaeda terrorists outside the traditional combat zone,
is governed solely by IHL. In short, enemy belligerents, whether members of the
other hand, has correctly taken the position that the targeting of
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forces of a nation, terrorists or other civilians directly participating in

hostilities,

do not enjoy

a "right to life"

during an armed conflict, irrespective of

their location.

1.

Are IHL and IHRL Complementary Regimes?

Proponents of the assassination/extrajudicial
that al-Qaeda terrorists are criminals to

killing

whom

argument take the position

law enforcement rules and IHRL,

not major military force and IHL, apply. Military force, they argue,

used in self-defense or as authorized by the
outside of these situations, States
bat terrorists,
tools,

93

and may,

and

may

only be

UN Security Council. They argue that

may only use law enforcement measures to com-

that drones are warflghting weapons, not law enforcement

therefore, not be used to target terrorists outside the traditional

combat zone. 94 Rather, law enforcement rules, such as the UN Basic Principles on
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN Basic Principles),

govern when police can use force against

include such provisions

4.

Law enforcement

civilians,

including terrorists. They

as:

officials, in

carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply

non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They
force

and firearms only

if

may

use

other means remain ineffective or without any promise of

achieving the intended result.

9.

Law enforcement

officials shall

not use firearms against persons except in

self-

defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to

prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to
arrest a

life,

to

person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his

or her escape, and only
jectives. In

when

less

any event, intentional

unavoidable in order to protect

The proponents of IHRL

extreme means are insufficient to achieve these ob-

lethal use

life.

of firearms

may only be made when strictly

95

applicability to the targeting of terrorists also cite the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) Nuclear

Weapons and Wall advisory opinions

to support their position. In discussing the right to

life

in

paragraph 25 of the

Nuclear Weapons opinion, the ICJ stated that

Covenant on

and Political Rights does not
cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the
[t]he protection of the International

right to

life is

Civil

not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be

234

—
Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo
deprived of [one's]
vation of

life

applies also in hostilities.

however, then

life,

to

falls

The test of what is an

arbitrary depri-

be determined by the applicable

namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which

is

lex specialise

designed to regulate the conduct

of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon
is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the
Covenant can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and
not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. 96

in warfare,

Similarly, in the

Wall opinion, the Court indicated in paragraph 106 that

the protection offered

by human

rights conventions does

not cease in case of armed

of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are
thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international
humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law, yet others
may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the
question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humani-

through the

conflict, save

effect

Article 4 of the International

tarian law. 9

2.

'

Targeting of Enemy Belligerents

Is

Governed by IHL

Arguments advanced by proponents of the complementary IHL/IHRL model
misplaced from both a practical and a legal point ofview.

would argue

US

that

forces

must

first

are

Human rights advocates

attempt to capture a suspected terrorist or

provide him/her an opportunity to surrender before using lethal force. 95
practical perspective, such a suggestion borders

on the

ridiculous.

These

From

a

terrorists

camps and strongholds located in some of the most
remote and inaccessible areas in the world in the FATA, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere. Any attempt by US Special Forces to capture these terrorists would be virtually impossible to undertake
and likely suicidal. Moreover, what human rights
are hiding

and operating

in

—

—

advocates are suggesting

is

a retrospective approach to combating terrorism

capture and prosecute the terrorists, hopefully before and not after another 9/11
attack occurs.

Such an approach

A prospective

approach

cessfully executed

the real

—

is

is

wishful iiiinking, at best.

—preventing

attacks before thev are

necessary to protect the United States and

and continuing threat from al-Qaeda and

planned and sucits

its supporters. "

citizens against

There

no obligation in domestic or international law to provide due process

is

simply

(e.g., judicial

review, offer to surrender, attempted capture, etc.) before using lethal force against

known enemy

belligerents, including terrorists,

continuing threat to the United States and
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its
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present an imminent and

citizens.

The Convention
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to

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention)

recognizes that there

is

no

"right to life" during

Article 15.2 that "deaths resulting

from lawful

armed

by providing

conflict,

acts of war" are outside the

in

scope of

100

the Convention.

Reliance on the ICJ advisory opinions to support the position that

IHRL applies

The focus of the
Nuclear Weapons opinion was not on the targeting of combatants, but rather on the
catastrophic effects a nuclear weapon detonation would have on the civilian population. The Court questioned whether the use of nuclear weapons could discriminate between the civilian population and combatants and civilian objects and
military objectives, indicating that the number of casualties that would ensue following the use of such a weapon would be enormous. 101 UAS, with their enhanced
to the targeting of al-Qaeda

and other

ISR and precision targeting
targets

terrorists

places.

also misplaced.

can easily distinguish between military

capabilities,

and protected people and

is

Moreover, although there have been

dental civilian deaths associated with the use of drones, the

numbers

inci-

(as discussed

below in the sections on proportionality and military necessity) are not excessive in
terms of the military advantage that has been achieved, and would certainly not

fall

Had

the

within the scope of casualties envisioned by the use of a nuclear weapon.

Court been asked, "Does an enemy combatant or
hostilities

said no.

have a

It is

also

'right to life'

sions, the

Court

that, other

than the reference to

and 25, the Court applies IHL, not IHRL,

the issues (paragraphs 74-96).
declaration that

during an armed conflict?" the Court would have

important to note

in dicta in paragraphs 24

civilian directly participating in

Nor does

its

on IHL, not IHRL,

rights

analysis of

the Court cite any authority for

IHRL applies during an armed conflict.
relies

in

human
its

Finally, in issuing

its

novel
deci-

stating:

D. Unanimously,

A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of
the international law applicable in

armed

conflict, particularly those

of the principles

of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under
treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons;

and

E.

rules

By seven votes

to seven,

by the President's casting vote,

It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
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However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at
its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear

weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence,
which the very survival of a State would be at stake. 102

Wall advisory opinion focused on an occupation

Similarly, the

address the issue of targeting
in hostilities. In fact, the

which only IHL

tions in

enemy combatants

setting. It

in

did not

or civilians directly participating

Court recognizes in paragraph 106 that there are

situa-

applies:

As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights
law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may he exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others

yet others

may be

may be

exclusively matters of human rights law;

matters of both these branches of international law (emphasis

added).

Clearly, targeting of enemy
tilities falls

into the

first

combatants and

category

—

civilians directly participating in hos-

exclusively matters of IHL. Additionally, as

Weapons opinion, the Court relies on IHL, not IHRL,

the case in the Nuclear

was

in de-

ciding the case:

For these reasons,

The Court

D. By

[a] 11

[a

.

.

.

[decided]

vote of] thirteen votes to two, [that]

States are

under an obligation not to recognize the

illegal situation resulting

from

the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction;
relative to the Protection

all

States parties to the

Fourth Geneva Convention

of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in

addition the obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international
law, to ensure compliance
in that Convention.

Finally,

some opponents

should be different

if

with international humanitarian law as embodied

to the use of drones have suggested that the rules

strike

is

is

an American

a

US

citizen.

citizen,

The

fact that the in-

such as radical

cleric

Anwar

who is hiding in Yemen, does not change the analysis. The citizenship of

the belligerent

on the

Israel

the suspected terrorist

tended target of a drone
al-Awlaki

by

103

is

Internet

irrelevant in the targeting decision. In

on May

an al-Qaeda video posted

23, 2010, al-Awlaki advocates the killing of
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death of Iraqi and Afghan civilians killed by

Americans do not have a

wage war against the United

right to

US

States. If

become lawful targets and may be engaged without "due process."
The Supreme Court held in Ex parte Quirin that US citizenship did not bar the
prosecution of individuals as "enemies who have violated the law of war." 105 The
they do, they

same

logic

would allow the

sided with al-Qaeda.

direct

engagement of a US

citizen

who

has actively

106

IflHRL Applies in an Armed Conflict?
Even if IHRL complemented IHL during periods of armed conflict, use of drones
to conduct strikes against terrorists outside the combat zone in self-defense would
3.

Does

It

Really Matter

not constitute a violation of IHRL. Although the ICJ indicated in the Nuclear

Weapons advisory opinion
tional

Covenant on

Civil

that the right to

and

life

Political Rights

found

in Article 6.1 of the Interna-

(ICCPR)

applies in times of war, the

Court went on to explain that
[t]he test of what

is

by the applicable

an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined

lex specialise

namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which

designed to regulate the conduct of

hostilities.

Thus whether

a particular loss of

is

life,

through the use of a certain weapon in warfare,

is to be considered an arbitrary deprivaCovenant can only be decided by reference to the
armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant

tion of life contrary to Article 6 of the

law applicable in
itself.

107

Under IHL, enemy belligerents, like the al-Qaeda terrorists, who have not surrendered and are not hors de combat may be lawfully engaged at all times, subject only
to the principles of military necessity and proportionality. Such attacks would not
constitute an arbitrary deprivation of life under the ICCPR. 108
It is also questionable whether the ICCPR would even apply to targeted killings
in Pakistan and other places outside the traditional combat zone. Article 2.1 provides that "[e]ach State Party
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant" (emphasis added). The ICJ similarly held in paragraph 1 1 1 of
the Wall advisory opinion that the ICCPR is only "applicable in respect of acts done
by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory" (e.g., in an occupation situation). The question of applicability of the Covenant therefore turns
on whether the terrorist being targeted "is within the jurisdiction, actual power, or
effective control of the state using the drone." 109 Al-Qaeda terrorists and their supporters operating out of the FATA, Yemen or Somalia are not within the territorial
.

.

.
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jurisdiction of the

United States nor are these individuals within the actual power

or control of the United States. In these circumstances, the

4.

So

ICCPR does not apply.

What Are Human Rights Advocates Really After?

From the foregoing, it appears that there is nothing to gain by applying IHRL in an
armed conflict scenario. In fact, application of the IHRL "arbitrary deprivation of
life" standard would arguably provide far less protection than the IHL principles of
and proportionality. So what are human rights advocates really
trying to accomplish by arguing that IHRL applies in armed conflicts? The answer
is simple: change the outcomes governed by IHL by adding IHRL into the equamilitary necessity

making IHL more restrictive and channeling the enforcement of IHL
through human rights mechanisms such as the Human Rights Council and retion, thereby

gional

human rights

We wish to

courts.

(boldly) take

To quote

a

human

rights advocate:

human rights to places, be they extraterritorial situations, or
reality, no human rights have

those of armed conflict, where, as a matter of practical

gone before. ... [A] purpose of the IHL/IHRL project is the enforcement of IHL
through human rights mechanisms. Thus, even if human rights substantively added
nothing to IHL, there would still be a point in regarding IHL and IHRL as two comple-

mentary bodies of law. IHL, now (jurisdictionally) framed in human rights terms,
could be enforced before political bodies, such as the Human Rights Council or UN
political organs more generally, or through judicial and quasi- judicial mechanisms,
such as the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the

UN treaty bodies or domestic courts. 110
The danger of allowing human rights mechanisms to review lawful military operations, whether in a traditional armed conflict or in the war on terrorism, is illustrated by the absurd decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the
McCann case. 111 The British government had information that three known IRA
terrorists were going to conduct a terrorist attack in Gibraltar by detonating a car
bomb by remote control. While several UK soldiers were following them, it appeared that the terrorists were preparing for an attack. As one of the soldiers moved
forward to arrest the suspects, he observed one of the terrorists move his hand as if
he was about to press a button to detonate the bomb, and shot the suspect. A second terrorist then appeared as if she was going to donate the bomb and was shot.
The

third terrorist

was

also shot.

A bomb was subsequently discovered in the car.

After hearing seventy-nine witnesses, a jury in the United
verdict of lawful killing. Dissatisfied

the case to the

by

that result, the decedents' estates brought

European Court of Human

honestly believed

.

.

.

that

it

Kingdom brought back a

Rights. Despite finding that "the soldiers

was necessary to shoot the suspects
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them from detonating a bomb and causing serious loss of life,"
less

found by a vote often

to nine that there

European Convention because the
in the control

the Court neverthe-

had been a violation of Article 2 of the

UK authorities had not taken "appropriate care

and organisation of the

arrest operation." Article 2.2 of the

Conven-

tion provides that "deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contra-

vention of this article

when

it

results

from the use of force which

absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person

is

no more than
" 112

from unlawful violence

A second example of this dangerous approach is the continuing efforts by Philip
(much of which

Alston, the current Special Rapporteur, to obtain information

is

on the use of UAS to target terrorists in the FATA and other areas outAfghanistan and Iraq. In May 2010, Mr. Alston called on the United States to

classified)

side

stop using

CIA

operatives to conduct drone strikes against al-Qaeda terrorists. 113

In a report delivered to the
"intelligence agents

Human

Right Council on

do not generally operate within

propriate emphasis

a

May 28,

Alston argues that

framework which places ap-

upon ensuring compliance with IHL, rendering

violations

more likely." 114 Alston's report also questions the validity of a portion of the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC's) Interpretive Guidance on the No-

Law that
allows for the targeting of civilians who are members of an armed group who have a
tion of Direct Participation in Hostilities

under International Humanitarian

continuous combat function (CCF). According to the report, the "ICRC's Guid-

human rights perspective" because the CCF category of
armed group members may be targeted anywhere, any time. The report concludes
that "the creation of CCF category is, de facto, a status determination that is quesance raises concern from a

tionable given the specific treaty language that limits direct participation to 'for

such time' as opposed to
alia, that

"[t]he

'all

the time.'" 115

High Commissioner

for

The report therefore recommends,

Human Rights should convene a meeting

of States, including representatives of key military powers, the
rights

and IHL experts

inter

ICRC and human

to arrive at a broadly accepted definition of 'direct partici-

pation in hostilities.'" 116

It

would appear from

that the Special Rapporteur

and human

this report that

Mr. Alston believes

rights organizations like the

Human

more qualified than the ICRC and States parties to the Geneva
decide IHL issues of this nature. I would suggest that determining

Rights Council are

Conventions to

whether a civilian has directly participated in
tions

hostilities

under the Geneva Conven-

and may therefore be targeted by belligerent forces is clearly outside the man-

date of the Special Rapporteur contained in Resolution 8/3 of the

Council and further demonstrates the overreaching by

and organizations.

Rights

rights advocates

117

In short, the United States has nothing to gain
plies alongside

human

Human

IHL

in

armed

by acknowledging that IHRL ap-

conflict situations, particularly in the targeting
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process.

Human

rights groups,

whether non-governmental or governmental, are

by any state and military
particular. They (and their financial

generally biased against military operations conducted

operations conducted by the United States, in

supporters) generally oppose a strong military establishment, seek to level the play-

ing field between

modern armed

forces

and insurgent groups/terrorists and en-

deavor to create a standard of zero collateral damage and incidental injury in war.

Any report or decision issued by these organizations would inevitably be critical of
US operations and would provide yet another source of information that can be exploited

by our enemies.
IV.

Host Nation Consent v. Self-Help

in Self-Defense

Following setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has been able to reconstitute

and establish bases of operation in the FATA, which have served as a "staging area for
al-Qaeda attacks in Afghanistan," as well as a base for its worldwide training operations. 118 In fact,

most of the high-priority terrorists, who continue

to actively plot

some of the most remote, inaccessible parts of the world, including the FATA. 119 To date, Pakistan has been unable or
against the United States, remain in hiding in

unwilling to prevent cross-border attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan or
to disrupt terrorist planning

United States and
options

—wait

its allies

and training

efforts to

conduct attacks against the

worldwide. That leaves the United States with two

for another terrorist attack or use

UAS

to conduct strikes against

these inaccessible targets.

A. Host Nation Consent
to the use of UAS to strike targets in nations outside the

combat zone
argue that host nation consent is required for such attacks, "unless the state where
the group is present is responsible for their actions." 120 Although there is some eviOpponents

dence that senior leadership within Pakistan

by providing bases

for

tacitly

consented to the drone strikes

UAS operations and targeting information to US forces and

the CIA, Pakistan has not officially consented to the attacks and has often publicly

protested the strikes as a violation of

its

sovereignty and territorial integrity. 121

Accordingly, the opponents to the use of UAS argue that there

is

no

legal basis for

the United States to attack terrorist targets in Pakistan or in any other nation outside of the

combat zone.

B. Sovereignty v. Inherent Right of Self-Defense

The opponents' position appears to be premised on the flawed assumption that
territorial integrity and State sovereignty are paramount in international law. The
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long-standing view of the United States on the issue of sovereignty, as articulated

by a former

legal adviser to the

law scholar,

is

US Department of State and a leading international

that "[territorial integrity

ternational law,

is

not entitled to absolute deference in in-

and our national defense requires

that

we claim

the right to act

within the territory of other States in appropriate circumstances." 122 President

Obama reaffirmed this long-standing position in an address at West Point in 2009,
indicating that the United States "cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists
location

by

is

known, and whose intentions are clear."

Articles 2(4)

and sovereignty

123

and 51 of the Charter, which make
give

way to

whose

The US position is supported
clear that territorial integrity

the right of self-defense.

C. Self-Help
It is

equally well settled that States have an obligation under international law "to

control persons within their borders to ensure that they do not utilize their territory as a base for criminal activity." 124 Both domestic courts

and international

bunals have acknowledged this obligation. For instance, the

tri-

US Supreme Court

held in 1887 that "[t]he law of nations requires every national government to use
'due diligence' to prevent a

nation with which

it is

wrong being done within

at peace,

its

own dominion to another

or to the people thereof." 125

The ICJ has

held that every State has an "obligation not to allow knowingly

used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."
It is

equally well settled that,

or other

if

a nation

armed groups from using

attacks against another nation or

its
its

is

its

similarly

territory to be

126

unwilling or unable to stop terrorists

territory as a location

from which

citizens, the aggrieved State

to launch

has the right to

armed groups within the territory of the host nation. 127
The State Department Legal Adviser reiterated this right in his remarks at the ASIL
strike the terrorists or other

meeting:

depend
upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of
the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of
[Wjhether a particular individual

will

be targeted in a particular location

those states to suppress the threat the target poses.

Much

FATA

of the

Pakistani

is

128

inaccessible to Pakistani security forces. Additionally, the

army has been

militant groups in

reluctant to conduct offensive military operations against

North Waziristan "because

it

powerful insurgent groups there that have so
Afghanistan."
its

territory

129

will

In short, Pakistan has been unable

does not want to antagonize
far

attacked only targets in

and unwilling to prevent use of

by al-Qaeda and other militant groups that continue to plan and
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conduct

terrorist attacks against the

United States and

its allies.

Under

these

circumstances, the United States has the inherent right under international law to

use force in self-defense against terrorist targets in Pakistan.

D. A History of Self-Help
Self-help

is

nothing new to the United States

—our

history is replete with examples

of the use of necessary and proportionate force in self-defense where a "neutral"
nation has been unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory as a staging

Some examples

base for attacks.

include: 130

and 1818 Seminole Indian attacks. The United States used force
in self-defense against attacks by Indians and former slaves emanating from Spanish Florida without the consent of Spain. The attacks were not directed at Spain
•

1814, 1816

nor was the United States
•

at

war with Spain

at the time.

1817 Amelia Island occupation. The United States used force in self-defense

to attack non-State actors (pirates, smugglers

and

privateers)

on Amelia

Island,

on "Spain's inability to control misuse of its islands to prevent
emanating from the islands." At
armed attacks on U.S. territory and shipping
the time, the United States was not at war with Spain and assured Spain that the
temporary occupation of Amelia Island was not a threat to its sovereignty. The US
relying, in part,

.

.

.

military actions were taken without Spanish consent.
•

1837 Caroline incident. The Caroline case also provides an example of the

use of force in self-defense against non-State actors without the consent of the
host nation. The United

Kingdom was not

at

war with the United

States

when

it

US waters to prevent future insurgent attacks emanating

attacked the Caroline in

from the United States into Canada. The attack was directed at the insurgents, not
the United States,
•

and was not viewed

an act of war by the

as

1854 Greytown bombardment. The

Greytown, Nicaragua

after the citizens

town, established their

and attacked

a

US

US

government.

US Navy bombarded

the

town of

of the town forcibly took possession of the

own government

(not recognized by the United States),

diplomat and engaged in other acts of violence against

tionals. In deciding

whether the President had the power to order such an

US

na-

attack,

US Supreme Court held that the President had the authority
to use force "as part of a power of protection of US nationals abroad against acts of
Justice

Nelson of the

lawless violence

and an irresponsible and marauding community." The bombard-

ment was conducted without
•

1916 Pancho Villa

attack

Pancho

the consent of Nicaragua.

raids. In 1916, President

Villa's forces in

Mexico

Wilson authorized US forces

after they
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when Mexican

thorized later that year

1998 cruise-missile

•

Texas and
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New Mexico. A second

incursion was au-

bandits attacked Glen Springs, Texas.

President Clinton authorized cruise-missile

al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan without the consent of the

strikes against

Taliban government after al-Qaeda

bombed

the

US

embassies in Nairobi, Kenya

and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The terrorist attacks killed more than 250 persons and

The

injured over 5,500.

armed

attacks

and

were

justified as self-defense in response to prior

to prevent future attacks against the United States

As these examples
that

strikes

must be taken

illustrate,

while a nation's sovereignty

is

by al-Qaeda.

an important factor

into consideration before conducting a cross-border strike,

it

does not take precedence over a right of self-defense where that nation has been

unable or unwilling to prevent the use of
attacks. Article 51 of the Charter also

integrity give

imminent

way to

threat of

makes

this inherent right

armed

its

territory as a base of operations for

and

clear that sovereignty

territorial

of self-defense against an armed attack or

been unable (due to inaccessible

attack. Pakistan has

terrain) or unwilling (due to political considerations) to prevent militant

groups

from using the FATA to plan and attack the United States and its allies. Under these
circumstances, the United States

UAS

including

strikes, to

Basic principles of

IHL

legally justified in using force in self-defense,

prevent future attacks from Pakistani territory.

Do Drone Strikes

V.

is

Violate Traditional Principles

affect all

oflHL/LOAC?

phases of the targeting cycle. This

true during the target development, validation, nomination

and

is

particularly

prioritization

force execution phases.

However, IHL

recognizes that military forces cannot engage in hostilities without

some degree of

phase, as well as the mission planning

incidental injury to protected persons

The key

is

collateral

and
and

collateral

damage

to protected objects.

the determination of how to minimize incidental injury to civilians

damage

to civilian objects consistent with mission

and

accomplishment and

the law.

As a general
is

rule, "the right

not unlimited."

131

of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the

Additionally, "[t]he civilian population as such, as well as indi-

vidual civilians, shall not be the object of attack." 132 In this regard,
ing military operations,

•

do everything

nor

.

.

.

when conduct-

commanders must

feasible to verify that the objectives to

civilian objects

enemy

but are military objectives
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take

•

all

ians

of means and methods of attack with a view

feasible precautions in the choice

and in any event minimizing,
and damage to civilian objects; [and]

incidental loss of civilian

to avoiding,

life,

injury to

civil-

from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidenwhich would be
tal loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 133
refrain

•

.

Commanders must
if it

also

.

.

be prepared to cancel or suspend an attack

becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special pro-

tection or that the attack

to civilians, or

concrete and

may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury

damage to

civilian objects

Based on the foregoing,

damage

to civilian objects

injury or

.

.

.

which would be excessive in relation to the

direct military advantage anticipated.

damage in

it is

is

134

clear that incidental injury of civilians

not prohibited by IHL; what

is

and collateral

prohibited

is

excessive

relation to the military advantage expected to be gained

by the

use of force. In other words, the wanton destruction of life and property as an end
in itself violates IHL,

whelming
the

force,

by

but the law does not prohibit the use of force, even over-

a military

commander to compel

the complete submission of

enemy in order to protect the safety of his force and facilitate the success of his

mission. 135 Therefore, attacks

by

UAS

that unintentionally cause incidental

injury to civilians or damage to civilian property, in addition to killing the intended
targets, e.g.,

an insurgent leader, are

jury or damage

is

fully consistent

with

IHL to

the extent the in-

not excessive when compared to the military advantage gained by

the attacks.

Compliance with IHL

is

much more complex

in the current conflict with al-

Qaeda because insurgent forces routinely commingle with the civilian population
and operate from protected places. It becomes exceedingly more difficult to minimize incidental injury and collateral damage in such situations because of the difficulties encountered in distinguishing combatants from civilians and military
objects from civilian objects. Under these circumstances, al-Qaeda and its supporters must be held primarily responsible for any collateral damage and incidental injury in such cases because they have failed to comply with their obligation to "avoid
locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas." 136 Additionally,

one must consider whether the

civilians are deliberately acting as

voluntary

human shields for the insurgent forces, in which case, they may be considered to be
directly participating in hostilities

and therefore subject
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A. Military Necessity

The purpose of IHL

is

to ensure that hostilities are directed

not used to cause unnecessary

human

essary to achieve a valid military objective.

mander should ask whether
so,

whether the

total

and physical destruction. The

suffering

principle of military necessity limits suffering

toward the enemy and

and destruction

to that

which

is

nec-

When applying this principle, the com-

the object of attack

is

a valid military objective and,

if

or partial destruction, capture or neutralization of the object

will constitute a definite military

advantage under the circumstances existing at the

time of the attack. This does not mean, however, that overwhelming force cannot

be used to destroy a valid military objective
tinction

if

consistent with the principles of dis-

and proportionality discussed below. 138

Opponents

to the use of UAS to

conduct

strikes outside the traditional

combat

zone argue that drone attacks violate the principle of military necessity because
they fuel anti- Americanism in the
nization. 139

Opponents argue

FATA and do little to weaken the al-Qaeda orga-

that killing innocent civilians invites retaliation

aids al-Qaeda recruitment efforts in the

FATA and elsewhere by antagonizing the

local population, alienating surviving family

The opponents point

to statements

confirmed that drone

strikes

and

members and

creating martyrs. 140

by some Pakistani military

motivate local tribesmen in the

officers

who have

FATA to fight against

the Pakistani government because the attacks are viewed as a breach of Pakistan's
sovereignty. 141

It is

therefore argued that,

if

the military objective of defeating

al-

Qaeda cannot be achieved because drone strikes do not weaken the terrorist organization as intended, but rather have had unforeseen consequences of fueling antiAmerican sentiments and
late the principle

assisting al-Qaeda's recruitment efforts, the attacks vio-

of military necessity. 142

These arguments, which are not supported by independent studies, are based on
exaggerated civilian casualty figures. They also

two years alone,

UAS

strikes

and mid-to-high-level

fail

to

acknowledge

that, in the past

have killed over 500 militants, including 39 top-tier

leaders, thereby disrupting al-Qaeda's ability to operate

with impunity from the FATA. 143

An

independent study by the

Foundation puts the number of militants

killed at

New

America

between 618 and 966. 144 More

important, since December 2009, the terrorist organization has been dealt a

num-

ber of serious blows by successful drone attacks against several high-ranking

al-

Qaeda officials. In December, Saleh al-Somali, a senior planner responsible for alQaeda operations outside Afghanistan and Pakistan, was killed by a drone strike in
northern Waziristan. 145 Al-Qaeda operations were dealt further crippling blows in
April 2010 and May 2010 with the deaths of the two top al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq,
Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, and the death of the number-three
official in

the organization and overall

commander
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Abu

Mustafa

al-Yazid. 146 Equally important,

drone

strikes

have effectively im-

among

paired al-Qaeda operations by creating an "atmosphere of fear and distrust

members" of the organization, with reports indicating that militant leaders sleep
outside of their homes for fear of being targeted by a drone and suspected spies are
routinely executed for providing information to the United States. 147

Independent studies by the
for Regional Research

do not support the

New America Foundation and the Aryana Institute

and Advocacy (AIRRA),

as well as Reuters reporting, also

allegations that civilian casualties in the

anti-American sentiments and assisting al-Qaeda recruiting
claims to the contrary, there have been

no major public

against the use of drones. Moreover, the

number of

FATA

are fueling

efforts. First, despite

protests in the

FATA

civilian casualties in the

FATA is much lower than the numbers claimed by militant groups and opponents
to the use of drones in Pakistan. The New America Foundation study shows that
the 131 reported drone strikes in the FATA since 2004 "have killed approximately
between 908 to 1,347 individuals, of whom around 618 to 966 were described

as

militants in reliable press accounts"; thus less than 30 percent of the total casualties

were

civilians.

148

The AIRRA study

also

concluded that anti-Americanism in the

increased significantly due to

US drone

attacks.

149

FATA

has not

Between November 2009 and

AIRRA sent five teams of five researchers each to conduct a public
opinion survey about UAS attacks in areas of the FATA most often targeted by US
January 2010,

drones.

The following

are the questions posed

by the survey teams and the

re-

sponses of the people of the FATA:

Do you see drone attacks bringing about fear and terror in the common people? (Yes
45%, No 55%)
•

•

Do you think the drones are accurate in their strikes?

Do you think anti- American
cently? (Yes 42%, No 58%)
•

•

•

feelings in the area increased

Should Pakistan military carry out targeted

(Yes 70%,

Do

(Yes 52%,

No 48%)

due to drone attacks

re-

strikes at the militant organisations?

No 30%)

the militant organisations get

damaged due

to

drone attacks? (Yes 60%,

No

40%)
Local residents were also asked questions concerning sovereignty and civilian
casualties.

Regarding

territorial integrity,

people were asked
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if

US drone attacks on
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the

FATA were viewed by the local population as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty.

More than
insulted

two-thirds said they were not. "Pakistan's sovereignty, they argued, was

and annihilated by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, whose

ter Pakistan lost

it

to them.

Al-Qaeda, not of Pakistan."

The US
150

is

territory

FATA is af-

violating the sovereignty of the Taliban

and

Moreover, more than two-thirds of the people inter-

viewed consider "Al-Qaeda and the Taliban as enemy number one" and a large
majority (nearly two-thirds) want the United States "to continue the drone attacks

because the Pakistani army
Taliban."

151

is

unable or unwilling to retake the territory from the

Although there was some concern over

civilian casualties

and

collateral

damage, most of the people interviewed indicated that most of the drone attacks
hit their
is

intended

targets. In fact,

they indicated that most of the collateral damage

to houses rented to the militants. Additionally, local residents indicated that the

Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists normally seal off the area after a drone attack in

order to remove everything, including militant casualties, from the

site

before

al-

lowing locals to return to their homes. As a result, an accurate battle damage assess-

ment

is

not possible. In short, the

AIRRA

study contradicts the assertion of the

impact of civilian casualties on anti- Americanism and "the mantra of violation of
the sovereignty of Pakistan perpetuated by the armchair analysts in the media." 152

The

results of the

cial report.

In a

AIRRA study were

subsequently confirmed by a Reuters spe-

May 2010 interview, a tribal elder from the FATA told a Reuters re-

porter that the residents of northern Waziristan "want to get rid of the Taliban and
if

the Pakistani

army cannot do

it

now, then

.

.

.

drone attacks

.

.

.

[are] fine

with

He further indicated that " [t]here is no anger against the strikes as long as
civilians are safe" and that "[t]here have been civilian deaths but not in big numbers." 154 A second tribal leader indicated: "We prefer drone strikes than army operations because in such operations, we also suffer. But drones hit militants and it is
them."

good

153

for us." 155 Based

drone

on

these independent reports

strikes violate the principle

and surveys,

allegations that

of military necessity are clearly misplaced.

B. Proportionality

The principle of proportionality is concerned with weighing the military advantage
one expects to gain by an attack against the unavoidable and incidental harm to civilians and damage to civilian property that will result from the attack. This principle
requires the commander to determine whether incidental injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects that may result from the attack will be excessive in relation to the concrete

Opponents

and

direct military advantage expected to be gained. 156

combat zone

to the use of drones outside the traditional

that killing a large
lates the principle

number of civilians
of proportionality.

in

157

an attempt to

kill

This argument
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is

one

also argue

terrorist leader vio-

based on alleged civilian
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casualty rates of fifty innocent civilians killed to each militant targeted
tio

of 50 to

1,

—

" [a] t a ra-

the disproportionate impact of drone attacks in Pakistan represents a

serious violation of the traditional rules of war." 158

The opponents' position

harm

to the civilian population

UAS

cause unnecessary and disproportionate

flawed for a

is

number of reasons.

number of actual civilians killed by UAS

cated above, the

nificantly lower than the

The

that

First, as indi-

strikes in Pakistan is sig-

numbers reported by the opponents

to the use of drones.

New America Foundation study shows innocent civilian casualties caused by

drone

strikes at

around 30 percent. 159 These

nior Pakistani military officer

dead were

gument

—

as

and a third innocent

Pakistani intelligence estimates put the

civilian casualties

—primarily family members who

low

and 20 percent,

as 5

se-

indicated that "he believed that a third of the

militants, a third sympathizers

some US and
militants

who

been confirmed by a

figures have

respectively.

civilians/' 160

And

number of non-combatant

live

161

and

travel

with targeted

Second, the opponents' ar-

comor wounded and the

incorrectly assumes that the principle of proportionality requires a

number of innocent

parison between the

number of terrorists killed or wounded.
actually requires

civilians killed

Rather, what the proportionality principle

a balancing of incidental injury to civilians

is

and collateral dam-

age to civilian property against the military advantage expected to be gained by the

— not by the ICRC, Human Right

attack, as

determined by the military commander

Council,

Human Rights Watch or the Special Rapporteur. The commander's deci-

sion

is

based on validated, real-time, reliable intelligence; target evaluation in light

of the campaign plan
tive);

(e.g., top-tier,

high-level, mid-level leader or low-level opera-

presence of civilians at the target and their statuses

place, civilian object, safe house, terrorist training

commander. Each

target

is

camp); and his or her experience

carefully scrutinized

plex targeting approval process which considers

most recent real-time

voluntary or invol-

women and children); location of the target (e.g., protected

untary human shields,

as a

(e.g.,

all

and analyzed through

a

com-

of these factors in light of the

intelligence.

C. Distinction

The

principle of distinction

civilians

ians
ers

is

concerned with distinguishing combatants from

and military objects from

civilian objects so as to

civilian property. 162

and damage to

To achieve this

have a duty to distinguish their forces from the

minimize harm to

result, military

civilian

civil-

command-

population

(e.g.,

through the wearing of uniforms or other distinctive signs) and distinguish valid
military objectives

from

civilians or civilian objects before attacking. 163

Opponents of the use of drones argue

that,

reasonably certain that the intended target
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is

even

if

a

US drone

operator

is

a valid military objective (e.g., an
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al-Qaeda

he or she

terrorist),

is

still

to

Combat Terrorism

obligated to minimize civilian injuries.

Because suspected terrorists wear civilian clothes and commingle with the local
population, they cannot be clearly distinguished from the innocent civilians, even

by high-tech drones. Citing

Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol

provides that "in case of doubt whether a person

is

(AP

I

I),

a civilian, that person shall be

considered to be a civilian," opponents to the use of drones argue that

any uncertainty
is

wearing

as to

whether or not a person

civilian clothes or

IHL presumes

by the

population.

It

the

them from

all

combine

target area
objects.

166

and

etc.),

Moreover,

opponents to
it

encourages

danger to the

civilian

enhanced precision and restraint drones bring to the
a pilot with limited information in the cockpit or

a long-range artillery battery. 165

"lack of fear-induced haste, reduced anger levels"

ments

attack.

militants, thereby increasing the

compared to

commander of

is

164

terrorists for violating the very laws that

also ignores the

targeting process as

there

a suspected militant (because he

a protected civilian.

is

the use of drones seek to use to protect
further violations

if

has commingled with the civilian population,

that the person

Such a position rewards

is

which

Improved ISR

capabilities,

and clearer battle damage assess-

enhance awareness of protected persons and objects in the

to

on the

restraint

part of drone operators to engage such persons or

More important, the opponents' position ignores basic rules of IHL that

prohibit belligerents from using protected persons
certain areas, objects or belligerent forces
Article 51(7) of AP

movement of the

I

and protected objects

immune from

attack.

167

to render

In this regard,

provides that "[t]he Parties to the conflict shall not direct the

population or individual civilians in order to attempt to

civilian

shield military objectives

from

attacks or to shield military operations." Article

58(b) additionally provides that "[t]he Parties to the conflict

mum extent feasible!,]

.

.

.

shall, to

the maxi-

avoid locating military objectives within or near densely

populated areas." Militants violate these principles on a daily basis by commingling with the civilian population

and

enlisting the voluntary

and involuntary aid

of human shields to enhance their operations and mobilize public opinion against
the United States

They

store their

hospitals, use

when UAS

strikes cause incidental injury or collateral

ammunition

in

mosques, place weapons on top of schools and

ambulances to deliver suicide bombs and

trol centers in private

damage.

set

up command and con-

homes, and then exploit the resulting injury or damage when

these protected places or objects are attacked. 168

Even though

UAS are among the most precise weapons in the US inventory to-

day, incidental injury to innocent civilians
erty

is

and

inevitable, particularly in light of the

operate.

The

State

collateral

manner

in

which

Department Legal Adviser highlighted
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damage

to civilian prop-

terrorists fight

this fact in his

and

remarks:
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[T] his
forces,

is

a conflict with an organized terrorist

but that plans and executes

its

enemy that does not have conventional

attacks against us

and our

while hiding

allies

makes the application of international
among civilian populations. That behavior
law more difficult and more critical for the protection of innocent civilians. 169
.

.

.

Although these repeated IHL violations do not
gation under the law to take
civilian life

all

relieve the

feasible precautions to

United States of its

minimize incidental

obli-

loss of

and damage to civilian objects, the terrorists' actions must be taken into

when determining the legality and proportionality of an attack
militants who have taken refuge in the civilian population and engaged in

consideration
against

hostilities

from protected

places. 170

US Adherence to IHL in the Targeting Process
The Obama administration (as well as the previous administration)
D.

to adhere to basic principles of IHL
traditional

has continued

when targeting al-Qaeda terrorists

combat zone. Koh emphasized

outside the

that administration officials have

carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these opera-

tions are conducted consistently with law of war principles, including:

.

.

.

the principle

of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilthe principle of proand civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack; and
which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticiincluding lethal
pated. In U.S. operations against al-Qaeda and its associated forces
operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles
great care is taken to
adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum. 171
ians

.

.

.

portionality,

—

—

In short, drone attacks are being conducted in accordance with

US obligations un-

der IHL.

VI.

Use of Civilian

Today, more than ever,

UAS

Operators to Target Terrorists

civilian contractors are increasingly

being utilized to sup-

port combat forces across the entire spectrum of military operations, to include intelligence, planning, technical support, logistics

and communications support

functions. Civilian contractors play critical roles as analysts, trainers,

programmers and maintenance technicians

for high-tech

computer

unmanned systems. The

1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Third Geneva Convention both recognize
that civilians will support

and accompany the armed
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forces in times of

armed
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AP I, Article 50 further recognizes that these individuals, notwithstand-

conflict. 172

ing their affiliation with the

armed

forces, are

still

considered to be "civilians" for

purposes of targeting and Article 51 specifies that civilians "shall not be the object
of attack." 173 Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention similarly provides that
"protected persons
lence."

174

.

.

.

shall at all

may increase

.

protected

.

.

against

all

acts of vio-

the risk that these civilian contractors

do not

directly participate in

if

they directly participate in the

hostilities.

Article 51 provides that "[civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded

this section, unless

and for such time as

added). Similarly,

Common Article

they take a direct part in

3 of the 1949

.

.

.

shall in all

be treated humanely" (emphasis added). Consequently,
operatives

who conduct drone

hostilities''

by

(emphasis

Geneva Conventions provides

that "persons taking no active part in the hostilities

CIA

.

they are not subject to direct attack.

Civilians lose their protected status
I,

.

incidentally injured or killed, as long as they

hostilities,

AP

.

Therefore, although the nature of their duties, and/or proximity to or

presence in the combat zone,

may be

times be

circumstances

civilian contractors or

would be

strikes against military objectives

considered to be directly participating in hostilities and could be lawfully targeted

by the enemy.
A. Inherently Governmental Functions

DoD

avoids this issue by prohibiting

its

civilian

personnel and contractors from

engaging in functions that are inherently governmental, including combat operations. 175

Pursuant to

combat operations
pabilities

is

DoD guidelines, civilians are prohibited from participating in

if the

planned use of disruptive and/or destructive combat

ca-

an inherent part of the mission. 176 Combat operations include actively

seeking out, closing with and destroying

enemy

forces, including

employment of

firepower and other destructive and disruptive capabilities on the battlefield. 177
Consistent with this guidance, only

US

military personnel

may operate US weap-

ons systems against the enemy.

B. Direct Participation in Hostilities

Opponents

to the use of

UAS

to

conduct

zone argue that CIA operatives and

strikes outside the traditional

conducting such

civilian contractors

combat

strikes are

may not participate in hostilities. 178 This position is contrary to the majority view expressed by most law of war scholars, who hold that it is
unlawful combatants and

not a war crime for civilians to participate in
entitled to

hostilities,

combatant immunity under domestic law

but

if they

do, they are not

for their belligerent acts. 179

Even the Special Rapporteur (Philip Alston) would agree that under IHL
.

.

.

are not prohibited

from participating

"civilians

in hostilities." 180 In his report filed
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the

Human Rights Council in late May, Alston indicates that direct participation in

hostilities is

not a war crime, but that there are consequences that flow from such

participation.
First,

because they are directly participating in hostilities by conducting targeted

may themselves be targeted and killed.

killings, intelligence

personnel

telligence personnel

do not have immunity from prosecution under domestic law

Second, in-

Thus CIA personnel could be prosecuted for murder under the
domestic law of any country in which they conduct targeted drone killings, and
for their conduct.

could also be prosecuted for violations of applicable

US law. 181

The aforementioned discussion assumes, of course, that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. If the opponents to the
use of drones are correct in arguing that the United States is not at war with alQaeda, then civilian operators would not be considered "unlawful combatants"
and their actions could be legally justified as a "lawful exercise of the customary
sovereign right of self-defense against a non-state actor." 182

VII.

Targeting Terrorists

Questions concerning

by opponents

Who Directly Participate in Hostilities

who may be targeted by a UAS

to the use of drones.

have also been raised

These questions center on what

tutes direct participation in hostilities
directly participated in hostilities

strike

(DPH) and how long

maybe

targeted. In his

activity consti-

individuals

May 2010

who have

report, Philip

Alston indicates that

regardless of the enemy's tactics, in order to protect the vast majority of civilians, direct

participation

may

directly supports

only include conduct close to that of a fighter, or conduct that

combat. More attenuated acts, such as providing financial support,

advocacy, or other non-combat aid, does

Thus, although illegal activities,

e.g.,

[sic]

terrorism,

criteria for direct participation in hostilities,

not constitute direct participation.

.

.

may cause harm, if they do not meet the

then States' response must conform to

the lethal force standards applicable to self-defence and law enforcement. 183

Other critics have similarly argued that IHL "supports decisions in favor of sparing

and avoiding destruction

life

in close cases." 184

Neither the Geneva Conventions nor the Additional Protocols define

an

effort to

fill

this gap, the

Law.
•

In essence, the

In

ICRC issued the non-binding Interpretive Guidance on

the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International
185

DPH.

ICRC guidelines

Humanitarian

address three questions:

Who is considered a civilian for the purposes of the principle of distinction?
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•

What conduct amounts

•

What

to
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to direct participation in hostilities?

modalities govern the loss of protection against direct attack?

Who Is a Civilian?

The ICRC

who

takes the position that, in an international

are neither

members of

armed

the

conflict, "all

persons

forces of a party to the conflict nor

participants in a levee en masse are civilians
direct attack unless

armed

and

.

.

.

entitled to protection against

and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 186 For

a non-international

armed

conflict, the

ICRC

maintains that

who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups of a
party to the conflict [i.e., armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict who continuall

persons

ously take a direct part in hostilities (continuous combat function) are civilians and
]

entitled to protection against direct attack unless

.

.

and for such time as they take a direct

part in hostilities. 187

What Constitutes DPH?
An act must meet the following criteria in order to constitute DPH under the InterB.

pretive Guidance: 188

Threshold of Harm.

•

An

act likely to adversely affect the military operations

or military capacity of a party to an
struction

on protected persons or

Direct Causation. There

•

harm

likely to result

which that

from

act constitutes

armed conflict or to

inflict

death, injury or de-

objects.

must be

that act or

an integral

a direct causal link

from

between the

act

and the

a coordinated military operation of

part.

The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the
required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.
•

Belligerent Nexus.

C. Loss of Protected Status

The

third question, concerning belligerent nexus, addresses a

number of issues,

in-

cluding the length of the period during which civilians lose their protected status
they directly participate in

hostilities.

According to the Interpretive Guidance,

if

civil-

ians lose their protection against direct attack only for the "duration of each specific act

amounting

execution of the

to

[DPH]," which includes measures preparatory

act, "as well as

of its execution." 189

When

the deployment to

to the

and the return from the location

civilians cease to directly participate in hostilities, they

regain their status as civilians

and are protected against
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The only exception to this rule is that
civilians who assume a CCF as members of an organized armed group belonging to
"revolving door" of civilian protection).

a non-State party to the conflict lose their protected status for as long as they re-

main members of the group.
D. Problems with the

The ICRC

ICRC Approach

guidelines concerning the "revolving door" of civilian protection

and

CCF are problematic, at best, and appear to be biased against
forces, particularly when applied in the UAS context. To illus-

the application of the

modern
trate:

military

under the "revolving door" of civilian protection,

if

an Afghan baker leaves

shop with an improvised explosive device (IED), places

his

road, detonates
safely returns to

it

on the

side of the

when a convoy drives by, killing five coalition soldiers, then
his home without being detected, the baker can no longer be di-

it

rectly targeted, because

he has regained his protected status as a

civilian

(assuming

of course that he has not assumed a CCF). This "baker by day, terrorist by night"

can be apprehended and prosecuted for his criminal
sidered to be directly participating in hostilities

Application of the

ICRC

acts,

but he

no longer con-

is

and is not subject to direct attack.

guidelines to individuals involved in the use of IEDs

The ICRC maintains that
a person who purchases and smuggles components for an IED and the person who
assembles and stores the IED in a workshop do not cause direct harm and are,
therefore, not directly participating in hostilities and may not be directly targeted.
According to the ICRC, only the person planting or detonating the IED meets the
against coalition forces also produces

anomalous

results.

requirement of direct causation for the purposes of direct participation in
ties.

Purchasing, smuggling, assembling and storing an

attack against coalition forces are not considered

IED

that

is

later

by the ICRC to be

hostili-

used in an

"integral parts

of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation."

Compare
considers

all

The ICRC
hostilities and

the ICRC's "integral part" analysis to the use of drones.
the following individuals to be directly participating in

therefore subject to direct attack:
•

the individual

who

loads the missile on a drone that

is

used to conduct a

strike against terrorist targets;
•

the individual

the drone

is

who

launches (or recovers) the UAS, even though control of

transferred to uniformed

who

combat

•

the computer specialist

•

the operator collecting intelligence data;

•

the individual illuminating the target;

forces

operates the
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it
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UAS through remote control;
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•

the specialist controlling the firing of the missile;

•

the radio operator transmitting orders to fire the missile;

•

the overall mission

commander.

While acknowledging that only
in isolation,

ICRC

a

few of these individuals carry out

more broadly in

the

conduct that causes harm in conjunction with other

words, even

activities that,

could be said to directly cause the required threshold of harm, the

interprets the standard of direct causation

to include

and

if a specific

act does not

on

its

UAS context

acts.

In other

own directly cause the required threshwould

old of harm, "the requirement of direct causation

still

be

fulfilled

where the

act constitutes

an integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that

directly causes

such harm." 190

It is

clear

from these examples

ternally inconsistent

and provide

that the Interpretive Guidance guidelines are ingreater protection for terrorists

and insurgents

than they do for civilians and civilian contractors accompanying the force.
conceivable that the

ICRC

IED

that

forces to be an "integral part of a concrete
fulfilling the

is

is

later

used in an attack on coalition

and coordinated

tactical operation,"

requirement of direct causation/harm. Yet, the

on

say that a contractor loading a missile
target

in-

does not consider the purchasing, smuggling of com-

ponents, assembling or storing of an

thereby

It is

a

ICRC would

UAS that is later dropped on a terrorist

directly participating in hostilities because the act of loading the missile

an integral part of a concrete and coordinated

tactical

is

operation that directly

harm to the enemy. Such a conclusion is absurd and completely ignores the
that IED attacks "are the No. 1 killer of US troops in Afghanistan" and "more

causes
fact

than half of American combat deaths

[in

2008] were the result of IED" attacks. 191

The ICRC is supposed to act as a neutral and independent humanitarian organization to protect innocent civilians and promote and work for a better understanding of IHL;

its

job

is

not to level the playing

Unfortunately, in the case of DPH the

like

between opposing

ICRC has lost its

to penalize the use of civilian contractors
at the

field

impartiality

belligerents.

by attempting

and high-tech unmanned systems, while

same time providing additional protection

to supporters of terrorist groups

al-Qaeda.

The Israeli Approach
The Israeli Supreme Court has taken
E.

a different, yet similar,

the Public Committee against Torture in Israel

Court determined that a civilian
•

is

v.

approach to DPH. In

Government of Israel decision, the

considered to have taken part in

hostilities

when

using weapons in an armed conflict, while gathering intelligence or while

preparing himself/herself for the

hostilities;
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human shield;

•

acting as a voluntary

•

sending a person to commit a hostile

ning a hostile

act, directing

the hostile act

and plan-

or

act;

joining a terrorist organization and committing a chain of hostilities, with

•

short periods of rest between them. 192

The Court additionally determined that lethal force could only be used against a
civilian that
criteria

were

is

considered to have taken a direct part in

satisfied:

well-based information

•

hostilities if the

following

193

is

needed before categorizing a

civilian as directly

participating in hostilities;
a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked if a less harmful

•

means can be employed

means involve a risk so great to
the lives of the soldiers that they are not required or harm to nearby innocent civilians might be greater than that caused by refraining from using lesser means; and
after

•

(e.g., arrest)

an attack on a

unless such

civilian suspected

of taking an active part in

hostilities,

a

thorough, independent investigation regarding the precision of the identification
of the target and the circumstances of the attack upon

Although not a perfect solution, the

Israeli

approach

sufficient safeguards to ensure protection of

him
is

is

to be performed.

more

realistic

and

offers

innocent civilians in the targeting

decision.

VIII.

Use of Advanced Weapons Systems

A final argument, which merits little attention, has been advanced by some opponents to the use of drones. In general, they argue that the use of advanced weapons

systems in lethal operations against terrorists

is illegal

under international law. In

response to this argument the State Department Legal Adviser correctly noted that
"the rules that govern targeting

do not turn on the type of weapon system used, and

no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict ... so long as they are employed in conthere

is

formity with applicable laws of war." 194 In this regard,
that

all

sistent

acquisition

with

all

DoD

regulations require

and procurement of DoD weapons and weapon systems be con-

applicable domestic law, treaties

and international agreements, cus-

tomary international law and the law of armed conflict. To ensure compliance with
international law

and US

treaty obligations,

all

intended acquisitions of weapons

and weapons systems

are subject to a legal review

conduct such reviews.

195

by a DoD attorney authorized

to

Drones have been determined to be consistent with all US
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treaty obligations

and international

weapons. Each military service
tion of

all

to

Combat Terrorism

A similar requirement applies to non-lethal

law.

required to conduct a legal review of the acquisi-

is

non-lethal weapons to ensure consistency with

customary international law and,

US

in particular, the laws of war.

treaty obligations,
196

IX. Conclusion

The position being advocated by human
use of drones

a position of weakness that,

is

provide al-Qaeda and

tion, will

rights advocates

its affiliates

war of aggression against the United

Department Coordinator

States

if

adopted by the

House Subcommittee on

Human

Rights in 2004:

to the

Obama administra-

with a substantial advantage in their

and

its allies. J.

for Counterterrorism, got

fore the

and the opponents

it

Cofer Black, the State

right

when he

testified be-

International Terrorism, Nonproliferation

and

from the scourge of terrorism. No country is immune from attack,
and neither policies of deterrence nor accommodation will ward off attack. Al-Qaeda
seeks only death and chaos, which is why we will continue to pursue the only viable
course of action before us, which is to destroy this enemy utterly, both with the cooperation of our allies and by unilateral action when necessary
This is definitely a long[W]hile we have made substantial progress toward eraditerm fight. This is a war
cating the threat posed by al-Qaeda, we are on a long, tough road. We cannot afford to
weakness is exploited, and it must not be shown. 197
falter
[I] n counterterrorism

No

country

is

safe

.

.

.

Mr. Black's testimony is equally applicable today. The United
to attack al-Qaeda

and

its affiliates

States

must continue

wherever they maybe found in order to achieve

victory in this protracted war. In the short term, the use of UAS appears to be the
best

(if

not the only) viable option to target terrorists operating from the remote

FATA, Yemen, Somalia and other places. As Harold Koh emphasized,
al-Qaeda continues to pose an imminent threat to the United States and the terrorareas of the

ist

organization

has not abandoned

its

intent to attack the United States,

and indeed continues to attack
and

[Accordingly,] the United States has the authority under international law,

us

the responsibility to

its

citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to

including by targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders
attacks.

If

itself,

are planning

198

you've seen the movie Patton you will

Third

who

defend

Army on

the eve of the

D-Day

recall

General Patton's address to the

invasion in 1944, which begins with his

258

.

Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo

famous quip:
his country.
try."

199

"I

want you to remember that no bastard ever won a war by dying for

He won

Opponents

by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his counthe use of drones argue that US forces must first warn or at-

it

to

tempt to capture suspected
even

if

terrorists before

they are engaged with lethal force,

the terrorists are operating out of remote

and

inaccessible areas like the

FATA. This "capture first" mentality violates the first tenet of Patton's clever remark by turning a blind eye to reality such a limitation on the use of force in an
armed conflict will provide greater protection for suspected terrorists and will inevitably result in large numbers of US casualties. Fortunately, Presidents Bush and

—

Obama

chose the Patton alternative

—providing al-Qaeda

terrorists the

opportu-

nity to die for their cause. Accordingly the United States will continue to use
to attack

UAS

enemy belligerents, including al-Qaeda operatives, consistent with the in-

herent right of self-defense and the laws of war.
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New Technology and the Law of
Armed Conflict

Darren M. Stewart*
Technological Meteorites and Legal Dinosaurs?

The

tacit contract

of combat throughout the ages has always assumed a basic

equality of moral risk:

kill

or be

the legitimacy of self-defence.

killed.

Accordingly violence in war avails

itself of

But this contract is void when one side begins

kill-

1

ing with impunity.

Introduction

The(LOAC)

issue of new technology and
is

not a

new

its

implications for the law of armed conflict

question. For centuries nations

and

their militaries

have had to respond to developments in the means and methods of warfare. These
have ranged from hardware developments, such as the crossbow and gunpowder,
to the

development of tactics, such

as

effects-based approach to operations
lenges, belligerents

(EBAO). In response

like the

to each of these chal-

have either developed enhanced weapons or tactics, or suffered

defeat. Usually technological

* Colonel, British

asymmetric warfare or doctrines

change has been of a

relatively

minor, evolutionary

Army; Director, Military Department, International Institute of HumanitarThe views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the IIHL, the British
Army, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence or Her Majesty's Government and are the auian

Law

(IIHL).

thor's personal views.

—
New Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict
nature, affording localized tactical or operational advantage. Occasionally devel-

opments have been profound, changing the
side over the other. History provides

gunpowder and nuclear weapons
hoplite phalanx, the

Napoleon are

all

one

strategic balance in the favor of

examples of these in the form of the crossbow,

in the case of hardware. Similarly the

Greek

Roman legion and the development of the corps structure by

examples of innovations which have shaped

tactics.

The question frequently posed today is whether the current nature of developments

in military technology constitutes a similarly seismic shift in the military

paradigm. Will the development of unmanned systems in the land,

air

and mari-

time environments be recorded in history in the same revolutionary terms as those
previously mentioned? This article will consider this question in the context of the
implications that flow from these developments for

Over the centuries LOAC,

in

LOAC.

various guises, has always had as

its

its

focus the

2

regulation of armed conflict so as to protect the victims of war. During the nine-

teenth century, in response to both the development of military technology and the
prevailing social

began to

One

reflect the

format that we are familiar with today.

has allowed

when

conflict.

capabilities

(means) and

More

important,

flexibility.

This

tactics

(methods) employed in

LOAC has demonstrated its flexibility

through the defining principles underpinning
military necessity, humanity, distinction

tactics

evolutionary

This has included specific measures to ban weapons 3 and tactics 4

seen as appropriate.

quality

its

LOAC to evolve in a manner that adapts to the developments

both technological

armed

LOAC rules started to become formalized and

of the notable features of LOAC has been

flexibility

in

mores of the time,

operation. These principles

its

—

and proportionality

and provide a benchmark against which developments
can be assessed as to their lawfulness.

vailing international mores,

LOAC

proves

When

itself

are of an enduring
in technology

and

applied in the context of pre-

both

flexible

and responsive

to

changes in the armed conflict paradigm.

The changing character of weapons systems and

their

impact on the law

ther one-dimensional nor negative. In fact, technological advances in

is

nei-

weaponry

work to enhance application of LOAC, particularly in the areas of disand proportionality. Challenges usually arise when such developments

frequently
tinction
raise

wider questions as to what are the acceptable ethical limits in the application

of technology to military purposes. In this context
regulating what
tional mores,

is

inherently a

human

LOAC,

operating as a system

activity within a prevailing set

of interna-

becomes an important consideration.

This article will consider whether the changing character of weapons systems,
particularly

LOAC's

unmanned

ability to

systems and vehicles,

is

such as to

call

into question

respond to the introduction of new technology onto the
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paper addresses three aspects: current

battlefield. In considering this question, the

developments in technology, the impacts on

LOAC

standards arising from

new

technology and the implications for accountability.
Part

will consider current

I

manned

systems that are either remotely controlled, have automated elements to

their operation or

in the

developments in military technology, including un-

can act in an autonomous manner.

development of such technology?

Do

What are the military drivers

developments in

artificial intelligence

constitute a turning point in technology such as to warrant a bespoke response

from the law? What then of the

weapons
(AP

I)?

5

existing legal

for their lawfulness as articulated

These questions

will all

framework for the assessment of new

by Article 36 of Additional Protocol

be addressed in Part

I

I.

The impact of new technology in armed conflict brings with it, even under the
extant legal paradigm, an obligation on belligerents to apply the rules such that
applicable standards of behavior

new technology and those
acknowledge

that don't.

at variance

Whether

between those who possess

this calls for a

common but differentiated responsibilities

pretation of what the applicable

Of course

may be

6

change in the law to

or simply a renewed inter-

LOAC standards are will be considered in Part II.

the question of standards in turn raises the issues of accountability

and the means by which

set

standards are to be measured. Does the law of unin-

tended consequences mean that the changing nature of weapons systems will result
in

an increased

level

of attention and scrutiny applied to senior levels of the chain

of command as the only "humans in the loop"? Have States, by removing

humans

from the operation of weapons systems, created a whole new set of implications for
accountability? Part

III

looks at whether civilian leaders and military commanders,

employ newer and better technology, have considered the consequences of placing themselves more squarely in the focus for breaches of LOAC

in their quest to

when

these (as they invariably will) occur.

Finally, the article will

conclude by addressing whether

LOAC has been able to

adequately respond to the challenge of the changing character of weapons or

fundamental root-and-branch reassessment

is

a

required.

Part I. Current Developments in Technology:

Unmanned

if

Unmanned Systems and

Vehicles

Definitions

The combination of technology and military jargon can be a dangerous distraction in the context of terminology and precision in its use. This article will therefore use terminology in line with that the United States has developed in

FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap
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its

(hereinafter referred to as

New Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict
the

Roadmap). 7 The Roadmap contains

area,
It

all

which are usefully consolidated

at

a multitude of

Annex

acronyms used

in this

H to the document.

should come as no surprise that the accepted term that applies generically to

vehicles

and systems

automated or exhibit a

that are either remotely controlled,

"unmanned vehicle systems" (UVS). UVS are broken down
by environment: land (unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs)), maritime (unmanned
maritime systems (UMS)) and air (unmanned air systems (UASs)).
UGVs are those that are either armed (ground combat vehicles (GCVs)) or unarmed. UMS include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface
vehicles (USVs). UASs include unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), tactical unmanned
air vehicles (TUAVs) and unmanned combat air vehicles. Some commentators
break UASs into three broad categories: TUAVs, stealth UAVs and agile or expendable UAVs, 9 however, this structure has not received widespread endorsement.
There have been some attempts by NATO Systems Concepts and Integrations pan8

degree of autonomy is

els to

to

seek standardization in this area, including terminology; however, this

produce

a definitive guide.

is

yet

10

Equal in importance to the requirement that terminology used with respect to

new technology is

of a uniform nature

military context in

is

the requirement to understand the wider

which new technology

is

employed.

Military Doctrine as a Driver for the Development of New Technology

While the development of terminology
relatively straightforward,

what

is

less

so

in relation to
is

new

the drivers for

its

military technology

development and

is

use.

The desire to develop a decisive hardware advantage over an opponent is but one of
these. As military doctrine evolves in relation to the employment of unmanned systems, technology

seen as a key enabler rather than a panacea to the challenges

is

posed by the paradigm of the contemporary operating environment. The manner
in

which technology is used by the military is therefore critical. As Air Commodore

Julian Stinton puts

it:

[L]etting the thinking drive the technology could lead to

more coherence

in

approach

and more commonality in capabilities under an overall concept, but less potential for
exploitation of novel game-changing technologies. This is the steady, analytical, nonephemeral approach, requiring

management,

prioritisation,

just as

much

technological capability in information

automation, pattern seeking, relational activity using star-

ing arrays, change detection, wide-area scanning and cueing, as the adrenalin [e] -laden,

higher-buzz technological demands of real-time ISR. 11

For those in the military, this
the benefits derived

will,

of course, be an obvious statement; however,

from recent developments
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been distorted by a perception that the quest for newer and better technology is virtually an

"end in itself," rather than being one of a number of "means to an end." Air

Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge describes the challenge in somewhat blunter terms:

Those who are lured by expensive technologies without a deeper understanding of how
to use them, task them and integrate them will be left with empty pockets and shiny
toys—the "esoteric chimera" I referred to earlier. Those that understand their

and the most important of all, the human dimension, will be left
more money to spend elsewhere and an essential capability that they can

limitations, benefits

with a

little

use effectively. 12

With the widespread introduction of EBAO by Western militaries into their operational doctrine, the use of new technology has become but one (albeit sophisticated) component of an increasingly integrated, multifaceted campaign plan. As
such, new military technology cannot be simply viewed as an upward trending
graph of enhancement in capabilities. It is the manner in which the myriad capabilities afforded by new technology are employed by commanders and their staffs that
is becoming the decisive factor in differentiating opponents and, as a consequence,
their ability to prevail in armed conflict.
Advocates for the employment of automated or even autonomous systems argue that the phenomenon of information overload, which is prevalent on the modern battlefield, underscores the requirement for systems that can process

make

information and

proach

fails

to consider

decisions far

more

efficiently

two important elements.

tion into intelligence requires

a

First,

broad array of

than humans. Such an apthe processing of informaskills,

including intuitive,

experience-based analysis and cognitive functions of which automated or autono-

mous

systems are incapable. Second, and perhaps most important,

is

the fact that

complex system of interlinked actions, each of which may impact

the battlefield

is

differently on

an opponent depending on the context in which it occurs, and which

will

a

management of this complex netinfluence the effect actions have in a coordinated manner toward

not have the same

work, seeking to

effect

each time.

It is

a certain set of campaign objectives, that

is

the

at the heart

of effects-based operations.

As such:
To the extent that it works, the place of the human in the system seems to have changed
dramatically. The important judgement is now made at a data fusion or intelligence
centre

—

made

a particular target temporarily important.

or, alternatively,

by a forward observer aware of how dynamics of a battle have
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Thus, the use of new technology in
cies

this context, while

enabling greater efficien-

and providing potentially decisive effect, does so within

struct that requires the exercise of clear

human

direction

campaign con-

a wider

and

control.

Types of New and Evolving Technology

UVS operating types fit into three categories.

Broadly speaking,

are remotely controlled, also
trol the

UVS

known

by some form of

First are those that

where an operator

will

con-

direct radio signal (line of sight or satellite).

The

as tele-operated,

operator can be either relatively close, such as in the same operational theater, or

many thousands
Afghanistan.

of miles away as in the case of Predator/Reaper operations in

14

The second category is automated UVS, meaning that functions are carried out
within preprogrammed parameters without the requirement for a command from
a human. There are many examples of this type of UVS currently employed by
militaries around the world. For example, Global Hawk is a UAS, most of whose
flight

commands are controlled by onboard systems without

recourse to a

human

operator. Similarly in the land environment, automated sentry systems that re-

spond

to

movement

in,

or breaches

of, security

tion to minefields or other installations,

without

human

perimeters are often used in rela-

and provide an automated response

intervention. In the maritime context, the close-in

tems used to defend surface warships from anti-ship missile attack

weapons

are,

sys-

due to the

speed of response required to defeat the threat, largely automated.
Finally,

work

is

being carried out to develop autonomous systems for military

application that incorporate forms of artificial intelligence, allowing the

operate independently of humans and carry out

would have involved human
Perhaps the best single

UVS

is

the

US Roadmap.

of the functions that otherwise

source of data on the types and employment of

Not only does

it

contain an analysis of future require-

ments (including detailed descriptions of individual system

US

military (the largest single user

employment. The investment
developing

in terms of resources

US

and

it

places these re-

how and why

effort

of

by the United

UVS

States

new UVS technology is impressive; the funding for this project alone

over a five-year period (2009-13)
This

characteristics) for the

and developer of UVS), but

quirements within an operational context focusing on the

in

to

action.

official

15

all

UVS

commitment

to the

is

projected to be a staggering $18.9 billion. 16

development and use of UVS

is

underscored by the 2001

congressional mandate that one-third of military aircraft and ground combat

unmanned by 2015. 17 The size and scope of the US unmanned systems
program bring into sharp focus the impact such new technology has, and will continue to have, on US military capability. Other nations can ill afford to ignore such

vehicles be
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a development. Professor Jack Beard paints the
rather

US fascination with technology in a

more somber light:

The U.S. military- technological experience represents a consistent, but exaggerated, variation of the historical trends in this area, as Americans have displayed an almost boundless confidence in the power of science and technology to promote "progress" and have
tended to trust in the power of military technology to translate into success in war. 18

It is

not possible to

list

the myriad of types

and names of systems

that are being

US unmanned
systems program. The table below illustrates the number and types of UVS that the
developed or will become spin-offs of the programs covered by the

United States assesses

as

having a force application capability

(i.e.,

capable of offen-

These systems span the ubiquitous Predator and Reaper

sive action).

UAVs

to

GCVs and the newly developed littoral combat ship (LCS). The LCS is the latest addition to the US Navy and is designed to operate on a modular basis with several
unmanned systems loaded on board,
and

including the

Remote Mine Hunting System

MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air Vehicle.
Table

1

Named Unmanned Systems Associated with Force Application
Air-to-Air

19

WMD Aerial Collection System (WACS)

UAS

Automated Combat SAR Decoys

Autonomous Expeditionary Support

Plat-

form (AESP)

Automated Combat SAR Recovery

Contaminated Remains/Casualty Evacua& Recovery

tion

Combat Medic UAS

for

Resupply

&

Crowd Control System

Evacuation

tor Follow- on)

EOD UAS

Defender

Floating

Mine

Neutralization

UAS

High Altitude Persistent/Endurance
High Speed

UAS

Intelligent

UAS

(Non-lethal Gladia-

Mobile Mine System

Next Generation Small Armed

UGV

Nuclear Forensics Next Generation

UGV

UGV Advanced

Micro Air Vehicle (MAV)

Small

Armed

MQ-1

Small

Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV)

MQ-9 Reaper

UAS-UGV Teaming

Next Generation Bomber

UAS

Amphibious
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Named Unmanned
Off Board Sensing

Table 1
Systems Associated with Force Application (continued)

UAS

Precision Acquisition

Autonomous Undersea Mine Layer
Bottom

and Weaponized

UUV Localization System

(BULS)

System (PAWS)

SEAD/DEAD UAS

Harbor Security

Armed UAS

Small

STUAS/Tier

Hull

Demonstration (UCAS-D)
Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical

Air Vehicle

Neutralization System

Next Generation USV with Unmanned Surface Influence Sweep System (USV w/US3)

Unmanned Combat Aircraft System-

manned

UUV Localization System (HULS)

Mine

II

USV

Un-

Remote Minehunting System (RMS)

(VTUAV Firescout)

WARRIOR A/I-GNAT

SUSV with Unmanned

Surface Influence

Sweep System (USV w/US3)

Weapon borne Bomb Damage

Information

UAS

Neutralize

To
table

VSW UUV Search, Classify, Map, Identify,

illustrate that

not

all

(SCMI-N)

developments have focused on offensive

capability, the

below illustrates that an even greater number of UVS are being developed that

are associated with protection capabilities. These systems include harbor security

UASs, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) UASs and battlefield casualty extraction
robots designed to reduce risk to military medics by carrying out the traditional
stretcher-bearer function.

Table 2

Named Unmanned Systems Associated with Protection
Automated Combat SAR Decoys

MK 3 MOD RONS

Automated Combat SAR Recovery

MK 4 MOD

Combat Medic UAS

&

Robot,

20

EOD

Evacuation

Mobile Detection Assessment Response
System (MDARS)

EOD UAS

Multi-function Utility/Logistics and

for

Resupply

Equipment (MULE)
(ARV-A(L))

MQ-1

ARV Assault Light

Multi-function Utility/Logistics and Equip-

ment (MULE) Countermine (MULE-C)
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Table 2

Named Unmanned Systems Associated with

MQ-5B Hunter

Protection (continued)

Multi-function Utility/Logistics and Equip-

ment (MULE) Transport (MULE-T)

EOD Robot

RQ-7 Shadow

Next Advanced

STUAS/Tier

Next Generation Maritime Interdiction

II

Operations

Unmanned Combat Aircraft System-

UGV

Next Generation Small Armed

UGV

Demonstration (UCAS-D)
Vertical Take-off and

Landing Tactical

Nuclear Forensics Next Generation

UGV

Unmanned Air Vehicle (VTUAV Firescout)

WARRIOR A/I-GNAT
Advanced
All

PackBot Explorer

EOD Robot System (AEODRS)

Purpose Remote Transport System

PackBot

FIDO

PackBot Scout

(ARTS)
Anti-Personnel Mine Clearing System, Re-

Route Runner

mote Control (MV-4B)

Armed UGV Advanced

Automated Aircraft Decontamination

Small

Automated Bare Base/Shelter Construction

Talon Eng/3B

UGV
Automated

Talon

Facilities Services

Autonomous CASEVAC

& Enroute Care

EOD

Talon IV

System (ACES)

Autonomous Expeditionary Support

Plat-

UAS-UGV Teaming

form (AESP)
Battlefield Casualty Extraction

Robot

xBot (PackBot Fastac)

(BCER)

CBRN Unmanned Ground Vehicle

Autonomous Undersea Mine

Advanced

Neutralization

CBRN Unmanned Ground Vehicle

Bottom

UUV Localization System (BULS)

Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration

Combat Engineering

& Support Robotic

Harbor Security

System
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Named Unmanned

Table 2
Systems Associated with Protection (continued)

Contaminated Remains/Casualty Evacuation

&

Hull

UUV Localization System (HULS)

Recovery

Crowd Control System

Mine

(Non-lethal Gladia-

Neutralization System

tor Follow-on)

Next Generation Surface-launched Mine
Counter-Measures Unmanned Undersea

Defender

Vehicle

(SMCM UUV)

F6A-ANDROS

Next Generation USV with Unmanned Surface Influence Sweep System (USV w/US3)

HD-1

Remote Minehunting System (RMS)

MARCbot

SEAFOX USV

Maritime Interdiction Operations

UGV

Surface-launched Mine Counter-Measures

Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (SMCM

UUV)

USV with Unmanned Surface Influence

Mine Area Clearance Equipment (MACE)

Sweep System (USV w/US3)

MK MOD
1

Robot,

VSW UUV Search, Classify, Map, Identify,

EOD

Neutralize

MK 2 MOD

Robot,

(SCMI-N)

EOD

Other nations have not been

idle in the face

of the incredible pace of UVS devel-

opment and the unprecedented resource allocation that the United States has committed to the task. Both the United Kingdom and Israel have long been pioneers in

UVS development, albeit in slightly different areas. In response to the Irish Republican Army terrorist threat in the second half of the twentieth century, which regularly

manifested

itself

through either remotely detonated or time-delayed

improvised explosive devices, the United Kingdom pioneered the development of
a

remotely operated

EOD

capability. Similarly,

capability in the Bekaa Valley in

Lebanon

it

was

Israeli application

in the 1970s that

of UAS

showed the potential

for

the future development of such systems. 21

However, development
types of systems.

in these countries has not

The United Kingdom

is

been

restricted solely to these

actively developing

its

capability in

TUAVs, with the early prototype Phoenix TUAV having been replaced by both the
Hermes 450 TUAV and Desert Hawk (a handheld TUAV). 22 Further development
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of the Watchkeeper
ing being deployed.

longer-range stealth
ect, as

TUAV will see the capability for automated takeoff and land-

23

In addition, the United

Kingdom has invested in developing

UAS with offensive strike capability as part of the Taranis proj-

well as in developing other offensive strike capability in the

munitions

24

and

In addition to

cruise missiles such as Brimstone.
its

vibrant

UAS industry, Israel has also developed capabilities in

the land environment with point- defense systems, such as the

which

form of loitering

25

illustrates increasingly

enhanced and sophisticated

Guardium System,

levels

of automation. 26

Samsung Techwin SGR-A1
Sentry Guard Robot 27 designed to perform surveillance and sentry duties of
minefields along the Korean Demilitarized Zone. China is also widely assumed to
South Korea has developed a similar concept with

be developing

UVS

its

technology following the unveiling of the Anjian (Invisible

Sword) prototype pilotless combat aircraft by the China Aviation Industry Corporation

I

at the sixth International

Zhuhai, in October 2006.

Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition held in

28

As one would expect when technology develops

at

such a

rate, there are also

prototypes that suggest either bizarre or incredible future developments. These
include the suggestion of using implants in crickets to aid in the detection of the

presence of either explosive chemicals or carbon dioxide emissions in order to
detect explosives

Engineering's

and humans,

respectively. 29

Other prototypes include LAPCAD

FOOT vehicle, the Fly Out of Trouble jet-engine-powered supercar,

and the aquatic robot named Ghost Swimmer that mimics the propulsion drive of
a bluefin tuna. 30

While these developments may seem incredible

to

many, other

previously dismissed systems such as FIST (Fully Integrated Soldier Technology),

which

consists of a

combination of special

e-textiles,

exoskeletons and nanotech ar-

mor, are being developed beyond mere prototype sketches into credible programs by
defense research agencies such as the

US

Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency (DARPA). Indeed, such are the advances in nanotechnology that a prototype ultramicro UAV called the Maple Seed Flyer is being developed by Lockheed
Martin

as a

means of providing

persistent

ISR

stealth capability. 31

Legal Consequences of New Technology

While much of the new technology discussed in the preceding section

mated or semiautonomous nature, the area giving rise
including legal consequences,

grammed

is

is

Professor

Arkin's hypothesis

is

of an auto-

to the greatest controversy,

that of autonomous systems. These are

to act independently of

technology

is

human

Ron Arkin of

control.

A

UVS pro-

leading proponent of this

the Georgia Institute of Technology. 32

that not only can robots that are

code outperform humans in terms of their
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ethical

complex, fast-moving
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scenarios, but they will consistently behave in a
is

manner that

is

not merely the zealous utterance of an extreme fringe of the

development community. Arkin has been commissioned by
study on the feasibility of his hypothesis and whether
plication. In relation to his research for

over-arching goal of producing an
bots termed humane-oids
field

than

humans

— robots

that can

unmanned system

DARPA to conduct a

in fact, has

DARPA Arkin

'artificial

are capable of doing."

it,

more humane. This

states:

"This effort has an

conscience,' to yield a

perform more

any military ap-

new class of ro-

ethically in the battle-

33

Clearly the suggestion of robots performing tasks, including offensive operations,

without recourse to

human controllers raises not only legal, but considerable ethical

questions. Support for these systems, of course, presumes that

can be produced that
that

is

will

allow robots to act in accordance with

yet to be determined.

LOAC

However, the mere claim that robots can

dance with LOAC does not test the

UVS

programming code

difficult, if not

—

a matter

act in accor-

problematic, question of operat-

armed conflict, where the fog of war creates ambiguity and
unpredictability beyond the imagination of even the most gifted programmer.

ing

in

These concerns have not gone unnoticed by States in their analyses of the devel-

opment and employment of this type of technology. The US Roadmap
Because the

states:

DoD complies with the Law of Armed Conflict, there are many issues re-

quiring resolution associated with

employment of weapons by an unmanned system.

For a significant period into the future, the decision to pull the trigger or launch a missile

from an unmanned system will not be fully automated, but it will remain under the

full

control of a

human operator. Many aspects of the firing sequence will be fully auto-

mated but the decision

to fire will not likely be fully

gagement, and safety concerns have

One

all

automated

until legal, rules of en-

been thoroughly examined and resolved. 34

could add that the "significant period into the future" referred to will also

community becoming familiar with, and
unconcerned about, the operation of such UVS, assuming, of course, that the
technology will develop in such a way as to satisfy all the operating criteria of the
military. This may well mean that for the foreseeable future we will continue to see
human control being exercised over UVS, even where these systems may have the
capability of operating independently of human control. The United States Air
include an element of the international

Force

Unmanned

service plan to

Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047, 35 essentially a single-

implement the

strategic

guidance provided in the Roadmap, clearly

anticipates the existence of this continued

human

ing assumption: "Agile, redundant, interoperable

control

when

it

makes the follow-

and robust command and control

(C2) creates the capability of supervisory control ('man on the loop') of UAS." 36
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The questions to be resolved by policymakers in the military application of UVS
are set out in the Air Force's

Authorizing a machine to

UAS Flight Plan as follows:

make

lethal

and military leaders resolving legal and

upon

combat decisions

is

ethical questions.

These include the appropri-

contingent

political

what circumstances it should be emand what limitations should be placed
Ethical discussions and policy decisions must
upon the autonomy of such systems
take place in the near term in order to guide the development of future UAS capabilities, rather than allowing the development to take its own path apart from this critical
ateness of machines having this ability, under

ployed, where responsibility for mistakes

lies

guidance. 37

Quite apart from the ethical questions posed by the employment of autono-

mous systems, perhaps the most overt extension of the application of UVS technology, there remain real concerns as to the ability of such

weapons

to

comply with

LOAC. The autonomous system's ability to distinguish a military objective from a
protected person or object, and
holistic

manner,

38

is

its

ability to

weigh the proportionality

The question of accountability
out for an answer and will be ad-

yet to be adequately addressed.

for the actions of autonomous systems also cries

dressed in Part

test in a

III.

The quest to develop the newest, best and most capable military technology (the
Holy Grail of decisive effect) can often result in the relegation to the backseat of
considerations as to whether such technology

broader perspective, even

Existing Legal Control

is

not only needed but, indeed in a

desirable.

Mechanisms

As military technology development continues

to progress at

as States strive to achieve the next level of technological

an unrelenting pace

advantage over one an-

how does the law cope with these new developments and seek to regulate
them? AP I is clear in articulating those types of methods (including weapons) that
other,

are prohibited in

armed

conflict. 39 Indeed, the prohibitions

contained in Article

35(2) are relatively non-contentious, representing as they do the customary law on
the subject. 40 Similarly, the provisions of Article 36 41 have been accepted, even

by

who are not parties to AP I, as either reflective of best practice or as an obligation flowing from the customary law norm articulated by Article 35(2)
although
States

—

it is

by no means

Article 36

is

as clear that Article

36 has the status of customary law. Not that

particularly controversial in

its

terms, which require States to deter-

mine the lawfulness of new weapons and means and methods of warfare. Rather, it
is in the obligation to comply with its operation that disparate State practice seems
to have developed.

As Professor Jacobsson observes, "Unfortunately, very few
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an examination before employing new means and methods

States undertake such

of warfare, despite the
'study'

fact that the obligation relates to the initial stages,

and 'development' of a new weapon."

i.e.,

Proving Professor Jacobsson's assertion empirically

is

problematic, given that

even those States, such as the United States, that have sophisticated weapons
ing programs

do not publish the

the

42

results of their analyses.

test-

The very nature of certain

new UVS technology will mean that not all States will even have the capacity to conduct adequate testing were they to acquire the technology. Notwithstanding

this, it

can be assumed that those States that do possess the wherewithal to develop

new

technology should also have the concomitant ability to carry out the necessary
analysis required

36

by Article

Of course,

36.

given that

it is

arguable whether Article

declaratory of customary law, those States not party to

is

comply with

specific obligation to

its

the Article 36 requirement to assess

provisions.

LOAC

However,

AP

I

are

as the sole

under no

purpose of

compliance of new weapon systems

prior to introduction relates to customary law obligations as codified in Article 35,
it

would appear a fortiori that best practice suggests a State would be prudent to en-

sure that

it is

not in breach of its

new weapons
what

is

LOAC obligations by assessing the introduction of

systems. Evidence of this approach can be seen in the existence of

probably the most sophisticated assessment process for the introduction of

new weapons carried out by a State
to

AP

I,

It is

namely, the United

—and

this

by a country that

is

not a State party

States.

another matter, however, whether the output from these reviews should be

published. This

is

certainly not current State practice, notwithstanding the fact that

there have been calls

from a number of differing organizations for greater transpar-

ency in the review of new weapon systems. These have ranged from representatives
of States 43 to

rights institutions. 44

human

These arguments include questions of

confidence measures in relation to international arms sales and exports in the case
of States, or the characteristics of weapons systems and their effect on civilian pop-

human rights activists. What is consistent is the argument
that there is a public right to know that the State that oversaw the development of
the new technology giving rise to the production of a new weapon system correctly
ulations in the case of

assessed

its

impact for

This debate aside,

velopments, then
for-use test in
the

test,

to

it is

it is

clear that if the

law

is

to keep pace with technological de-

through the weapons review process that the

initial fitness-

LOAC terms can be established. While the requirement to carry out

whether

would appear

LOAC compliance.

as a

binding

legal obligation or as

to be entirely consistent with an

keep pace with

new

an exemplar of best practice,

approach

illustrating the law's ability

technology, the concerns raised by an increasing

interested parties within the international

number of

community over whether such reviews are
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actually conducted would

seem to give rise to justifiable concerns that this important

component of LOAC application is not being given the effect it should have.
The existence of new military technology, possessing capabilities far beyond
those anticipated when the LOAC paradigm was first formally constructed in the
nineteenth century, has resulted in calls that LOAC is no longer "fit for purpose" in
fulfilling the role of regulating armed conflict and, in particular, providing protection to those
tion,

it is

designed to protect. Increasing levels of weapon system automa-

coupled with claims that robots can behave "more humanely" than humans,

create an uncomfortable juxtaposition of concepts leading to further reflection as
to

LOAC's

part,

suitability in its current guise.

These

calls fail to

LOAC does provide a framework to address these issues. In many senses it is

the failure of States to apply the principles of AP
tent

address the fact that, in

manner

that results in a perception of

and 36

in a consis-

new technology being

allowed to

I's

Articles 35

proceed without any form of checks and balances.
It is

clear that in theory, if not in practice,

to ensure
is,

adequate control mechanisms do

exist

LOAC compliance during the development and procurement phases.

It

however, appropriate to consider whether the changing character of weapons

systems has had the effect of altering the applicable
their

employment. Part

II will

LOAC

standards in terms of

consider this question and whether

calls for

the de-

velopment of LOAC to respond are warranted.
Part II. Impacts on

LOAC Standards Arising from New Technology

The enhanced capabilities brought about through the development and employment of the new technologies referred to in the preceding part bring with them not
only the ability to achieve decisive effect on the battlefield but an unprecedented
ability to give effect to the application of LOAC. The changing character of weapons means that militaries possessing the relevant capability can not only target with
unprecedented precision but, in addition, through the use of sophisticated persistent surveillance, assess with

much greater accuracy the anticipated effects of inci-

damage to civilian persons or property and take appropriate remedial
measures. The cumulative effect of this has been to enable, in certain circumstances, the achievement of much enhanced levels of protection for civilians by
dental loss or

those nations employing such technology.
It is

important to note the qualification "certain circumstances" in the preced-

ing paragraph. Notwithstanding the aspiration to be able to conduct targeting in an

environment that is as controlled as possible, both the nature of armed conflict and
in particular the

mean

confused and often ambiguous environment of land operations

that the conditions necessary to fully exploit the capabilities that
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technology offers commanders and their staff are frequently not met. This

is

ularly challenging scenario in conflicts of a non-international character,

where the

commonplace occurrence.
has the changing character of weapons had on the standards

blurring of the lines between civilian and military

What

effect, then,

to be applied

I

a

Have technological advances

UVS

resulted in the effect of Article 57 of

changing? 45

Some
take

is

by States who possess the types of advanced technology of which

are an example?

AP

a partic-

all

academics, 46 and indeed State practice, 47 suggest that the requirement to

minimize incidental

feasible precautions in attack to

and damage to

civilian objects

loss

of life to civilians

should be seen in the context of a subjective analysis

based on capabilities available to the relevant commander. This will

where a commander's technological

capabilities exceed those of his

mean

that

opponent, a

higher standard in relation to precautions in attack will apply. There are, however,
those

who would argue that an entirely new legal standard is now possible and that

LOAC should be amended so as to speak to the question of common but differentiated responsibilities. 48

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
Professor Gabriella

Blum

argues that by comparing

LOAC

to international trade

law or environmental law, parallels can be drawn between those regimes where
fering standards are applied to countries that have greater

do

not.

Or

dif-

means than to those who

otherwise put:

While the equal application of the law has formally endured in [international humani-

most spheres of international law, regulation has taken a different
path in some areas of international law most notably, international environment law
("IEL") and international trade law ("ITL")
by linking obligations with capabilities.
This linkage has been accomplished in several ways: by defining obligations with reference to resources (such as ordering compliance by developed parties "to the fullest extent possible"), exempting weaker parties from compliance with certain obligations
altogether, and even ordering more powerful parties to extend material assistance to
weaker ones. Taken together, these provisions have been termed Common but Differ49
entiated Responsibilities ("CDRs")
tarian law], as in

—

.

Taken

in the context

malist sense,

.

.

—

,

of new technology, the concept of CDRs, applied in a mini-

would support the extant requirement under

possesses the technical capability to be obliged to consider
all

feasible precautions in attack. In extremis, the

gate States to share technology,

LOAC for a State who
its

use as part of taking

CDR approach might well obli-

where to do so would improve the

protection afforded to the civilian population.

286

Of course,

the

overall level of

phenomena, often

Darren M. Stewart

characterized

by new technology, of enhanced precision and distinction are moti-

vated more by military considerations than necessarily the ability to minimize incidental loss, which

is

share technology as

welcomed spin-off. In such circumstances the obligation to
part of some form of CDR may well prove problematic, even
a

counterproductive to the development of the types of new technology that enable

LOAC

Nor is there a positive obligation under LOAC for
States to develop and employ new technology possessing such characteristics. 50
Therefore, CDRs that go beyond the current LOAC construct would require
either a basis in treaty or some form of development in the customary law. Neither
greater

compliance.

would seem to be likely in the short to medium term, nor does there appear to be
any need for this. The current LOAC principle of proportionality coupled with the
requirement to take all feasible precautions in attack would appear to be perfectly
adequate not only in recognizing the differing means available to parties to a conflict,

but in also requiring that higher standards be observed by those parties

who

The term "all feasible precautions" provides sufficient flexibility to address the
relative disparities in capabilities between belligerents. As such, it can adequately
accommodate the application of both extant and new technology.
can.

To create a structure that seeks to
necessary, but

would be

codify a set of CDRs in

quite impossible to achieve

LOAC not only is un-

—impossible

in the context of

CDRs under treaty law (to an extent that provides any form of meaningful advance on the extant LOAC) and impossible in that
being able to adequately define such

State practice sufficient to point to such a

development in customary law would be as

elusive as the proverbial pot of gold at the

end of a rainbow. Which State with the rel-

evant capability
Professor

is

likely to

conduct

itself in

a

manner

so as to create such practice?

Mike Schmitt underscores this fact in his

reference to the existence of

a state of normative relativism:

[A]s the technological gap widens, the precautions in attack requirements operate

the belligerents in an increasingly disparate manner. After
tive,

on

the standards are subjec-

not objective; a belligerent is only required to do what is feasible, and feasibility de-

pends on the available technology. The
belligerent
It is,

all,

is

result

is

normative relativism

—

held to higher standards vis-a-vis precautions in attack than

the high tech
its

of course, normative relativism by choice because States are under no

tion to acquire assets that will permit
jectives

and the

civilian population.

them

to better distinguish

opponent.

legal obliga-

between military ob-

51

Evolution of Customary Law?
Notwithstanding Schmitt's clear statement of where the current law places
ing obligations

on

belligerents

recent International

(making the

CDR approach somewhat moot),

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
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the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International

Law (DPH

Study)

52

might

hind CDRs. At chapter IX of the
permissible levels of force that
objective.

It

ICRC view of the customary law

suggests that the

relation to the use of force

some

in

Humanitarian

limited

manner support

position in

the premise be-

DPH Study the ICRC sets out its position on the

may be used by parties to a conflict to achieve a military

argues that technology can be determinative in defining the military

necessity context within

which particular

levels

of force are used. Indeed the

Study anticipates technology playing a limiting role where

it

DPH

provides the capability

to achieve effect with the use of lower levels of violence.

DPH

The
tion

Study

is

not without

its critics,

takes in articulating the existing law in chapter IX.

it

on what

cuses

is

LOAC,

Much of the criticism fo-

perceived as a conflation of a law enforcement paradigm

human

governing the use of force under

rights

law with the approach under

ignoring the accepted principle of lex specialist While

this article to

be as

particularly with respect to the posi-

engage in a detailed debate of the

some commentators of

critical as

chapter IX and finds
ceivable that the

it is

not the place of

DPH Study (the author would not

the position articulated by the

ICRC

in

much in the remainder of the study to commend it), it is con-

DPH

Study might be used to develop arguments

in

support of a

CDR approach. Whether this is the intent of the DPH Study or not, there is a need
to consider the consequences of such

arguments on LOAC, particularly with

ence to proportionality and precautions in attack. This
purely on questions of distinction and therefore
part of a discrete study

Any

on

not a debate that impacts

of questionable value in forming

direct participation in hostilities.

new technology on LOAC

consideration of the impact of

the risk of being seduced by the

of what

is

is

refer-

same scenario

standards runs

that creates exaggerated perceptions

new technology can deliver in terms of effect on the battlefield. Such a per-

ception drives the argument that the law has failed to keep pace with change,
therefore redundant

and requires change. However, such an approach

knowledge the operation of LOAC
logical

as a flexible

system in which the

fails

latest

to ac-

techno-

advances can be adequately accommodated without the need for root-and-

branch change to the law. Professor Christopher Greenwood, writing

in 1998,

identified this quality as the key strength of LOAC:

The

is

flexibility

of the general principles thus makes them of broader application than

the specific provisions which are

all

too easily overtaken by

new

technology. If the

speed of change in military technology continues into the next century (as seems

most

inevitable), that capacity to adapt

is

going to be ever more important. 54
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Greenwood's assertion

is,

of course, predicated upon the assumption that the

pace of technological development will
lar

make specific attempts to regulate particu-

developments either susceptible to redundancy, or

tempt to ban individual weapons. 55
assess the

When

reflective

AP

one couples the

of a piecemeal
I

at-

requirement to

implementation of new technology for the purposes of LOAC compli-

ance in conjunction with the extant customary law obligations to assess proportionality

and take

all

Greenwood when he

feasible precautions in attack,

it is

hard not to agree with

states:

both more probable and more desirable that the law will
develop in this evolutionary way than by any radical change. With the law of weaponry,
In this writer's opinion,

it is

most of the law of armed conflict, the most important humanitarian gain
would come not from the adoption of new law but the effective implementation of the
as with

law that we have. That should be the priority for the next century. 56

If

one accepts that the extant

arising

LOAC paradigm is adequate in addressing issues

from both the development and employment of new technology, then

right to consider

whether the

final part

of the

LOAC

system

it is

—accountability—

is

similarly well placed to cope. Part III will consider the changing character of weap-

ons and whether the

LOAC accountability paradigm can adequately address the is-

sues that arise from

new technology.
Part III. Implications for Accountability

When

considering

new technology and

its

military application, any analysis will

invariably turn to the question of accountability.

While mechanization of the bat-

tlefield is neither

new, nor something the international law dealing with criminal

responsibility

unaccustomed to addressing, the potential

is

weapon systems to

effectively

remove the human,

either

autonomous
from the loop or even on
for

the loop, poses challenges.

Remotely Controlled and Automated Systems

The question of accountability in
relatively straightforward.

An

the case of tele- or remotely operated vehicles

is

operator controls the device and as a consequence

the actions of that device can be attributed to that operator, or indeed to his/her

commander in the context of directing action that constitutes a breach of LOAC or
where the commander fails to act to either prevent or punish LOAC breaches.
Similarly, even

context that

is

automated systems

will generally

be employed within either a

controlled by humans, directing the vehicle to a particular task, or
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one
its

in

which humans can intervene

mission or the permitted

tion

is

in the event that the device

act outside

LOAC paradigm. The premise underpinning automa-

that the operation of the relevant device

dicted based

were to

is

capable of being accurately pre-

on the programming and commands inputted.

Barring deviant behavior, on behalf of either the computer programmer or operator,
gal

can be assumed that the vehicle will generally act within the permitted

it

framework.

Of

le-

course malfunction can never be excluded, nor can the

consequences of ambiguity on the battlefield. However, there

is

generally sufficient

nexus of control or operation in the cases of both remotely operated and auto-

mated vehicles such that the international criminal law can attribute accountability
for culpable behavior in cases of

LOAC violations.

Autonomous Systems
This equation becomes
tems.

much more

problematic in the case of autonomous sys-

The very nature of autonomous systems implies

that they have an artificial

intelligence capable of analyzing information, determining a course of action

based on
tion of a

this analysis

and then executing

that response,

all

without the interven-

human operator. The operation of the autonomous device creates consid-

erable challenges for the

would-be

LOAC

violation prosecutor in terms of

establishing the relevant nexus of culpable behavior

by a human such as to give rise

The tele-operator of remotely controlled vehicles or even the
command programmer for automated equipment can both be seen as having direct roles in determining the actions of the devices they control. They are capable of
to criminal liability.

direct responsibility, even if that control

is

exercised at distance

—sometimes

a

considerable one. 57

This cannot be said of those involved with autonomous systems. Neither the

programming nor the command data inputted to these vehicles prior to their deployment on a particular operation will necessarily result in a specific outcome in
response to any given

set

of circumstances; this

as for

the essence of autonomy. Absent

command programmers, which would

the aberrant behavior of either the data or

be considered in the same context

is

remotely or automated vehicles,

be almost impossible to attribute the autonomous system's behavior
particular

human. That

is

breaches. Indeed, even the

it

would

directly to a

not to say autonomous vehicles are incapable of LOAC

most ardent supporters of autonomous systems do not

argue that breaches can be completely removed, just that autonomous systems can

perform better (including more

ethically)

than humans. 58

The notion of accountability is of course a uniquely human one. Under any system of law the commission of a crime (such as a breach of LOAC) should give rise
to an investigation and where sufficient evidence exists, the prosecution of the
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alleged perpetrator.

prosecuted because

equipment there

What happens then when the perpetrator is incapable of being
it is

is little

a machine? Other than

point in carrying out a

vant piece of equipment guilty of a

reprogramming or scrapping

futile exercise

of finding the rele-

LOAC breach. Such a scenario offends not only

more visceral human desire to find an individual accountable. Given this, it would appear highly unlikely that a breach of
LOAC by an autonomous system is something that would go without some degree
the notion of the rule of law, but also the

of human accountability. Indeed there

is

a strong argument that States should not

be able to employ such systems and rely upon the relative impunity with which
their operations
ity fails to

might be conducted in the event that the question of accountabil-

be resolved.

and Commanders in the Dock
There are, of course, two alternative means of accountability: State responsibility
under human rights mechanisms and command responsibility.
To take these in order: The extent to which States will be held responsible for
States

what might constitute a human
will

rights violation that

depend on not only the character of the

spective State obligations

is

equally one under

conflict concerned,

under international human

59

LOAC

but also the

rights law. This will

produce

significantly disparate effects in terms of sanctions, e.g., in the case of States

are parties to the

European Convention on

who have

re-

who

Human Rights as compared to that of

on Civil and
Political Rights alone. This is largely due to the enforcement mechanisms in place
in relation to each of these treaty structures. While this difference may well have an
impact on the formal aspects of enforcement (e.g., court rulings and pecuniary
awards against States in the case of the former), one cannot avoid the implications
for States that flow from judgments of courts like the European Court of Human
Rights and Inter- American Court of Human Rights, or bodies such as the United
Nations Human Rights Council. Such pronouncements, influencing as they do in
those States

obligations under the International Covenant

the age of mass communication the court of public opinion,

mining

effect

on the preparedness of States

to

may well have a deter-

employ autonomous systems ahead

of the creation of any corresponding permissive environment, whether this be political

or social.

Perhaps one of the unintended consequences of the development of autono-

mous weapons

systems

is

the potential that they

may have

to focus greater atten-

on civilian leadership and military commanders at the operational or strategic
level for the actions of autonomous systems. It is useful here to remind oneself that
the increased levels of sophistication and complexity that new technology introtion

duces to the battlefield are part of a systemic approach to leveraging technology to

291

New Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict
achieve decisive effect. As such, any future

must be seen

in this context. It

would be

employment of autonomous systems

naive, therefore, to think of circumstances

where a commander would allow the deployment of autonomous weapon systems
in a

manner where their operation was not

in

accordance with his or her particular

campaign design and where the purpose behind the use of these systems would not
be to achieve consistent, predictable

effect.

Given the unpalatable outcome of alleged breaches of LOAC going unpunished,
it is

far

more likely that

in the future the

concept of command responsibility under

international criminal law will be seen as an appropriate recourse for attributing

LOAC

accountability for

breaches by autonomous systems. The arguably lower

threshold test in terms of culpability for

Rome

60

command responsibility contained within

commander "should have known" of
the possibility of the alleged breach of LOAC, places in sharp focus a commander's
the

Statute,

requiring merely that a

potential liability. This

of subordinates in the

is

particularly the case in circumstances

command

chain results in fewer individuals

otherwise be accorded the substantial responsibility for
It

remains to be seen whether

where the removal

who might

LOAC breaches.

this increased risk is a "real"

one or whether

it is

no different than that which exists in cases where such systems are not employed.
is,

however, a consequence that has received

visers in

armed forces.

It is

little, if

from

certainly deserving of greater consideration.

tion should focus not only

on the

legal ad-

Such atten-

technical aspects of attributing responsibility

based on the requisite elements of offenses being
lic

any, attention

It

satisfied,

but on the broader pub-

policy issues associated with the possibility of military operations being

conducted

in a "blameless

environment."

Conclusion
In one sense, the changing characters of weapons
specific context of

unmanned

vehicles

the natural evolution of technology in

and armed

conflict, seen in the

and systems, represent nothing more than

its

application to the battlefield. However, in

other respects the introduction of new technology creates challenges for the application of LOAC,

complex and

if only

in the sense that

what is unusual or different is often seen as

difficult.

This article posed the question of whether the changing character of weapon
systems, including
ity

of

LOAC

unmanned systems and vehicles,

to adequately

is

such as to question the

abil-

cope with the introduction of new technology to the

battlefield.

Fundamental to this question
text within

which

it

is

to be

is

the consideration of new technology in the con-

employed.

New
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new

relationship with the evolution of

tactics

brings to the battlefield have aided in shaping
"art of war." It

is

capabilities

it

new approaches to the practice of the

important to remind oneself in this respect that the tail should not

be wagging the dog. Enhanced capability and
are in the scope

and stratagems. The

and reach of their

effects,

new hardware,

bewildering as they

should be seen as means to an end, not

ends in themselves.
Just as military doctrine has
lentless

and

demonstrated

development and introduction of new technology,

will

continue to provide

Calls to create

—

a

framework

in coping with the re-

its flexibility

LOAC has provided

for the regulation of

armed

conflict.

new standards or to interpret the law in ways that seek to regulate the

unknown, or at least the not yet known, do not stand up against an assessment of
what LOAC provides in terms of a system of law that regulates not just the introduction of new technology, but also

its

application.

Useful processes, such as those forming part of the
view,

seem purpose designed not only to

military

I

Article 36

weapons

re-

act as initial control valves to ensure that

methods and means can advance

also to act as red flags to possible

AP

in a coherent

and

manner but
employment of

effective

LOAC issues associated with the

new technology. It is unfortunate that too few States engage actively in the weapons
review process, an area where greater effort to comply with the law should occur.
Generally the existing

LOAC rules would seem

the deployment of new technology

on the

sufficiently flexible to adapt to

battlefield. In

many respects new tech-

nology has greatly aided the application of LOAC and contributed to an increase in
the protection of civilians. In this sense, the story

is

a

good news one. The extant

LOAC paradigm has responded in a flexible manner, benefiting from the positive
synergies afforded

by technological advances. The

virtue of such a system,

however, comes with compliance rather than the creation of
responsibilities,

standards or

new technolArmed conflict

such as CDRs, or use of the capabilities afforded by

ogy to argue that a

human

rights

paradigm

is

continues to be an unpredictable, often base
prevails,

new

more
affair,

appropriate.

where

significant ambiguity

notwithstanding the employment of considerable technological capabil-

The benefits afforded by new technology in such circumstances are significant
if they can ameliorate even some of the suffering caused by armed conflict, but they
are by no means a panacea.
ity.

New technology creates its own challenges in the context of accountability, parautonomous systems. The perverse effect for States and the
senior civilian and military command echelon who promote the development and
implementation of new technology as a means of "casualty free" warfare is that
they may well find themselves with nobody to stand between the actions of such
autonomous systems and themselves when things go wrong. It is hoped that the
ticularly with respect to
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associated discomfiture

from

this realization

focus minds as to the need for such

new

may well

act in a positive capacity to

technology, and

manner

in

which

it is

employed.
Consider the mutually assured destruction scenario, which hung over the world
during the Cold

War and led to the notion that nuclear weapons should be treated
was largely due to the nature of such weapons, dehu-

as a "special case." This

manizing war and giving rise to massive destruction on a wide-scale basis. Autono-

mous weapons

systems as an example of the changing character of weapons

not involve such destruction; indeed one of the consequences of their use
avoids such a scenario. However, an increasing reliance

has the potential to dehumanize
risk and, in

doing

so, possibly

armed conflict,

is

upon technology

may

that

it

clearly

creating a perception of low or

no

convincing States of the viability of the recourse to

the use of force to resolve disputes.

In the face of this,

LOAC continues to offer a balanced, civilizing effect as part of

a system of law providing a

tion to the

most vulnerable. In

compliance)

ogy

broad regulatory framework intended to afford protec-

is its

this context, flexibility (of

greatest strength.

will constitute a

course coupled with

Whether the current developments in technol-

"watershed" or defining

moment

in the evolution of warfare

remains to be seen.

What is clear is that LOAC is capable of keeping pace and con-

tinuing to meet

mission of protection and humanity.

its
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in attack,

it
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is little
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an aspiration similar to that articulated by Jacobsson, supra note 42.
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5, art.
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1

In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the

ian population, civilians
2.

With
(a)

and

civil-

civilian objects.

respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:

those
(i)

who

plan or decide

do everything

upon an

attack shall:

feasible to verify that the objectives to

be attacked are nei-

and are not subject to special protection but
are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that
it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them;
ther civilians nor civilian objects

(ii)

take

all

feasible precautions in the choice of means

and methods of attack

with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian

life,

injury to civilians

and damage

to civilian objects;

from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and

(iii)

refrain

incidental loss of civilian

direct military advantage anticipated;
(b)
tive

an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objecnot a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be

is

expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
ian objects, or a combination thereof,

life,

injury to civilians,

which would be excessive

damage to

civil-

in relation to the

concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(c)

effective

advance warning shall be given of attacks which

may affect the civilian

population, unless circumstances do not permit.
3.

When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar

military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack

expected to cause the least danger to civilian
4.

lives

and

to civilian objects.

In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the

shall, in

conformity with

its

rights

air,

each Party to the conflict

and duties under the rules of international law appli-

armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions
and damage to civilian objects.
cable in

5.
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to avoid losses of civilian lives

No provision of this article may be construed as authorizing any attacks against the

civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.
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Human rights law will continue to apply in times of armed conflict, subject to the application of the lex specialis rule in relation to LOAC or where States have made derogations under
59.

applicable treat:

cle

60.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July

21

Res r onsibility of commanders

17,

1998,2187 U.X.T.S. 90. Arti-

and other superiors provides
i

as follows:

In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes

within the jurisdiction of the Court
(a)

A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander

shall

be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and con-

may be,
wh

trol as the case

h forces,

as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over

i

That military commander or person either knew
stances at the time, should have known that the fore
(i)

commit such

crimes;

or,

owing to the circumjommitting or about to

and

That military commander or person

and reasonable
measures within his or her power to present or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
(ii)

(b)
i

With
i

respect to superior

failed to take all necessary

and subordinate

relationships not described in paragraph

superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the

Court committed by subordinates under his or her

effective authority*

and control,

as a

result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i)

The superior

either

knew, or consciously disregarded information which
were comniitting or about to commit such

clearly indicated, that the subordinates

crimes;

The crimes concerned

activities that

were within the

effective responsibility

and control of the superior, and

The superior

failed to take all necessary

and reasonable measures within

his or

her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the

competent authorities

for investigation

and prosecution.
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PART VII
THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF TACTICS:
LAWFARE IN ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS

XI
The Law of Armed Conflict in Asymmetric

Urban Armed Conflict

David E. Graham*
Introduction

At

the conference from which this "Blue

Book"

is

derived,

I

served as the

moderator of a panel entitled "The Changing Character of Tactics: Lawfare

in

Asymmetrical Conflicts." This

changes have occurred in the
conflicts of an

In offering

reflects

tactics

now

an apparent assumption: that tangible
being used by States in waging armed

asymmetric nature.

some thoughts of

my own

on

this subject,

I

turn to the pivotal

questions posed to the panel. "Is this a valid assumption? And,

changes in
of the

Law

tactics

if so,

have such

occurred within the context of the historically accepted norms

of Armed Conflict (LOAC), or do these tactical modifications repre-

sent a fundamental shift in the

manner

in

which the customary and codified

LOAC is now being both interpreted and applied to these conflicts by the international

community?"

US Army (Ret.); Executive Director, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and
US Army. The author has prepared this article in his personal capacity and does not purrepresent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army or The

* Colonel,

School,

port to

Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School.

The Law of Armed Conflict

in

Asymmetric Urban Armed Conflict

The Goldstone Report: Has There Occurred a Fundamental Interpretive
Change in the Applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict to Asymmetric Urban

Armed Conflict Scenarios?
There currently
tactics

now

exists a

widespread assumption that

a

change has occurred

being used by States to wage asymmetric conflicts.

in the

If this is true,

these tactics, nevertheless, continue to reflect a traditional application of the

LOAC
by

to such conflicts? Or, instead, are these tactical changes being driven, in fact,

substantial shift in the

manner

to interpret the application of

in

do
a

which the international community has chosen

fundamental

LOAC principles to such scenarios?

—

The focus will be on a very specific type of asymmetric conflict one involving a
State on the one hand and a non-State entity on the other
and, even more specifically, asymmetric armed conflict between a State and a non-State entity in essen-

—

tially, if

not exclusively, an urban environment.

why do

narrowly, and

Why

is

the question focused so

consider this subject to be one that has recently taken on

I

increasing importance?
Certainly,

it is

true that, for almost a decade,

US and coalition

forces have

been

involved in ongoing and seemingly unending conflicts increasingly waged in
densely populated urban areas. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have seen extensive
fighting occur in

urban

settings as the

US and

coalition partners have con-

its

fronted both State and various non-State entities in the form of the Taliban and

ements of

Qaeda

al

conflict," the

el-

in these theaters of operation. In this age of "persistent

chances are great that the United States will continue to see

its

forces

consistently having to deal with such fighting environments. In brief, asymmetric

State/non-State urban conflicts
ated with such conflicts

—and, importantly,

—have been

all

of the

LOAC issues associ-

a part of the international landscape for

an

extended period of time.

why is it that I now believe it to be an imperative that the
United States and other States that may well find themselves involved in these types
Given this

reality, then,

of conflicts fully examine the matter of whether a fundamental
in the
will

manner

in

shift

has occurred

which some of the most well established principles of the

LOAC

be applied to an armed force's future use of force against a non-State entity in

an urban setting? Again,

The answer
stone Report.

1

why now?

to this question resides in the

Many are

familiar with this report.

little

consideration has been given to

hand

—

its

form of something

potentially adverse impact

its

It

called the

Gold-

would appear, however,

that

contents in the context of the matter at

on the future applicability of the LOAC to the

types of conflict in issue.
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The Goldstone Report, issued in September 2009, is the product of the United
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, established, interestingly
enough, by the President of the UN Human Rights Council in April 2009. Its mandate was "to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the
context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period
[between] December 27, 2008 and January 18, 2009, whether before, during or
after." 2 The military operations being referenced were, of course, those of the Israeli
Defence Force's (IDF's) Operation Cast Lead, taken primarily in response to mortar and rocket attacks launched against Israel by the Palestinian organization
Hamas from within Gaza (some 12,000 attacks in the previous eight years). 3
The four-member Goldstone mission was headed by Justice Richard Goldstone,
a former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former president of
the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The
other three appointed members were a professor of international law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, an advocate of the Supreme Court
of Pakistan, and a former officer in Ireland's Defence Forces. 4
From the very outset of its work, the mission stated that it would interpret its
mandate as requiring that it place the civilian population of the region at the center
of its concerns regarding violations of international law, 5 an interpretive decision
that

was to prove to be of no small consequence, particularly from the standpoint

of the appropriate applicability of LOAC. Also key to the mission's approach was
its

determination that, in keeping with

action that might be

its

mandate,

it

was required to consider any

deemed a violation of either international human rights law or

international humanitarian law6 (a popularized, but duplicative

and misleading

term said to incorporate both the customary and codified LOAC).
This latter determination

is

a matter of particular concern, as

it

serves to assert

would submit, erroneous, contention that human rights law applies coequally with the LOAC during periods of armed conflict.
That is, the assertion is that the LOAC is not lex specialis that it is not that body of
law that exclusively regulates the methods and means of conducting conflict. Indeed, a number of the mission's allegations of offenses said to have been committhe historically controversial, and,

I

—

ted by the

not the

IDF are based exclusively on presumed violations of human rights law

LOAC.

If left
tial shift

unchallenged, this particular contention alone would represent a substanin the potential legal obligations

battlefield

and responsibilities of combatants on any

and in any form of conflict, and could portend,

hancement of the potential criminal

liability
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of such individuals. They could

now

The Law of Armed Conflict

in

"human

be charged with largely undefined
tions of the well-established

Asymmetric Urban Armed Conflict

rights" violations, rather than viola-

customary or codified LOAC.

Setting aside this particular issue, this attempt to conflate the

me

LOAC with human

more detail, to an examination of the manner in which
the mission chose to apply some of the most basic provisions of the LOAC, itself.
And, with an apology to those who are fully conversant with this body of law, in
rights law, let

turn, in

order to assess the mission's "unique" application of this law to the conflict in
Gaza,

it is

useful to review

what have been long regarded

as universally recognized

LOAC principles/precepts binding on every State in the international community.
These
1.

are:

"Military necessity (advantage)." This principle authorizes those use-offorce measures, not otherwise forbidden

by the LOAC, required

complish a mission. The important caveat, here, of course,
principle

must be applied

LOAC principles,
the codified

2.

in conjunction with the other

as well as with

more

is

to ac-

that this

customary

specific constraints contained in

LOAC.

"Distinction/discrimination." This principle requires that combatants

be distinguished from non-combatants and that military objectives be
distinguished from protected property and protected places
civilian

gious

3.

—

that

property and protected places such as cultural, medical and

is,

reli-

sites.

"Proportionality." This principle serves as a balancing fulcrum, weighing
the competing principles of "military necessity"

making
loss

a targeting decision.

and "distinction" when

The proportionality test

—"the

anticipated

of life and damage to property incidental to an attack must not be

excessive in relation to the 'concrete'

pected' to be gained"

7

—introduces

and

'direct' military

the idea of a "reasonable

mander" making proportionality determinations, and

man"

advantage

is

'ex-

com-

akin to the

would a "reasonable commander," i.e., a
commander of ordinary sense and understanding, given the facts known
to him at the time, have been justified in taking the action in issue?
"reasonable

4.

test.

That

is,

"Unnecessary suffering." The
principles requires an

armed

last

of the four basic customary

force to

minimize "unnecessary

LOAC

suffering."

In essence, this applies to the legality of the types of weapon systems

and

ammunition used, as well as to the legality of the methods used to employ
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such weapons and ammunition. Certain weapons/munitions are per
unlawful

—

se

projectiles filled with glass, lasers specifically designed to

permanently blind unenhanced vision and hollow-point ammunition.
For purposes of

this discussion,

it is

also

important to

recall that, as

weapon systems can be used in an unlawful manner.
use of a weapon must comport with the lawful "methods" of

noted, even lawful

That

is,

the

conducting

One

conflict. 8

point must be considered before moving to an examination of the

last

manner in which these most fundamental principles of the LOAC were applied by
the Goldstone mission to Operation Cast Lead. To what types of armed conflict
does the LOAC apply? The answer to this question is found in Common Articles 2
and

Geneva Conventions. 9
defines international armed

3 of the 1949

Article 2

any other armed

conflict

conflicts as "all cases of declared

which may arise between two or more of the High Con-

tracting Parties [to this Convention], even

one of them"

—

that

is,

Article 3 applies the
as conflicts "not of

the

—

this as

tions

not recognized by

an international character occurring in the territory of one of
[to this

Convention] ." That is, they are "internal con-

State,

—occurring within the

territorial

ones involving a non-State entity (insurgents) attempting to

government of a

background,

let's

The purpose,

—and concomitant

State

examine

which the Goldstone mission applied the
in Gaza.

is

LOAC to conflicts not of an international character, defined

displace the constituted

IDF

the state of war

revolutions, rebellions, insurrections

boundaries of a

With

if

State-on-State conflict.

High Contracting Parties

flicts"

war or

by force.

just several

LOAC to actions taken primarily by the

here, will be to assess

allegations of

examples of the manner in

LOAC

whether the mission's determinaviolations

—

do, in fact, evidence

both a departure from the way in which the most basic principles of this law have
historically

been interpreted and a fundamental

shift in the

manner in which such

principles will be applied in the future, particularly in the context of asymmetric

State/non- State urban conflict. Also of importance

is

the consideration of whether

these allegations represent, either implicitly or explicitly, a
tially

enhanced criminal

whether in turn

this

move toward poten-

liability for State participants in

has effected

—or

is

—

effecting

wage these types of conflicts.
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a change in the tactics used to
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against

Specifically the
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Hamas "Government"

Buildings and Gazan Authorities,

Gazan Police

The government of Israel (GOI) has contended

Hamas

integral part of the

ments of Hamas engaged
that the
trast,

Gazan

"terrorist infrastructure" in that they

in directing the

were an

housed those

ongoing armed attacks against

arm of the Hamas

police were merely an

Israel

ele-

and

military forces. 10 In con-

the Goldstone mission determined that the buildings in issue were not used

manner

that

made an

accordingly,

IDF

attacks

in a

that the buildings targeted

"effective" contribution to military action

that attacks be limited strictly to military objectives.

such attacks had resulted in a "grave breach"
ian property not justified

With

that,

on these buildings constituted a deliberate attack on
violation of the customary rule of the LOAC that requires

civilian objects in

wantonly

and

— of the LOAC.

respect to the

It

further concluded that

—the extensive destruction of

civil-

by military necessity carried out both unlawfully and
11

IDF

attacks

on Gazan

police personnel, the Goldstone

may have been certain elements of the
Gazan police who were also members of Hamas armed groups and accordingly pomission determined that, while there

tential

combatants,

and thus had not lost their civilian immunity from

part in hostilities"

The mission
strike

when attacked these police personnel were not taking a "direct

further concluded that the

IDF

attacks

on the police

direct attack.

facilities failed to

an acceptable balance between the direct military advantage expected to be

gained, that

is,

the killing of those policemen

who may, in fact, have been members

of Hamas military groups; and the loss of civilian life, that

who may

not have been

members of such

who may simply have been

the public

is,

those other policemen

members of

military groups, as well as

in the vicinity of such attacks. 12

Even a cursory assessment of the Goldstone mission's

stated reasoning regard-

ing this matter reveals what appears to be both a misinterpretation and misapplication of the

LOAC principles of military necessity, distinction and proportionality.

The same can

also

be said of the manner in which the mission chose to apply the

concept of "direct participation in
their status alone,

hostilities" to

Hamas

police personnel

who, by

could arguably have been targeted as combatants. Thus, to deem

IDF operational decisions in question as a "deliberate attack on civilian objects" and a "grave breach" of the LOAC reflects a deliberate intent on the part of
the

the mission to proffer an interpretation of these
nificantly

ings

from

would

LOAC concepts

that departs sig-

their historical application. Left unchallenged, the mission's find-

potentially constitute a fundamental shift in the

way

in

which these

most basic of LOAC principles will be applied in the future to all forms of conflict.
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The Obligation of the IDF to Take Feasible Precautions to Protect Both the
Civilian Population and Civilian Objects in Gaza
In the context of this issue, the mission focused specifically on the obligation of
the IDF to provide "effective" prior warnings of its attacks undertaken in Gaza.
While the mission acknowledged that significant efforts had been made by the IDF
to issue such warnings

—radio

broadcasts, the dropping of over 2,500,000 leaflets

and the making of over 165,000 phone
13

targeted

—

calls to specific

buildings that were to be

concluded that this was not enough. In the view of the mission, such

it

warnings were simply not effective because some of both the prerecorded phone
messages and

leaflets

lacked the required specificity 14 (absent a discussion of what

And, in examining the IDF practice of firing
warning shots from light weapons that hit the rooftops of designated targets in
which civilians previously had been warned of an impending attack as a final
such specificity might

—

warning

entail).

—

it

concluded that

not only did not serve as an "effective"

this, too,

warning, but, instead, constituted an attack against civilians
in the targeted buildings.

Once

who

chose to remain

15

again, the mission's interpretation of the actions that

must be taken

provide an "effective" warning to civilians of an impending attack
of the codified

by the IDF

specific as to the

time and location of an attack. 16 The mea-

in issuing warnings to the civilian population within

went far beyond anything legally required. The mission's reasoning on
reflects

in the face

flies

LOAC. Such warnings can be only general in nature. There is no re-

quirement that they be
sures taken

to

an ignorance

—or

intentional misstatement

—of the

this

Gaza

matter

applicable law.

IDF Resulting in Loss of Life and Injury to Civilians
The mission examined multiple incidents involving IDF actions that

Attacks by the

civilian casualties

and

civilian

the recognition that, for
tionality"

all

property

loss. It

prefaced

its

legal conclusions

risk of civil-

to

ian casualties

this,

that, in

assessed, each

applying these customary

IDF use offeree,

ational considerations that

with

armies, decisions involving the concept of "propor-

—weighing the military advantage be gained against the
—would present genuine dilemmas. Having noted

concluded

resulted in

however,

it

LOAC principles to every IDF action

regardless of any mitigating circumstances or oper-

may

have been involved, had been indiscriminate in

nature and, in multiple cases, a deliberate, intentional attack on the civilian population

and civilian

olated the

infrastructure.

As such, the mission contended, these

attacks vi-

LOAC; some were grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention

(the

1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of

War); and, in certain cases, they also constituted a violation of the right to life of the
Palestinian civilians killed

—

that

is,

they were a violation of
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these mission findings, setting forth, in detail, the opera-

tional considerations that

were

at play at the

time of the incidents in

and

issue,

sessing the actions of the IDF, in each instance, in the context of both codified

customary

A
that,

LOAC principles.

targeting

GOI would lead to

the conclusion

IDF commanders might be second-guessed regarding

certain

and weapon decisions made during the course of an ongoing operation

and some IDF mistakes were made, and acknowledged
analysis of the events in issue

deliberate

would not

and indiscriminate

applicable

objective

LOAC

IDF engaged

in

attacks against the civilian population of Gaza. In

of protected persons by IDF personnel, giving

responsibility, reflect a

—an

result in a finding that the

view of the information available to the Goldstone mission,
killings

and

18

review of the information provided by the
while individual

as-

its

allegations of willful

rise to

individual criminal

complete misinterpretation or intentional distortion of the

LOAC norms.

The IDF's Use of Certain Weapons
The Goldstone mission, while noting that white phosphorus 19 is not proscribed
under the LOAC, made the determination that the IDF was "systematically reckless" in

using this substance in densely populated, built-up areas. Accordingly,

it

concluded that serious consideration should be given by the international community to

banning

its

use in such settings.

The mission also focused on the IDF's use of flechettes: thousands of very deadly
darts generally contained in tank shells. When a shell is fired, and detonates, these
darts are sprayed over a three-hundred-by-one-hundred-meter area.

nomenclature of

this

munition, the mission opined that flechettes are an area

weapon of an indiscriminate
for use in

nature,

urban locations where

and were,

therefore, particularly unsuitable

civilians are present. 20

These mission statements are noted in order to
sentatives

Given the

alert

those government repre-

who deal with such matters of the fact that the mission has essentially de-

clared the use of flechettes in certain operational settings as illegal per

"appropriate" use of such munitions

may

se.

The

thus well appear on a forthcoming

agenda of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
In choosing to apply the

LOAC,

as well as

human

rights law, in the

manner

noted above, to IDF actions taken in Operation Cast Lead, the mission concluded

IDF had committed over thirty violations of these legal regimes, to include
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and that, most significantly, in doing
so, the IDF had intentionally targeted both the Gazan civilian population and infrastructure. Given its findings, the mission demanded that the GOI investigate, try
and punish those individuals found to be responsible for the commission of the
that the
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offenses that

had documented. This

it

is

"complementarity," the right of a State to investigate and,

members of its armed
ever, of particular

forces

concept of

in keeping with the

who have engaged

if

necessary, punish

in violations of the

importance, the mission further

LOAC. How-

recommended that, should the

GOI be unable or unwilling to take these actions, these offenses should then be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and/or made subject to the exercise

of universal jurisdiction. 21

The mission then immediately proceeded to provide its own answer to the matter

of whether the

GOI was,

in fact, willing or able to undertake the investigatory

and potential prosecutorial actions the commission deemed necessary.

It

made the

following determination:

human rights law and humanitarian law require states to investigate and,

International

by military personnel. International law has also established that such investigations should comply with standards
of impartiality, independence, promptness, and effectiveness. The mission holds that
the Israeli system of investigation does not comply with all of these principles. 22
if

appropriate, prosecute allegations of serious violations

The mission

also

concluded that

there are serious doubts about the willingness of Israel to carry out a genuine investigation in an impartial, independent, prompt,

view that the

make

and effective way. The mission is also of the

system overall presents inherently discriminatory features that

Israeli

the pursuit of justice for Palestinian victims very difficult. 23

In essence, then, the mission adjudged the GOI's application of the concept of

complementarity in
sion

this particular situation

would appear to
rights

it

lacking.

Such a conclu-

serve as a unilateral mission determination that

gone conclusion that

human

and found

its

allegations of

GOI

it

violations of both the

was a

fore-

LOAC

and

law would be submitted to the ICC and the exercise of universal

jurisdiction.

In making such a determination, the mission evidences either an apparent

fail-

ure to understand fully the requirements of complementarity or a decision to apply
these requirements in such a way that even the world's
vestigatory

most developed military in-

and prosecutorial systems could not meet the standards imposed. 24 Re-

gardless of its motives, the mission's cursory dismissal of GOI efforts to investigate

and prosecute
Lead

alleged

LOAC violations occurring in the context of Operation Cast

as inadequate does

not serve as an authoritative interpretation of the

complementarity concept.
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Largely unnoticed, but of substantive importance to those States which consistently engage in the types of conflicts in issue,

the Goldstone Report,

Human

the fact that, since the issuance of

contents have been endorsed in both a February 2010

"human

Rights Council report of a special rapporteur on the

and other occupied Arab

tion in Palestine

April 14 in a
report.

its

is

Very

territories"

25

and most

UN

rights situa-

recently

on

UN Human Rights Council resolution dealing specifically with the
significantly, the resolution called

promote an urgent discussion on the future

upon

legality

the General Assembly "to

of the uses of certain muni-

tions as referred to in the report of the United Nations Independent International

Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, drawing, inter alia,

UN

of the International Committee of the Red Cross." 26 These

such flawed

legal analysis are

upon

the expertise

endorsements of

indeed daunting.

Conclusion

In closing,

and in an attempt to formulate a basis for what I believe to be a necessary

discussion concerning whether the Goldstone Report reflects a fundamental shift
in the

manner

in

LOAC will be ap-

which some of the most basic principles of the

urban armed conflict, I pose the follow-

plied to future asymmetric State/non-State

ing questions:

1.

Does the manner
tate the extent to

in

which these types of conflicts are characterized

which the

LOAC applies to such military operations? In

the case of Operation Cast Lead, the conflict was unique in nature.

be argued that

it

was neither a

cle 3 conflict; that

is, it

Common Article 2

nor a

was the view of the Goldstone mission

it

ternational

community

as a

whole

—

—

It

can

Common Arti-

was neither international nor internal

Yet, clearly,

dic-

in nature.

as well as the in-

that certain aspects of the

LOAC

dictated the conduct of the parties involved. Are the findings of the mission, then, to

be applied in the future to

all

forms of conflict in which op-

erations are conducted in an urban environment,

Taliban urban strongholds in Afghanistan?
the specific aspects of the

LOAC — both

e.g.,

If not, in

codified

US

assaults

on

what manner are

—

and customary

to be

applied to asymmetric State/non-State urban conflict?

2.

Does the Goldstone Report

LOAC

reflect a

consensus within the international

community

that the

controls the

means and methods of waging

aspects of human rights law

is

no longer the exclusive

now play a
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3.

In view of the Goldstone Report, has an identifiable shift occurred in the

manner in which basic LOAC principles are now to be applied to targeting decisions made in the context of urban conflict? That is, when balanced on the fulcrum of "proportionality," does the principle of
"discrimination/ distinction"

and

civilian

property

—the protection of the

civilian

population

—now disproportionately outweigh the principle

of "military advantage/necessity"?

4.

Are there lawful weapon systems (white phosphorus,
ter

bomb

flechettes

and clus-

units) that are, nevertheless, so indiscriminate in nature that,

for the protection of the civilian population

and

civilian property, they

should be barred from use in urban conflict?
5.

And,

as

an associated question: in view of a perhaps evolving perceived

need to give added weight to the protection of the
civilian

6.

civilian

populace and

property in urban conflict, should a State that possesses precision

weapons and munitions be required

to use such?

The

to

issue of "dual targeting"; that

non- State entity personnel and

is,

what extent might

facilities

a State target

used by such personnel when

they may serve both civilian and military purposes? In Gaza, for example,

would include the Gazan

this

the

7.

and the

facilities

of

Hamas leadership.

This issue, in turn, raises the exceptionally controversial matter of the
criteria to

be used in determining whether an individual associated with

a non-State entity
ject to

8.

police, their facilities

The

is

"directly" participating in hostilities

—and thus sub-

being targeted.

extent to,

and the manner

in,

which a

State

must

issue a

warning to

an urban civilian population at large, or to individual civilians, of a pending attack

9.

on a general area or a

What are the LOAC
the international

obligations of a non-State actor,

if

any?

How might

community hold a non- State actor responsible for both

compliance with, and violations
1 0.

specific facility?

of,

these obligations?

How does a State cope with the intentional use of the civilian population,
civilian

property and protected places by a non-State entity for the pur-

pose of gaining a military advantage?
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the status to be accorded non-State combatants seized in the

course of a State/non-State conflict? For what offenses might they be tried

and
to

1

in

issues are, of course, related

any form of conflict in which "unlawful combatants" might participate.

And,

2.

what type of judicial forum? All of these

finally,

the Goldstone mission concluded that the

meet the international law standards required

GOI had failed to

for a lawful exercise of the

principle of complementarity, that right of a State to try

military forces for alleged violations of the
as to

members of its

LOAC. How is an

assessment

whether a State has met the requirements of complementarity to be

—or bodies—

made? And what body

are

empowered to make such a judg-

ment, and a concomitant decision/recommendation that the alleged

LOAC violations in issue be referred to the ICC or subjected to the exercise

of universal jurisdiction?

As noted, these questions go

to the central issue of whether the Goldstone Report

community that there has
occurred a fundamental shift in the manner in which some of the most basic principles of the LOAC
and, the mission would contend, human rights law as well
evidences a growing consensus within the international

—

should be applied to asymmetric State/non-State urban
this

form of conflict, why not

ment? Moreover,
risk

if this is,

of potential criminal

to every

form of conflict waged

in fact, the case, does this

liability for

conflict.

the

And,

in

if applicable

to

an urban environ-

change portend an enhanced

members of a

State's

armed

forces

who

are

upon to make critical decisions in the midst of battle?
Commentators may soon begin to contend that the Goldstone Report currently
"occupies the field" with regard to these issues. For those who would differ with
this assessment, I would submit that the time has come for an informed discussion
called

and

a clear statement of disagreement with the Goldstone mission's interpretation

of the

LOAC principles applicable to State/non-State urban asymmetric conflict.
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A principal strategic tactic of the Taliban

.

.

.

is

Jr.*

either provoking or exploiting

civilian casualties.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

1

Introduction

I.

Although he does not use the term "lawfare," Secretary Gates' observation
reflects

what

is

in reality

one of the most

common

iterations of lawfare in

today's conflicts. Specifically, the Taliban are aiming to achieve a particular military
effect,

that

is,

the neutralization of

with respect to airpower.

To do

US and

allied technical superiority, especially

so they are, as Secretary Gates indicates, creating

norms of the law of armed
distinction between combatants and civilians.

the perception of violations of one of the fundamental
conflict

(LOAC),

that

is,

the

While "provoking or exploiting
is

by no means

its

civilian casualties"

is

clearly a type of lawfare,

it

only form. Although the definition has evolved somewhat since

modern interpretation was introduced in 200 1, 2 today I define it as "the strategy
of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to
its

—

—

achieve a warfighting objective." 3

As such,

weapon
legal

it is

ideologically neutral, that

that can be wielded

by either

is, it is

much as a
many uses of

best conceptualized

side in a belligerency. In fact,

"weapons" and methodologies avoid the need to resort

to physical violence

Major General, US Air Force (Ret.); Visiting Professor of the Practice of Law and Associate Director, Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security, Duke University School of Law.
*
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and other more deadly means. This
States

and other nations seek

whenever

.

and Tomorrow

.

one reason,

United

to use sanctions before resorting to the use of force

would be the use of a contract "weapon" during the early
of Operation Enduring Freedom to purchase commercially available satellite
illustration

imagery of Afghanistan. 4 This approach was equally
other

not

for example, that the

possible.

Another
part

is

.

more

fall

or,

perhaps, more effective than

means might have been in ensuring the imagery did
hands. Additionally, most experts consider the re-establishment

traditional military

into hostile

of the rule of law as an indispensable element of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.
Finally,
is

few debate that the use of legal processes to deconstruct

terrorist financing

an extraordinarily important part of countering violent extremists.

many uses of what might be called "lawfare"

In short, there are

that serve to re-

duce the destructiveness of conflicts, and therefore further one of the fundamental
purposes of the law of war. All of that
different

meaning. Some couch

it

in terms of what

of international law claims, usually factually or
Similarly, the privately

have given the concept a rather

said, others

is

alleged to be the "growing use

legally meritless, as a tool

run Lawfare Project openly acknowledges

asserts, that are

it

"other than, or contrary

concentrates

human

rights laws"

to, that for

which those

"on the negative manipulation of international and national
for purposes,

it

of war." 5

laws were originally enacted." 6

Some go even further. In 2007 respected lawyer-writer Scott Horton expressed
concern that unnamed "lawfare theorists" purportedly consider that attorneys
who aggressively use the courts in the representation of Guantanamo detainees
and other terrorism-related matters "might

More

recently,

much

as well

be

discussion of lawfare has centered

terrorists themselves." 7

on

legal

sociated with the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. For example,

and organizations

some

any party

article.

cam-

8

In any event, these sometimes hyperbolic permutations

not that espoused by this

as-

individuals

see lawfare as "the latest manifestation in the sixty-year

paign to isolate the State of Israel."

this writer that

maneuvering

on lawfare

theories are

Among other things, it is certainly not the view of

legitimately using the courts

Instead, this brief article will focus

more narrowly on

is

doing anything improper.

the role of law in contempo-

rary conflicts, principally that in Afghanistan.
It is

true, as Secretary Gates'

comment

suggests, that lawfare in the

Afghan

context has typically taken the form of the manipulation of civilian casualties to

make

it

appear that

US and

allied forces

have

somehow

violated legal or ethical

an asymmetrical form of war-

norms. Thus,

it

could be said that lawfare

one

is

value-based and that seeks to outflank, so to speak, conventional

fare,

that

military means.
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itself is

Charles J. Dunlap,

Regardless,

from

Jr.

this writer's perspective, the use

of the term "lawfare" was

al-

means of encapsulating for non-lawyer, military audiences the
meaning of law in today's war. It was not intended to fit neatly into some political
science construct. Rather, the sobriquet of "lawfare" was meant to impress upon
military audiences and other non-lawyers that law is more than just a legal and
moral imperative; it is a practical and pragmatic imperative intimately associated
with mission success. In that respect, the growth of the term seems to have had
some positive results.
ways intended

as a

II.

Lawfare Today: Airpower and Civilian Casualties

would characterize as lawfare is more prominent than the restrictive rules of engagement imposed upon allied forces in Afghanistan in an effort to win "hearts and minds" by limiting civilian casualties.
These restrictions go far beyond what LOAC requires, and are a classic example of
efforts to "improve upon" LOAC via policymaking that insufficiently appreciates
unintended consequences that can have, at the end of the day, decidedly counterproductive results. As a noncommissioned officer explained to columnist George
Will in June of 2010, the rules of engagement in Afghanistan are "too prohibitive
Perhaps no aspect of what

this writer

for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical success." 9

And other troops

fight-

ing there have raised similar concerns.

—wrongly

my view—as a villain with respect to the civilian casualty issue. The Army and Marine Corps' COIN Field ManAirpower in particular has been

ual

(FM)

in

3-24, 10 for example, discourages the use of the air

that "[b]ombing, even with the

ian casualties."
clear

cast

11

weapon by claiming

most precise weapons, can cause unintended civil-

Of course, any weapon "can" cause civilian casualties, 12 so it is not

why air-delivered munitions should be

singled out for "exceptional care," as

FM 3-24 demands.
More important, the data show that ground operations can be vastly more dangerous to civilians than

found that fewer than

airstrikes.

5 percent of civilian casualties in Iraq during the

frame were the result of airstrikes.

Watch study of airstrikes found
that created the

A study by the New England Journal of Medicine

most

13

Regarding Afghanistan, a 2008

that

it

2003-8 time

Human Rights

was the presence of troops on the ground

risk to civilians, as the "vast majority of

known

civilian

came from airstrikes called in by ground forces under insurgent attack. 14
Even more recently, a National Bureau of Economic Research study found that

deaths"

only 6 percent of the civilian deaths attributed to International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) were the result of airstrikes. In
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fact, traffic

accidents with ISAF vehicles
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were two and a half times more

women and

.

.

likely to

and Tomorrow
be the cause of the deaths of Afghan

children than were airstrikes.

Nevertheless,

ground commanders have

insisted that civilian deaths could be

Army Brigadier

General Michael Tucker suggested as

more

curtailed with

much when

.

troops.

USA Today

in late

2008 that

ground, we would not have to rely as

much on

he told

when General

therefore,

"[i]f

we

got

more boots on

[airstrikes]."

Stanley McChrystal assumed

15

command

the

Unsurprisingly,

in Afghanistan in

June of 2009, he immediately issued orders that significantly restricted the use of the
air

weapon, 16 and shortly thereafter
It

called for a "surge" of mainly

ground

forces. 17

should be said that even before General McChrystaPs orders the coalition's

ability to use the air

nouncements

weapon was complicated by NATO's own public pro-

that distorted the understanding of the law of war, with tragic con-

NATO declared that its forces "would not
knew there were civilians nearby." A year later its statement
fire on positions if
was even more egregious, when a NATO spokesman preened that "[i]f there is the
sequences. 18 Specifically, in June of 2007

19

it

likelihood of even one civilian casualty,

Osama bin Laden

is

down

there."

we

will

not

not even

strike,

if

we

think

20

This statement was not only insensitive to Americans cognizant of the horror of
the bin Laden-inspired 9/11 attacks;

it

also

works counter to the basic purposes of

LOAC. Of course, zero casualties are not what LOAC requires; rather, it only demands that they not be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.
The law is this way for good reason: if "zero casualties" were the standard, it would
invite adversaries to keep themselves in the company of civilians to create a sanctuary from attack. The Taliban heard NATO's invitation and did exactly that. 21
In any event,
ian lives,

it

if the

intent of the June 2009 airpower restrictions

was to save civil-

did not succeed. Although civilian deaths from the actions of

NATO

forces did decline, 22 overall civilian deaths in Afghanistan nevertheless reached an
all-time high in 2009. 23

And

record-breaking figures.

I

would suggest that an obvious

of forgoing opportunities to

day to

kill

This

more

civilian deaths soared 31 percent in

kill

extremists via airstrikes

McChrystal's order
recent months.

Dadkhah

is

unintended) result

that they live another

innocents. 24

may be why the UN reported on June
25

(albeit

2010 over 2009's

—

19,

2010

—about

a year after General

that security in Afghanistan has "deteriorated markedly" in

Moreover,

in

terms of "winning hearts and minds," analyst Lara M.

raises the interesting point

worth pondering

in a

February 2010

New

York Times op-ed that the "premise that dead civilians are harmful to the conduct

of the war
claim."

26

[is

mistaken,

That

is

as]

no

past

war has ever supplied compelling proof of that

proving to be the case in Afghanistan.
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To his credit, General McChrystal did admit in December 2009 that there was
"much about Afghanistan that [he] did not fully understand." 27 In that respect, his
assumption that seems to underlie his order that civilian deaths inevitably work

—

—may be one of
For example, Ben Arnoldy of the
—were responsible
the Taliban—not NATO

the things he did not correctly un-

against the perpetrators' cause

Christian Science Monitor reports that

derstand.

forces

deaths in 2009.

28

Even though those deaths

Arnoldy says that "there

reflect a

for the majority of civilian

41 percent increase over 2008,

indication these Taliban indiscretions have back-

is little

on the movement so far." 29
Consider as well the Afghan reaction in September of 2009 when General
McChrystal sought to apologize for the bombing of a hijacked oil tanker near
Kunduz that allegedly killed seventy-two Afghans. The Washington Post reports
fired

when General McChrystal began to apologize,
Ahmadullah Wardak, cut him off' with demands
that

a local "council chairman,
for a tougher approach. 30

"McChrystal," the Post recounts, "seemed to be caught off guard [by Wardak' s reproof]" as

Wardak asserted

that the allies have

been "too nice to the thugs." 31

Jeremy Shapiro, a Brookings Institution scholar who served on a

civilian assess-

ment team for General McChrystal, analyzes Wardak's remarks as saying that if the
coalition
"

[

is

going to be a genuine provider of security for the people, that means:

Y] ou'll do what

is

necessary to establish control, and the very attention that the

coalition pays to civilian casualties actually creates the impression

ghans that [coalition forces] in

fact are

among many Af-

not interested in establishing control and

not interested in being the provider of security." 32 Shapiro concedes that the

Afghan government has "highlighted" the
is

doing so "because

and gives

[it]

it

civilian casualty issue

serves to demonstrate

leverage with the coalition."

33

[its]

but argues that

it

independence from the coalition

To his surprise, Shapiro says, local of-

ficials in his

experience "tend actually not to be too concerned" with the civilian

34

In short, he concludes that while the civilian casualty issue "clearly

casualties.

resonates very strongly [in the United States] and in Europe ...
that Afghans actually see this as a key issue."

[it is]

not clear

35

A Gallup poll released in February 2010 provides further data as to Afghan perceptions.

show

Although the question of

airstrikes

was not

directly addressed,

that beginning in June of 2009 (coinciding with the

new

it

restrictions

did

on

airpower) through the end of the survey period in late 2009, Afghans' approval of

US leadership in Afghanistan declined, as did their support for additional troops. 36
Obviously, the restrictions on airpower did not have the hoped-for "hearts and

minds"

effect.

Further complicating the issue

civilians, coalition casualties also

is

the fact that, like those of Afghan

reached an all-time high in 2009. 37

And these dis-

turbing casualty trends are continuing into 2010; by the end of September the
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number of coalition

.

.

casualties exceeded the record-breaking high of 2009. 38 Thus,

however well-intentioned the airpower
their efficacy

The

is

cowered

at

restrictions

may have

been, evidence of

not apparent.

deleterious effect

rity situation

and Tomorrow

.

noted

on operations

in the

unmistakable, as the deteriorating secu-

is

UN report above attests. 39 At one time Taliban fighters

American airpower. 40 Today, however, the Air Force Times reports

because of the

new

directive, the Taliban

that

"no longer run and hide when they see a

41

The Times quotes an Air Force pilot as expressing frustration "when you can see them shooting at our guys" and are obliged not to attack. 42
The pilot laments that the enemy knows that "we are not allowed to engage in cerfighter jet overhead."

tain situations." 43

At the same time airpower technology continues to develop even more discrete

and

effective

ways to hunt the

terrorists

without the need to put thousands of

young Americans in harm's way. According to the Washington Post, "a new generation of small but highly accurate missiles" designed to limit collateral damage is being fielded for employment on remotely manned vehicles. 44 Such technology, the
Post reports, along with better intelligence, has caused the "clamor over [drone]
strikes [to have] died

down

While airpower alone
wars, rethinking

it

considerably over the

not

is

and can never be

in the context of

produce opportunities to

fulfill

last year."

45

—the whole solution

to today's

what today's technology can provide might

the President's intent of protecting Americans

against terrorist attack in a less resource-demanding way, 46

and

at the

same time

serve the interests of international humanitarian law's effort to ameliorate the hor-

ror of war,

and

especially

III.

its

impact on innocent

civilians.

Lawfare Tomorrow: The Emerging Issues

The increasing controversy concerning "drones," or, more accurately, remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), is raising some interesting legal and policy issues with
lawfare implications. By all reports, these weapon systems are extremely effective,
particularly in eroding enemy leadership cadres. Yet a variety of objections have
been offered

as to their use.

Some of the attacks border on the absurd, and are reminiscent of medieval legal
debates. For example, in A.D. 1139

Pope Innocent

II

and the Second Lateran

Council condemned the missile warfare that was devastating Europe's knighted ar-

and archers "dastards" that are practicing a "deadly
and God-detested art" with their stones and arrows. 47 Fast-forward to 2009, and
we find former Australian Army officer David Kilcullen condemning the missile
warfare that is devastating the terrorist aristocracy of the Taliban and Al Qaeda by
istocracy by calling slingers
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telling

Congress to

tacks as "cowardly
It is

and weak."

drones" in part because the militants view aerial

militants.

at-

48

not clear why anyone should be concerned about the

and Al Qaeda
as

"call off the

Jr.

sensibilities

of Taliban

Although Kilcullen and others seem to view the militants

courageous fighters seeking man-to-man

provised explosive devices

fights, their

use of indiscriminate im-

—which grew 94 percent over

shows that they embrace remotely operated systems

the past year 49

(albeit

—

plainly

on the ground and not

in the air). In addition, reports indicate that the Taliban are not only intermingling

with civilians in the hopes of being shielded; media reports also say they are engaging in the vile practice of buying children to use as suicide bombers. 50

Almost
systems

is

as

problematic as the "cowardly" objections to advanced warfighting

the emergence of the "targeted killings" debate. This has

thing of a cottage industry within the human rights establishment.

become some-

Many commen-

seem to be frantically searching for ways to find the use of the highly effective
RPVs somehow improper. A good example is the recent report of the UN's Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. 51

tators

One of the most disappointing aspects of the report was the allegation that RPV
operators might adopt a "Playstation mentality." This wholly speculative and un-

proven allegation questioning the professionalism of RPV operators

is

but one

il-

lustration of the report's deficiencies. Moreover, the illogical suggestion that

military or intelligence professionals

capturing and interrogating

him

is

would

prefer to

kill

a terrorist as opposed to

yet another indication of the report's flaws.

Yet there are issues associated with RPVs. For example, in a recent issue of

Armed Forces Journal,
the status of

RPV

Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution raises issues about

operators by questioning the propriety of the operation of the

—

—

by other than military personnel. 52 Perhaps as interesting or more so is
the question of fully autonomous RPVs or other weapon systems.
As a practical matter, the current generation of RPVs generally requires a very
aircraft

permissive air environment to survive.

To

use the systems in contested airspace

must be overcome, not the
least of which is the maintenance of continuous contact between the vehicle and its
presents a variety of daunting technical challenges that

distant operator.

Many experts believe that in the future the vehicle would have to

operate autonomously, at least part of the time.

The world has not, however, been receptive to autonomous weapons systems.
Exhibit "A" would be the near-universal ban on landmines we have today. When
one examines the history of the ban, it becomes clear that emotional arguments
predominated as opposed to tempered, rational discussions of how the weapons
might be used in ways that actually reduce the destructiveness of war. Regardless,
the experience of the landmine campaign
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may

be something of a portent for

Lawfare Today

.

.

.

and Tomorrow

policymakers to consider, as science will inevitably provide the opportunity for the

development of a whole family of partly or even
tems for use

in air, land, sea

fully

autonomous weapons

sys-

and cyber domains.

IV.

Concluding Observations

Any discussion of lawfare seems to invite conclusions that "the law" is somehow an
impediment

to successfully warfighting, especially in an era of irregular warfare

waged by non-State actors. 53

It is

certainly will always be those

true, as

who

will

mentioned earlier in this article, that there

abuse the law for perverse purposes. That

should not, however, suggest abandoning the law. Consider the thoughtful observations of Lawrence Siskind in response to the "lawfare" strategies of Hamas leveled at Israel:

When al-Qaeda terrorists used jet planes as weapons to crash into skyscrapers in 2001,
the

West did not abandon

its

airports

and

office buildings. Instead,

cope with danger without making fundamental changes to
that

its

it

found ways to

business

life.

The

fact

Hamas terrorists are cynically using another Western institution, the rule of law, as

weapon today does not mean that Western nations should abandon
must learn to adjust and cope. 54

a

In the twenty-first century
lawfare.

we should

it.

Instead, they

expect to see further developments of

We may not like all of its iterations, but we should never forget that legal

battles are always preferable to real battles,

suited to

wage

—and win—

and modern democracies are

well-

legal "wars."

Notes
1.

Press Conference, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

& Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Michael Mullen, Leadership Changes in Afghanistan (transcript), DEFENSELINK (May

11,

2009), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4424.
2.

Charles

J.

Dunlap,

Jr.,

Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian

Values in

Human Rights, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/
Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap200 1 .pdf (last visited Jan. 2 1 20 1 1 ).

21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for

,

3.

The author

originally cast the definition to say "achieve

an operational objective" but

changed the wording so as to preclude an interpretation that was linked to a particular level of
J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today, YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Winter
2008, at 146, available at http://www.nimj.org/documents/Lawfare%20Today.pdf.

war. Charles

4.

See John

J.

Lumpkin, Military Buys Exclusive Rights to Space Imaging's Pictures ofAfghanistan

War Zone, ASSOCIATED

PRESS, Oct. 15, 2001, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/10/

apl01501.html.

322

Charles /. Dunlap,

5.

David

B. Rivkin,

Jr.

& Lee A.

Casey, Lawfare,

Jr.

WALL STREET JOURNAL,

Feb. 23, 2007, at

Al 1, 0vaz/aWeathttp://online.wsj.com/article/SBl 17220137149816987.html (emphasis added).
6.

What is Lawfare?, THE LAWFARE PROJECT, available at http://www.thelawfareproject.org

(last visited Jan.

21,2011).

war on the rule of law, HARPER'S
2007, at 74, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/07/0081595.
7.

Scott Horton, State of exception: Bush's

8.

Lawrence

J.

Siskind,

Lawfare,

THE AMERICAN THINKER

(Feb.

MAGAZINE,

July

2010), http://

7,

www.americanthinker.com/2010/02/lawfare_l.html.

George Will, Editorial, Futility in Afghanistan; An NCO fires off a round of illumination,
WASHINGTON POST, June 20, 2010, at A 19.
10. Headquarters, Department of the Army & Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (2006), available at http://
9.

www.scribd.com/doc/9137276/US-Army-Field-Manual-FM-324-Counterinsurgency.
app. E, para. E-5.

11.

Id.,

12.

See, e.g.,

Afghan

Official:

Troops Killed Civilians,

CNN.COM (May 14, 2010), http://

afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/05/14/afghan-official-troops-killed-civilians/.
13. Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks et al., The Weapons That Kill Civilians - Deaths of Children and
Noncombatants in Iraq, 2003-2008, NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, Apr. 16, 2009, at

1585, 1586, available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/360/16/1585.pdf (emphasis added).
14.

IN

HUMAN

RIGHTS WATCH, "TROOPS IN CONTACT": AlRSTRIKES AND CIVILIAN DEATHS

AFGHANISTAN 29

(2008), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2008/afghanistan0908/

afghanistan0908web.pdf.

Jim Michaels, Airstrikes in Afghanistan increase 31%, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2008,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-l l-05-afghanstrikes_N.htm.
15.

16.

Dexter Filkins, U.S. Toughens Airstrike Policy in Afghanistan,

at 1,

NEW YORK TIMES, June 22,

2009, at Al.
1

7.

The author discussed this issue in Could Airstrikes Save Lives?, WASHINGTON POST,

Oct.

22,2010,atA25.
18.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations are the principal but not exclusive con-

tributors of foreign forces for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Wound Civilians in Southern Afghanistan, Official Says, Associated Press, international herald Tribune, June 30, 2007 (quoting Major
John Thomas, spokesman for NATO's International Security Assistance Force), available at
19.

Noor Khan, US

Coalition Airstrikes

Kill,

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/30/asia/AS-GEN-Afghan-Violence.php.
20.

Pamela Constable,

NATO

Hopes

WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 27, 2008, at A12
spokesman

for

NATO

to
Undercut Taliban with Surge of Projects,
(quoting Brigadier General Richard Blanchette, chief

forces), available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2008/09/26/AR2008092603452_pf.html.
21.

Eric

See, e.g., Inside

Holdaway as

US Hub for Air Strikes, BBC AMERICA, Nov.

29,

2008 (quoting Colonel

saying, " [S]ome of our enemies have clearly located themselves

amongst

civil-

ians"), available at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/7755969.stm.

22.

"Pro-government forces reduced

tory sides with Taliban, for now,
23.

2010,

at

24.

civilian killings

by 28 percent." See Ben Arnoldy, His-

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,

See Dexter Filkins, '09 Deadliest Year for Afghans,

UN.

May

Says,

10,

2010, at

9.

NEW YORK TIMES, Jan.

A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/world/asia/ 14kabul.html.
See supra note 17.

323

14,

.

.

.

Lawfare Today

25.

.

.

and Tomorrow

Ernesto Londono, U.N. Report on Afghanistan Notes Surge in Attacks and Killings,

WASHINGTON

POST, June 20, 2010,

at

A9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/20 1 0/06/ 1 9/AR20 1 006 1 9027 1 5.html.
26.

M. Dadkhah, Op-Ed, Empty Skies Over Afghanistan, NEW YORK TIMES,

See Lara

Feb. 18,

2010, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/opinion/18dadkhah.html.

The Results of the Strategic Review, Part II: Hearing Before the House Armed
Services Committee, 1 1 1th Cong. 61 (2009) (statement of General Stanley R. McChrystal), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-l 1 lhhrg57832/pdf/CHRG-l 1 lhhrg57832.pdf.
27. Afghanistan:

28.

Arnoldy, supra note 22.

29.

Id.

30.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Sole Informant Guided Decision

POST, Sept.

6,

On Afghan

Strike,

WASHINGTON

2009, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/

2009/09/05/AR2009090502832.html.
31.

Id.

Jeremy Shapiro, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Index
and Assessments Project at the Brookings Institution 33 (Oct. 5, 2009) (transcript available at
32.

http://www.brookings.edU/~/media/Files/events/2009/1005_afghanistan_pakistan/20091005
_afghanistan_pakistan.pdf)
33.

Id. at 32.

34.

Id.

35.

Id.

36.

Julie

Ray & Rajesh Srinivasan, Afghans More Skeptical of U.S. Leadership, Troops, GALLUP

(Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/125537/afghans-skeptical-leadership

-troops-2009.aspx.
37.

See Operation Enduring Freedom: Coalition Military Casualties by Year

lCASUALTIES.ORG, available at http://www.icasualties.org/OEF/ByMonth.aspx

and Month,

(last visited

Dec.

2,2010).
38.

Id.

39.

See Londono, supra note 25.

40.

See,

e.g.,

Rowan Scarborough, Pentagon

WASHINGTON

Notebook: McPeak

calls

McCain

too fat,

TIMES, June 26, 2008, at B01 (quoting a Taliban commander as saying, "Tanks
and armor are not a big deal the planes are the killers. I can handle everything but the jet fighters."), available at http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/jun/26/pentagon-notebook-mcpeak

—

-calls-mccain-too-fat/?page=2.
41.

Michael Hoffman, Looking

Airstrikes Takes
Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Joby Warrick

45.

Id.

46.

Even

ducted. See

& Peter Finn, In Pakistan,

Post, Apr. 26, 2010,

critics

hicles but also

in Frustration:

Punch Out of Pilots, AIR FORCE TIMES,

42.

Washington

Down

at

CIA

McChrystal Order Limiting Afghan

May 3,

Refines

Methods

by other means
Frankel,

to

Reduce Civilian Deaths,

A8.

concede that attacks on high-value targets

Mathew

2010, at 16.

—can be extremely
Remarks

at the

effective

—mainly by remotely

when properly

piloted ve-

calibrated

and con-

Defense Challenges and Future Opportunities

Brookings Institution 4-13 (Mar. 26, 2010) (transcript available at http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/20 1 0/0326_defense_challenges/20 1 00326_defense

Symposium,

at the

_challenges_panel 1 .pdf)

324

.

Charles /. Dunlap,

47.

Jr.

Jonah Goldberg, Crossbows & Suicide Bombers, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Aug.

10, 2001),

http://www.nationakeview.com/articles/204995/crossbows-suicide-bombers/jonah-goldberg.

Doyle McManus,

Drone Attacks in Pakistan 'Backfiring/ Congress Told,
3, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe
-mcmanus3-2009may03,0,7133284.column.
49. See Londono, supra note 25 (citing UN report).
50. Sara A. Carter, Taliban Buying Children to Serve as Suicide Bombers, WASHINGTON
48.

U.S.

LATlMES.COM (May

TIMES, July 2, 2009,
51

See U.N.

at

1.

Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary

or arbitrary executions, U.N. Doc.

A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010)

(Philip Alston), available at

http://www2.ohchr.Org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf.
52.

P.W. Singer, Double-Hatting Around the Law,

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL,

June 2010,

44, available at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/06/4605658. See also

Americas unlawful combatants, WASHINGTON POST, March

12, 2010, at

Gary

at

Solis,

A17, available af http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/ll/AR2010031103653.html.

The Department of Defense defines "irregular warfare" as a "violent struggle among
and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular
warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will." See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms (Nov. 12, 2010, as amended through Dec. 31, 2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/
53.

state

doctrine/dod_dictionary/.
54.

Siskind, supra note 8.

325

XIII
The Age of Lawfare

Dale Stephens*

We

are currently living in the age of lawfare; perhaps

we always have been.

The term, in its relationship to armed conflict, was most recently popularized by Major General Charles Dunlap of the US Air Force in 2001 and has generated an exponential and diffuse trajectory of meaning and critique since that
time. The term "lawfare" has no real fixed definition, but has come to be generally
l

understood as the "use or misuse of law as a substitute for traditional military

means

to achieve military objectives." 2

mestic

US

legal practices,

3

has been examined in the context of do-

It

in transnational legal incidents 4 and, of course, within

the realm of public international law, particularly in the context of the law of

armed

conflict

lawfare

is

(LOAC). 5

All accounts

do share a conception

concerned with the instrumentalization or politicization of the law to

achieve a tactical, operational or strategic

The

effect.

reference to the "use or misuse" of law in the

essentially neutral perspective.

The

fact

is

that

Dunlap

modern

the application of force

is

done

UN Charter,

CSM, Royal Australian Navy. The views

the author in his personal capacity and

le-

as a substitute for

do not

Chapter VII,

"all

necessary

expressed in this paper are entirely those of

necessarily reflect the views of the Australian

government, the Australian Defence Force or any other body with
associated.

do

and hence represents a form of lawfare so defined. This

manifested with, for example, a

* Captain,

definition reveals an

State military forces

gitimately use the law to achieve military outcomes. This

may be

that recognizes that

whom

the author

is

The Age ofLawfare

means" Security Council resolution

that displaces the law of neutrality or other-

wise shapes the tactical or strategic military environment. 6 Alternatively,
also be manifested in a formal determination as to
at all,

tion

whether

group

is

it is

whether an armed

it

may

conflict exists

international or non-international and/or whether an opposi-

to obtain prisoner of

war

rights or not. In this sense, the

law

is

"weaponized" to achieve a desired military outcome that negates the need to apply
force to obtain the

same

result.

highlighted the notion that

Indeed, recent scholarship on this body of law has

LOAC

practice itself

is

a process of construction,

contestation and strategic instrumentalization that usually advantages State mili-

That the existing architecture of LOAC possesses

tary forces. 7

for State military forces
jects,

and not the

tive,

this

not surprising. Under

is

objects, of international law.

preference

is

tionally recognized military

is

to ensure the right balance

is

in warfare

between interna-

is

maintained and

effectively preserved.

engage in a type of structural lawfare to achieve military aims, the

primary focus of this
ner in which lawfare
State groups

Moreover, from a policy perspec-

and humanitarian aims

that institutional accountability
States

views States are the sub-

both appropriate and necessary under the existing

international legal structure. This

While

classical

apparent bias 8

this

article is to
is

engaged

tool to obtain military

examine the converse

exercised against States.
in

situation, namely, the

The strategic use of the law by non-

asymmetric warfare has been recognized

and

political advantage. In these contexts,

inter alia, invite the application

man-

as a significant

such groups

will,

of force against themselves or their proxies, inno-

cent civilians (as incidental injury), or ostensibly civilian objects (that have lost
their protection) that, while strictly lawful, nonetheless generate political costs

and/or moral dilemmas for the attacking force. The goal

is

to

undermine the

resolve

of State military forces by generating negative reaction by relevant constituencies

with political power.
Predictably, this type of lawfare

prompts reactions concerning the "unfairness"

of legal constraints applying to one side as compared to the wanton disregard of legal

compliance by the other. 9 Such asymmetric disadvantage

is

usually framed in

terms of a dilemma within the literature for Western "law-abiding" military forces
in

meeting the threats while retaining a

fidelity to the law.

Lawfare

terized in the register of formal legality of being a refuge of the weak,

is

thus charac-

10

of being dis-

ingenuous by unfairly manipulating the law to achieve a relevant extra-legal and

asymmetric
It is

effect.

the purpose of this article to review the

phenomenon of lawfare to highlight

how law is situated within the broader political, moral and social terrain of military
decision making.

The

reactions against lawfare disclose a

number of assumptions.

Principally, the reactions against lawfare evidence a particular interpretive attitude
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LOAC, specifically one based squarely within a positivist orientation. Positivism
remains the dominant interpretive idiom of LOAC, but it contains a number of

to

vulnerabilities in
vulnerabilities

its

theoretical structure. It

and to propose remedies

that

is

a goal of this article to identify such

might be used to prompt a more

self-

aware counter-lawfare response within positivism's interpretive enterprise.

A broader goal is to tackle the issue of how the law is actually employed within
military decision making. It will contend that while LOAC is often expressed in a
key of validity,

it

should also be understood in a register of legitimacy. The factors

that contribute to such an approach

draw upon broader

socio -legal

and

ethical

considerations and these will be canvassed.

To

this end,

it is

submitted that military lawyers and operators alike regularly

synthesize legal propositions with broader political, social

and moral consider-

when dispensing advice and embarking upon a course of action. In so doing,
permits a more nuanced and surgical application of force that meets broader

ations
this

military

and

ment.

also allows for a firmer foundation in confronting lawfare

It

political goals. In short,

it

allows for effective mission accomplish-

and its intended

manipulation of moral and political reaction. This assimilation of factors that occurs

when developing legal advice is not always admitted, but it occurs nonetheless, and
should be acknowledged and discussed for what it can add to the military appreciation process.

This

is

not to say that the register of formal

legal validity

with. Quite the contrary, a formal assessment of law

is

any interpretive

and

exercise. Rules are carefully parsed

has been dispensed

always the starting point in
their linguistic construc-

tion assessed against standard canons of interpretation. However, the law

is

more

more malleable and open, than what we might imagine.
of LOAC takes place against a complex array of normative

indeterminate, language
In reality, the practice
factors.

Whether reconciled

as acting within the "free space" of legal discretion

permitted under positivism's structure or as a product of government-imposed

some other rationale, the
result is the same. It remains true today that, at least since the Vietnam War, liberal
democratic societies are compelled to wage war through a prism of self-perceived
legitimacy. Modern military lawyers by necessity navigate this complex legal and
political topography as a matter of course. It also means that confronting lawfare
policy overlay to ameliorate a rule's strictness, or indeed

tactics

head-on

This

is

article is

not as daunting as

comprised of three

it

may at first seem.

parts. Part

I

will briefly

examine the tenor of

claims regarding lawfare so as to situate the subsequent analysis. Part
the

dominant

interpretive

onstrate the blind spots

idiom of

and gaps

II

will canvass

—namely, positivism—and

LOAC

that this

methodology generates.

the remedies that are available to deal with lawfare
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counter-lawfare) either

The Age ofLawfare
under positivism's method or more broadly under a complementary approach of

LOAC

practice within the register of legitimacy. Finally, Part

III will

examining the choices and orientation military lawyers might adopt
of counter-lawfare.
structivism

To

and virtue

in the context

assessment of means-ends rationality, con-

this end,

ethics will be separately undertaken.

Part I. Lawfare and

The term

conclude by

Its

Taxonomy

"lawfare" has established a distinctly pejorative connotation within the pre-

vailing literature. This
intrinsically

seems unusual,

as the

term

itself is

value neutral.

It is

neither

"good" nor "bad," but rather an agnostic phenomenon. Indeed, as out-

lined in the introduction, established State military forces in the conduct of warfare

can deploy a form of structural lawfare.
In the contemporary environment, allegations of lawfare are routinely cited as a
tool used

by insurgents or other non-State actors

forces. This

is

the version of lawfare that has

the term. Hence,

in actions against State military

become more typically associated with

US Army lawyer Eric Jensen identifies that in the context of asym-

metric warfare, an opponent will seek to exploit an adversary's weaknesses to seek
tactical

or strategic advantage. Such weaknesses are not necessarily those of military

capacity, but rather are

more

intangible

and revolve around

inciting violent reac-

tion that feeds public disquiet. Thus, "[i]n this type of conflict, the disadvantaged

party must seek to use the comparatively low-tech tools at

comparative advantage."

11

Such non-State groups

will

its

disposal to gain the

openly violate the law in

order to strike at a more militarily superior though legally bound (thus restrained)
force.

As outlined by Jensen, such subversion takes the form of attacking from pro-

tected places

and using protected places or objects

ing without wearing a proper uniform, using
targets,

as

weapons storage

human

sites, fight-

shields to protect military

using protected symbols to gain military advantage, murdering prisoners

who are protected and not distinguishing oneself from the general popuwhen taking a direct or active part in hostilities. 12

or others
lation

The types of incidents

detailed

by Jensen almost always have an exception

for

Under positive prescriptions of the law, protected
places lose their immunity when used for military purposes, 13 human shields may
not be directly attacked (at least when not voluntary) but become part of the inci-

the use of force by opponents.

dental injury calculation under proportionality assessments, 14 and while fighting

without a distinguishing uniform does threaten greater
identification,

it

civilian loss

due

to mis-

does not prohibit State military forces from targeting those taking

a direct part in hostilities

(DPH). 15
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The point is not that legal arguments

can't be relied

ing these tactics, but rather that the political

upon such exceptions can cause
moral dilemmas and
such

political

and

upon in favor of surmount-

social

consequences of relying

a negative effect. These exceptions highlight the

and

social costs faced

by

soldiers

when engaged

in

conflict.

In this sense,

it is

main concern about lawfare is in fact the
invoked. Hence, as Casey and Rivkin state: "The

significant that the

broader context in which law

is

term 'lawfare' describes the growing use of international law claims, usually factually

The goal is to gain a moral advantage over your
of world opinion, and potentially a legal advantage in national

or legally meritless, as a tool of war.

enemy

in the court

and international
It

became

tribunals." 16

clear

during the counterinsurgency (COIN) operation within Iraq

that insurgents invariably used unlawful

means

to intimidate the population

and

discredit the

government. The whole point of using such unlawful means was

specifically to

invoke an overreaction by counterinsurgent forces. Provoking vio-

and values

lation of counterinsurgent ethics

means

to

in reacting to an insurgency

a

an end, namely, discrediting the legitimacy of the host government and

the counterinsurgent forces themselves. As David Kilcullen notes, Al
Iraq

is

Qaeda

in

drew the majority of its strength from the "backlash engendered by counter-

insurgent overreaction rather than genuine popular support." 17

When examined in these terms, the reaction against lawfare turns out to be less
about the law

itself than

about the broader question of a

tion to the application of force that has the capacity to

LOAC

tiveness. In this context,

(and

its

political

undermine military

sustaining interpretive model)

particularly adept at providing a sufficiently calibrated response.

framed in a binary manner.

It

and prohibits
well with

The law is

is

not

largely

It restricts

attacks against military objectives 18

Hence within this binary code, decisions are made in an
or "no" manner viz., this military object over there may be at-

nuance or

effect.

tacked, that civilian one here

may not;

these civilians are a proportionate loss but

those ones are not. Issues such as whether the object to be attacked
that

effec-

attacks against those objects that are civilian. 19 It does not deal very

essentially "yes"

mosque

reac-

mainly deals with categories of persons: combatants,

and those hors de combat.

civilians

and moral

is

is

a church or a

being used for a military purpose have no formal relevance as a

matter of law. Neither does the question whether the civilians who will incidentally
die as a result of a proportionality equation are individuals

particular broader social network. These underlying social

who may be

and political

part of a

factors are

simply accorded no formal legal weight.

Notwithstanding

this,

attacking such objects, while lawful, will often have the

inevitable effect of galvanizing resistance

by a resident population, which,
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may

well

undermine broader

strategic goals. Similarly,

whether an insurgent

is

a

hard-core fanatic determined to die in his or her cause or an "accidental guerilla"

20

loosely swept into a broader

movement

is

of no account as a matter of formal law;

may be targeted under DPH criteria. While some scholars have ventured that
there may exist some level of cultural relativity in making assessments of "military
each

advantage" or "proportionate"

upon

loss,

21

the broad sweep of the law

a conception of exchangeable universal value.

There

is

predicated

exists a pretense

of

mathematical certainty in making assessments of "military advantage units" versus
"civilian loss units."

To

this end, the

appeal of universality sustains the law.

be enough to respond to allegations of lawfare to say that "this

we do

is

"lawful." In certain contexts

and to

is

the law"

reference to "the court of world opinion" identified

may

and what

certain audiences, such assertions

be conclusive. In other circumstances and for other audiences, they

The

It

may

may not be.

by Rivkin and Casey

has both an international and a domestic application. As discussed above, entirely
lawful attacks within a theater of operations can result in popular resentment

by

those within that battlespace that translates into practical resistance. Equally,
resistance

may be

manifested within domestic polities

at

home and

can galvanize

domestic reaction and decisively undermine military capacity. Hence, as Dunlap
has observed

The United

when

addressing this issue in the context of the Vietnam War:

States has already seen

how

an enemy can carry out a value-based asym-

metrical strategy. For example, one of the things that America's enemies have learned
in the latter half of the 20th century

is

to manipulate democratic values. Consider the

remarks of a former North Vietnamese commander: "The conscience of America was

war-making capability, and we were turning that power in our favor. America lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a will to win." By stirring up dissension in the United States, the North Vietnamese
were able to advance their strategic goal of removing American power from Southeast
Asia. Democracies are less-resistant to political machinations of this sort than are the
part of its

totalitarian systems

common to neo-absolutists. 22

These lessons have been
military lawyers.

It

has

fully

become

there are wars of necessity

absorbed by military professionals, especially by

clear that there are

and wars of

force in relation to both the jus

choice.

ad helium and jus

23

"good" and "bad" wars,

just as

on issues of
impact. As a result,

Public conscience

in hello

has real

the levels of discretion exercised under the law differ due to

imposed government/

command policy restraints. While prevailing textbooks and restatements of LOAC
present a picture of almost clinical certainty, the truth of the matter has always

been more nuanced. Law and
the starting point

legal interpretation are

modulated. Legal rectitude

and of course universal prohibitions
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acknowledged

(i.e.,

not attacking

interpretation invariably

but

civilians, respecting hospital ships, etc.),

accommodates

legal

implicit counter-lawfare elements at

matter of policy overlay. Legitimate targets are not attacked and extraor-

least as a

dinary measures are taken to spare civilian populations from any incidental injury.
Is this

approach consistent with positivism's method?

or does

it fall

Is this really

a policy overlay

within "proper" legal interpretation? As will be outlined in Part

below, such accommodations

may still be

II

conceived as validly coming within the

structure of positivism's methodology.

Part II. Positivism, Legitimacy and Lawfare

Law and Morality
Positivism remains the dominant interpretive idiom of LOAC. As an interpretive
style, it is

venerable and hardy and has withstood numerous challenges to

nance throughout the twentieth century. While regarded
scholars,

24

embraced

it

nonetheless heralded a

at the

its

as too illusory

domi-

by some

momentous change to international law when

turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Reading accounts

of international law in the 1920s, one gets a palpable sense of positivism's great

emancipatory promise. 25 While international law in the nineteenth century was
largely bound

up in sovereign prerogatives and naturalist conceptions, the onset of
the twentieth century saw law harnessed for progressive causes. Positivism was the
means by which such progress was to be realized. While international courts ini26
over time
tially resisted impositions by positive law on sovereign prerogatives,
even these nebulous rights were quietly relegated as products of an

earlier era. 27

The legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in his 1962 account The Concept ofLaw probably best describes positivism's contemporary structure. 28

fundamentally centered on a separation
sarily tied to

any moral inquiry.

29

thesis, that

is,

To Hart, positivism was

legal validity

was not neces-

Rather law was a combination of primary and

secondary rules that was sustained by an inner social perspective of law's

The

rule of recognition

established

was the most

what was law

based upon social

significant secondary rule, 31

in terms of pedigree.

fact. Significantly,

The

and

officials.

30

essentially

rule of recognition itself

was

words did a considerable amount of work

penumbra for framwords possessed unassailable mean-

within positivism and Hart conceived of a duality of core and
ing interpretive discourse.
ing.

Law was

32

Within the

core,

thus ascertainable and largely predictable. At the border of the core,

within the narrow penumbral region, the law was
level

less

determinate and a broader

of discretion was permitted to determine legal outcomes. Indeed, Hart

lowed for a policy- or

legislative-type reasoning within this
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The separation

thesis,

which sustains much of Hart's approach, was famously

outlined in an exchange with Harvard professor

Lon

Fuller in a series of articles

appearing in the 1957-58 edition of the Harvard Law Review. 54 In question was the
status of laws passed during the Nazi
naturalist legal

methodology

regime in Germany. Fuller invoked a form of

to argue that such edicts could not constitute law.

while such laws were morally bankrupt, they

Hart presented

a differing view;

nonetheless

constituted law properly adopted in accordance with a prevail-

ing process.

still

35

Importantly, Hart did fully acknowledge that while they were

name

deserving of the

"law," one could nonetheless rely

grounds not to obey such law.

upon personal moral

36

much about

This dichotomy reveals

still

positivism that has application within

LOAC reasoning and more broadly within the context of lawfare. While it is plain
that

"no sensible

positivist

.

.

.

would claim

essary for legal interpretation,"
38

When

37

that morality

positivism

is

is

never relevant or nec-

essentially a non-directive

form of

meaning of words (and
sentences) 39 there remains a requirement to follow the course of such wording to
its necessary end to reach an inevitable legal result. This is done notwithstanding
interpretation.

that

one

what occurs may in

table or silly result."

"ought" to be

40

(at least

fact

is

resolutely within the core

appear to be "a wrong or unjust or unwise or inequi-

This differentiation between law as

it

"is"

and what

it

within the core) has the potential to cause blind spots and

contradictions in legal interpretation. Yet,

it is

resolutely defended

by many as the

appropriate measure of legal interpretation and has resisted inroads by alternative

Former US Attorney General Michael Mukasey has, for example,
strenuously argued that government lawyers must ensure they only "do law." 41 He
legal theories.

outlines that a lawyer's primary duty

to define the space in

which the

client

is

may legally act.

.

.

.

[Tjhere will be times

when

law prohibits them from taking their desired course of
them from doing things that are, in your view, the right thing
to do. And there will be times when you will have to advise clients that the law permits
them to take actions that you may find imprudent, or even wrong. 42

you

will advise clients that the

action, or even prohibits

Judge Higgins in a famous defense of this methodology reaffirmed the perspective
that the practice of law

is

best conceived of as the application of "neutral princi-

ples" to achieve predictable outcomes. 43

This conception

There

is

is

reflected in traditional approaches to interpreting

usually an emphatic confidence in the literature that

of a broad core of validity.
clause that

makes

LOAC.

LOAC is comprised

To be sure, even a provision such as the famous Martens

a direct appeal to the "dictates of public conscience" 44 has
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strenuously argued to be

no more than an aid to

interpretation of existing positive

law and certainly not a source of legal authority in
This reliance

its

own

right.

45

upon pedigree of legal norms and the strong confidence placed in

the core structure of

words seems a

little

too emphatic in the literature. Indeed,

such a patois might be read as reflecting a type of anxiety as to the capacity of law to

The
law would

actually restrain violence.

and a

fear

46

that

LOAC project was always placed between a promise
intercede

and ameliorate the excess of warfare's

violence.

Given the strong differentiation between law, morality and policy considerations, at least resident within core

be

little

surprise that lawfare

is

meanings of words and sentences, there should

derided as unfair. Compliance with the law con-

cerning the propriety of certain attacks

is

the formal answer to those who take issue

with the moral, social and political consequences of such attacks. Lawyers are

ill

equipped to respond with anything more than extolling the virtue of compliance
with the law as

it

exists.

guistic construction are

Arguments

in support of structural rectitude

what sustain

legal responses. Despite this, to relevant

and faithfulness may not be persua-

publics "out there" such exquisite compliance
sive,

indeed

and of lin-

may not be worth "two straws."

47

This necessarily leaves open a

num-

the picture painted by Hart (and others) that the law

com-

ber of vulnerabilities to such advocacy.
It

also relies

upon

prises a large inner core of meaning.

terminate than what

can

flip

If,

in fact, the law (especially LOAC)

is less

de-

many imagine, if language is so intrinsically malleable that we

between the core and the penumbra with greater ease than what we

antici-

many of the assumptions that underpin "proper" interpretive technique
become undone. However, in accepting these factors we have new challenges, but
pate, then

also better opportunities to align legal advice

acuity

with a greater moral and political

and so may confront lawfare more instrumentally.

Core/Penumbra and the Malleability of Language

Many scholars have critiqued the semantic certainty implicit in the core/penumbra
distinction. Winter, for example, observes that
nitive process of ascribing a

"distinction

purpose to words that we necessarily make means the

between a policy-free core and a penumbra of

necessarily collapses." 48 According to Winter,
tacit

Hart fails to appreciate that the cog-

we

all

'legislative'

operate in accordance with

knowledge and seek to attribute a meaning to words that will give

underlying policy. Language
firewall

is

freedom

effect to

an

by nature malleable, rendering the placement of a

between open (penumbra) and closed (core) discretion an arbitrary exer-

Duncan Kennedy has adeptly demonstrated that the "self-evident" placement
of words within the core or penumbra is a highly contentious exercise. Hart
cise.
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advocated that "plain cases" 49 would always be easily discernible, but Kennedy argues that through "legal work" 50
strained core or the
political discretion.

we can find ourselves within either the conopen textured penumbra whenever we wish to exercise a more
Either way, we can construct a desired result. In essence, Ken-

nedy concludes that determinacy is "a function of the worlds of valid norms, and of
the content of other sources, and also of their interaction with the resources and
strategies of whoever has the

power

to

do

legal interpretation." 51

The Malleability of Language and Common Article 3
The malleability of language within LOAC was amply demonstrated

in the course

of the internal Bush administration debates concerning the application of

mon Article

3

(CA

3) to the

war

in Afghanistan.

Com-

Writing in January 2002, Deputy

Yoo determined that the conflict then under way
Afghanistan was an international armed conflict. However, according to Yoo,

Assistant Attorney General John
in

Qaeda detainees were accorded prisoner of war status, because Afghanistan was a "failed State" and therefore the Geneva Conventions did
not apply. 52 The question then to be decided was whether CA 3, which set a minimal humanitarian standard for detainee treatment, applied as a matter of law. Yoo
determined that it did not and drew heavily upon a textual analysis of the provision. Significantly, the opinion Yoo drafted had an especially narrow determination of the application of CA 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Yoo opined
that CA 3 (which applies to "conflicts not of an international character") was intended to apply only to a condition of civil war or "large scale armed conflicts between a State and an armed movement within its own territory." 53
The opinion specifically relied upon a close textual analysis, as well as a historineither Taliban nor Al

cal
if

account of the negotiating history and past practice of States.

CA

3

guage."

was to have a "cover
54

The

all" reach,

"precise language"

55

then

it

It

concluded that

would have used "broader

actually used restricted

it

lan-

to the type of conflicts

identified.

In reply, William Taft, the

Department of State's Legal Advisor, responded by

taking issue with the reading of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions,
stressing that "[t]he President should

know that a decision that the Conventions

do apply is consistent with the plain language of the Conventions." 56 Moreover application of the

Conventions "demonstrates that the United States bases

duct not just on

its

policy preferences but

Ultimately, President

matter of policy"
sity"

58

would be accorded

con-

on its international legal obligations." 57

Bush determined

humane

its

that

CA 3 did not apply dejure but "as a

treatment to the extent "consistent with military necesto detainees. 59
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Subsequently, the executive assertion that

CA

3 did not apply to the conflict

with Al Qaeda was litigated before the Supreme Court. In the 2006

Hamdan case, 60

the Court held that the term "conflict not of an international character" contained

within

CA

3

was used

in contradistinction to "conflict

the phrase "'not of an international character' bears
such, applied effectively to

thus constituting

CA 3

The remarkable

and

armed

all
its

meaning" 61 and,

its literal

conflicts that are

minimal standards

between nations." Hence
as

not between nation-States,

as a "cover all."

feature of this composite line of executive

and judicial reason-

upon "precise," "plain" and "literal" meaning of the words and
yet such reliance produced widely divergent conclusions. In its terms the Yoo
opinion was a credible enough exposition of the law, yet it seemed profoundly
wrong in its recognition of a gap vis-a-vis a legal obligation to observe even minimal humanitarian standards for detainees. Were Taft and the Supreme Court
ing was the reliance

better at linguistic construction

core of meaning?

and was

Or perhaps was

"legal

CA 3

work"

terminology
at play?

"self- evidently" in the

Was this

rather about wise

international relations (IR) policy, 62 or perhaps checking executive excess 63 or per-

haps retaining a moral high ground for instrumental reasons? 64

The debate about the semantic placement of CA
key terms throughout
itary advantage,"

65

LOAC.

3

is

sels

numerous

Issues concerning the correct interpretation of "mil-

of the "nature" of an objective that renders

of whether "war-fighting or war-sustaining" capability
jective, 67

replicated with

is

it

66
liable to attack,

a legitimate military ob-

of how "reasonable" must be the grounds for boarding and attacking ves-

under the right of visit and search or blockade in naval warfare, 68 of the issue of

sufficient "effectiveness" in aerial

and naval blockade, 69 of the application of the

precautionary principle to weapons selection (particularly by those countries possessing high- technology weaponry) 70 and, of course,
loss

71

are

all illustrative

of the

many

what counts as "proportionate"
occupy contentious

interpretive issues that

and/or ambiguous decision making under the law. Invariably
ters are usually

decided by recourse to "judgment."

72

Within

many of these mat-

this

indeterminacy it

becomes evident that legal arguments are calibrated less in terms of lawful and unlawful,
style

this

and more in terms of differing degrees of lawfulness. In so doing,

of legal reasoning develops that

is

a different

more amenable to policy influence. Perhaps

can be reconciled with Hart's sense of penumbral reasoning, or perhaps

it

indi-

cates that the register of legitimacy (with a small dose of Holmes's predictivism) 73

provides better explanatory power for

how LOAC

is

applied in practice, an expla-

nation that gives a sufficient basis to deal with the political and moral advantage

sought to be generated through lawfare.
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The Register of Legitimacy
Writing

in 1952, Sir

law

at the

is ...

uously

at the

Hersch Lauterpacht famously observed that

vanishing point of law, the law of war

vanishing point of international law."

diminished relevance has in
years

fact

is

74

"if international

perhaps even more conspic-

This dire warning of LOAC's

been breathtakingly challenged

in succeeding

and rendered meaningless. Over the past few decades there has been an "ex-

plosion" of treaties, restatements, handbooks, institutional assimilation and deep
professional military

and academic investment with LOAC. This has been

driven by a strategy of pragmatic engagement by humanitarian voices.

Rather than law becoming assimilated
politics, the reverse

at the

seems to have happened.

have been embraced by political

elites

"vanishing point" of international

LOAC and its

and invoked

further broader strategic claims. Certainly

partly

75

underlying principles

in a vernacular of legitimacy to

from the

first

Gulf War onward, law

has been invoked and heralded as providing decisive support for broader cam-

paign advocacy. 76 There

is

no doubt now that compliance with the law forms part

of the political discourse as to the legitimacy of a conflict. Witness the negative con-

sequences of the

Abu Ghraib

events in Iraq, 77 or even

initiated tanker attack in Afghanistan,
hello

78

more

recently, the

to identify the correlation

German-

between jus

considerations and broader political and social identification with the

macy of a military campaign.
This phenomenon is being

tracked within the legal literature. David

become

cies.

a variegated process of input

Traction of legal arguments has

legiti-

Kennedy

has observed that the practice of international law, and especially that of
has

in

LOAC,

and reaction from relevant constituen-

become measured more

in terms of persua-

sion within such constituencies than technical mastery of legal construction. In
short, a register of legitimacy

'[international law has
action

.

.

.

complements

become

[and that] law

that of legality.

Kennedy notes

that

the metric for debating the legitimacy of military

now shapes

the politics of war," 79 and, further:

In the court of world public opinion, the laws in force are not necessarily the rules that

some technical sense, but the rules that are persuasive to relevant political
constituencies. Whether a norm is or is not legal is a function not of its origin or pedigree, but of its effects. Law has an effect
when it persuades an audience with
is law
political clout that something someone else did, or plans to do, is or is not legitimate.
The fact that the modern law in war is expressed in the keys of both validity
are valid, in

—

.

.

—

.

and persuasion makes the professional use of its vocabulary both by humanitarian and
military professionals a complex challenge. 80

In this context, ethical and political corroboration with legal rules
evitable.

becomes

in-

We leave behind the smooth reassurance of an external judicial standard
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and enter a more dynamic though unfamiliar and contentious world
law has
recent

its

rightful place,

its

purchase

is

of a variable nature. In describing this

phenomenon Kennedy observes:

International lawyers
that

but

— one where

it

became

less interested in

whether a rule was valid

—

in the sense

could be said to be rooted in consent, in sovereignty or in the nature of an inter-

sovereign

—than

community
The

national law did.

in

whether

it

worked. International law was what inter-

observations of sociologists or political scientists about what

functioned as a restraint or a reason became
jurists in

more important than the ruminations of

determining what international law was and was not. As one might imagine,

it

became ever less possible to say in advance or with precision what rules would, in fact,
be effective as law. To do so was to make a prediction about what would, in the end, be
enforced. Acting under cover of law became a wager that the action's legality would be
upheld in the unfolding of state practice. Moreover, it became clear that the effectiveness of rules depended less on something intrinsic to the rule than on aspects of
society
how powerful was its proponent, how insistent its enforcement, how persua81
sive its reasons to the broad public who would determine its legitimacy.

—

The perspective presented by Kennedy concerning the variable nature of legal
norms is representative of a wave of critical reassessment. Over the recent past
there have been a number of theories put forward that seek to rationalize the relativity of legal norms within international law. Whether predicated upon notions
of "compliance pull" 82 or theories of transnational politico-legal iteration, 83 they
all

share recognition of a corroborative role of politics/policy as fused with con-

ceptions of legitimacy. In assessing the themes proffered, a
justificatory discourse
self-interest

84

still

as a

begins to emerge, one that belies too obvious political

with appeals to a broader legitimacy. This

arguments cannot

model of the law

is

not to say that bad legal

be distinguished from good ones. 85

It

does acknowledge

though that the vernacular of persuasion has more resonance than appeals to pedigree or

some kind of external

validity.

course within the international realm

As one commentator has noted,

is

legal dis-

not

some legal truth "out there," waiting to be discovered. It is a practice that
on the basis of common understandings and shared beliefs about the relationgoverned by the rules in question. Thus interpretation of international law is the

the search for

operates
ship

search for an intersubjective understanding of the

Critically, the

point

is

not one of

"all

norm

at issue.

86

things considered" subjective policy

choice, but rather choice within the indeterminacy of the law.

likened to "politics within the law"

determining

87

Such choice has been

or perhaps the "legalisation of politics." 88 In

how choices are to be made, some commentators have pointed to the
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role of "general principles" of the

law as reflected in Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute

of the International Court of Justice as providing a durable catalog. Such principles
proliferate

throughout international law and often form complementary and op-

posing pairs. 89 Hence within

LOAC,

the principle of military necessity

poised against the principle of humanity, and each

is

counter-

may be relied upon to advance a

particular interpretive perspective. Kalshoven has argued that such principles

themselves reflect particularized social, historical and ethical traditions and are
sustained by an "inner force" 90 that

The move

is

to a frame of legitimacy

"moral in nature." 91

and

to

acknowledging the power of political

persuasion as part of a justificatory process signals a significant departure from the
positivist
still

firmament of external standards and

linguistic precision.

Perhaps

we are

within the positivist frame but are situated deeply within the penumbral region

more freewheeling exercise of policy-like discretion is
permitted. If so, the penumbra is more than just a narrow band, but rather occupies a much larger space. The type of legal practice and interpretive style currently
described by Hart where a

being theorized actually signals a reflection of the type of reasoning advanced by
the American legal realist

movement of the

1920s and

'30s.

This

movement sought

accommodate the indeterminacy of law and in so doing wanted to implement a
more self- aware process of legal reasoning 92 one critically predicated upon a conception of social scientific methodology that could more productively guide rele-

to

—

vant canons of interpretation. 93

Counterinsurgency, Stabilization Operations and American Legal Realism
This

move

more instrumentalized form of legal reasoning has found

to a

expression in the recently published

US COIN and

explicit

stabilization doctrines. Legal

LOAC became contextualized in seeking to achieve specific political
and military outcomes. The US COIN doctrine was developed against the exigencies
interpretation of

of the increasing violence in Iraq in 2005-6. General Petraeus and others reviewed

counterinsurgency best practices, and thinking "outside the box" developed a
strategy for dealing with the increasingly pressing insurgency.

print for "a strategy waiting to be

It

was

implemented as everything else

in fact a blue-

failed in Iraq." 94

The resulting COIN manual grapples with the new realities of postmodern war
and recommends decisive change. Indeed, the introduction to the manual makes it
very clear that

abruptly

it

made

understand

it,

that "[t]hose

or at least understand what

The manual
tive

new course. Within the first paragraph, the point is
who fail to see the manual as radical probably don't

intends to set a

deals with a

methodology

that

is

it's

number of legal

up

propositions and directs an interpre-

decisively instrumental.

strategic effect within the context

against." 95

These are tailor-made to attain

of an insurgency. The doctrine contains a number
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of paradoxes that seem counterintuitive to prevailing approaches to legal interpre-

These include:

tation.
•

Sometimes, the more you protect your

•

Some of the best weapons

•

Sometimes, the more force

•

the

force, the less secure

for counterinsurgents
is

you may be, 96

do not shoot, 97

used, the less effective

it is,

98

and

The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and
more risk must be accepted. 99
evident that

It is

terinsurgent forces.

COIN doctrine knowingly places greater physical risk on counIt fully

concedes that choices will need to be

made that will re-

higher counterinsurgent casualties. These truisms necessarily test resolve as

sult in

They also provide a meaningful counter to the political
and moral advantage that is sought by insurgent forces through lawfare techniques.
It turns out that political and social success in the field provides the best antidote to

well as public expectation.

lawfare susceptibility at home as well as within the relevant theater of operations. 100

The

COIN and stability operations

doctrines have proven, within Iraq at least, to

provide a reliable framework to reach that goal. General restraint and an allocation
of particular ethical and social value to the consequences of violence have provided
a

more durable context for legal

interpretation.

Within an insurgency, those taking a direct or active part in hostilities are ostenunder the DPH provisions of LOAC. As outlined earlier in this

sibly targetable
cle, little

those

differentiation

who

are

more

is

made between hard-core

traditionally

loosely associated with an insurgency (but

arti-

insurgents and

who

nonetheless

come within the DPH formula). There is, as previously highlighted, an assumption
of mathematical precision that underpins this approach to legal reasoning under

LOAC.

In challenging this blanket legal categorization the Multi-National Force-

Iraq guidelines, reflecting the

ing strategy that was based

COIN doctrine, introduced a more nuanced target-

upon the question of reconcilability and modified legal

approaches. Hence the guidelines stated bluntly:

We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify
and separate the "reconcilables" from the

"irreconcilables" through engagement,

ulation control measures, information operations
strive to

make

and

political activities.

reconcilables a part of the solution, even as

capture or drive out the irreconcilables.

we

identify,

We

pop-

must

pursue and

kill,

101

This required a greater use of intelligence to understand deeper tribal and provincial
tribal

networks and allegiances. Understanding relevant ethnography and intra-

group dynamics gave a better context for instrumental thinking.
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meant

that a substantive differentiation could be

made between

the hard-core in-

surgent and the "accidental guerilla" with respect to targeting. These

nuanced approaches combine with
seeks to

promote

a revised legal interpretive

more

methodology

that

a particular effect with respect to targeting choices.

In relation to the principle of proportionality, the

COIN manual

similarly sig-

on the manner in which this legal standard is usually
interpreted by concentrating upon political and social alienation. The manual
nals a self-conscious variation

states:

In conventional operations, proportionality
terms: civilian lives
gained. In

and property

COIN operations,

lost versus

[military]

is

usually calculated in simple utilitarian

enemy destroyed and

advantage

is

military advantage

best calculated not in terms of how

many insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or detained.
... In

COIN

environments, the number of civilian

needs to be measured against

how much harm

lives lost

and property destroyed
do if al-

the targeted insurgent could

lowed to escape. 102

The commentary notes
ity

that the principles of discrimination

and proportional-

have an additional sociopolitical significance that must be factored into any in-

terpretive exercise

under the law,

or death to noncombatants
gency's appeal
their use."

—

may

stating that "[f]ires that cause unnecessary

create

more

resistance

harm

and increase the insur-

especially if the populace perceives a lack of discrimination in

103

Law, Legitimacy and Interpretive Space
In reconciling the recourse to legitimacy with legal interpretive theory, a broader

opportunity arises to grapple with lawfare

—not

least

of which

is

the ability to

meaningfully address the political and moral advantage sought by non-State actors.

The COIN and

stability operations doctrines

provide an illuminating insight

into

how the calibrated application of force can result in achieving identified military

and

political effects at the tactical, operational

and

strategic levels. Indeed, military

journals these days disclose a fascination by military operators with the implications of force in terms of psychological, sociological

means of fulfilling mission accomplishment
cessity,

goals.

and anthropological effect as a

104

Military lawyers have, of ne-

been part of that experience.

When we speak in the register of legality in familiar terms of classic modern positivwe must be aware of what this implicates and the vulnerabilities it exposes. We
still rely upon this methodology because it retains sufficient explanatory "horsepower" for some audiences in some circumstances. Such circumstances would, of
course, encompass formal litigation processes. They would also be more likely in a
ism,
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"State-on-State" conventional warfare context, which

is

the background in which

LOAC was principally developed, or even when dealing with an "irreconcilable" in a
COIN context. The disquiet that is felt by some that lawfare techniques can undermine

military efforts seems geared to this concept

and context of legal

As has been outlined, however, the register of formal
equipped to deal with social, political or moral critiques. But

legality
this is

exposition.
is

not well

only one con-

cept or version of interpretive valence. In a broader day-to-day context, the inter-

play between law, legitimacy, policy and politics has

become

well understood

by

military lawyers, if not expressly, at least intuitively as a different narrative of the

Some might reconcile these interactions as mere policy overlay of hard law at
the core of legal meaning. Or they could perhaps be reconciled as occurring in the
law.

(broad) penumbral region of discretion of Hart's conception of positivism, or by

invoking and assimilating American legal

now"),

realists

105

techniques (we are, after

all, "all

or perhaps as forming a competing legal methodology of norma-

tive legal relativism

However

realist

and pluralism.

these interactions are reconciled

fact is that military lawyers

from a

have in practice adopted a more informed attitude to

interpretation that has kept pace with broader national
for military action.

theoretical perspective, the

and international strategies

The recent COIN and stabilization doctrines and their support-

ing interpretive legal approaches are designed precisely to counter adverse political

and social reaction in order to obtain military advantage. They represent strong elements of counter-lawfare in their ontological premise. As will be discussed below,
departing the safe moorings of a register of legality for one of legitimacy allows for a

more instrumental approach to achieving mission outcomes. Though not without
risk, it also offers the means by which lawfare techniques used by non-State actors
can be decisively met and defeated.
Part HI, Legal Choice by Military Lawyers in a Pluralist Environment

If,

as

I

have contended, the legal framework of LOAC generates considerable inter-

pretive space, military lawyers necessarily have a
ciling multiple factors
it is

a

theme of

lawfare.

Such

complex

when shaping their advice. Notwithstanding this

this article that military lawyers are well

skills

responsibility in recon-

challenge,

equipped to deal with

have developed quite independently as part of the general nature

of dispensing advice within

LOAC practice. The purpose of this part is to explore

the exogenous factors that underpin military legal decision making. First will be an
analysis of

means-ends

the law

used to mobilize

is

rationality, looking particularly at
political action.

constructivism, which seeks to demonstrate
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IR theories as to

how

be an examination of

how internalization of normative legal
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standards can result in generating a sense of self- identity and interpretive attitude.
Finally, the part will

conclude with a survey of virtue

ethics,

which have particular

resonance within the military ethos and can be understood as a basis for adopting
particular legal strategies of support or resistance.

Means-Ends Rationality and
Public opinion

is

Politicization of Law

often readily acknowledged by military lawyers as having

considerable effect in driving government policy.
lawfare, domestic public opinion

Of

course in the context of

a decisive strategic target, yet there

is

is little

un-

derstanding of how law gets metabolized by advocates to prompt the type of politimobilization that subsequently shapes opinion.

cal

To

end international lawyers and international

this

exhibit

what Jack Goldsmith has referred

tication."

and are

106

legal scholarship generally

to as a "methodological unsophis-

Lawyers generally have a predilection to favor formal over functional

less interested in

examining

causality. 107

They tend

to

assume law's

role in

directing policy choice as a given. Conversely, IR theory seeks to explain interna-

more "realistically" and thus takes "theoretical, methodological,
draw[s] more generously on economand empirical issues more seriously, and

tional behavior

.

ics,

sociology,

and history."

108

.

.

Generally speaking, IR scholars review international

behavior in terms of power, interests, institutions, beliefs or ideas. International

law can have normative

manner

in

effect

within these mechanisms of influence but not in the

which most lawyers possibly

In describing

anticipate.

how international legal norms can be invoked to initiate or sustain

political mobilization,

Simmons

observes that treaty ratification can be seen as an

anchor for creating domestic and international advocacy networks; hence
'

[t]reaties

can change values and beliefs and can change the probability of successful

political action to achieve the rights
affects elite agendas,

political action

Simmons,
in

they promulgate." 109 She notes that ratification

supports litigation and has a particular capacity to mobilize

among epistemic communities. 110 Treaty ratification,

signals not only a "costly signal of intent," but also

marks

according to

a decisive step

"domestic legitimation," thus fostering a precommitment to receptivity by a

government, increases the

size

of the mobilizing coalition, enhances "intangible"

resources and expands the range of political and legal compliance strategies. 111
Similarly,

Keck and Sikkink catalog how

cess for those motivated

treaty ratification creates channels of ac-

by shared values and structured mechanisms

for informa-

tion exchange. These authors present both rationalist (language of incentives
constraints, strategies, institutions, rules)
tions

the

and

and

constructivist (norms, social rela-

intersubjective understandings) foundations to

mechanisms of

social

and

political
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politicizing legal

ing

113

cies,"

norms. 112 Interestingly, the authors

to "alter the information

which

pressure,

refer to "frames" of

and value contexts within which

states

mean-

make poli-

in turn involve "not just reasoning with opponents, but also bringing

arm

encouraging sanctions, and shaming." 114

twisting,

The concept of framing provides a useful context for understanding LOAC
politicization. The issue of banning anti-personnel landmines, for example, which
ultimately resulted in the drafting of the Ottawa anti-personnel mines conven115
was originally discussed in terms of military utility and saving soldiers'
tion,
lives. When the debate was subsequently "framed" by advocates in terms of indiscriminate effect upon civilians, there developed an unstoppable momentum for
universal banning.

in the context of individual vulnerability to military vio-

It is

lence that political mobilization of

Keck and Sikkink note
cent

LOAC norms

seems to be the most

that "issues involving physical

human individuals

effective.

harm to vulnerable or inno-

appear particularly compelling" 116 for network organiza-

tion (issue of framing personified). Consistent with this observation,

it is

not

surprising to see that trenchant arguments of lex specialis vis-a-vis international

human rights law are usually relaxed when it comes to issues such as detainee treatment. Even if the de jure extraterritorial application of human rights law is not
accepted, at least

its

policy stipulations

normative underpinnings are observed through humanitarian

—

partly as recognition of that public expectation that such stan-

dards will be applied.
This recognition of the use of law to press moral and political leverage from a

on military lawyers and, of course, is relied upon as
part of any lawfare campaign. Means-ends rationality concerning public support is
domestic audience

is

not

lost

implicitly part of the military decision-making calculus that underpins approaches

to the law,

whether consciously acknowledged or subconsciously registered.

LOAC

includes tremendous license for the application of destructive power; however,
full exercise is

action

is

unlikely to be pressed. Indeed, legal assessment of mainstream military

rarely

undertaken to decide whether something

as previously noted,

it is

much more

a case of deciding

is

legal or illegal. Rather,

between various

of legal justification and construing the better arguments, which

of course, does not

mean

that

it is

good policy and

this

is

iterations

may range from

merely colorable through to compelling. Deciding whether something
legal,

its

is

merely

where means-ends

rationality invariably enters the equation. Questions concerning public support,
institutional reputation, ethical orientation, self-image, internal discipline

merous other inchoate

and nu-

factors are part of that mix. In discussing the nature of the

by a number of senior US military lawyers to aspects of the
Bush administration's legal framework for the war on terror, Hatfield notes: "The
military lawyers deferred to the law as an accumulation of hard-won institutional

resistance exhibited
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wisdom. They believed the law against torture to be a reality-based warning to keep

doomed to learn the same lessons

us from being

(usually referred to as 'those

from

Vietnam') again and again." 117

The Vietnam War and

its

consequences loom large

in the literature.

There

is

a

sense that something intangible was lost in that conflict and that the decades since

have been devoted to a restoration of professional ethos within the military and a
reach for renewed public trust.

and

LOAC

is

also emphasized. In a recent article, retired Colonel

observes that events like the

searching

The specific correlation between the Vietnam conflict
David Graham

My Lai incident "caused great consternation and soul

among Americans generally," 118 and was a catalyst for initiating compre-

hensive and profound revision and prioritization of the law of war training within
the military. 119
If

lawfare

is

opinion, then

partly predicated
it is

upon

a strategy of decisively influencing public

logical that lawyers

theories that detail the pathways in

should better understand applicable IR

which law is

politicized for this very purpose.

Indeed, the incorporation of public affairs officers within most chains of command

evidences the general institutional recognition by the broader military of the deci-

power of public opinion in liberal democratic societies. Due to a number of
reasons, not the least of which is a lack of relevant social scientific training, 120 lawyers seem reluctant to undertake an analysis of law's effect upon political mobilization. These perspectives allow lawfare strategies a head start. The rationalist and
sive

constructivist methodologies used

by advocacy groups

to influence political deci-

making should be better understood so that alternative arguments can be
meaningfully mounted in response. Similarly, the issue of "framing" LOAC issues
sion

to mobilize public opinion in order to achieve a particular political result

usefully studied to better understand

and

might be

anticipate different perspectives.

Constructivism and a Logic of Appropriateness
Constructivism

is

an ideational theory of IR that posits that national

interests are

shaped by international structures. Hence national identity is partly "constructed"

by international
predicated

legal

norms

that create

upon the partial or full

and disperse

internalization of legal

of coercion, persuasion or acculturation,

121

normative force of international law, in

this case

This realization

norms through

is

a process

leading to an overall acceptance of the

ness" as opposed to a "logic of consequence"
talist

beliefs.

122

LOAC. A

"logic of appropriate-

ensues; hence

it is

less

instrumen-

than other competing IR theories.

Under the constructivism mantle, psychological factors can permit "shaping" of
perspectives through a conscious or unconscious

acknowledgment of global

mili-

tary isomorphism. 123 Moreover, constructivism seeks to provide an answer for
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normative adherence to the tenets of

LOAC. Examples of

this process at

work

through the constructivist lens would include the unique universality of ratification of the 1949
this

Geneva Conventions

(the only treaty series in the

world to achieve

coveted status), the de-emphasis of reciprocity as a basis for an obligation to

comply with the LOAC (famously reinforced by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Kupreskic case) 124 and the enhancement of
legal "principles" (as opposed to treaties or customary international law which are

upon State consent) based upon "elementary consideration of human125
morality 126 and interstitial norms 127 that have achieved greater sway in legal
ity,"

predicated

interpretation. Constructivism also provides

an explanation for why LOAC treaty

and reservations are not, in practice, fully relied upon within interpre-

declarations

LOAC. Additionally, as discussed above, under the means-ends
rationality concept, it goes some way to explaining why, as a matter of "policy"
overlay, a number of human rights norms within armed conflict find resonance,

tive

approaches to

especially within the field of detention operations.

Constructivism, not surprisingly, provides the most comprehensive account of
social

agency among competing IR theories. Some see

initial "role

and

Jinks

playing"

examine

128

this as a

two-step process of

that then leads to an internalization of norms.

this further to differentiate

Goodman

between "persuasion," a conscious

acceptance of the merits of an idea, and "acculturation," under which partial internalization occurs through the
icry,

phenomena of sociological micro-processes of mim-

orthodoxy, identification, status maximization and avoidance of cognitive

dissonance. 129

Constructivism provides an explanation for
generate a level of self- identity from

why

LOAC. Famously, during

tration debates about the dejure application of the
in Afghanistan, the

Chairman of the

the

come

Bush adminis-

Geneva Conventions

to the

is

war

Geneva Conventions were a fundamental

and every military member was trained on them.

Objectively applying the Conventions was important to our self image."

sentiment

to

Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, resisted

their non-application, stating that " [t]he

part of our military culture

military forces can

echoed by other military members

who

asked

130

.

.

.

This

who "owned"

the

131

Geneva Conventions, the civilian lawyers or the military. Plainly there was a level
of deep cognitive dissonance that came from a perception of civilian technical legal
manipulation. Such questioning suggests a strong sense of internalization of

norms

associated with the legal framework.

Constructivists also posit the view that their theory helps explain the non-use

of nuclear and chemical weapons at times

when

their legality

was

still

evolving

and rationalist theories would have expected such use. While these theories may
be overstated and fail to account for the types of means-end rationality arguments
132
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more

outlined above, or

generally for simple military utility, they nonetheless

provide a credible basis to understand disposition.

If,

in fact, the military

do

"owns"

LOAC as many so perceive, then normative adherence has less to do with external
legal controls

than with an internal orientation of self-image. As such, arguments

of legal propriety find a receptive audience in the military and permit a more

nuanced view of the application of force. This does not deny the

some

legal

arguments

to ensure

complete mission accomplishment.

ever, allow for a "base" internal attitude

accepted

—one

that

is

availability of fulIt

does,

how-

toward legitimacy of action that has been

not oblivious to the significance of moral and social conse-

quences concerning the application of force.

Virtue Ethics
Unlike deontology or utilitarianism, which are forms of external moral guidance

"where

[an] agent has to bring his will

laws ... or to maximize the

common

notes that "virtue

is

good,"

133

in line with universal

moral

virtue ethics deal with a deeply

Of Aristotelian origin, virtue ethics are conexamination of our own behavior. Mark Osiel

personal orientation toward living

cerned with consistent personal

and action

life.

a property of our character, not our relation to others, even

evidenced in such relations."
vating factor that led a

134

Osiel points to a

form of virtue

number of senior US judge advocates

if

ethics as the moti-

to resist

some Bush

administration policies which were thought to undermine a particular balance in
the framework of

means-ends

LOAC. 135 The motivation was not

rationality, or

upon

even a conscious expression of internalized legal norms;

rather they were motivated

by

Interestingly, virtue ethics

a deeper sense of felt professional honor.

have been viewed as a more reliable basis for action

than "altruistic obligations to others and braver than

self-interest." 136 Importantly,

they represent something of a reversion to an aristocratic
life

necessarily based

based upon a sense of reflective equilibrium.

137

commitment of living

Critically, the

motivation

is

a

not

premised upon any sense of (human) rights discourse, but rather a reflection of
personal integrity. Hence with respect to the Judge Advocate General's (JAG)

Corps approach to detainee operations, Osiel observes that the

felt

sentiment was

we have detained as terror suspects should best be
understood ... as an inference from the duties we owe our fellow citizens to behave

that "the duties

we owe to

those

honorably, consistent with our identity as a people constitutively committed to the
rule of law." 138

The

military

is

particularly susceptible to the agency of virtue ethics as codes

of behavior and service values are ritually emphasized in
organizations around the world. Moral courage, as

all

much

professional military

as physical courage,

is

highly prized, and heuristic devices that transmit and reinforce this virtue are

348

Dale Stephens

consistently deployed.

As Osiel

in the oft-used statement

notes,

one such shorthand expression

"Marines don't do that/'

Corps defender of a Guantanamo detainee,
conveys the depth of this appeal to virtue

"It's

not

all

sequence of such decision making.

It

it's

JAG

about us," 140

COIN manual. 141 That this particu-

The business of warfare

Drawing upon a self-illuminated moral

reflected

does the refrain "Lose Moral

should have explanatory power for choices

that surprising.

is

Similarly, the line of a

not about them,

ethics, as

Legitimacy, Lose the War" outlined within the
lar perspective

139

identity

is

is,

brutal

made under

the law

is

and deeply intimate.

or should be, a necessary con-

does necessarily inform decision making in a

manner independent from means-ends rationality and constructivist internalization theories. Of course, targeting and other operational decision making has
become highly bureaucratized 142 and there is the sense of a loss of responsibility
through the battery of iterated routines. 143 Yet, there
gic,

is

always space at the strate-

operational and tactical levels where independent judgment

is

exercised under

LOAC and it is here, within those spaces, where virtue ethics have some explanatory power for decision making. As such, the recognition of virtue ethics as a motivating force within the military acts as a sort of default setting to counter lawfare
strategies that

aim

to ignite overreaction

and violation of moral standards.

Conclusion

The typical sentiment expressed when dealing with

assertions of lawfare

is

a pernicious tactic that exploits the vulnerabilities of "law-abiding" States.

that

it is

The fact

LOAC, has always taken place on a highly contested terrain of social and political norms. What the phenomenon of lawfare does
is

that the practice of law, including

is

highlight the perceptions of the limitations under the positivist

dressing

and countering

its

goals. All

reveal a level of interpretive space

can be infused into

Correlatively,

it is

contemporary accounts of positivism today

where broader

legal interpretation. It

that the interpretive space
also a

is

theme

much
that

framework in ad-

social

and policy considerations

has been a strong theme of this article

broader than what might be imagined.

LOAC is more indeterminate than what might

be hoped. Hence, whether reconciled as the interplay between law and policy, or
being an interpretive act within Hart's penumbral region, or representing a

format of legitimacy, the means

exist

by which the goals sought

new

in a malevolent

lawfare strategy can be decisively countered. Evidence of these opportunities

ready exists within the

al-

COIN and stability operations environment, but these new

doctrines merely represent aspects

of a broader reality about interpretive

approaches.
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In understanding the choices that are available to military legal officers

terpreting

and applying the

law, there are a

number of factors

that

do

when in-

get included

in the

decision-making calculus beyond mere textual excursus. Means-ends ratio-

nality

and the

accepting
the

role of public opinion have always

this, legal analysis

manner

in

been relevant considerations. In

should borrow from IR theory to better understand

which the law

is

used as part of

advocacy projects.

political

Constructivism provides another explanatory theory for why normative features of
the law are internalized

and why there

"owned" by the

Such an understanding assists

military.

exists a strong

sentiment that

LOAC

in anticipating the

is

margins

may be at play when grappling with the decision-making prounder LOAC. Similarly, virtue ethics sometimes play an unconscious

of appreciation that
cesses

though

vital part

of the interpretive experience and permit a reliably professional

assessment of law's purpose in relation to military decision making.

The

issue of equipoise

between principles of military necessity and humanity

remains central to the interpretive endeavor of

LOAC. As

fundamental touch-

a

stone of every interpretive exercise in any register of approach

of Professor Dinstein,

[ejvery single

by

norm

who

of

the observations

poignantly notes that

LOIAC

a parallelogram of forces:

mands of military

is

[the

law of international armed conflict]

is

moulded

confronts a built-in tension between the relentless de-

it

and humanitarian considerations, working out a compromise formula. The outlines of the compromise vary from one LOIAC norm to
another. Still, in general terms, it can be stated categorically that no part of LOIAC
overlooks military requirements, just as no part of LOIAC loses sight of humanitarian
necessity

considerations. 144

The expression of such a "categorical imperative" provides a critical foundation
for directing the trajectory of
as

any interpretive approach. While lawfare

an unfair or malevolent means to an ulterior end,

its

is

derided

recognition permits a

deeper appreciation of the social and political context in which law

is

used to un-

derpin military decision making. This requires that the inevitable moral and
cal

dilemmas encountered

advice

is

in

such decision making be consciously faced

to be rendered meaningful. Central to this exercise

is

politiif legal

the critical need to

balance military and humanitarian considerations, always and everywhere, as a

matter of legal rectitude.

It

also

prompts a necessary acknowledgment of the special

role military lawyers have in dispensing advice

must always responsibly

act.
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Warning Civilians Prior to Attack under
International Law: Theory and Practice

Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Noam Neuman*

A

primary goal of the modern law of armed conflict
tional humanitarian law)

is

to protect civilians as

(also

known

as interna-

much as possible from the

violent consequences of hostilities. Accordingly, the law of armed conflict requires
that the parties to a conflict apply certain precautionary measures in order to mini-

mize incidental injury to
cautionary measures

This

article will deal

is

civilians resulting

from military attacks. One of these pre-

the provision of warnings to civilians prior to an attack.

with this measure, and examine both theoretical and practical

aspects of providing advance warnings of attacks.

During World War
an

attack.

II

there were instances

Advance warnings were

also

when

civilians

were warned prior to

provided during other armed conflicts

throughout the second half of the twentieth century; however, the amount, scope

and

specificity of

warnings issued to

conflicts fought since the

civilians

have dramatically increased in the

beginning of this century. Probably the most elaborate

and systematic warnings were issued by Israel in its conflict in Lebanon in 2006 and

* Professor (Colonel, Israel

School of Law,

Israel,

Defense Forces (Ret.)) Pnina Sharvit Baruch, Tel Aviv University

and Lieutenant Colonel

Noam Neuman, Israel Defense Forces. The opin-

and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Israel Defense Forces or the government of Israel. We would like to thank
Galit Rajuan, Nimrod Karin and David Benjamin for their valuable comments and suggestions.

ions and conclusions expressed in this article are those of the authors

Warning Civilians Prior to Attack under International Law

especially in

operation in the Gaza Strip in 2009. This article explores the legal

its

boundaries of the obligation to issue warnings to civilians prior to attack. Does the
recent practice of Israel

and other

States result

flection of self-imposed restrictions?
in

from

legal obligations

or

a re-

is it

What are the elements a warning should fulfill

order to meet the legal requirements?
Section

I

briefly reviews the legal

prior to an attack,
in military

its

historical

manuals. In section

framework of the obligation

development and the manner with which
II,

dealt

it is

State practice will be examined, with a focus

Based on these two sections, section

Israeli practice.

warnings

to give

aspects of the obligation. Finally, the article will

III will

on

analyze the different legal

end with our conclusion

as to

both

the legal and practical issues associated with advance warnings.

This article
cal aspects

is

written from the viewpoint of practitioners faced with the practi-

of the issue

at

hand and

is

based on personal experience. Hopefully,

will serve as a useful tool to those facing similar

it

dilemmas, as well as to those evalu-

ating the performance of others.

The Duty

I.

A. Historical

Give Prior Warning: The Legal Basis

Development

The requirement to give,
tack that

to

may affect

in certain circumstances,

advance warning prior to an

at-

the civilian population appears in the earliest codifications of

we

the law governing the conduct of hostilities. Thus,
tion in Article 19 of the Lieber

Code of

find the following instruc-

1862:

Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a
place, so that the

moved

noncombatants, and especially the

before the

bombardment commences. But

women and

it is

law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise

Article 19

acknowledges that there

no

children,

may be

infraction of the

may be

a necessity.

re-

common

1

may be situations when it is justified not to give

when it is necessary to enable surprising the enemy.
The Lieber Code influenced the language of the Brussels Declaration of

a warning, as

which stated
village,

is

in Article 16 that "if a

defended, the officer in

commencing

a

authorities." Unlike the Lieber
ficer in

town or fortress, agglomeration of dwellings, or

command

bombardment, except

2

command

specifies that the

1874,

of an attacking force must, before

in assault,

do

all

in his

Code, the Brussels Declaration

of an attacking force and not to

power
is

commanders

to

warn the

directed to the ofin general.

It

also

warning must be given to the "authorities." Similar language
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appears in the Laws of War on Land published by the Institute of International
in

1880 (known also as the Oxford Manual)

.

annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV con-

Article 26 of the Regulations
tains

Law

3

wording that is almost identical to that of the Brussels Declaration: "The Offi-

cer in

Command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment,

except in the case of an assault, do

term "assault"

warn

all

warn the authorities." 4 The
regarding which there is no obligation to

in his

refers to surprise attacks,

power

to

in advance. 5

Article 6 of the 1907

Forces in

Time of War

Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval
duty to issue warnings prior to attacks. 6

also refers to the

Conversely, the draft Air Warfare Rules of 1923 did not refer to warnings, 7 which
suggests that at that period of time

bombardment.

The implementation of the
ated

little

no

similar rule existed with regard to aerial

8

obligation to issue warnings prior to an attack cre-

difficulty in earlier eras

population came from

artillery,

when attacks likely to seriously affect the civilian
usually in a siege operation. In such a context,

since the authorities of the besieged area

had no

means of protecting the
was not required and attacking troops

military objectives being targeted, surprise

had

little

problem

in giving

an advance warning; 9 however, when attacks through

bombardment commenced

aerial

considered a

critical

practical

early in the twentieth century, surprise

was

condition for success. As a consequence, as reflected by the

absence of a warning provision in the 1923 Air Warfare Rules, apparently no rule
existed at that time requiring warnings prior to aerial attacks. Rogers indicates that

when

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was preparing its rethe Conference of Government Experts in 1971, a majority of experts felt

the International

port to

that the rule regarding warning

B. Current Legal

Today

there

is

"had

fallen into disuse." 10

Framework

widespread acceptance that the rule laid

Regulations reflects customary international law.

B.l.

The 1977 Additional Protocols and

The duty to

the

give warnings prior to attack

tional Protocol

I

Duty

is

down

in the 1907

to

Give Warnings

addressed in Article 57(2) (c) of Addi-

of 1977, dealing with precautions in attack. The

"Effective advance

warning

shall

Hague

11

be given of attacks which

population, unless circumstances do not permit."

12

The

article provides,

may affect

article

the civilian

was adopted with

ninety votes in favor, none against and four abstentions at the diplomatic confer-

ence that negotiated the Protocol. 13

No relevant reservations were made regarding

361

Warning Civilians Prior to Attack under International Law

it.

14

reflects, in essence, a rule existing in

This article

customary international law. 15

We will analyze the components of the customary norm below.
Article 57(2)(c) refers only to

mand

warnings prior to "military operations" that are not attacks. 16

however, distinguish

among
on

ried out against objectives
sels at sea
article.

warning of "attacks" and, therefore, does not de-

and

land, naval
land.

17

As

and
for

aerial attacks so

does not,

It

long as they are car-

warnings with regard to attacking ves-

aircraft, there are special rules that will

not be discussed in this

18

Additional Protocol

II

of 1977, dealing with non-international armed conflict, 19

does not include an obligation to issue warnings prior to an attack; 20 however, the

ICRC study Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL)
ligation to issue a
conflict.

tional

21

warning prior to attack

also applies in non-international

ob-

armed

This article will address advance warnings only in the context of interna-

armed

conflict; the

de jure applicability of the rule in non-international

armed conflicts will not be analyzed.
The recently published manual on
deals with the duty to issue warnings
sile

states that the

air

when

and

missile warfare

(AMW Manual) 22

attacking ground targets by air or mis-

operations in rule 37:

When

the attack of a lawful target

death or injury to

by

civilians, effective

air

or missile combat operations

specific as

B.2.

leaflets

may

to Issue

civilian

be done, for instance,

or broadcasting the warnings. Such warnings ought

circumstances permit

Other Obligations

result in

advance warnings must be issued to the

population, unless circumstances do not permit. This

through dropping

may

to

be as

23

Warnings Prior

to

Attack

The law of armed conflict also includes an obligation to give specific advance warnings before attacking persons and objects entitled to specific protection. 24 These include civilian hospitals, 25 medical units, 26 hospital ships, 27 civilian medical units, 28
civil

defense personnel and material, 29 and cultural property. 30 The purpose of the

warning in these instances

is

to provide the

enemy the opportunity to put an end to

the misuse of such personnel and objects in order to avoid the need to attack

them. 31 Accordingly, the

AMW Manual stipulates

that such warnings should

include a time limit within which to redress the situation to the extent that the

cumstances permit.

Reference to warnings appears also in the
Restrictions

amended Protocol on

Prohibitions or

on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol

the Convention

cir-

32

on Certain Conventional Weapons).

33

II

to

Additionally, as indicated

above, there are also special rules about warning vessels and aircraft in the context
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of surface warfare at sea and of aerial operations. 34 This

article will

not address

these specific types of warning.
Finally,

ground

warnings usually constitute part of the rules of engagement issued to

forces involved in law enforcement missions. For example, while trying to

power might have a duty to warn the suspect before
using lethal force through verbal warnings and warning shots. This article will focus,
however, only on warnings during armed conflict.
arrest a suspect, the arresting

C. Military Manuals

An obligation to give warnings prior to attacks appears in many military manuals,
including the most recent. 35 Examples include the following.
•

The US Army's Operational Law Handbook, published

The

general requirement to

warn before

a

bombardment only

in 2010, provides:

applies if civilians are

an assault (any attack where surprise is a key element), no
warning need be given. Warnings need not be specific as to time and location of the at36
tack, but can be general and issued through broadcasts, leaflets, etc.
present. Exception:

•

if it is

Paragraph 8.9.2 of the

US Navy's The Commander s Handbook on

the

Law of

Naval Operations, which was issued in 2007, under the heading "Warning before

Bombardment" states, "Where the
should make every reasonable effort

military situation permits,
to

warn the

civilian

commanders

population located in

bombardment. Warnings may
lest the bombarding force or the success of its mis-

close proximity to a military objective targeted for

be general rather than

specific

sion be placed in jeopardy." 37
•

Article 5.32.8 of the

United Kingdom's The Manual of the Law of Armed

Conflict (2004) provides:

There is a duty to give advance warning of an attack that "may"
lation, unless

circumstances do not permit. Obviously, the point does not arise as a

matter of law if military operations are being conducted in an area where there
vilian

popu-

affect the civilian

population or

if the

attack

is

not going to

affect the civilian

population

is

no

ci-

at

all.

In

must be effective. The object of
and to enable the civil
defense authorities to take appropriate measures. To be effective the warning must be
38
in time and sufficiently specific and comprehensive to enable them to do this
other cases, the warning must be given in advance and

the warning

is

it

to enable civilians to take shelter or leave the area

.

•

Article 551 of Australia's 1994 Defense Force
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Manual provides:

.

.

.

Warning Civilians Prior
When

a

planned attack

is

Attack under International

likely to affect the civilian

Law

population, those making the at-

advance warning of the attack to the
population. This requirement must obviously be applied in a

tack are required to give,
authorities or civilian

to

if

practicable, effective

commonsense manner in light of all other factors. If the proposed action is likely to be
seriously compromised by a warning then there is no requirement to provide any
warning. 39

Article

•

420 of Canada's manual Law ofArmed Conflict at the Operational and

Tactical Levels (2001) states,
tacks

which may

"An

affect the civilian population, unless

such a warning to be given. For

warning
•

advance warning

effective

in order to

tactical reasons,

be given of

at-

circumstances do not permit

an attacking force

maintain the element of surprise."

Article 1.4 of France's

shall

may not give a

40

LOAC Summary Note of 1992 states, "If the military

mission allows for it, appropriate warning must be given to the civilian population
to give

it

time to seek shelter." 41

Additional examples appear in volume

of the ICRC's customary international

II

law study. 42

IT.

State Practice

This section includes under the heading "General Practice" several examples of
State practice

on warnings

prior to attack. 43

It

should be kept in mind that

this

is

only a brief account of these examples and does not purport to be a comprehensive
or exhaustive record of such practice.

The second part,

"Israeli Practice," is a

more

detailed description of Israeli practice with regard to warnings prior to attack, particularly in the

Lebanon War of 2006 and

Gaza

in the operation in the

Strip in

2008-9.

A. General Practice

A.l.

World War II

During World
conducted
practice

in

War

II,

enemy

warnings generally were not given prior to

territory.

44

In a

US

Air Force pamphlet

it is

aerial attacks

explained that

was lax on warnings, "because of the heavily defended nature of the targets

attacked as well as because of attempts to conceal targets." 45
general warnings by dropping leaflets listing cities that
listed cities

The Air Force did give
would be bombed. The

were indeed subsequently bombed. 46

There were, however, also examples of cases where specific warnings were given,
to include the

warning given

in

1945 to the
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the city

was about

to be

bombarded

given ninety minutes prior to a

Czechoslovakia.

48

bomb

In other cases, particularly
tory,

US

Another example

fore the use of the atomic

if

is

he did not surrender. 47
attack

A warning was also

on the Skoda armament works

in

the warning to the Japanese authorities be-

against Hiroshima. 49

when

the objective was situated in occupied terri-

warnings were made by radio or by means of pamphlets. 50 There were also

cases in

which aircraft flew at a very low altitude over the objective, giving civilians,

workers or townspeople time to leave. 51

were given during World

War

II,

It

seems, however, that

when warnings

especially with regard to aerial attacks, this

was

not necessarily done out of a sense of obligation, but rather in order to induce the

opposing belligerent to surrender or to avoid further escalation that would

from
A.2.

large

numbers of civilian

result

casualties.

Korean War

During the Korean

War

of 1950 to 1953, warnings prior to aerial bombardments

were sometimes issued by
the United Nations
residents to leave

UN forces. 52 For example, a warning was broadcast by

Command

to the civilian population of

any areas where there were military

North Korea asking

targets.

The warning

listed

the objects that were considered military targets, including railroads, bridges and

power plants. 53 In addition, United Nations
telling the

enemy the towns

it

Command forces often dropped leaflets

was about to bomb. 54 According to the report of the

United States in the CIHL, the warnings given in the Korean
their terms,

not to

such as advising

alert the air

civilians to

War

were general in

avoid war-supporting industries, "in order

defense forces of an impending attack on a specific target." 55

A3. The Conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
In some cases NATO issued warnings prior to attacks during Operation Allied
Force's bombing campaign over the territory of the FRY in 1999. 56 Notwithstanding this fact, in its report on the operation, Amnesty International claimed there
was "a consistent

failure to give effective

warning to

civilians." 57

The incident which attracted the most attention concerning the issue of warnings was the bombing of the building housing the television and radio station in
Belgrade on April 23. According to the final report to the prosecutor reviewing the
NATO bombing campaign, 58 evidence concerning the warning given prior to this
attack is somewhat contradictory. On one hand, NATO officials in Brussels are alleged to have told Amnesty International that they did not give a specific warning,
because it would have endangered the pilots. 59 On the other hand, foreign media
representatives were apparently forewarned of the attack. In addition, apparently a

warning was received by Yugoslav authorities eleven days prior to the
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some Yugoslav officials may have expected that
struck. The report to the prosecutor concludes:
result

the building was about to be

Although knowledge on the part of Yugoslav officials of the impending attack would
not divest NATO of its obligation to forewarn civilians under Article 57(2), it may
nevertheless imply that the Yugoslav authorities may be partially responsible for the

from the attack and may suggest that the advance notice
may have in fact been sufficient under the circumstances. 60

civilian casualties resulting

given by

NATO

According to some
site

warning the foreign journalists to stay away from the

critics,

was not sufficient to meet the requirement of informing the Yugoslav authorities

of an attack. 61 In addition,

was not

it is

argued that the warning to the Yugoslav authorities

was no longer perceived

threat

took place eleven days

effective since the attack

and by

as plausible, leading civilians to

building at the time of the attack.

AA.

later

that time the

be present in the

62

NATO in Afghanistan

During the military operations
continued to the present,

in Afghanistan that

began

in 2001

and have

NATO forces have routinely issued general warnings to

the civilian population prior to attack. 63 Additionally, according to different reports, such as those issued

by Amnesty International,

in

some circumstances,

NATO aircraft in Afghanistan fly close to targets or shoot warning rounds to move
away from

civilians

a potential target. 64

A. 5. Coalition Forces in Iraq

According to reports, during Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition forces routinely

dropped

leaflets

from the

end of April 2003,
ures. 66 It

warning

advising Iraqi civilians of pending attacks. 65

3 1 ,800,000 leaflets

civilians to stay

against

away from

campaign aimed

military targets, 67

at civilians

Saddam Hussein and

By

the

had been dropped, according to US Army fig-

should be noted, however, that while some of the

logical warfare

them

air

and

his regime.

leaflets

focused on

many were part of a psycho-

soldiers

and were meant

to turn

68

A.6. Russia-Georgia Conflict (2008)

The Independent
issued

but

its

it is

report

unclear

refer to a

International Fact-Finding Mission

on the
if

conflict in

September 2009.

69

The

and when warnings were given prior

few specific cases regarding warnings.
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on the Conflict

in Georgia

is

comprehensive,

to attacks.

The report does

report
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by the Republic of
Abkhazia authorities to the civilian population of the upper Kodori Valley, who,
immediately before the military operation began, received many warnings on the
preparations and execution of the military operation planned in that area and
First,

the report mentions positively the warnings given

were provided with a humanitarian corridor so that they could leave the area of
hostilities.

70

The report is less content with the practice of the Georgian forces, which used
smoke grenades to warn the population before artillery shelling. The report claims
that this falls short of giving an effective advance warning, though no analysis is
provided. The report finds the fact that Georgian authorities declared a three-hour
unilateral ceasefire to allow the
flict
all

area

by moving in

remaining

civilians in Tskhinvali to leave the

a southern direction does not

feasible measures. This

fulfill

con-

their obligation to take

contention seems linked to the finding that

when

the

nighttime offensive on Tskhinvali was carried out, no general advance warning was

provided to the remaining population. 71
It is

interesting to note that in that portion of the report

tion of the precautions

its

ings are not mentioned.

where Russia's descrip-

forces took in the course of the conflict

is

quoted, warn-

72

B. Israeli Practice

B.l.

Lebanon

Lebanon in 1982 and 1996, warnings were given by Israel
population of southern Lebanon prior to attacks through the distri-

During the operations
to the civilian

in

bution of leaflets and via radio and loudspeakers, as well as by telephone

When

the Second

Lebanon War broke out

calls.

73

in 2006, Israeli authorities stressed

the importance of warning the civilian population to stay away from areas of com-

bat in order to avoid as

much

as possible civilian casualties. 74 Different

were given in different phases of the

The

first aerial

bombardment by Israel was

night of July 12, 2006.
Israel

attack, as will

Its

aim was

now be

warnings

described. 75

a surprise attack carried out

on the

to destroy the long-range rockets of Hezbollah.

had managed in the years before the war to acquire accurate intelligence as to

the location of Hezbollah's long-range rockets (Fajar rockets), which were limited

number and had the capability of reaching the center of Israel's most populated
areas. The opening strike in the war was directed at these storage places, which
in

no warning was
given, as surprise was crucial in order to prevent the relocation of the weapons to
new, unknown locations. The main deliberations prior to the attacks focused on

were, for the most part, residential buildings. Prior to these attacks

the proportionality analysis, as

many

civilians
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were expected to be

killed or

Warning Civilians Prior
wounded

in these attacks.

tage anticipated

from the

During the next

me

several

to

Law

Attack under International

This was weighed against the substantial military advanattack."

weeks

continued with

Israel

naval operations, and also

commenced

its

aerial operations, as well

ground operation. At

a

this stage,

Israel

gave general warnings to civilians in specific areas of southern Lebanon, ad-

vising

them

tect

to evacuate the area to places

north of the Litani River in order to pro-

themselves from impending attacks expected in those areas. 77 Additionally,

from which

similar warnings were given to villages

launched toward
such

as

Dahiya

Israel

and

to villages

and

missiles

which military

specific areas in

weapon depots and Hezbollah headquarters, were located

(for

objects,

example, the

district in Beirut).

The warnings were given through four main methods:
craft,

were actually being

leaflets

dropped by

air-

recorded Arabic messages to telephones, messages on an Arabic-speaking

radio station broadcasting from Israel, and telephone conversations with mukhtars
(local leaders),

mayors and community

leaders." 8

The warnings were intended

to

provide civilians with a reasonable period of time for evacuation, during the course
of which travel would be relativelv safe and strikes in the evacuation routes would

be avoided (unless the target was time sensitive, such

were

fired

toward

Israel

and there was

ing). In addition, the Israel

a

need

as, for

example,

to prevent such fire

when rockets

from continu-

Defense Forces (IDF) gave general warnings advising

Chilians to avoid places in which Hezbollah operated.

One such

leaflet,

out of

510,000 dropped on the afternoon of July 16 over Sidon, Tyre and Beirut, read as
follows (originallv in Arabic) :"

To

g

the residents of Lebanon

To protect the citizens of the
anon

State of Israel, the

against Hezbollah's unbridled

For your
volved

own

safety,

civilians,

IDF will continue its operations

and continuing

and because of our

in Leb-

terrorist attacks.

desire to prevent

you should avoid places where Hezbollah

harm from coming to uninis

located

and from which

operates against the State of Israel.

Such places

are:

•

Locations from which rockets are launched

•

Storehouses of ammunition and military equipment belonging to Hezbollah
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Hezbollah centers in south Beirut and regions in south Lebanon under Hezbollah

•

control

•

Beirut's southern

The IDF

suburb [Dahiya] which

upon the

calls

direct or indirect aid to

You should know
from having

The

the terror center

and the Lebanese army to avoid extending

Hezbollah elements. Anyone who does so endangers his own life.

that the continuation of terrorism against Israel will prevent

a better

life

you

in the future

State of Israel

Warnings

make

residents of Lebanon

is

to civilians in specific villages

were repeated several times in order to

sure that civilians were aware of the need to evacuate the area. 80 Following

the comprehensive warning campaign a vast majority of the civilian residents of

south Lebanon

The

Israeli

left

and headed north, although some

operation in Lebanon was subject to

prepared by missions sent by

on Lebanon or the Reports).
tainly saved

critical

behind. 81

review in two reports

UN human rights bodies (hereinafter the UN Reports

82

One of the reports admitted that the warnings "cer-

many lives, both in south Beirut and south of the Litani River." 83 Nev-

ertheless, the

Reports also included criticism of the warnings given by Israel during

the military operation.

made

civilians did stay

in section

An

analysis of the legal standards applied

by the Reports

is

III.

B.2. Israeli Practice in the

Gaza

Strip (2000 to the Present)

autumn of 2000 there was an outbreak of hostilities between Israel and
Palestinian armed groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the years that
In the

IDF carried out aerial operations against targets located in these arsuch as weapon depots, military headquarters and tunnels used for smuggling

followed, the
eas,

of weapons. 84
Prior to aerial operations against such targets, Israel developed a practice of giv-

ing a general warning by pamphlets to residents of buildings housing such military
infrastructure to stay away. In addition, specific

and

precise warnings

by phone

were provided to the inhabitants of the location immediately prior to the

attack. 85

The aim was to enable the civilians to leave before the planned attack; however, in a
few cases civilians being warned chose not to heed these warnings and instead were
even joined by others coming to shield the house from attack. This led to the addition of further steps of giving further warning by phone calls and eventually of
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warning shots using small munitions aimed

at the roofs

of the designated

86
targets used in such cases.

When

the operation in

Gaza commenced

in

December 2008,

Israel

was faced

with the difficult task of carrying out extensive military operations in a small
area

—one

of the most densely populated in the world

widespread intermingling of hostile forces with the
cordingly, in order to minimize civilian casualties as

much as possible,

publication as follows:

First,

is

civilians

was

there
87

Ac-

Israel

em-

civilian population.

ployed substantial efforts and various means to warn
operations. This extensive system of operations

—where

of impending

described in an Israeli

official

88

general warnings were used, calling

Hamas was conducting combat
in certain areas, calling

on

activities.

on

civilians to stay

away from

sites

where

In addition, regional warnings were distributed

civilians to leave those areas before

IDF

forces operated in

them. Efforts were made to include in these warnings sufficient information to the

resi-

and designated specific routes for this
from having no place to flee, residents could and

dents, including a timeframe for the evacuation

purpose leading to

safe areas. Far

the vast majority did

—move

—

to safe locations. Finally, specific warnings were issued to

residents of particular buildings before attack.

Throughout the Gaza Operation, the IDF employed a variety of methods to communicate warnings effectively. The warning techniques included:

The IDF conveyed instructions and advance
warnings to residents by local radio broadcasts with IDF announcements and by about
165,000 phone calls. This involved specific notices as well as a daily news broadcast (the
latter from 31 December onwards).
•

Radio Broadcasts and Phone

Calls:

Dropping of Leaflets: During the Gaza operation, the IDF dropped a total of some
2,500,000 leaflets of various kinds in the Gaza Strip. Some of the leaflets warned civil•

from military targets, including buildings containing weapons, ammunitions or tunnels, or areas where terrorist activity was being conducted.
Other leaflets directed residents to leave a particular location and move to a safe zone
by a certain route and within a defined period of time. Such leaflets were distributed,
89
for instance, in the northern Gaza neighbourhood of Sajaiya.f
While warnings were
a significant tool to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, IDF forces did not consider the distribution of leaflets alone as sufficient to presume the absence of civilians at
ians to distance themselves

]

the relevant locations.

•

Specific

phone

Warnings Before Attacks: In addition to the above, the IDF made specific tele-

calls just

before an attack was about to take place, informing residents at risk

about the upcoming strike and urging them to leave the place. In certain instances,

though such warnings were made, the

civilians
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chose to

stay. In

such

cases, the

al-

IDF
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made even greater efforts to avoid civilian casualties and minimise collateral damage by
firing

warning shots from

proceeding with the

light weapons that hit the roofs

strike.

of the designated targets, before

These warnings were accompanied by real-time

surveil-

lance in order to assess the presence of civilians in the designated military target, despite the

advance warnings. Accordingly, the commander in charge assessed whether

the collateral

was

damage anticipated, including to those who chose to

stay at the premises,

not excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.

The

specific

warn-

ings were generally effective. Several such incidents are discussed in Section V.D(2), in-

cluding one in which

all

residents of a four-story apartment building safely evacuated

following a series of warnings, and another in which surveillance confirmed the evacuation of a group of residents, although apparently one family remained despite the extensive warnings.

The

Israeli

[wjhile the

report concludes that

warning systems implemented by the IDF did not provide a 100 percent

guarantee against civilian casualties, they were, in
surveillance

by IDF

fact,

highly effective. Aerial video

forces confirmed the departure of civilians

from targeted

areas

prior to the attack as a direct result of the warnings. 90

One example referred to

in the report

is

an incident in which

were given of the attack on the house of Nazar Ri'an on January
is

a

good

illustration of the

manner

in

1,

specific

warnings

91

Since this

2009.

which warnings were used,

it is

worth de-

scribing in detail.

and members of his family were killed in an aerial strike that hit their home. Ri'an
was a senior Hamas operative, but he was not the target of the attack .... Instead, the
operational goal of the strike was to destroy Hamas' central compound in the Jabaliya
refugee camp. The compound included several buildings that served as storage sites for
large quantity of sophisticated weapons.
[T]he IDF issued several warnings before
the attack. These included not only general leaflets and telephone calls, alerting civilians to avoid facilities serving Hamas and other terrorist groups, but specific phone
calls to the residents of the targeted buildings, notifying them of the planned strike and
warning them to evacuate the premises. The IDF also fired two separate rounds of preliminary warning shots with light weapons, 13 minutes and 9 minutes before the strike,
providing sufficient time for residents to evacuate. The residents evidently understood
these early warnings, as a group of them did leave the building, a fact confirmed by IDF
surveillance before proceeding with the strike. The IDF observed this group evacuation
and drew the reasonable conclusion that the buildings (including Ri'an's house) were
empty. Only then did the IDF launch the strike.
Ri'an

.

Following the

strike,

.

.

secondary explosions were

visible.

used the buildings for weapons storage, and therefore
jective

according to the

it

This confirmed that

was

a legitimate military ob-

Law of Armed Conflict. Only later was
371

Hamas

it

discovered that Ri'an
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and

his family
1

their death.

*

chose to remain in the building after others had evacuated, leading to

2

warn the civilian population during the
operation have been described by some as "probably the most extensive, and most

The measures taken by

Israel to

warnings of offensive operations over such a short period in the history of

specific,

warfare." 93 However, the warnings given by Israel were criticized
ficient in the report

UN Human Rights Council (Goldstone Report). 94

The Goldstone Report has been
conclusions.

95

insuf-

prepared by the Fact Finding Mission headed by Richard

Goldstone on behalf of the
methodology, the

and found

reliability

strongly criticized, mainly with regard to

its

of the factual findings and the ensuing questionable

These deficiencies are also evident with regard to

its

analysis of the

warnings given during the operation. 96 In addition, doubts have been raised concerning different aspects of the legal analysis in the report, including in relation to
the standards
97

tack.

it

has set regarding the scope of the duty to issue warnings prior to

These standards

different

will

be examined in the course of the

components of the obligation
III.

warn

in section

of the

III.

Analysis of the Obligation to Issue Warnings

After setting the legal

framework and reviewing State practice with regard to warn-

ings given to civilians prior to attack,

and content of this

to

legal analysis

at-

we

will

now turn

to an analysis of the scope

obligation.

We will start with some general observations on the essence of the obligation to
issue

warnings prior to attacks and

ples of the

law of armed

conflict.

its

relationship with the other rules

and

princi-

This will be followed by an analysis of the aim of

the obligation to give advance warning. In this context

we will

ference between a lawful warning and an unlawful threat.

discuss also the dif-

We will then examine the

different aspects of warnings that influence their effectiveness: the temporal aspect,

the recipient of the warning, the content of the warning and the
the warning

when

is

issued.

method by which

Next we will explore the exception to this obligation, namely,

are circumstances such that an attacker need not issue a warning. Finally,

will

conclude

ings

on

this section

we

with a short reference to the ramifications of the warn-

civilians left behind.

The Essence of the Obligation
The obligation to give warnings prior
A.

to attack

is

one of the precautionary mea-

sures military forces are required to take under the law of armed conflict.
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of precautionary measures

is

to avoid (or at least to minimize) the collateral effects

of hostilities on civilian persons, the civilian population and civilian objects. 98
Article 57(1) of API,

which lays down the general rationale of precautions

tack, states that "constant care shall

ians

and civilian

objects." In the

be taken to spare the

Commentary to API

in at-

civilian population, civil-

it is

explained that this article

"appropriately supplements the basic rule of Article 48 ...

,

which urges

Parties to

the conflict to always distinguish between the civilian population and combatants,
as well as

between

civilian objects

and military objectives." The Commentary goes

on to explain that "[e]ven though this is only an enunciation of a general principle
which is already recognized in customary law, it is good that it is included at the
beginning of this article in black and white, as the other paragraphs are devoted to
the practical application of this principle." 99 In other words, precautions in attack

meant to be practical means of enabling the application of the principles of distinction and proportionality. The precautions are meant to ensure, as much as possible, that civilians and civilian objects are spared. This is achieved by setting duties
on commanders to do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked
are military objectives and to choose means and methods of attack with a view to
minimizing incidental injury to civilians and civilian objects by refraining from
are

launching attacks expected to be in breach of the principle of proportionality 100

and by issuing warnings prior

Beyond the

to attacks.

legal aspects, there

is

also a practical

connection between the issu-

ance of warnings and the implementation of the principle of proportionality.

Warning civilians prior to an attack enables them to evacuate the area before the attack takes place or to seek shelter at the time of the attack. This contributes to mini-

mizing

civilian casualties

fact that civilians

and to enhancing

their protection.

have evacuated an area or found shelter leads to a lower number

—namely,

of anticipated civilian casualties from the attack
lateral

damage

At the same time, the

—and hence

to less anticipated col-

increases the ability to carry out a proportionate attack.

This connection between giving a warning and

fulfilling the

proportionality

standard leads to warnings being, on one hand, a valuable measure in reducing

harm to civilians and, on the other hand, a useful tool in the hands of commanders
for gaining more freedom of action. This does not mean that warnings are counterproductive in terms of enhancing the protection of civilians in armed conflict situations; on the contrary, this only reflects one of the realities of such situations,
namely, that they are not necessarily zero-sum games.

B.

Aim of the Warning

As discussed above,

armed

conflict,

as

one of the precautionary measures prescribed by the law of

providing a warning prior to attack
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is

aimed

to

enhance the
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The way in
which warnings contribute to this protection of the civilians is by providing them
an opportunity to protect themselves from impending attacks. Based on this aim of
the warnings, two main questions require analysis: (1) prior to which kinds of attack is a warning required and (2) what is a genuine warning and when is a warning
protection of civilians from the harmful consequences of hostilities.

measure used to threaten or mislead the

actually a

now examine
B.l. Prior to

civilian

We

will

each of these questions.

What Kinds

B.l.l. Attacks

of Attack

Endangering

Is

a Warning Required

Civilians. Again, the

give warnings prior to attack

is

purpose of imposing a duty to

to enable civilians to protect themselves

consequences of the attack. Accordingly,
obligation to issue warnings focus

on

all

attacks

warnings in an area where there are no
be affected by the attack.

from the

the legal instruments dealing with the

which might

the case also in the military manuals. Therefore, there

to

population?

civilians or

affect civilians.

no legal obligation

is

This

is

to issue

when there are no civilians likely

101

many examples

members of armed forces
have been warned of an impending attack. 102 This does not mean that the warning
There

are,

was given

of course,

of cases where

as the result of a legal obligation, since other non-legal considerations

also exist, such as getting the other side to surrender, thus avoiding unnecessary
casualties to

both parties to the conflict or when the aim of the operation

ture prisoners, in order, for example, to

render
B. 1 .2.

may also

promote a prisoner exchange.

Civilians Requires a

warn

civilians

them in other ways?
The standard set in
applies to attacks

civil-

apply only prior to attacks that might endanger the

I,

or

when the expected results of the attack may affect

this regard in Article 57(2) (c)

is

a very

of API

broad term that arguably could

to property or even non-physical

104

lives

is

that the duty to

warn

"which may affect the civilian population" (Emphasis added.) The

term "may affect"

selves."

an impact on

question arises as to what degree of impact raises this duty. Does the obli-

physical safety of civilians or also

Protocol

Calls to sur-

Warning. Since the duty

to give warnings prior to attacks refers only to attacks having

gation to

to cap-

be part of a psychological warfare campaign. 103

What Degree of Impact on

ians, the

is

also

encompass damage

harm. However, according to the Commentary to

the function of warnings

is

"to give civilians the chance to protect them-

Similarly, the object of warnings specified in the

civilians to take shelter or leave the area

and to enable the

take appropriate measures." 105 Likewise, France's
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UK Manual is "to enable

civil

defense authorities to

LOAC Summary Note states that
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warning must be given to the
shelter."

civilian

population in order "to give

it

time to seek

106

The emphasis on limiting the scope of the obligation to physical harm is explicMan ual, which stipulates that the obligation to isitly stated in rule 37 of the
sue a warning is limited to attacks that "may result in death or injury to civilians."
(Emphasis added.) In the
Commentary it is explained:

AMW

AMW

come into play when a particular air or missile combat operation may
damage to, or destruction of, civilian objects. Neither does it come into
play in case the attack results in mere inconveniences to civilians caused by, e.g., electri107
cal blackouts or reduced mobility due to broken lines of communications.
Rule 37 does not

result only in

The formulation of rule 37 seems an accurate reflection of the State practice described above, which does not include examples of warnings given prior to attacks
were aimed

that

at targets located

near empty civilian objects or that caused only

inconvenience to the civilian population. 108
Evaluating whether an attack may affect civilians also raises factual questions. In

some

cases there

might be uncertainty as to whether

civilians

would be

affected

by

The evaluation of whether an attack should be considered as one that
"may" affect civilians is based on the information available to the person making

the attack.

the decision at the time of the attack. 109 In a case of reasonable doubt, however,

warnings should be given (unless circumstances do not permit). 110

B.2.

Genuine Warnings versus Threats and Deception

Genuine warnings are an important measure

on

attack
tack.

to

minimize the harmful

effect

of an

by enabling them to protect themselves from the expected atcases, however, in which the warnings are not made with a genuine

civilians

There are

objective of protecting civilians, but rather are intended to terrorize civilians or to

mislead them. This
threats

B.2.1.

is

an unlawful use of warnings.

We will first address unlawful

and then discuss when warnings become unlawful ruses of war.

Unlawful Threats. There

and unlawful

is

sometimes

a thin line

between lawful warnings

threats that are intended to terrorize the civilian population. Article

51(2) of API prohibits "acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which
to spread terror

among the civilian population";

used as a means of spreading such terror.

112

therefore warnings

The defining element in

between lawful warnings and unlawful threats
hibition

111

is

is

must not be

differentiating

the intention. Article 5 1 (2)'s pro-

on terrorizing civilians refers to threats "the primary purpose of which is to

spread terror." 113 (Emphasis added.) In the Galic case, the International Criminal

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia emphasized that the prohibition on terrorizing
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when

there

is

Law

a "specific intent to spread terror

among the civilian population" and that this "was principal among the aims" of the
114
Therefore, it does not include genuine warnings, even when worded in a
act.
frightening way, since their "primary purpose"

is

to get civilians out of the area for

and the principal aim of the action

their protection

According to the CIHL, threats that all

civilians

would be considered liable to at-

tack have been

condemned and withdrawn. 116 By

anyone staying

in a

combat zone

sidered a threat, but rather a

mere

main behind. Warnings must be

way

A

not to cause terror. 115

is

endangering his or her

is

reflection of the real

manner.

life

civilians that

should not be con-

danger facing those who

effective and, therefore,

that clarifies the danger in a forceful

warning

contrast,

re-

should be worded in a

117

related issue regards situations of unlawful internal displacement of civilians.

According to the

UN Reports on Lebanon, unlawful arbitrary displacement includes

"displacement in situations of armed conflict which

not warranted by the need to

is

ensure the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons." 118 The

UN Reports insinuate that the Israeli warnings in Lebanon were used as a means to
achieve such internal displacement.

The conclusion of the two Reports

that

warning

civilians

during battle might be

regarded as internal displacement of civilians that constitutes a violation of the law
of war

is

legally

in times of

unsound

armed

since the rules forbidding deportation or forcible transfers

conflict refer

mainly to occupied

territories

and require

a degree

of control over the population that does not exist merely by issuing warnings. 119

Moreover,

as for the Israeli

warnings in Lebanon, while they did lead to a massive

evacuation of areas in south Lebanon and parts of Beirut, they were, according to
rael,

intended to spare civilian

and ground operations

lives.

Since these warnings were followed by aerial

in those areas that did indeed

pose a risk to the

siding there, the evacuation did protect civilians' lives.

what basis the
B.2.2.

120

It is

civilians re-

therefore not clear

UN Reports conclude that the Israeli intentions were not genuine.

Unacceptable Ruses of War. The API Commentary

of the warnings

is

Is-

states that since the

to give civilians the chance to protect themselves

on

121

aim

from the conse-

quences of the attack, ruses of war regarding warnings that would deceive the population

and

nullify the

proper function of warnings are unacceptable. 122 This

concerns messages conveyed to civilians cloaked as warnings about an impending
attack

when

there

this limitation

is

warnings and,

as a

is

no

that

real intention to carry

once

false

warnings are given,

consequence,

will

from the consequences of the

civilians will

not trust genuine

ignore them. This would lead to defeating the

purpose of the warnings, that of giving
selves

out such an attack. The rationale for

civilians the possibility

attack.
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Henderson contends that from the wording of the API Commentary, which uses
the term "unacceptable"

drawn between

and not

"illegal"

or "unlawful," "a distinction can be

a ruse that causes an unnecessary evacuation,

the effectiveness of future warnings, which

is

and thereby

limits

unacceptable but not unlawful, and a

ruse that actually contributes to collateral damage, which

unlawful." 123 Clearly,

is

using warnings in order to purposefully endanger civilians

is

unlawful; however,

any use which is counterproductive to the aim of the warnings, that is, to enable civilians to protect themselves,

The

limitation

on

should be avoided.

ruses of

course, that every warning

war with regard

to warnings does not

must be followed by an

mean, of

attack, since there are cases

where decisions change for different reasons, including operational, policy and humanitarian considerations. 124 The focus is on the intention at the time the warning
was
C.

issued.

What Is Considered to Be an "Effective" Warning

In order to achieve the aim of the warnings, warnings

now turn to an
light

ment of the

effective.

We will

analysis of this requirement.

At the outset
viewed in

must be

it

must be emphasized

that the effectiveness of a

warning must be

of its evaluated effect at the time of its issuance based on the assess-

available information at the time,

warning. Therefore, even
tect themselves, this

if a

and not

in light of the results of the

warning was unsuccessful in causing

does not necessarily

mean

that the

civilians to pro-

warning should be deter-

mined to not have fulfilled the requirement to be effective. 125 Furthermore, there is
no precise formula of what is considered an "effective warning." As Rogers puts it,
what is "effective" must be a matter of common sense. 126 Similarly, the Australian
manual states that the requirement to give effective warnings must be "applied in a
commonsense manner in light of all other factors." 127
It is also important to acknowledge the inherent uncertainty of armed conflict
128
situations, in which circumstances are unpredictable and constantly changing.
This reality has implications on what is considered an effective warning. Thus, for
example, in some cases there may be uncertainty with regard to the manner in
which military operations and attacks are going to proceed. Accordingly, it is not
always clear where the fighting will take place, what targets will be attacked and

which areas
the

will

be safer than others.

Much

depends, of course, on the actions of

enemy forces.

This might pose a dilemma as to whether

it is

preferable to issue warnings

sooner, despite the vagueness of the situation, or to wait until the situation
clearer. In
civilians.

some

cases, giving

As an example,

is

warnings could actually reduce the protection of

civilians are requested to evacuate
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an area and proceed

—
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to

toward a certain location; however, the fighting does not reach the places from

which they have evacuated
have been directed.
ing given at a time

or,

even worse, reaches the destination to which they

On the other hand, postponing the warning might lead to it be-

when

become impossible for civilians to evacuate in an or-

has

it

dilemmas might exist with regard to the level of specificity of

derly manner. Similar

the warnings; hence the choice

many times

is

in favor of the lesser of two evils.

In analyzing the effectiveness of a warning, different factors

These are

ered.

temporal aspect

(1) the

the recipient of the warning

warning and

(4) the

—

—when should the warning be

whom

to

method by which

the warning
is

given, (2)

addressed, (3) the content of the

is it

of these factors separately; however, there

is

issued.

We will analyze each

an interrelationship among them.

Therefore, the assessment as to whether a warning

made on

must be consid-

is

indeed effective must be

the basis of the accumulation of all these factors, taking into account the

factual circumstances.

C.l.

— When Should

The Temporal Aspect

UK Manual succinctly states

As the

The decision
circumstances and

time."
the

129

out in the

when

as to
is

is

Warning Be Given

in order to

be effective a warning must "be in

the right time to issue a warning depends

related to the content of the warning. This

AMW Commentary.

warning, a distinction

it,

the

may

130

is

on

also pointed

In analyzing the issue of the correct time to give a

be made between two different types of warnings

warnings given prior to an attack on a specific target and general warnings to the
residents of a certain area.

We will examine each of these types.

Warnings Given Prior to an Attack on a

C.l.l.

fective,

warnings that a specific target

a reasonable

time before the attack

close to the time of the attack,

ulation to evacuate.

131

is

is

Specific Target. In order to be ef-

about to be attacked must be issued within

actually launched. If a

tary

give the

is

Conversely, there

may be

well-founded military considerif,

enemy the opportunity to remove weapons

equipment held inside the designated

target.

132

for example, to

do so

or other movable mili-

But a warning must not be

sued too early either, as this might lead people to believe that the threat
valid.

issued too

might not allow sufficient time for the civilian pop-

it

ations that favor not giving a warning well in advance,

would

warning

is

no longer

For example, in the case of the attack on the Belgrade television and radio

tion, eleven days passed

By the time of the

emptied the building

earlier point in time,

lieving the threat

sta-

between the warning received by Yugoslav authorities and

the execution of the attack.
at

is-

an

had passed.

133
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attack, civilian employees,

had returned

who had

to the building be-
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C.1.2. General

Warnings.

area, in order to

When warnings call upon civilians to evacuate a certain

be considered effective the population must be given enough time

and opportunity to evacuate safely (unless circumstances do not permit). 134 Obviously, the amount of time needed for residents of a region or village to leave the
area

is

much greater than the time required for residents of a certain street to leave,

and significantly more than what residents of a particular building need in order to
vacate it. In other words, the time that must be given for evacuation is dependent

on the scope of the area from which the evacuation is sought, the number of those
required to evacuate, the destination to which they are to evacuate, the state of the
roads leading thereto and so forth. All these considerations must be taken into
account.

On the other hand, the commander also has to weigh military concerns, such as
manner in which enemy forces might utilize the period given for evacuation in

the

order to reinforce targets within the designated area, to initiate attacks from within
it

human

or to operate in proximity to civilian convoys, using such civilians as

shields against forceful responses.

As an

when circumstances do not permit civilians
it might be preferable to just warn them to stay in-

alternative to evacuation,

enough time to evacuate
doors and take

safely,

shelter.

—

The Recipient of the Warning to Whom It Is Addressed
In order for a warning to be considered effective, it must be addressed to the
C.2.

appropriate recipients, namely, those who can utilize the warning in order to protect
civilians

from the approaching

attack. In this context

when can or should the warning be addressed
and who should receive the warning.
C.2.1.
ings,

Warning the Authorities. In

two aspects will be analyzed:

to the authorities of the other side

the historical instruments dealing with warn-

beginning with the 1874 Brussels Declaration and including the 1907 Hague

Regulations, the duty is to provide a warning to the authorities of the other side. 135

By

contrast, Article 57(2)(c) of

API does not

indicate to

whom

the warning

given, simply stating that "effective advance notice shall be given."

manuals do not
ther refrain

warning the

military

limit giving of notice only to authorities of the other side,

from mentioning the recipient of the warnings or
civilian

AMW Manual.

Most

137

population

directly.

136

This

is

also the

is

and

ei-

explicitly refer to

requirement in the

Direct warnings to the civilian population seems to also reflect

the current actual practice of States.

One

explanation of this shift

nection between the

armed

is

that in the past there

forces of

one party

379

was usually no

to the conflict

and the

direct concivilians

of
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means of spreading the warning directly to civilians were
such is often not the case today. The change might also represent another
limited
reflection of the shift in the law of armed conflict from its focus on inter-State rela-

the other party; thus the

—

tions to protection of civilians. 138

Notwithstanding

sometimes

this shift in the law,

suffice if they are effective.

the prosecutor reviewing

who seems
tack

on the Belgrade

would

demonstrated by the conclusion of

is

140

on

in the

former Yugoslavia,

Yugoslav authorities of the impending

and radio

television

suffice relies

This

NATO's bombing campaign

to accept that notifying the

the warning requirement.
ities

even today warnings to the authorities would

139

station

The determination

at-

may have been sufficient to fulfill
as to

whether warning the author-

their ability to reach the relevant civilian population in

an effective manner. 141 Accordingly, as Rogers explains, a warning to the authorities

hundreds of miles away and cut off from the proposed attack would not be

considered effective. 142

C.2.2.

Who Should Receive the Warning. When a warning is given directly to the

civilian population, the

question arises to what part of the population

addressed. According to the
the

Group of Experts

warnings
In

is

it

must be

AMW Commentary, there was disagreement among

that drafted

it

over the question of whether the duty to issue

limited to warning civilians located in close proximity to the target. 143

some of the military manuals there is reference to such a limitation, 144 though in

others there

is

not.

In our view, limiting the duty to give warning to only warning those in "close

proximity" to the target

is

too

restrictive. Rather, the

determination of who ought

on the anticipated harm under the circumstances of the
attack. In this regard, we think the
Commentary provides a good standard,
namely, that the warning must reach the civilians likely to suffer death or injury
from the attack. 145 Thus, if accurate smaller munitions are used, civilians in the
next street need not be warned, while if widespread heavy bombing is anticipated,
to be

warned should

rest

AMW

who might be killed or injured as a result of the attack should receive warning. This does not mean that any civilian who might be
somehow affected by an attack must be warned, as discussed above when the aim of
civilians located in a larger area

the warnings

was addressed.

As with the determination about the

right time to give the warning, the decision

on who should be the recipient of the warning depends on the circumstances and is

Thus in the Gaza operation a general warning
almost all the civilians in the Gaza Strip, calling on

related to the content of the warning.

was issued

them

in the first

to stay away

phase to

from

sites

where Hamas was conducting combat activities.

regional warnings were given to civilians living in certain areas, calling
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leave these areas,

and

specific

warnings were given prior to attacks on individual

buildings to the residents of those buildings, warning them to leave the location before the attack. 146

Another example of the connection between the content and the

recipient of the warnings

is

the warning given by coalition forces in southern Iraq

during Operation Iraqi Freedom to repair workers that communications links being repaired

would be

This exemplifies

attacked. 147

how the proper recipients of the warning are determined based

on the circumstances of the attack against which they are being warned. When it is
a specific planned attack on a defined location, the warning is addressed to those
who might be directly affected by the attack. When it is an attack on certain objects
or infrastructure, it is directed toward those in close proximity to such objects, and
when it is a wide-scale operation, such as an anticipated ground operation or massive air raid, it is given to residents of large areas, even though some of them might
not eventually be affected by the ensuing attack. 148
The Content of the Warning
In discussing the content of the warning several aspects deserve
C.3.

analysis.

These are

the clarity of the warning, the specificity of the warning, the need to repeat warnings

and the inclusion of instructions

to civilians.

The Clarity of the Warning. In order to be considered "effective," a warning must be sufficiently specific and comprehensive so as to enable civilians to
protect themselves from the impending attack. 149 An obvious example is that a
C.3.1.

warning in a language the population does not understand will not be considered
effective. 150
It

must be acknowledged, however, that there may be objective difficulties in

is-

suing very clear and definite warnings and that sometimes warnings will inevitably

be vague

armed

when

as a result

conflict.

of the inherent uncertainty of situations that occur during

Understanding the uncertainty of the situation

assessing after the fact the clarity of the warnings.

Israeli practices

and those of other

States

Some

seems to overlook

is

also

important

of the criticism of

this reality. Assessing

must be done without the benefit of hindsight and in light
of the information available to the commanders at the time of the decision to give
the clarity of a warning

the warning. For example, with regard to the operation in Gaza, Israel has been
criticized for

what some described

Goldstone Report

as unclear

and confusing warnings. 151 The

stresses that "[t]he effectiveness

of the warnings has to be as-

sessed in the light of the overall circumstances that prevailed

view of conditions that the

civilians

and the

subjective

concerned would take in deciding upon their

response to the warning." 152 In other words, the report implies that since civilians
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face

Shany

sees this as yet another

example of the report's "human rights-dominated

approach to an armed conflict situation," which focuses on the
vidual civilian

— and on

his or her

viewpoint

—without

military concerns of those involved in the conflict.

Ultimately, although the underlying

must

fulfill

situation

giving due weight to the

aim of warnings

is

to enable civilians to

ought to be "as

realities

AMW Manual

specific as circumstances permit."

155

states

According to

AMW Commentary, this means that they should not be vague, but "be as specircumstances permit to enable the civilian population to take relevant pro-

cific as

measures." 156 The

tective

UK

Manual

requires warnings to be "sufficiently

specific" in order to enable civilians to take shelter or leave the area. 157

however, to determine
tion in this regard

is

how specific and direct warnings ought to be.

whether a general warning

is

enough or

gation to provide specific warnings to the particular civilians

by the

is

It is
158

not easy,

One ques-

there a legal obli-

who maybe harmed

attack.

General warnings
lets

of the

forces involved.

Warning. Rule 37 of the

Specificity of the

that warnings

and accuracy they

be considered effective cannot disregard the

and the concerns and constraints of the military

The

C.3.2.

in order to

rights of the indi-

154

protect themselves, the determination of the extent of clarity

the

clear. 153

an uncertain situation, the warnings ought to be more accurate and

may consist,

for example, of a blanket alert delivered

by leaf-

or by broadcasts advising the civilian population to stay away from certain mil-

itary objectives. 159

Sometimes a warning can contain

a

list

of the objectives that will

be attacked. 160 General warnings would usually not include any specific information regarding the attack.
Specific warnings

certain building)

aimed

more concrete target (such as a
providing more details regarding the geo-

present in a

at civilians

would usually involve

graphical boundaries of the area to be affected

and a description of the time of the

expected attack in order to enable the civilians to leave or seek shelter. In addition,
they might also include precise details of the impending attack.

US manuals warnings might be general and do not have to indetails regarding the attack. The Operational Law Handbook states,

According to the
clude specific

"Warnings need not be

specific as to

time and location of the attack, but can be

general and issued through broadcasts,

quoted

on precautions

in attack,

tion of whether an abstract warning

must be given before

is

He

In the CIHL,

US officials are

162

Queguiner acknowledges that the ques-

enough, or whether a particular warning

a specific attack that

not have a clear-cut answer.

161

may suffice.

warning"

as stating that a "blanket

In his article

leaflets, etc."

may affect

the civilian population, does

goes on to submit, however, that "the level of
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precision required will

depend on the general objective pursued; the attacking

party will have to ensure the

immunity of the

property, while also taking into account
gic context."

163

It

its

own

civilian

military interests in each strate-

seems, however, that this standard exceeds what

the current rules of the laws of armed conflict. There
the

immunity of the

fulfilling

population and civilian

civilian

population' nor

is

is

is

required by

no obligation

to "ensure

there usually any practical

way of

such a high standard.

On the other hand, warnings must be effective, namely, they must give relevant
information to civilians who might be affected by the attack, thus enabling them to
protect themselves as
specific

much

as possible

warnings might be required

if

from the impending

attack. 164 Therefore,

not providing them would

mean

that civil-

ians have not received the information necessary to take protective actions. This

seems to be the meaning of the standard

Manual,

set

by the

AMW Manual and by the UK

as discussed above.

In this regard, the degree to which a warning

must be specific and detailed is de-

pendent on the context and circumstances of the

situation. Relevant factors in-

clude the timing of the warning in relation to the attack, the available
issuing the warning,

165

the objective of the warning, the

amount of

modes of

control the

forces have in the area, the severity of the situation, the urgency of the attack
forth. In addition, in

ation

and so

determining what details to include in a warning, consider-

must also be given to the risk posed to mission accomplishment and to the se-

curity of the forces. 166

As previously discussed, during the Gaza operation, general warnings were
phase of the operation calling on

sued in the

first

used by the

Hamas forces.

civilians to stay

away from

is-

sites

Next, regional warnings were provided in certain areas,

IDF operations therein, and
then specific warnings were given a short time prior to attacks on individual buildcalling

on

civilians to evacuate those places prior to

ings, giving their residents

time to leave the buildings. 167 Interestingly, in spite of

these comprehensive warning procedures, the Goldstone Report finds these warnings to be insufficient. 168 Schmitt criticizes this conclusion

and

stresses that these

warnings were extensive and specific in an unprecedented manner. 169

A question arises whether the extensive nature and specificity of the warnings issued by Israel in Lebanon and particularly in the Gaza operation

reflect a legal obli-

gation with regard to the scope of the obligation. As addressed in section
issuing warnings

might have an

effect

on the proportionality of an

III. A,

attack and, as a

consequence, on the freedom of operation of forces. Therefore there might be an
incentive to give specific warnings even
obligation. Moreover, for

outcome of an

when

to

do so

is

not derived from a legal

moral or policy considerations 170 even a proportionate

attack might not be sufficient, leading to stricter limitations
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to

use of force 171 and also, possibly, to the issuance of more extensive warnings. These

kinds of extralegal considerations played an important role in the

during

its

military operations.

172

They

Israeli

conduct

led to a decision to give extensive warnings

beyond what may be considered as legally required under the laws of armed conflict in order to minimize civilian casualties. One must also bear in mind that Israel
had close contact with, and

which enabled

it

relatively

intelligence regarding, the

Gaza

Strip,

to give such specific warnings as telephone calls to the inhabitants

of houses planned to be attacked. 173
Israel to carry

good

It

was these unique circumstances that enabled

out such extensive methods of warnings.

would seem wrong, therefore, to deduce from the Israeli practice in Gaza that
the various methods of providing warnings and their specificity represent an imIt

plementation of a legal obligation. This conclusion

is

reinforced when the elements

necessary for the formation of a rule of customary law are considered. Since there

no known previous

practice of such extensive warnings, there

was

clearly

Israel

was

also driven

opinio juris

is

exist-

new legal

ing customary rule requiring them. Israel's practice alone cannot create a

norm, since widespread practice

no

is

necessary. Moreover, as has been indicated,

is

by moral and policy considerations; therefore the element of

also missing. 174

C.3.3. Repetition of Warnings.

Another question that arises is whether, after a warn-

ing has been given, there might

still

minimize

be a duty to issue further warnings in order to

civilian casualties.

An illustrative example appears in the European Union report on the conflict in
Georgia with regard to the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali. Georgia
cause, following a general

warning and a three-hour unilateral

criticized be-

is

ceasefire to allow

the remaining civilians of Tskhinvali to leave the conflict area, there was
tional general
sive

advance warning given to the remaining population when the offen-

on Tskhinvali was

specify

no addi-

carried out that night. 175

The authors of the

report do not

what the content of a second warning should have been, but

sumed they meant

this

would be

a

warning aimed

at

enabling those

it

may be

left

as-

behind to

seek shelter at the time of the attack.
In his article

on precautions, Queguiner

also refers to this question.

He

ac-

knowledges that States usually fulfill the duty to warn "by issuing a general warning
to the civilian population"

and that "the attacking commander does not have

to

is-

sue multiple warnings of the danger incurred by a civilian population that

is

lo-

cated near a clearly defined military objective that has been declared as such."

176

He

contends, however, this "does not exempt the attacking
further,

commander from

more precise warning whenever possible or necessary."

an example of a target which

is

"an infrastructure that
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giving

Queguiner gives

essential for public service
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and is staffed almost permanently by civilians." 178 In such a case, he concludes that
the warning will, depending on the circumstances, have to be more specific. He
explains:

It is
lic

obviously impossible for a party to the conflict to accept an interruption in pub-

services just because

an enemy has designated these services as a legitimate military
working at the site, a more precise

objective. In order to spare the civilian population

warning must be issued

as early as possible.

179

we must return to

In order to determine whether a warning should be repeated
the aim of the requirement to provide warnings, that
tunity to protect themselves

ing

is

is,

to give civilians

from the ensuing attack. Therefore,

if a

an oppor-

general warn-

would be no legal requirement to issue
cases where the general warning has left the civilian

sufficient to achieve this aim, there

further warnings. However, in

population without a reasonable understanding of how to protect

itself,

or

when

the content of the warning has changed, an additional warning might be required,
subject to military considerations.

The

case of the attack

on Tskhinvali seems

case. In that case a general

to represent an

example of such a

warning to evacuate was given, but since that warning

did not indicate when the attack was to take place, an additional warning addressed
to those civilians left behind

might have been required,

in the period immediately prior to the attack.
ferent: the first is general

The

if circumstances

rationale of each

permitted,

warning

is

dif-

and aimed at getting civilians to evacuate the area; the sec-

ond is more specific and is given closer in time to the attack in order to allow those
remaining behind to take shelter against the approaching attack.
In Queguiner's example, the first warning is a general warning to stay away from
certain locations.

An

additional,

more

specific

warning would not necessarily be

required with regard to such locations unless the target has a special nature that attracts civilians,

such as a public service

facility

or a place that civilians regard as a

possible shelter (schools, etc.); then an additional warning might be necessary.

Moreover,

it is

distinction

worth noting that

in

both examples there

and proportionality requirements. Even

would not be considered as being required by the law,
tack to be

deemed

civilians

is

if

a

need to

fulfill

the

an additional warning

absence might lead the

at-

disproportionate.

C.3.4. Instructing Civilians.

warnings

its

is still

A

further question with regard to the content of the

whether they must include

what they should do

specific instructions explaining to affected

in order to protect themselves

385

from

attack.
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to evacuate a certain area they

might be advised of

the direction they should take or the routes they should follow.

remains whether there
cording to one of the

a legal obligation to provide such

is

UN

"should take into account
instruction

and not

that warnings

still

and other guidance. Ac-

Reports on Lebanon, military forces issuing a warning

how they expect the civilian

drop paper messages from an

just

The question

must be very elaborate and

population to carry out the
aircraft."

The report

asserts

give civilians "clear time slots for the

evacuation linked to guaranteed safe humanitarian exit corridors that they should
use." 180

The Goldstone Report finds that in order for a warning to civilians to be
considered effective, "it must clearly explain what they should do to avoid harm
state the location to be affected and where the civiland ... [a] s far as possible
.

ians should seek safety."

Determining that

a

ing legal requirements

.

.

181

warning must be that
182

specific

flict

may be general.

183

US manuals actually emphasize

Furthermore, according to the law of armed con-

the party subject to attack bears the responsibility for taking precautions

against the effects of the attack. 184 This
tocol

I,

which provides, "The

feasible

.

.

.

sulting

and

tacks.

reflected in Article 58 of Additional Pro-

Parties to the conflict shall, to the

civilian objects

maximum

extent

under

their control against the dangers re-

from military operations." 185

The purpose of Article 58
bility

is

take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population,

individual civilians

is

to place

on the defending party the main responsi-

of taking the defensive measures necessary to protect

The law of armed

comports with

its

civilians against at-

impose an obligation on the attacking

conflict does not

side to deal with this aspect of the safety of civilians of the
also

reflect exist-

nor represent current State practice. Moreover, none of

the military manuals includes such a duty and the
that warnings

does not seem to

practical considerations

opposing party. 186 This

—the attacking party

usually does not

have adequate knowledge of the relevant services and infrastructure to issue detailed instructions to the civilians
It is

of the opposing party.

not surprising that the claim that warnings should include instructions to

civilians

of the other side

is

raised

by human

clear reflection of human rights standards
civilians vis-a-vis the

armed

rights bodies.

which put the emphasis on the

forces of the parties to the conflict

ferent rationale than that of the law of armed conflict.

tween

human

rights

law and the law of armed conflict

topics in the field of international law today

Having

said that,

we

and

is

recognize that in order to

ians to protect themselves

Such a requirement

is

a

rights of

and which have a

dif-

187

The proper relationship be-

is

one of the most contentious

not addressed in
fulfill

the

this article.

aim of enabling

188

civil-

from attack, there might be situations in which warnings

need to include some guidance and instruction as to

386

how

civilians

should act

Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Noam Neuman

may

following receipt of the warnings. Such circumstances

when, without

exist

such information, the warnings would not give the civilians sufficient understanding
of what they need to do in order to protect themselves and the attacking side has the
ability

of clarifying the situation without compromising

its

military concerns.

Warning Is Issued
Warnings can be given by radio and television broadcasts, by telephone calls and
even by Internet announcements, 189 or by dropping or distributing leaflets (and, of
course, by a combination of all these methods). 190 Sometimes they can be given by
word of mouth, when ground forces are operating 191 or where territory is occupied
CA. The Method by Which

by the enemy. 192 In some
the objective.

193

The

the

cases,

warnings

possibility of giving

may be

given by aircraft flying low over

warnings from the

air

depends on which

AMW

party has control of the airspace and what air defenses are in place. 194

Commentary states that

The
They may be is-

w] arnings need not be formal in nature.
sued either verbally or in writing, or through any other means that can reasonably
be expected to be

A

"

[

effective

under the circumstances." 195

made by using warning shots. As
above examples illustrate, there have been instances when this method has been
used. 196 In the AMW Commentary it is acknowledged that " [i]n some situations the
only feasible method of warning may be to fire warning shots using tracer ammuquestion arises whether warnings can be

nition, thus inducing people to take cover before the attack." 197

assertion

though we do not believe

it is

since inducing civilians to take shelter

nition

and

tracer

We agree with this

necessarily limited to tracer

might

also

ammunition

be achieved with regular

ammunition might not always be

ammu-

available.

Warning shots are commonly used in law enforcement situations, such as

in in-

stances where they are necessary in order to get a suspect to surrender to arrest after

verbal warnings have been disregarded. 198

ing than that discussed in this
clear

article, it

Though this

is

a different kind of warn-

does share a similar rationale of giving a

warning prior to the use of force in order to avoid,

if possible,

physical harm.

Therefore, in our view, the widespread use of warning shots in law enforcement

sit-

uations reinforces the lawfulness of using warning shots from the air or from
equivalent platforms as a
Israeli practice, as

method of warning

civilians prior to attack.

previously discussed, included the use of warning shots as

part of the specific warnings given to the occupants of a particular target. This was

done

in cases

where prior warnings, through phone

calls

and other means, were

not heeded. These warning shots were fired using small munitions that
roofs of the designated targets.

In the Goldstone Report this method, termed "roof-knocking,"

The report argues

hit the

199

that roof-knocking "constitutes a
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is

criticized.

form of attack against the
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to

and

civilians inhabiting the building"

that "an attack,

Law

however limited

in itself,

cannot be understood as an effective warning in the meaning of
57(2) (c)."

200

First, as

The

article

correctness of this claim requires further analysis.

has been illustrated, State practice and military legal manuals include

warning shots
ing shots are

method of issuing warnings. Moreover, even if warnconsidered "an attack," it is incorrect to view them as an attack
as a legitimate

"against civilians," because they are not fired at civilians, since the objective of
their use

is

harm to civilians. In this regard, as Schmitt notes, it is impormind that since the object of the warning shots is a military objec-

to avoid

tant to bear in

tive 201 (otherwise the

whole attack

performed by the warning shots

non-combatants therein
attacking civilians.

D. The Exception

is

at

is

most

fails

the distinction principle), the "attack"

aimed

at a lawful target

a matter of proportionality, not

—When Not Issuing a Warning

It

that

if

37 of the

AMW Manual and

"circumstances do not per-

should be noted, however, that some manuals use different formulations

and provide

"when

Is Justified

as well as in rule

most military manuals, warnings are not required
mit."

one of directly

202

As specified in Article 57(2) (c) of API,
203

and the presence of

that warnings should be given "if the military mission allows" 204 or

the tactical situation permits." 205 This exception reflects the understanding

sometimes the existing circumstances preclude giving a warning prior to

at-

The analysis of the exception will be divided into two parts as follows: the situations covered by the exception and general considerations in applying the
tack.

exception.

D.l.

The Situations Covered by the Exception

The exception does not comprise a numerus clausus of situations, but depends
on the particular prevailing circumstances at the time of the decision. However,
the presence of circumstances that justify not issuing an advance warning would
usually be determined based on one of the following rationales: mission accomplishment, force protection, speed of response or practical impossibility.

now briefly examine
D.l.l. Mission

We will

each of these considerations.

Accomplishment. The

fact that

warnings are not required with

regard to surprise attacks was recognized in the earliest articulations of the rules
addressing warnings. 206

The 1907 Hague Regulations provide

that

no warning need

be given in cases of "assault," with "assault" being understood as referring to surprise
attacks.

The

rationale of not

imposing

a

duty to warn in such attacks

is

attacks require surprise in order to accomplish the mission. Dinstein
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that "surprise

is

one of the main

staples of warfare, not only when

an assault is con-

templated." 207
achieve

He finds that "[t]he practice of states shows that the desire to
surprise may frequently preclude warnings in non-assault situations." 208

Article 57(2) (c) of API has less restrictive wording, not limiting the exception to

cases of "assault."

ment

Hays Parks remarks that the

that appeared in the

Hague

article relaxed the

warning require-

Regulations, while simultaneously aligning

with the customary practice of nations in the twentieth century.

it

209

The exception covers cases where the success of the military operation is contingent on the element of surprise, 210 such as in instances when the target is transportable and might move or be moved away if a warning is issued in advance. 211
An illustrative example of an attack requiring surprise was the Israeli attack on
the long-range rockets carried out in the first stages of the war in Lebanon in
2006. 212 Warning in advance of these attacks would have enabled moving the
rockets to different,

unknown

locations, thus preventing the achievement of the

operational end.

The focus of this exception

is

on the chances of success of the

on the

effect giving

military operation.

the exception applies only when surprise

or whether
mission.

it

also applies

when

is

an advance warning will have

A question may arise whether

essential for the success of the operation

surprise only contributes to fulfillment of the

The API Commentary refers to cases in which giving advance warning prior

to an attack

is

inconvenient 213 since the element of surprise

"is

a condition of its suc-

cess." 214

The ICRC's CIHL uses the term "essential to the success of an operation."
The
Commentary talks of an operation "predicated on the element of
216
surprise."
The UK Manual refers to cases "where the element of surprise is crucial
to the success of the military operation." 217 The US Operational Law Handbook
uses the phrase "where surprise is a key element." 218 The Australian manual refers
to an action that "is likely to be seriously compromised by a warning." The opinion

AMW

215

of a

US

legal advisor in

surprise in an attack
successful

1995 quoted in the

on enemy military forces

accomplishment of the mission."

tion, indicates that

it

CIHL

219

refers to use of the

in order "to increase

Queguiner,

element of

its

chance for

when analyzing the excep-

includes cases where giving a warning prior to attack

result "in annihilating

—or at

least seriously

would

—the military opera-

compromising

chances of success." 220

tion's

It is difficult

to

deduce an exact legal standard that justifies not giving a warning

for reasons of mission

accomplishment.

It

seems

safe to say that lack of surprise

does not have to lead to a total unquestionable failure of the mission and that

would
seem

suffice if the prospect of success

insufficient,

forces,

was "seriously compromised."

It

it

would

however, for surprise just to be convenient for the attacking

and the formulation of "increase the chances of success" seems too broad.
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As

in other cases, there

there

is

is

no

clear-cut formula

sufficient justification for

ement of surprise would have

and the evaluation

as to

whether

not providing a warning in order to retain the

to rely

on reasonableness, taking

el-

into account the

circumstances of the situation.
D.1.2. Force Protection Considerations. This exception,

which provides warnings

need not be issued when "circumstances do not permit," allows the taking into acforces, 221

count of the safety of attacking

warning

will

such as in circumstances when issuing a

enable enhancement of the target area's defenses in a

crease the risk to the attacking forces. 222

An example

provided due to force protection considerations
authorities, according to

is

way that will

in-

of when warnings were not

the explanation given by

Amnesty International, with regard

to

NATO

NATO operations

over Kosovo, in which warnings were not given, due to the risk to the aircrews. 223 In
this regard,

acy

warnings are more feasible when one side has

—hence giving advance warning

Admittedly, there
force protection
it

is

a

or tactical suprem-

creates less risk to the attacking aircrews. 224

between mission accomplishment and

a close relationship

and sometimes

air

warning would compromise both, such

could enable the opposing side to shoot

down

as

when

the attacking aircraft prior to the

attack,

however, these are separate considerations. Thus, for example, in a case

when

warning might lead to removal of military equipment from the

a

target, the

warning would compromise mission accomplishment but does not necessarily
fect force protection.

On

the other hand,

if it is

a fixed target

warning

might lead to a threat to attacking forces on the way back from the
might not

affect the success

Here again

it

may be

in

af-

advance

attack,

but

of the mission.

asked what level of threat to the forces

advance warnings. According to the

UK Manual

it is

justifies

not giving

permitted not to issue a warn-

ing "where the safety of attacking forces would be compromised." 225

The US naval
handbook refers to preventing forces from being "placed in jeopardy" 226 The opinion of the

US legal advisor in

1995 quoted in the

of surprise in order to "reduce

CIHL

risk to the attacking force

refers to use of the
" 227

element

Without entering

into

the intricate discussion of the appropriate weight force protection considerations

should have in the proportionality analysis in general, 228 for the purpose of warnings

it

seems that

complishment,
forces
forces

it

this

is

undoubtedly a central consideration. As with mission ac-

would seem

correct to conclude that not every remote risk to

would justify not giving a warning. However, the level of risk to the safety of
that would justify not giving a warning might arguably be less than the level

of risk to mission accomplishment required in order to refrain from giving a warning.

This can be exemplified in the wording of the

plicability

UK Manual dealing with the ap-

of the exception, which uses the term "crucial" with regard to the effect a
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warning might have on the success of the mission, and the much more lenient standard of "be compromised" with regard to safety of the forces. 229
D.1.3.

Speed of Response. Another instance where circumstances would permit

not giving warnings is when the situation does not allow time to give warnings, due
230
to the necessary speed of response.

One such

tacked and are required to respond to the attack.

situation

231

is

when

troops are at-

In such circumstances, they ob-

viously do not have time to issue an advance warning.

Another kind of case

is

that involving time-sensitive targets (TSTs)

immediate response because

"[a] target requiring

target of opportunity or

it

it is

—

a

TST is

a highly lucrative, fleeting

poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces." 232

An obvious example of such a target is a rocket about to be launched. 233 Such cases
should be differentiated from the earlier-discussed surprise and force protection
considerations. Those categories deal with preplanned attacks in

which the justifi-

cation not to give a warning can be contemplated in advance at the planning stages.

In cases of TSTs or counterfire situations, the fact that an advance warning
given

is

inherent in the situation since there

to the attack.

is

no time to

is

not

give such a warning prior

234

D.1.4. Practical Impossibility of Giving a

Warning. Another category of cases

fall-

when there is no reasonable possibility of issuing an effective warning, such as when there is no way to convey the warning due to a lack of
ing within the exception

is

means of communication. This seems
issuing a warning;

it

to be a straightforward justification for not

simply cannot be done.

D.2. General Considerations in Applying the Exception

A few general considerations deserve mention with regard to the implementation
of the exception to the obligation to provide warnings.

some cases circumstances prevent giving specific warnings but it might
235
still be possible to give a more general warning.
This brings us back to the discussion on the extent warnings must be specific and acknowledges that this depends,
among other factors, on military considerations. For example, if there is an intenFirst, in

tion to attack places being used to house weapons, specific warnings might lead to

the removal of the weapons and hence to compromising the success of the mission.

However, general warnings may still be possible, informing in general terms to stay

away from
Second,

places used to store military equipment.
it

must be

stressed

once again that the determination as to whether the

made by the commander in light of the relevant circumstances
and based on the information available to him or her at the time of the decision. 236
exception applies

is
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Third, the decision not to issue a warning, even
tion,

when

falling

Law

within the excep-

might have an impact on the possibility of carrying out the attack. As has been

discussed, the fact that a warning has not been given prior to an attack, even
fiably,

have

if justi-

may affect the proportionality analysis due to the fact that civilians who may

left

had

collateral

a

warning been issued remain

in the area, thus leading to increased

damage. In these circumstances, while not issuing a warning

the absence of a warning
therefore being

deemed

would

lead to the attack failing the proportionality

legitimate target, but giving a
it

is

a large

weapons depot that is a

warning prior to attack could lead to the weapons be-

would be justified not to give such warning.

number of civilian casualties

anticipated

from such a surprise attack

cessive in relation to the military advantage expected

the attack

test,

unlawful.

As an example, beneath a civilian residence there
ing removed; therefore

justified,

is

If,

is

however, the

viewed

as ex-

from destroying the weapons,

would be considered disproportionate. In such a case, commanders may

some weapons would be removed, but assessing that the advantage of destroying the weapons left behind (albeit smaller than the advantage gained from destroying all the weapons) would
decide to issue a warning, taking into account that

then be proportionate because of the
since civilians

much

lower

number of civilian

casualties

would have had the opportunity to leave the building prior to attack.

In this context, the suggestion

made in the Goldstone Report that when evaluat-

ing whether circumstances permit not issuing a warning, a balancing process

is

re-

quired in order to determine "whether the injury or damage done to civilians or
civilian objects

by not giving

a

warning

is

excessive in relation to the advantage to

be gained by the element of surprise for the particular operation" 237 deserves comment. In other words, the report suggests a proportionality analysis that weighs the
potential incremental military advantage gained

against the potential increased

damage

from not providing

a

to civilians or civilian objects that

warning

may oc-

cur in the absence of a warning. Schmitt explains that this does not represent the
existing legal requirements of the law of armed conflict,

and

that the report

is

con-

fusing the warning requirement with the principle of proportionality. 238 Schmitt
clarifies "that

an attacker

is

already required to assess the proportionality of a mis-

would be a factor in that analysis, as
would other factors such as timing of the attack, weapons used, tactics, life patterns
of the civilian population, reliability of intelligence, and weather. A subsequent
proportionality analysis would consequently be superfluous." 239
sion as planned; the issuance of warnings

E.

The Ramifications

It is

—How

to

Regard Those Not Heeding the Warning

incontrovertible that following warnings civilians remaining in the zone of op-

eration retain their civilian status. 240

The
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" [a]n effective

the attacker

warning does not make an unlawful attack lawful, nor does

from

its

it

divest

other obligations to take feasible precautionary measures." 241

Accordingly, civilians not heeding warnings to evacuate an area must be taken into

account in the proportionality analysis. Nevertheless, on a practical level,

if follow-

ing warnings civilians evacuate a given area, then most of those remaining are
fighting elements. This allows the attacker

cussed in
ality,

III. A,

this influences the

more freedom of action

since, as dis-

implementation of the principle of proportion-

namely, the balance between the military advantage to be gained and the

damage

collateral

anticipated

Another aspect

is

from the

attack.

the risk that the warning

would lead, not to

civilians evacuat-

ing the area, but to civilians gathering on, or in proximity to, the intended target in

order to shield

human

shields

warning when

This raises controversial questions on the issue of voluntary

it.

242

and

it is

as to

whether a commander might refrain from giving a

reasonably believed that such a warning would lead to civilians

gathering in the planned target and hence would increase the danger to civilians instead of mitigating such peril. This article addresses neither of those questions.

IV. Conclusion

The duty

warning prior to attack

to give civilians

is

not new; however,

its

imple-

mentation has become more widespread and the scope and level of warnings given
have increased in recent years. This

on protection

sis

casualties.

is

yet another reflection of the growing

and the avoidance,

for civilians

This emphasis

is

driven by

legal,

as

much

as possible,

empha-

of civilian

moral and policy considerations.

When State practice is viewed in this regard, Israeli practice, especially during the
Lebanon

conflict in

2006 and the Gaza operation of 2008-9, stands out. The scope

and specificity of warnings given in these conflicts were unprecedented. Nevertheless,

human

rights institutions

have found these warnings to be

insufficient.

In order to analyze the components of the duty to give warnings one must
identify the
tect

aim of the obligation. Warnings

are

aimed at enabling civilians to pro-

themselves from the impending attack; hence no warning

civilians are anticipated to

be physically harmed by the

nation of when an attack may affect civilians in a
is

is

attack.

is

The factual determi-

this context,

anyone wanting to make a

393

warning

important in order to appreciate and

fair after-the-fact

duty to issue a warning.

a prior

understanding the

address the dilemmas faced by commanders. This understanding
for

needed when no

way that requires

based on the circumstances of the situation. In

uncertainties of armed conflict situations

first

is

also

important

evaluation of the fulfillment of the
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Warnings

armed

measure to enhance the protection of

as a lawful

conflict

must be

the civilian population

differentiated

aimed

threats

if

during

at terrorizing

and from unlawful ruses of war. The defining

intention of the act. Even
this

from unlawful

civilians

factor

is

the

warnings might indeed cause fear and apprehension,

does not make them unlawful unless their primary intention

is

to terrorize or

mislead the population.
In order to achieve the

warnings must be

tack,

aim of enabling

To be

effective.

civilians to protect
effective,

themselves from

warnings must

fulfill

at-

various

requirements.
First,

from the temporal aspect, warnings must be given

too close in time to the attack nor too early.
a certain area, warnings

must

give

in a timely

manner, not

When civilians are advised to evacuate

them enough time

to evacuate safely. If this

is

not possible, civilians should be cautioned to stay in place and take shelter instead
of attempting to evacuate the area.

Second, with regard to recipients of warnings, in the past authorities of the
other side were those to be warned. Although this

is still

ings usually should be given directly to those civilians

a possibility, today

who might be

warn-

affected

by

the attack.

Third, in order to be considered effective the content of the warning must be
clear

and

sufficiently specific,

although the required

determined. There could be cases

more than

when

it

level

of specificity

would be necessary to repeat

should not be regarded as setting a

specificity

dard, due to the special circumstances of

its

warning

a

practice nor opinio juris

are to take

expectation of

It is

of the actions

upon

human

is

neither

enough

State

on which to base a customary rule with regard to specificity

and number of warnings required.
exists to notify civilians

legal stan-

operations and the significant policy

considerations that were the basis of this practice. There

—they

not easily

once. In this context the Israeli practice of often providing multiple

warnings of increasing

etc.

is

also highly doubtful that a legal obligation

—evacuation, route

to take, staying in place,

receiving a warning. This seems, however, to be the

rights bodies, as exemplified in the reports prepared

by

those bodies on Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.

Fourth, as to the

ranging from
shots
this

is

method of the warning,

leaflets

may also be an

and radio broadcasts

there are different options available,
to specific telephone calls.

option in certain cases, though there are those

Warning

who

disagree

an appropriate method of giving warnings.

Once the components of the rule on warnings have been identified, the question
of exceptions to the rule arises. Such exceptions include cases when surprise is necessary to achieve the goal of the mission, as well as cases where warnings would endanger the

forces. In addition,

warnings are not required prior to attack
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circumstances when there

no time to give such warnings, as a result of the nature
of the attack, or for reasons making it impossible to provide warnings, such as in
instances when no means of communication is available.

One

is

of the concerns raised with regard to warnings

ians to evacuate a certain area, military forces

is

that after advising civil-

might consider anyone who did not

evacuate as forfeiting civilian status and becoming a lawful attack objective. This,

of course,

is

not the case and

civilians

who have not left the area must be taken into

account in the proportionality analysis. Nevertheless, successful warnings that

most civilians leaving a combat area do allow military forces more freedom
of action in the knowledge that less civilian collateral damage is expected. In today's

lead to

asymmetrical
ties are

battlefield,

when

fighters intermix

used as bases of operation, causing

with civilians and civilian

civilians to evacuate

an area

is

locali-

one of

means available of minimizing civilian casualties. In that regard, warnings have become an important tool in promoting the protection of civilians on
the one hand, while enhancing military freedom of action on the other. This demonstrates that the rules of the law of armed conflict are not necessarily a zero-sum
game and warnings, as well as other precautionary measures, can be beneficial for
the useful

all

sides involved.
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE OPERATION IN GAZA: FACTUAL AND

(Part V.D)

fflf

388-91 (2009), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism

—l-Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Operation_Gaza_factual_and_legal_aspects
_use_of_force_complaints_about_IDF_5_Aug_2009.htm.
92.

M,HTf 388-90.

93.

Schmitt, supra note 57, at 828. See also Interview by

Kemp, former commander of

BBC reporter with Colonel Richard

18, 2009), http://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=WssrKJ3Iqcw (stating that he doesn't "think there has ever been a time
in the history of warfare when any army has made more efforts to reduce civilian casualties and
deaths of innocent people than the IDF is doing today in Gaza"); David Graham, The Changing
Character of Tactics: Lawfare in Asymmetric Conflicts, which is Chapter XI in this volume at 301,

British forces in Afghanistan (Jan.

307.
94.
tories,

U.N.

Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Terri-

Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict ffif 498-540, U.N.

Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 29, 2009) (Richard Goldstone), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC- 12-48.pdf [hereinafter Goldstone Report].

Amnesty International also published a report criticizing, inter alia, Israeli warnings during the
operation. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL/GAZA - OPERATION 'CAST LEAD': 22 DAYS OF
DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 50-51 (2009), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
MDE15/015/2009/en/8f299083-9a74-4853-860f-0563725e633a/mdel50152009en.pdf. The main
criticism in the report is that the general warnings received by people all over Gaza during the operation caused panic and were not effective since the civilians receiving them could neither leave
Gaza nor find a place in Gaza where safety was guaranteed.
95. See, inter alia, Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts But Missing the Law: The Goldstone
Report, Gaza and Lawfare, 43 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(forthcoming 201 1); European Centre for Law and Justice, Legal Memorandum Answering the
UN Human Rights Council's Report on the Goldstone Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict,
40 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming 201 1); Nicholas Rostow, The Human
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and International Law, 40 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (forthcoming 2011); Chatham House, Report of an Expert Meeting which Assessed
Procedural Criticisms made of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (The GoldRights Council (Goldstone) Report

stone Report) (Nov. 27, 2009), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15572
_il271 109summary.pdf.

One

example is the allegation concerning the attack on the el-Bader flour
mill. According to the Goldstone Report the mill received two recorded messages, but these
were not acted upon. Five days later the mill was struck with no warning. Goldstone Report,
supra note 94, fflj 502, 913-19. The Israeli military investigation found that the area of the mill
was warned in advance since a ground operation was planned in this area. When the ground
operation commenced several days after the warning, IDF troops came under fire and when they
returned fire the mill was hit by tank shells. No additional specific warning was given since this
was not a preplanned target. STATE OF ISRAEL, GAZA OPERATION INVESTIGATIONS: AN UPDATE
163-74 (2010), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8E841A98-1755-413D
ffl|
-AlD2-8B30F64022BE/0/GazaOperationInvestigationsUpdate.pdf [hereinafter Gaza Investigations Report First Update]. Interestingly, no civilians were hurt during the attack and only
property was damaged; yet the complaints are made about the lack of warning. Goldstone Report, supra, J 923. Another interesting feature of this case is the fact that the UN found an unexploded IAF bomb inside the mill, while amazingly there was no entry hole in the roof of the
mill. This might indicate that the ordnance was planted there in order to incriminate Israel.
State of Israel, Gaza Operation Investigations: Second Update fflf 141-45 (2010),
96.

interesting

available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/1483B296-7439-4217-933C-653CD19CE859/

0/GazaUpdateJuly2010.pdf. This serves as yet another reminder of the caution required when

making
97.

after-the-fact judgments.

For example, one commentator

states:

"In sum,

on the

issue of warning, the

Goldstone

Report badly distorts IHL's [international humanitarian law's] balance between military neces-

and humanity.

sity

It

imposes requirements that both have no basis in the law and which run

counter to state practice and military

common sense."

98.

Queguiner, supra note

99.

API Commentary, supra note

9, at

Schmitt, supra note 57, at 829.

794.
12, ^ 2191.

100.

DINSTEIN, supra note

101.

UK MANUAL, supra note 38, H 5.32.8; USAF Pamphlet, supra note 37, at 5-1 1; CIHLS

supra note 14, at 64;

5, at

138.

OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note

36, at 21;

CIHLS II, supra

I,

note

13, at 409, TI 484. Civilians do not include in this regard individuals who have lost their immunity
from attack because they are directly participating in hostilities.
102. For example, in the Gulf conflict of 1991 Iraqi soldiers were warned in leaflets that their
tanks were liable to be attacked, but that if the soldiers moved well clear of their tanks they would

be

safer.

103.

UK MANUAL, supra note 38, U 5.32.8 n.207.

See reports regarding

US

psychological warfare in Iraq in note 68 supra.

API COMMENTARY, supra note 12,
quoting Cassesse: "Warnings are designed
104.

before
for

it is

is

from the

to enable the

106.
107.

Government

behind the requirement

controlling the civilian population to see to

remove themselves and

5, at 144,

'to allow, as far as possible, civilians to leave a locality

vicinity of military objectives that

vidual civilians to
105.

See also DINSTEIN, supra note

attacked.'" Parks, supra note 8, at 158, states that "the reason

warning

tion

at 687, 1 2225.

evacua-

might be subject to attack; it also permits indifrom high-risk areas."

their property

UK Manual, supra note 38, J 5.32.8.
CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 402,^438.
AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at

its

133, H 4.
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Most reports of human rights organizations have also not suggested that warnings are re-

quired in such situations, although the Goldstone Report does link the obligation to issue a
warning to the duty to minimize death or damage to civilians or "damage to civilian objects."
Goldstone Report, supra note 94, 1 527. The report does not elaborate what is meant by the reference to such damage in this context. See also IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF
TARGETING: MILITARY OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK 188
(2009), in which it is suggested that the term "affect" "should be interpreted narrowly to mean
directly affected in the sense of injured or killed, as well as property damage." The author does

not explain this reference to property and stresses elsewhere that there

warnings before attacking
109.

See, e.g.,

is

no obligation

to issue

civilian objects. Id. at 185.

Prosecutor

the former Yugoslavia Dec.

Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 1 58 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
2003) ("In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is

v. Galic,
5,

necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator,

making reasonable use of the information

available to

him or

—namely,

expected civilian casualties to result from the attack."). This standard

formation available to the person making the decision"

is

that of "the in-

used with regard to the implementa-

also

seems appropriate with regard to the

effective

warnings when circumstances permit. See

tion of the principle of proportionality;

implementation of the requirement to give

—

her, could have

it

Kalshoven & Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An
Introduction to International Humanitarian Law 109 (3d ed. 2001); Parks, supra note

also Frits

ROGERS, supra note 5, at 109-1 1.
110. A relevant example is the case in which a German officer ordered an airstrike against two
fuel trucks which were stuck on a sandbank near the German camp in Kunduz, Afghanistan on
September 4, 2009 during NATO operations. No advance warning was given prior to the attack
by, for example, a low altitude flight over the trucks. Many civilians were killed in the attack. The
German federal prosecutor investigated the case and decided that the officer was allowed to assume that there were no civilians present, and hence was not required to give a warning prior to
the attack. Critics of this decision contend that the obligation to warn also exists in cases when
there is doubt as to whether civilians are present; therefore refraining from giving a warning
would have been justified only if the officer was absolutely sure that there were no civilians near
the trucks. Constantin von der Groeben, Criminal Responsibility of German Soldiers in Afghanistan: The Case of Colonel Klein, 1 1 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 469, 484 (2010).
111. This article represents customary international law. See, e.g.
MANUAL, supra note
8, at 156;

,

18, rule 18;

AMW COMMENTARY, supra note

1 1,

at 102-3;

CIHLS

See also Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment,

mer Yugoslavia Nov.

AMW COMMENTARY, supra note

113.

In the

is

104

AMW

supra note 14, at 8 (rule

(Int'l

2).

Crim. Trib. for the for-

30, 2006).

112.

ror

If

I,

1 1,

at 134,

TJ

14.

US Navy's handbook, the prohibition is limited to situations where spreading terCommander's Handbook, supra note 18, If 8.9.1.2. In the
indicated that the majority of the Group of Experts did not

the "sole" purpose of the attack.

AMW Commentary on rule 18,

it is

agree with this limitation and believed the prohibition referred to activities in which the "sole or

primary" purpose of the attack

COMMENTARY, supra
1

14.

115.

note

1 1,

is

that of spreading terror

among the civilian

population.

AMW

at 102.

Galic, supra note 111, ^ 104.

DlNSTEIN, supra note

the actual

outcome of the

5, at

126, emphasizes that "it

attack." See also

is

the intention that counts,

and not

API COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 618; William J.
Wake of Mass Violence: Attacking

Fenrick, Symposium: Justice in Cataclysm Criminal Trials in the
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the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 539 (1997); Schmitt, supra note 57, at 818.
CIHLS I, supra note 14, at 65. The examples referred to in the study are of cases where it is
1 1 6.
alleged that civilians were told that all those left behind would be regarded as legitimate targets.
Applying this standard, the criticism of the wording of the warnings given by Israel in
1 17.
Lebanon does not seem justified. As mentioned earlier, the report prepared on behalf of the UN
itself admits that the warnings "certainly saved many lives, both in south Beirut and south of the
Litani River." UN Mission to Lebanon and Israel, supra note 82, ^ 36.
1 18.
UN Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, supra note 75, H 206; UN Mission to Lebanon
and Israel, supra note 82, J 66. The latter report refers to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, principle 6, which restates ICCPR Article 12, and to customary international humanitarian law. Id., ^

66 n.81.

James G. Stewart, The U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, 5 JOURNAL OF
International Criminal Justice 1039, 1054 (2007).
119.

120.

Id.

The author notes that the commission "appears not to have considered whether por-

tions of the displacement resulted

from lawful evacuations or from

civilians

choosing to leave

the region for fear of lawful hostilities."
In this regard

121.
lives.

it

may be noted

that the

UN reports admit that the warning saved many

See supra text accompanying note 83.

API COMMENTARY, supra note

122.

12, at 687,T|2225. See also

DlNSTEIN, supra note

5, at 144.

HENDERSON, supra note 108, at 188.
The Goldstone Report seems to set a questionable standard in asserting that " [a] credible
warning means that civilians should be in no doubt that it is intended to be acted upon, as a false
alarm or hoax may undermine future warnings, putting civilians at risk." Goldstone Report, supra
123.
1

24.

note 94, ^ 528 (emphasis added). As Schmitt rightfully puts

it:

humanitarian) reasons, some attacks are always canceled.

"For operational (or perhaps even

No ground

exists in international

humanitarian law for charging the attacker with responsibility for countering the population's
reaction to the fact that

warned

This comports with the general understanding that those making decisions on precau-

125.

on the

tions have to reach decisions
to

them
126.
1

27.

attacks did not take place." Schmitt, supra note 57, at 828.

at the relevant time. See

ROGERS, supra note

CIHLS

II,

5, at

supra note

ness of a warning depends

on

basis of their assessment of the information that

is

available

supra note 109.
100.

3, at 40 1 J 43 1 According to the Goldstone Report, the effectivethree considerations
the clarity of the message, the credibility of

1

.

,

—

the threat and the possibility for those receiving the warning to take action to escape the threat.

Goldstone Report, supra note 94, ^ 51 1.
128. Parks, supra note 8, at 182-83, 201; ROGERS, supra note
129.

UK MANUAL, supra note 38, J 5.32.8.

130.

AMW COMMENTARY, supra note

As

for timing,

fective
in

at 133, U 9,

1 1,

which

5, at

1

17.

states:

an imprecise warning issued well in advance of the attack may be more ef-

than a precise warning immediately preceding it. Similarly, a warning issued well

advance of the attack

be more

effective

— reaching only

a certain part of the civilian population

than one reaching the entire civilian population, which

is

— may

issued just

prior to the attack.
131.
1

32.

UK MANUAL, supra note 38,
Queguiner, supra note

9, at

If

5.32.8.

808; Rowe, supra note 56, at

1

54.

An example is the attack on
the Goldstone Report, Abu

the house of the

Abu Askar

Askar received

telephone warning only seven minutes prior to the attack, though the report

a

family in the Gaza Strip. According to
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acknowledges that all the residents of the building (around forty people) managed to evacuate on
time and no one was hurt in the attack. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, KU 501, 656-57. The
Israeli investigation showed that the house was used to store weapons and ammunition, including

Grad rockets. Gaza

Investigations Report First Update, supra note 96,

ing given allowed enough time for

hand, without the weapons being
133.

all

fflf

175-82. The warn-

the residents of the building to safely evacuate

moved out of the building on

on the one

the other hand.

Bring, supra note 62, at 46-47; Queguiner, supra note 9, at 808-9. See supra section

II.A.3.

See discussion on the Lebanon War supra notes 77 and 78 and accompanying text. In its
on Sri Lanka, Human Rights Watch gives the example of an attack on Mutur on August 2,
2006. A Muslim community leader was warned that an attack would take place within an hour,
but because electricity had been cut off he had no way of getting the notice to all the residents on
time. Human Rights Watch, Improving Civilian Protection in Sri Lanka n (2006),
134.

report

available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/09/ 1 9/improving-civilian-protection-sri-lanka.

135.

See supra section LA.

136.

The manuals which include

specific reference to the civilian

population as recipients of

the warnings include, inter alia, those of Belgium, Croatia and France.
specifies that
is

warnings should be given to the "authorities or

the Italian international humanitarian

The Australian manual

civilian population."

An exception

manual of 1991, which requires warning "the local au-

137.

CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 401-2
AMW MANUAL, supra note 18, at 122

138.

See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94

thorities."

fflj

432, 436, 438, 431, 440, respectively.

(rule 37).

AMERICAN IOURNAL

of International Law 239, 245 (2000).
139. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 100.
140. See supra text accompanying note 60. Israel too issued warnings to local authorities in
Lebanon, though this was done in addition to the warnings to civilians and not instead of such
warnings. See supra text accompanying note 78.
141. An interesting question is what happens when the authorities are duly warned and have
the ability to pass the warning to the civilians but do not, in fact, warn them. This raises the question of the scope of the responsibility of one side to the conflict to the civilians of the other side.
That question
142.

will

not be dealt with here.

ROGERS, supra note 5,

at 100.

HENDERSON, supra note

108, at 188, cites

an example from

Operation Desert Storm, explaining that since the coalition purposefully disrupted the

ability

of

warning to the central authority would
those in remote regions.
143.
COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 133, U 5. There was also disagreement on a related
question of the geographic extent to which the warning must apply. Id., ^ 8.
144. See Commander's Handbook, supra note 18, f 8.9.2. Italy's LOAC Elementary Rules

the Iraqi authorities to

communicate with the civilians,

not amount to an effective warning to

a

civilians, especially

AMW

Manual ( 1991 )

states:

"When the mission permits, appropriate warning shall be given to civilian

populations endangered by the direction of attack or by their proximity to military objectives."

CIHLS

II,

Commanders' Manual (1992) has an identical
Ecuador's Naval Manual (1989) states: "When circumstances permit,

supra note 13, at 402, ^ 441; Croatia's

formulation,

id.,

^ 436;

advance warning should be given of attacks that might endanger noncombatants in the vicinity ... ."Id.,

145.

If

437.

AMW COMMENTARY, supra note

1 1,

at 133, J 8.

Operation in Gaza: Conduct of the Operation, supra note 84, J 263.
147. HENDERSON, supra note 108, at 187.
146.
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148. Such situations, which are not rare in armed conflict, must be differentiated from cases
when warnings are given without any intention to attack. These might amount to unlawful ruses.

See supra text accompanying notes 122 and 123.
149.

UK MANUAL, supra note 38, U 5.32.8.

AMW

ROGERS, supra note 5, at 100;
COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 133, H 12.
Goldstone
Report
notes
that
Israel
declared in the midst of the operation that it
151. The
would attempt to improve the clarity of warnings. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, fflj 524-25.
The report indicates this proves that the "circumstances almost certainly permitted much better
warnings to be given than was the case." Arguably, the Israeli step could be viewed as a reflection
of the uncertainty which existed in the initial stages of the operation.
150.

^542.

152.

Id.,

153.

In this context, Yuval

Shany notes

that "[t]he

committee

refers to the

dangerous and

confusing circumstances prevailing in Gaza during the operation, not to lighten the burden im-

posed on the

Israeli military as the

language of article 57(2) seems to suggest, but rather to under-

Human Rights and Humanitarian
Paradigms
Fighting
Terror
(Hebrew
University International Law
as Competing Legal
for
Research Paper No. 23-09, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract

score Israel's duty to provide clearer warnings." Yuval Shany,

Law

_id= 1504 106 (then One-Click Download hyperlink).
1 54.
Id. In this regard, see also Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human
Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 98 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 32-33 (2004); Naz K. Modirzadeh, The Dark Sides of Convergence: A Pro-civilian Critique

THE WAR IN IRAQ:
US Naval War ColHampson, Is Human Rights Law ofAny Relevance to

of the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, in

A LEGAL ANALYSIS 349, 362-67
lege International

Law Studies);

(Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo ed., 2010) (Vol. 86,
Francoise

J.

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
US Naval War College International Law Studies).

Military Operations in Afghanistan?, in

N. Schmitt
155.
156.
1

57.

158.
1

59.

ed.,

2009) (Vol. 85,

AMW MANUAL, supra note 18, rule 37.
AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 133,^1 10.
UK MANUAL, supra note 38, ^ 5.32.8.
DlNSTEIN, supra note

CIHLS I, supra note

5, at

144; Queguiner, supra note 9, at 807.

14, at 65;

CIHLS II, supra note

on the US position.
160. API COMMENTARY, supra note

1

3, at

409, ffl| 483, 485, for a statement

12, J 2225.

Operational Law Handbook, supra note 36, at 21. See
note 37, at 5-11; Commander's Handbook, supra note 18, ^ 8.9.2.
162. CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 409, 1 483.
161.

163.

Queguiner, supra note

9, at

UK MANUAL, supra note 38, 1 5.32.8.

165.

These two factors appear

166.

also

USAF

Pamphlet, supra

808.

164.

11, at

(Michael

in the

AMW Commentary. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note

133,H7.
See infra section

III. E.

1.1-2.

Operation in Gaza: Conduct of the Operation, supra note 84, J 263.
168. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, J 536.
167.

169.

Schmitt, supra note 57, at 828.

170.

For an example of circumstances in which policy reasons

sions, see

Commander's Handbook, supra note

18, H 8.3.2.

As

for

may impact

targeting deci-

moral considerations, we

will

not enter into a discussion of the complex relationship between moral and legal aspects that oc-

cur during armed conflict.
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171.

Such considerations

led, for

example, to the imposing of strict limitations on the use

of force by coalition forces in Afghanistan. Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International
Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra
note 154, at 307, 312-14. See also Laurie Blank
Operationalizing the

Law

& Amos Guiora, Teachingan Old Dog New Tricks:

of Armed Conflict in

New

Warfare,

1

HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY

JOURNAL 45, 67-68 (2010).
172. See, e.g., DANI HALOUTZ, STRAIGHTFORWARD 424-25 (2010)

(in

Hebrew). The author,

who was the Israeli Chief of Staff during the Second Lebanon War, notes that during the conflict in
Lebanon there was always a concern that attacks accidently leading to significant civilian casualties might seriously affect the international response to Israeli actions and affect the continuance
of the operation. This concern materialized in the case of the attack on the village of Qana, where
the high number of casualties and the ensuing reactions against Israel led to a decision by the
Israeli Prime Minister to limit Air Force attacks for the subsequent forty-eight hours. See also
RAPPAPORT, supra note 76, at 203-4.
173. The Goldstone Report recognizes some unique characteristics possessed by Israel relevant to the evaluation of the effectiveness of the warnings, including the extensive preparations
for the operation, intimate

knowledge of Gaza, sophisticated

intelligence, access to telephone

networks and domination of the airspace. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, f 509.
174. See also Schmitt, supra note 171, at 328-29.
Report on Georgia Conflict, supra note 69,
176. Queguiner, supra note 9, at 808.
175.

fflf

347-48.

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180.

UN Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, supra note 75, J 157.

Goldstone Report, supra note 94,
182. Schmitt, supra note 57, at 827.
181.

TJ

530.

OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 36,
Commander's Handbook, supra note 18, f 8.9.2.

183.

5-11;

184.
1fl[

Parks, supra note 8, at 158; API, supra note 12,

at 21;

art. 58.

USAF Pamphlet, supra note 37, at
API COMMENTARY, supra note

12,

2244, 2257.
185.

See also Section

MANUAL,

H

of the

AMW Manual

supra note 18. See also the

CIHL

dealing with passive precautions.

AMW

regarding precautions against attacks, where

it is

noted:
Practice has

shown that the construction of shelters, digging of trenches, distribution of

information and warnings, withdrawal of the civilian population to safe places, direction of traffic, guarding of civilian property

and the mobilization of civil defence orgaand civilian

nizations are measures that can be taken to spare the civilian population
objects

CIHLS

I,

under the control of a party to the

conflict.

supra note 14, rule 22.

The bombing of the Serbian

and radio station discussed in the report to the
prosecutor with regard to the NATO bombings in Kosovo provides an example. In that case, Yugoslav authorities knew of the attack and could have warned the occupants of the station. The report concluded that because of that knowledge NATO authorities were not expected to issue
more concrete warnings. Report to the Prosecutor on NATO Bombings, supra note 58, 1 78.
See, in a similar context, Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy
Civilians, 39 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 81, 89-90 (2006).
186.

television
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which the European Court of Human
Rights criticized a Russian operation in Katyr-Yurt in Chechnya. The Court analyzed the attack
using human rights law applicable to law enforcement situations and concluded that the Russian
military in the planning stage did not make serious calculated arrangements for the evacuation of
civilians "such as ensuring that they were informed of the attack beforehand, [determining] how
long such an evacuation would take, [determining] what routes evacuees were supposed to
take," etc. The Court found this to be a violation of Article 2 (the right to life) of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. ffl|
185, 187, 191 (2005). For an analysis, see William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal
Armed Conflict: the European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
In this regard, see, for example, the Isayeva case, in

187.

International

Law 741

(2005).

supra in note 154. See also Modirzadeh, supra note 154, at 349.

188.

See, e.g., articles cited

189.

AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 134,1 13.

190.

UK MANUAL, supra note 38,

191.

Id.

192.

193.

ROGERS, supra note 5, at 1 15.
API COMMENTARY, supra note

194.

Id.,

195.

AMW COMMENTARY, supra note

196.

See also the manuals of Kenya and of Nigeria in

If

2224;

If

5.32.8.

12,

If

2224.

AMW COMMENTARY, supra note
1 1,

at 134,

1 1,
If

at 133,

1f

9.

15.

CIHLS

II,

supra note 13, at 403,
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The Changing Character of Public Legal
Scrutiny of Operations

Rob McLaughlin*
Introduction

The

issue of legal scrutiny of operations

ultimately a synthesis of many indi-

developments in the conduct and monitoring of operations

vidual
generally.

is

Over the last two or three decades

in particular, the practice of operations

law has evolved in response to an intricate web of related developments
itself,

or in

its

interpretation; in technology (in terms of both

and monitoring of operations); and in the
consequence

is,

—

in the

law

conduct of operations

capacities of accountability agents.

The

quite naturally, significantly greater scrutiny. There are few nations

currently engaged in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in

Afghanistan, for example, that have not faced the very public dissection and deconstruction of their legal responses to discrete operational incidents. This
certainly not a
this

development to be lamented; indeed

—

that can result

from rapid evolution

in

any ecosystem. In

duction to the changing character of legal scrutiny,
particular factors in this evolution

of accountability agents

—the enablers of

I

—and

overview three

law, technology and the capac-

—and make some short general observations on

the effects of these developments

on public

But

this short intro-

will briefly

potential implications of this evolution for military operations.

* Associate Professor, College

most

to be greatly lauded.

overwhelmingly positive development should not disguise the tensions

flaws

ities

it is

is

My focus is upon

legal scrutiny, rather

of Law, Australian National University.

the

than the internal
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or organic legal scrutiny that for most States has long been an integrated

compo-

nent of the conduct of military operations.

Enablers:

Law

Clearly, greater definition or certainty in the

operation

is

a positive

law applicable to any given military

development. This should not disguise, however, the in-

alienable fact that greater ultimate precision in the law

comes

tainty during the evolutionary process of establishing

at the price

and implementing those
which

interpretations while simultaneously conducting operations in

minted law or interpretation or guidance
other articles in this volume clearly

dominant view

is

clearly applicable

there

attest,

is

no

of uncer-

settled

and

is

that

newly

being applied. As

—nor even

view

—among and between academics, non-governmental

a pre-

organizations

(NGOs), inter-governmental organizations, the International Committee of the Red
Cross and individual States on the scope and application of the concept of targetable

members of an organized armed group
conflicts.

1

in the context of non-international

Yet this substantive legal concept

is

evolving as

it is

armed

applied in opera-

developments in the way

tions such as those of

ISAF

concept

and applied are not yet finalized or settled. Actions and inci-

is

interpreted

in Afghanistan. Clearly,

dents are nevertheless being held to account against the concept

forms and interpretations
to

what

is,

—

in

its

this

myriad

—contemporaneously with wider
debate
The obvious —but
and
challenging— consequence
an NGO,
general

the

precisely, the correct interpretation

as

application.

highly significant and operationally

is

that

an operational incident against one interpretation of the

for example, will analyze

evolving law or appreciation of the law, whereas a State

may well be

same incident

differing State practice in

in light of a different interpretation

relation to the very

same

fusion and antagonism

law. Clearly, the scope for differential appreciation, con-

is

plainly evident.

The notion of direct participation
cept into ad hoc

armed

conflict

in hostilities,

and the subdivision of this con-

and organized armed group components,

obvious current manifestations of
explosive-device

and

maker killed

(LOAC)

analyzing the

(that

is,

but one of the more

phenomenon. Whether an improvised-

an attack was

in

group) or murdered (a civilian

this

is

killed in

as a targetable

who was

accordance with the law of

member

of an organized armed

not within the targetable envelope)

is

a

fundamental fracture point.

Another example,

in relation to collateral

damage mitigation and weapon-

may similarly assist in illustrating this point. It was recently reported that a
US Army field artillery regiment in Afghanistan had developed a method of mitigating potential collateral damage when undertaking fire support missions by
eering,
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using less-explosive training ammunition during the "adjustment phase." 2 As the
report

makes clear, however, this is a "moral and strategic choice within a counter-

insurgency environment." 3
It is

sal

important to emphasize that

—amendment

in attack

and

to

what

collateral

is

innovation

this

is

a contextual

—not univer-

to be considered as feasible in relation to precautions

damage

mitigation.

The

one

potential exists, however, for

now

party in a debate to assert, with strong reasoning, that this innovation should

become the norm across all operations. Another party to the debate may well wish
to emphasize, on the basis of equally sound reasoning, that this innovation is a
choice available only in limited situations and a choice that is dependent upon terrain, ballistic conditions, availability, strategy and so on.
The message is clear, however: the significantly broader availability of detailed
information and the vastly expanded opportunities for debate as to "the law" by
reference to that information have increased the depth, scope and occurrence of
public legal scrutiny of operations. The reverse side of this development is that the
language of the applicable law most particularly LOAC can be very publicly

—

—

misused so

as to provide

an aura of incontestability or authority to an otherwise

weak statement or analysis.
ticular effect

Stating an opinion, without proper analysis, that a par-

was "disproportionate"

carries with

cant legal context and implications, even
a colloquial, ethical or

A

moral

if the

it

very strictly defined and signifi-

user of the term was employing

scrutiny

is

is

the role of law itself in terms of the

manner

in

legal

which that

conducted. Public debates on operational incidents are today generally

conducted within a legal framework: the language used
beit specific terms or concepts are occasionally

sometimes undermining the ultimate quality of the
the investigative

and enforcement paradigms

public debate (in political, media and

civil

drawn from the law

analysis,

utilized are

—and the

interpretation of the applicable law

is

(al-

improperly used or explained,

consequences are often expressed in terms of the law.

how

in

sense.

second aspect of the evolution of law as a component of increasing

scrutiny of operations

it

scrutiny);

bounded by law; and the

It is

legal

and thus the

notable, for example,

—dominated

framework

society arenas) in Australia

and the

4

United Kingdom in the lead-up to operations in Iraq in 2003. Similarly, the most
accessible

and public

creasingly through

This
is

is

evident

the significant

British

resort to complaint in relation to operational incidents

and via the

in-

law.

on several levels. On a limited, very individual level, one example
recent media attention surrounding litigation commenced by a

army sniper against the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)

that his identity

is

was protected

monitored by MoD

officials

after

for failing to ensure

he gave an interview (that was approved and

who had told him his identity would be protected) He
.
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and

his family

have since been required to relocate as they were assessed to be

high risk of kidnap or targeting by militants.

On

a

broader

scale,

law and

at

5

legal process

have also been used to invite wider

public scrutiny of operations through public interest channels able to access the

mechanisms of judicial review.

On the basis of publicly available information and
MoD, Maya

other information originally released to her by the
in

some media

as

"an anti-war

activist"

—described

able to agitate for judicial review of

UK forces serving within ISAF to Afghan gov-

ten specific detainee transfers (from

ernment

—was

Evans

authorities) so as to ensure that detention operations in general

subject to additional public legal scrutiny.

6

This

were

very clearly, a positive develop-

is,

ment: authoritative and public legal determinations on detailed matters of direct

made on the basis of accurate
will generally generate more di-

operational concern, where those determinations are

information and with contextual appreciation,
rectly

and operationally useful guidelines and instructions.

Similarly, authoritative

determinations that generally endorse current practice and legal risk mitigation
strategies (as

was the case

condemnatory decisions,
cisions. It

to

sometimes

is

know what we

in this litigation), while

perhaps not as newsworthy as

are nonetheless often as useful as such

as edifying

condemnatory de-

and important to the practice of operational law

are getting right as

it is

to

know what we have got wrong.

Enablers: Technology

Technology functions as a similarly bivalent force in the evolution of legal scrutiny of
operations.

On

one

level,

technology in operations raises myriad questions about

contemporaneous or simultaneous

legal scrutiny,

means and methods of warfare and precautions

most

particularly in relation to

in attack.

One example

is

the fact

that public perceptions as to both the efficacy of precision-guided munitions

(PGMs) and

their ubiquity in

tional reality. This disjuncture

Regardless of best intentions,
agents

who analyze weapons

modern operations
is
it

are often at odds with opera-

thoroughly problematic in terms of legal scrutiny.

must be accepted

incidents

may

that non-State accountability

—or equally may not—be applying an

accurate understanding of the capabilities, limitations,

and

effects

of such weapons or of their place in broader systems of assessment,

weaponeering and targeting. All of these factors
crete

will influence the effect

weapon in any given context, and all of these factors

available information

cantly

employment parameters

more

—can be

and

scrutiny. Perhaps the

most

some incidents
where debate over launching weapons from altitude,

example was the public misappreciation of

during the Kosovo conflict

as increasingly publicly

built into (and misapplied in the course of) signifi-

detailed alternative legal assessments

telling recent

—

of a dis-
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insofar as

it

related to precision-guided munitions

some PGMs,

increased accuracy of

mately inaccurate

Technology

ulti-

by some accountability agents. 7

—quality of information

of operations.

but

clearly evidenced well-intentioned

also plays a significant role in terms of the quantity

always positively
tinizers

legal assessments

and the altitudes associated with

One example

available to

—but not

both commanders and scru-

by

the detailed analysis

is

and

Human

Rights

Watch (HRW) of a US and Afghan forces engagement in Azizabad in Afghanistan
on August 21-22, 2008. In a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, HRW investigators reported, on the basis of their assessment of what the technology could
do and thus what

[i]t is,

it

should have told

US

forces about events in the village, that

therefore, questionable that the close proximity of insurgent forces to civilians

was "unknown" to US and Afghan forces;
telligence was shockingly poor

if it

was unknown, then the quality of US in-

Given what could be expected to have been known about the large civilian population in the
village at the time,

conducting airstrikes over several hours that destroy or damage 12 to

14 houses in the middle of the night makes high civilian casualties almost inevitable. 8

As is a risk with all assessments completed in hindsight, the factor that comes to
dominate when a tragedy occurs may now appear glaringly obvious and thus be attributed significant weight in assessing both the aftermath

blame. At the time, however,

it

and apportionment of

may have been but one factor among a multitude of

noisy competing pieces of information, each of which would have been colored by
differential quality tags

and unknown

levels

of perishability, and subject to the

compressed time frames of operational decision making. The piece of information
in question

may not,

dominant place
result

at the

time the decision was actually made, have held such a

in the lexicon surrounding the incident.

Not

all

mistakes are the

of intentional disregard, recklessness or negligence. Sometimes mistakes are

simply the result of decisions that were

at the

time legitimately

made (and thus

of

continuing lawfulness) from within a swirl of information of highly variable and
occasionally

equal

unknown

quality

and corroboration. Mistake does not

necessarily

illegality.

Technology, with respect to legal scrutiny, also has significant

effects in

terms of

post-incident monitoring and assessment, two of the core components of legal
scrutiny.

These

effects

mobile phones with

operate on several different

digital

levels. First,

—from

technology

video recording capabilities to the ubiquity of access to

the Internet in operational zones, and the availability of information

formation sharing across the Internet

—

clearly
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and ease of in-

legal scrutiny of operations
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significantly faster,

more omnidirectional and more informed than

the past. Footage of an incident recorded

by a bystander on

a

at

any time

mobile phone can be

uploaded to the Internet within minutes and can be viral within minutes

after that.

Within hours, footage of an incident can be the subject of both informed and
informed

formed"
sarily

legal scrutiny, the latter necessitating a response.

in

in

Of course, more

ill-

"in-

terms of raw material forming the basis of assessment does not neces-

mean more "informed"

in

terms of analysis; that

is

a function of the law

and

the analytical process applied.

make

Access to information and comment, and the ability to in turn

comment

—

regardless of

further

accuracy, quality, purpose or contextual worth

its

immediately available to millions of people can drive a scrutiny agenda

down

a

myriad of paths, thereby opening the potential for irrelevant or minimally relevant
factors or concerns to

dominate or

governmental public

affairs

derail a debate or scrutiny project. Military

bureaucracies are slower and

less agile

and

many

than

of

the other actors in the ideas and influence marketplace, a logical consequence of

both clearance requirements and the predilection for prior clarification and cor-

The consequence, however,

roboration.

mechanisms
ten the

first

is

that while operational public affairs

are generally proactive with respect to "good"

news

(or rather, are of-

and only media to report such stories), they are generally seen as merely

responsive to "bad" news.

An example

of

how

media-driven

legal scrutiny

situationally inconsequential or irrelevant paths

can herd such scrutiny

might be

illustrated

down

by some media

reporting of the Australian Director of Military Prosecution's decision to prefer

charges against three Australian soldiers in relation to a civilian casualty incident in
Afghanistan.

any

rate)

One

issue that

came

to

dominate the debate

(for a period

was International Criminal Court (ICC) cognizance

over, the matter.

While it was

of,

at

and jurisdiction

clear in press reporting that the charges

accordance with Australian domestic law and

of time

were

laid in

after a Service Police investigation,

an "obiter" comment by a respected Australian international law academic that
merely reiterated that Australia has certain obligations under the Rome Statute 9 suddenly saw the non-existent issue of overt

based

legal scrutiny

and reportage

ICC

"pressure"

become

the focus of media-

for a week. "International obligations

compelling the prosecution of Aussie troops," asserted one newspaper.
it

was

clear

—even on

the facts as reported

inadmissible before the

ICC because

by the media

Australia

—

that the matter

had appropriately

Quasi-legal opinion that the decision to prosecute

10

may have been

may be

However,

would be

investigated.

taken to ensure

ICC could not intervene was not only ill-informed and irrelevant; it was manifestly wrong at law. In accordance with its own statute, the ICC's attention, if any, is

the

assuaged, regardless of any subsequent decision as to prosecution, at the point the
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relevant State has properly conducted

had done
It

was

and considered an investigation, as Australia

in this instance.

also clear, quite apart

from the

issue of complementarity, that the "grav-

requirement for enlivening ICC jurisdiction was not met in

ity"

however, did not stop the public media-led
ceeding

down

a deep

and

legal scrutiny

this case.

ICC

This,

of the matter from pro-

irrelevant rabbit hole, with resultant public

standings of the role and jurisdiction of the

11

misunder-

as a potentially

enduring

consequence.
Second, as noted previously, technology and the

and

scrutinizers (who, as also

flexible

and quicker

off the

agility

of non-State monitors

noted previously, are often significantly more

mark than more

agile,

bureaucratic public affairs mecha-

nisms) often combine to ensure that incidents are placed within the public domain

The consequence is that operational bureaucracies are increasingly forced to publicly respond well in advance of having collated and analyzed the
available information. Whereas additional and alternative scrutiny was previously
in very short order.

something that generally occurred

and

and

based upon

ment

assessment

implementation process had been completed and communicated, the

results

additional

after the reporting, investigation,

alternative scrutiny process

initial reports,

is

increasingly multistaged: scrutiny

scrutiny at the investigative stage, scrutiny at the assess-

phase, scrutiny at the consequences stage

implementation of the lessons-learned

(e.g., trials)

and scrutiny

at the

stage.

A recent example is apparent in one of the many threads of scrutiny activity that
arose out of the October 2010 WikiLeaks disclosure of many thousands of classified

documents

had been prepared between

relating to the Afghanistan conflict that

January 2004 and December 2009.

One

public interest legal group wrote the

UK

Minister of Defence recommending investigation "as suspected war crimes" of incidents disclosed in the WikiLeaks documents. These

group
ians

asserts, the

need

documents

disclose, the

for further legal scrutiny of "the killing of at least 26 civil-

and the wounding of a further 20 by

British forces." 12 Legal scrutiny

is

thus

now occurring, divisibly and in detail, at every procedural stage of an incident's legal
life

—from

initial

reporting,

to

investigation,

to

outcomes and consequence implementation. Again,
with

it

carries

But

it

also carries with

ity.

this is

consideration,

it

to

not an evolution to be

great potential for increased transparency

decried;

it

judicial

and accountabil-

the potential for misinformation, inaccurate assess-

ments and misguided responses

at

multiple fracture points in an incident's legal

journey, each of these inevitably coloring, shaping and informing the next substage of scrutiny. This

is

a very different proposition

opinion based on the invariably more considered and
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accompany an open judicial hearing in which evidence is
contextualized and weighed as it is being publicly disclosed.

analysis that can

oughly

tested,

thor-

Enablers: Capacities of Accountability Agents

The

third element of the troika of enablers that are playing a significant role in the

evolution of public legal scrutiny of operations
ity

—

become much more professional
incidents, and much better equipped

agents have

proach to

alternative investigations.

on

some non-State accountabiland thus effective in their ap-

that

is

litigation

Academics and public

have long brought their analytical

—

to conduct additional

interest

skills

and

law groups with a focus

to bear

on

specific incidents

but have traditionally been hamstrung by the availability of detailed information.
But, as has been discussed, as information scarcity

becomes

less

the norm, the

opportunities for such academics and public interest law groups to engage with
specific incidents in

grown

much

greater detail

and with

significantly greater fidelity has

apace. 13

Similarly, the general stock-in-trade of many

NGOs was for many years limited by

information and capacity to general comments or press statements. Today, however,
the increased and improved professionalism, access, resourcing and specialization

of some

NGOs have enabled them to become highly influential non-State actors in

the field of legal scrutiny of operational incidents. 14 Second-order issues such as
scrutiny

on reputation, and creating impetus

achieving effects on operations

—

effects that

for policy

change

as a

means of

can be achieved on the basis of report-

age and opinion as opposed to detailed legal investigation and analysis

longer necessarily the focus of

NGOs. These

some

better resourced, connected

accountability agents are

now

focusing

more

—

are

no

and informed

extensively

upon

achieving direct and discernible results in terms of legal processes and conse-

quences by inquiring into issues with

much greater granularity and utilizing more

rigidly (if not always accurately or correctly) applied legal

frameworks

as the para-

digms within which they inquire, analyze and conclude. This allows these account-

more direct and timely change. Being told
that your policy is wrong is a less legally significant issue
and is likely to prompt a
ability agents to create opportunities for

less

immediate

result

—than being

—

told that

you

are in breach of the law.

Consequences?

Although the enablers outlined above are but three of many that are driving the
changing nature of legal scrutiny of operations, they do point the way to three thematic conclusions as to the future shape of this evolution. The
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first,

which

is

no

Rob McLaughlin

surprise,

is

that the language of additional

incidents will continue to be

and

alternative scrutiny of operational

dominated by law and legal paradigms. Engaging with

and analyzing the high volume of disparate and hybrid

pieces of information that

are increasingly available to alternative accountability agents, such as

media and academics,
framework. Perhaps

NGOs,

are difficult in the absence of an organizing principle

the

and

much more readily than purely policy analysis, law provides a

universally recognized

(if not

always universally agreed upon) framework, supple-

mented by detailed rules and processes, against which that information can be
marshaled and applied. Further, legally based scrutiny projects bring with them the
potential for substantially more urgent and direct responses and consequences
than many forms of policy pressure exerted with respect to the same issue. Being
told, in detail, how and why your use of force breaches the law is much more likely
to prompt an immediate response than being told why your approach to the use of
force is wrong from a policy perspective.
Second, military operations are ever-increasingly intelligence led and effects
based. The natural consequence is that militaries not only have the capacity to
generate greater levels of information on discrete targets or on discrete operational incidents, but are in fact driven by law, strategy and doctrine to do so. This
development

clearly

opens discrete incidents to deeper additional or alternative

scrutiny because each incident

is

treated

more rigorously as an

stance, thereby generating greater levels of detail

detailed legal scrutiny.

It

also

more narrowly defined

ever

individual pieces of information.
least

levels

It will

become

it

relates to a particular piece

drawn. This

is

by which

it

will allow

also

very

for scruti-

to engage not just

of intelligence that a

commander may

relates to the

already the case with the markedly increased potential for additional

alternative legal scrutinizers to analyze particular

It is

them

at the

manner by which it was colwas analyzed and the source from whence it was

have relied upon, but with the law that
lected, the process

—
searching—

increasingly possible

through the cross-referencing capabilities of Internet

with the law as

of legal scrutiny into

such as the reliance a commander placed upon

nizes to arm themselves with information that

and

and thus greater opportunities for

opens the path for new

issues

individual circum-

weapons-use incidents.

becoming an accepted fact of operational life that such legal scrutiny of

intelligence itself is

now routinely possible on the basis of publicly available infor-

mation: scrutiny as to the motives and background of individual sources of intelli-

gence (warlord, sympathizer or user of the military force as a proxy in his/her
vendettas?); as to the legal status of the process

by which

lected (telecommunications intercepts, biometrics, paid
availability of other

ligence. It

is

that intelligence

human

agents?);

was

own
col-

and the

information that enhances or degrades the quality of that

intel-

also entirely possible that post- incident scrutinizers are able to easily
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and apply

find

—and

—additional

thus assume a commander's knowledge of

information to which that

commander may not have

actually

had

access.

The third consequence of this evolution in the legal scrutiny of operations is that
it is no longer just about what is investigated; it is about who investigates, when and
where they investigate, how they investigate, that body of law used to investigate,
and that body of law (or which States' particular interpretation of the law) used to
measure the results. That is, the dimensions of additional and alternative legal
scrutiny have now spread well beyond simple engagement with the incident itself.
It is a statement of the obvious that additional and alternative legal scrutiny projects will

issue

that

continue to broaden in focus so as to engage with any ancillary or related

where there

is

is

a legal

framework

that

is

readily applicable

and information

readily available.

Conclusion

The changing nature of legal scrutiny of operations generally, and of operational
incidents more particularly, is not to be decried. It is vital that militaries and States
acknowledge and accept that this is ultimately a positive development in the evolution of transparency and accountability in operations. It is also important that militaries and States understand that this evolution will continue regardless. However,
the obligations created by this evolution are not all one way. Certainly States will
continue to test and adjust their processes in order to respond to this development
by developing quicker public affairs mechanisms, through increasing transparency
in releasing their

investigation or inquiry findings in relation to certain

and by engaging

incidents,

scrutiny reports

upon

own

in detailed rebuttals of additional

where appropriate. But

these additional

and

and

legal scrutiny

is

development

alternative legal

also places obligations

alternative legal scrutiny agents in terms of their

engagement with information,
bility,

this

and

analysis

nothing

if

and the

law.

With power comes

own

responsi-

not powerful.
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Litigating

How We Fight

Ashley S. Deeks*
I.

Introduction

well- documented that the way the Bush administration chose to conduct
Itconflict
between the United States and
against
Qaeda caused a significant
its

is

al

rift

European States. US policies that authorized the use of renditions,
facilities

secret detention

and harsh interrogation techniques created diplomatic tension between

the United States and

many

of

its

European

allies,

making

it

harder to focus on

other bilateral and multilateral issues and at times diminishing law enforcement

and intelligence cooperation. Many of these European reactions and decisions were
1

discretionary, taken

by the

political

branches of European countries in response to

pressure from their electorates and

human

rights groups.

One might

reasonably

some of the changes introduced by the Obama administration related to the conflict with al Qaeda
the three January 2009 executive orders,
for instance
would have started to close that rift. 2
But something remarkable and surprisingly unremarked upon has been
happening since 2001 that is both widening and securing the permanence of this
transatlantic divide. Courts on both sides of the Atlantic are deciding cases
brought by individuals who are contesting the way States have been fighting
armed conflicts with non- State actors (such as the Taliban and al Qaeda, as well as
think, therefore, that

—

—

—

—

Academic Fellow at Columbia Law School. She previously served in the Office of the Legal
Adviser at the US Department of State. The views and characterizations expressed herein are
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*

government.
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armed groups

in Iraq).

fulness of detention at

of

ity

claim.

have

its
3

cases,

We Fight

With the exception of individual claims related to the lawGuantanamo, the US government has won the vast major-

with the courts often declining even to reach the merits of the

In contrast,

lost virtually

European

States (with the

every case on these issues that has

before the European Court of
systematic effect

United Kingdom leading the way)

on

Human

States' decisions

conflict. It therefore

is

come

before their courts or

Rights (ECtHR). These cases are having a

about

how

to conduct themselves in

in the interests of policymakers

and warfighters

armed

to under-

stand this trend.
Part

II

of this

article

State officials have

armed

examines the wide spectrum of cases in which States or

been sued for their alleged conduct related to non-international

conflicts. Part III assesses the real-world implications for the judicial deci-

sions in each area, not only for the specific litigants but also for

government policy

and operations more generally. Part IV considers possible explanations for the diver-

some thoughts about how States might try

gent outcomes of these cases and offers
to

manage

these developments in the future.

II.

Suing States over How They Fight

Virtually every aspect of the

way

in

which the United

States

and European

—including detention, use of
another and
of detainees from one
agencies — has been challenged

are fighting conflicts against non-State actors

force during occupation, the transfer

the use of intelligence

and

States

the

State to

in court. 4

intelligence

These cases stem primarily from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, though

some flow from
tions about

US

the

US conflict with al Qaeda outside of those theaters and allega-

activities,

such as renditions, in the course of that

latter conflict.

This Part examines four categories of claims asserting unlawful actions by States:

unlawful detention, unlawful treatment, unlawful transfers and

gence

activities.

States' cases,

Each section focuses

most often

first

on US

cases

cases brought in the United

illegality in intelli-

and then turns

to other

Kingdom.

Claims of Unlawful Detention

US
It is

Cases
useful to sort into three general categories claims brought

by detainees against

the United States alleging that they are being unlawfully detained. First, detainees

have challenged the executive branch's general authority to detain
Taliban fighters under the laws of war.
thority in this area. In

Hamdi v.

US

al

Qaeda and

courts have upheld the executive's au-

Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of
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detention of individuals engaged in hostilities against the United States in Afghanistan,

while requiring the

US government

to provide the individual detainee in

question with a process by which to contest the factual basis for his detention. 5
Likewise, in

Hamdan

v.

Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court affirmed that the United

Qaeda and did not question the legality of
Hamdan's detention as a member of al Qaeda (though it concluded that the military
commission before which the United States planned to try him was unlawful). 6
States

was

in

an armed conflict with

al

Second, detainees have sought to have federal courts, not just the executive
branch, review the legality of their detentions. The United States, which has argued
against the extension of review to courts, has lost these cases.

The chain of cases

Supreme Court's holding that constitutional habeas corpus
detainees held at Guantanamo includes Rasul v. Bush and Boumediene

that resulted in the
applies to
v.

Bush. 7

The Boumediene decision resulted in a third category of cases: detainees at
Guantanamo have brought habeas petitions challenging the specific factual bases
for their detentions. The United States is defending almost two hundred habeas
cases brought by those who remain at Guantanamo, and has lost a number of cases,
even as the courts continue to uphold the basic scope of the government's claimed
detention authority. 8 Much ink has been spilled about the unprecedented nature of
judicial review of the propriety

of a person's detention during an armed

conflict.

Indeed, the fact that the federal district courts hearing these cases are struggling

with what rules to apply to this review illustrates the novel nature of the courts' role
in this type of decision
conflict.

9

making and the non-traditional nature of the armed

The outcomes of these

cases have

been mixed: the courts

(to date)

denied detainees the writ of habeas in about sixteen cases, and have granted
thirty-seven cases. 10

As

a result, the United States has transferred a

tainees to their countries of nationality or other locations,

tinues to seek

homes

and

have
it

in

number of de-

in other cases con-

for those ordered released.

In Boumediene, the

Supreme Court evaluated three

factors to determine the

reach of the writ of habeas in the wartime detention context: "(1) the citizenship

and

status of the detainee

tus determination

and the adequacy of the process through which

was made;

(2) the

then detention took place; and

nature of the

sites

that sta-

where apprehension and

(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the

prisoner's entitlement to the writ." 11

One

question

left

unresolved by Boumediene was whether the right of habeas

corpus might extend to detainees held in

US

custody in locations other than

Guantanamo.
In

May

Maqaleh

2010, the D.C. Circuit answered this question in the negative in the

case, at least

with regard to certain detentions in Afghanistan. 12 The court
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would run to
Afghanistan by the United States of three non-Afghan detainees
the United States apprehended them outside of Afghanistan. The

applied the three Boumediene factors to determine whether the writ
the detention in

who

alleged that

Maqaleh court concluded

that the writ did not run to those detainees, holding that

"under both Eisentrager and Boumediene, the writ does not extend to the Bagram
confinement

in

an active theater of war

in a territory

under neither the de facto nor

dejure sovereignty of the United States and within the territory of another dejure
sovereign." 13 In reaching this conclusion, the court expressed concern about an in-

would

terpretation of the Suspension Clause that
traterritorial extension

of the Suspension Clause to noncitizens held in any United

States military facility in the world,

other United States-leased

and perhaps

facilities as well."

14

lacked jurisdiction to hear the detainees' claims.
the detainees were not Afghan nationals

not apprehended in Afghanistan
courts

"create the potential for the ex-

would conclude

—

and

in

to

The court thus determined
15

This holding

—

in a case in

that

it

which

which they alleged that they were

suggests that

that habeas

an undeterminable number of

it is

would extend

even more unlikely that

US

Afghan

to detainees such as

nationals apprehended in Afghanistan during the current conflict.

While

it is

Guantanamo and Bagram
Boumediene

US

possible to imagine a future

factors, for

generis in being alien

detention

facility that falls

Air Base in Afghanistan on the spectrum of the

now

it

appears as though

wartime detainees

tentions. Courts thus have left

it

Guantanamo

detainees are sui

entitled to federal court review of their de-

to the executive

branch to determine whether,

outside of Guantanamo, a particular individual's detention during
is

between

armed

conflict

lawful.

UK Cases
The UK case of al-Jedda, another case about the legality of a detention during noninternational

armed

conflict, stands in

some

contrast to Maqaleh. 16

The ECtHR

on June 9, 2010, so its ultimate disposition remains uncertain.
However, the UK House of Lords decision is worth considering both for its holding
and because it illustrates the complicated expansion of the European Convention
held a merits hearing

on

Human Rights (ECHR) 17 into warfighting for States parties to that Convention.

The larger implications for that expansion are discussed in Part III.
The UK armed forces in Iraq detained Mr. al-Jedda, a dual British-Iraqi national, for several years as a "security internee."

claiming

it

violated

ECHR Article

5,

which defines the situations

lawfully can deprive a person of his liberty,

tention.

18

The

UK

Al-Jedda challenged his detention,
in

which

a State

and which does not include security de-

government pursued two main

lines

of argument.

First,

it

argued that al-Jedda's detention was attributable not to the United Kingdom but to
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UN, which had authorized a multinational force to take action in Iraq.

UN

argued that his detention was authorized by

1546

(UNSCR

security," 19

ECHR

1546),

and

that

Second,

Security Council Resolution

which contemplated detention "for imperative reasons of
the Resolution therefore qualified al-Jedda's rights under

Article 5 (and

Human

under the UK's

Rights Act (HRA), which imple-

mented the ECHR in UK law).
The House of Lords rejected the UK's first argument but accepted in part its
second. The Law Lords determined that Article 103 of the UN Charter, which pro-

—

—

vides that a State's obligations under the Charter prevail over any other of the
State's international obligations, qualified the
cle 5. 20

However, the Lords made

entirely.

One lord's opinion

UK's obligations under

ECHR Arti-

clear that

UNSCR 1546 did not supplant Article 5

"[T]he

UK may lawfully, where it is necessary

stated,

for imperative reasons of security, exercise the

power

to detain authorised

by

UNSCR 1546 and successive resolutions, but must ensure that the detainee's rights
under

article 5 are

tention."

21

not infringed to any greater extent than

is

inherent in such de-

Another lord noted that the scope of UNSCR 1546 and the way the Res-

olution might interact with Article 5's requirements were not clear and that the
issue would

remain for decision in future proceedings. 22 Three of the five Lords ex-

pressed discomfort with security detention generally; one suggested that the

United Kingdom bring al-Jedda back to the United Kingdom and another favored
criminal proceedings, viewing security detention only as a fallback. (Both of these
positions are in tension with the view under the law of war that security detention
in the location in

which the

conflict

is

occurring

is

acceptable.)

The House of Lords thus considered that it had jurisdiction to review al-Jedda's
claims, in contrast to the D.C. Circuit in Maqaleh. Further, while

Jedda's detention as lawful,

it

held that

UNSCR

it

upheld

al-

1546 qualifies the applicability of

ECHR Article 5, but only to the extent necessary to give effect to the obligations in
UNSCR 1546. In other words, Article 5 continues to apply to the UK's security
detentions to the greatest extent possible consistent with the Resolution.
to be seen

whether the

It

remains

ECtHR will take a similar or more expansive view of the ex-

which the UK's obligations under the ECHR must govern its treatment of its

tent to

detainees during

armed

conflicts outside

UK territory. 23

Claims of Unlawful Detainee Treatment
Another category of claims against
flicts is

States fighting non-international

armed con-

claims that detainees in these States' custody suffered mistreatment at the

hands of State

officials, either directly

or as a result of policies approved by the

officials.
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Cases

members of

Qaeda or the Taliban have
brought a number of cases in US courts seeking declaratory relief and damages for
their alleged abuse while in US custody. Some have tried to sue US government ofIndividuals detained as suspected

ficials,

while others have tried to sue

further, the courts

al

US contractors. 24 None has succeeded to date;

have resolved the cases in a way that has avoided addressing the

underlying substantive claims.
In Rasul

v.

Rumsfeld, four former

Guantanamo

detainees sued former Secretary

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and ten other senior military
ages for their detention

and alleged mistreatment while

officials,

seeking

in that facility.

25

damThey

claimed that they were subjected to beatings, sleep deprivation, extreme tempera-

and interrogations

tures, forced nudity, death threats

US

leged violations of the

at

gunpoint. Their claims

al-

Constitution and international law, including the 1949

Geneva Conventions. In 2008, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case; the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded for further consideration in light
of Boumediene. 26

On

that the defendants

remand, the D.C. Circuit again dismissed the

were entitled to qualified immunity.

that " [n]o reasonable

case,

holding

In addition to holding

government official would have been on notice that plaintiffs

had any Fifth Amendment or Eighth Amendment
its

27

view that "the Court

in

rights," the court also expressed

Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb

existing

law governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other
than the Suspension Clause." 28 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2009.
Likewise, in Arar

other

US

officials,

v.

Ashcroft,

Maher Arar sued the former Attorney General and

claiming that they had violated the Torture Victims Protection

Act and Arar's Fifth

Amendment

rights

by authorizing

his

removal to Syria with-

out appropriate process and with the knowledge that the Syrian government would
detain and torture him. 29

The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to create a
new Bivens damages remedy against the government officials allegedly responsible
for his transfer. The Second Circuit described the diplomatic, foreign policy, classified information and national security implications of allowing damage claims for
harms suffered during renditions as among the "special factors" counseling against
the extension of a Bivens action to this type of activity. 30 The court concluded,
[W]e decline

to create,

on our own,

a

new cause of action against officers and employwe conclude that, when a case presents the in-

ees of the federal government. Rather,

tractable "special factors" apparent here, ...

how

it is

for the Executive in the first instance to

implement extraordinary rendition, and for the elected members of
Congress and not for us as judges to decide whether an individual may seek compensation from government officers and employees directly, or from the government,

decide

to

—

—

31
for a constitutional violation.
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to the political branches in assessing

whether and

how to

create such a remedy.

worth mentioning Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. While that case was
about the legality of the military commissions created to try Mr. Hamdan, and not
In this context,

it is

about his treatment in detention, the Supreme Court's decision that
cle 3

of the Geneva Conventions applied to the

Common Arti-

US conflict with al Qaeda had a direct

US government's treatment and interrogation of
al Qaeda (and Taliban) detainees. One might therefore view this case as an example
that runs counter to the primary thesis of this article, because a US court waded
effect

on the

rules governing the

into an issue that forced

examine what

to

it

to military operations during

case as

one whose core

cate: the interpretation

an armed

rules the executive

branch must apply

However,

possible to view the

conflict.

were squarely of the type that courts usually adjudi-

issues

of two

US

statutes (the

Uniform Code of Military

and the Detainee Treatment Act) and the parameters of a
ing's implications for

it is

fair trial,

Justice

with the hold-

broader treatment issues an important second-order

effect.

Indeed, even though the US government asked the courts to abstain from considering the merits of the case,

its

primary argument was that the courts should abstain

until the military justice process ran

its

course, not that the issue

was a

political

32

question inappropriate for judicial review.

UK Cases
In contrast, the

by UK

UK courts allowed a comparable case of alleged detainee abuse in

Her Majesty's Government (HMG) conceding
that the ECHR applied to an Iraqi detainee who had been killed while in its custody. In al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence, family members of six Iraqi civilIraq

forces to proceed, with

ians killed in Iraq brought cases against

armed

forces

had killed the individual

occupying power in Basra,

Iraq. Five

HMG. 33 In each case, a member of the UK

at a

time

when the United Kingdom was an

of the individuals were killed during UK patrols

or raids on houses; the sixth, Baha Mousa, was detained and beaten to death in
custody.

The

Iraqis' claims

were based on the UK's HRA, a law that requires those

bringing cases under the law to

incompatible with an

show that

ECHR right of the

claimed that the UK's actions violated
(right to life)

and 3

(right

responding parts of the

UK

its

the

UK government acted in a manner

claimant or deceased. 34 The individuals

procedural obligations under Articles 2

not to be subjected to torture) of the

HRA)

ECHR (and the cor-

to investigate violations thereof. 35

UK government argued that the HRA did not apply to UK government actions outside its borders. 36 With regard to Mr. Mousa, however, the UK government
conceded that, while he was in UK detention, Mr. Mousa was within its jurisdicThe

tion for purposes of applicability of the

ECHR. 37 Because
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the al-Skeini court did not discuss the issue in any depth. Several

scholars have noted the uncertainty as to the precise basis for the

holding regarding Mousa;

fact

"was apparently premised on some special jurisdic-

Kingdom was said to have over its military prisons abroad, not

tion that the United

on the

it

Mr

of direct physical control over

concession by the

House of Lords'

UK government

future overseas detentions during

Baha Mousa." 38 In any event,

suggests that the United

armed

Kingdom

this

will treat

conflict or peacekeeping operations as

ECHR unless there is a specific UN Security Council resoluin place that would "trump" the UK's ECHR obligations. 39 As with al-Jedda,

being covered by the
tion

the

ECtHR

is

hearing the al-Skeini case, so the case's ultimate outcome remains

unresolved.

Claims of Unlawful Detainee Transfers
In another series of suits filed in regard to conduct taking place during non-

armed conflicts, detainees have asked courts to enjoin their transfers
from the custody of the State holding them to the custody of another State. Detainees who had been in US (and Canadian) custody have lost their cases; based upon
the approach of the UK courts and the ECtHR to date, the detainees who are or
were in UK custody seem likely to win theirs.
international

US

Cases

In 2006,

two US nationals held by Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)

tions for habeas corpus in

MNF-I to

Iraqi officials

US

court, asking the court to block their transfer

(who had issued arrest warrants

Court, hearing their consolidated cases as

United States

Armed

district courts

filed peti-

may

Munaf v.

for them).

40

by

The Supreme

Geren, considered "whether

exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin our

Forces from transferring individuals detained within another sovereign's

territory to that sovereign's

government

for criminal prosecution." 41

The Court

concluded that, although US courts had statutory habeas jurisdiction over the individuals (presumably because they were

the

remedy sought.

Although not the
that the individuals

US

citizens), those courts

could not grant

42

sole basis for

were captured

its

holding, the Court took into account the fact

in the context of an

ongoing conflict. The Court

considered other cases in which the United States had transferred
foreign countries for

trial

US

citizens to

and remarked:

Neither Neely nor Wilson concerned individuals captured and detained within an
territory during

ongoing

hostilities involving

our troops. Neely involved a charge of

embezzlement; Wilson the peacetime actions of a serviceman. Yet
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American citizens to foreign
would be passing strange to hold that the Executive lacks that same authority where, as here, the detainees were captured by our
Armed Forces for engaging in serious hostile acts against an ally in what the GovernSuch a conclusion would implicate
ment refers to as "an active theater of combat."
that the Constitution allows the Executive to transfer
authorities for criminal prosecution.

It

.

.

.

not only concerns about interfering with a sovereign's recognized prerogative to apply
its

criminal law to those alleged to have committed crimes within

its

borders, but also

concerns about unwarranted judicial intrusion into the Executive's ability to conduct
military operations abroad. 43

Thus, the Court concluded that

it

could not enjoin

US armed forces from transfer-

ring individuals detained within Iraq's territory to the Iraqi

government for crimi-

nal prosecution.

Guantanamo

detainees have been

transfers to other countries. In a case

that

no more

successful in suing to block their

known as "Kiyemba II," the D.C.

Circuit held

Munaf controlled to bar courts from granting writs of habeas corpus to block

transfers of detainees

from the United States to foreign

countries, even

when those

being transferred would face continued detention or prosecution under the receiving country's laws. 44

The Supreme Court denied

certiorari in

20 10. 45 Federal

judges thus lack the authority to block, even temporarily, the transfer of a detainee

from Guantanamo

to another country. This allows the

US government

to decide

when to send detainees, as long as the
own policy not to transfer a detainee to a

without judicial interference where and

United States

acts consistently

place where he

is

with

its

more likely than not to face torture. 46 US courts thus remain wary

in this context of conducting inquiries into the legal process or treatment that

individual will face

upon

transfer, while leaving

open the

an

possibility that they

would do so if it were manifest that the individual would be tortured if transferred.
Canadian Case

On facts similar to Munaf, Canada's courts took a similarly skeptical view about the
propriety of blocking transfers from a detaining State to a territorial State, at least

Amnesty International sued Canada to prevent Canadian troops in Afghanistan from transferring
detainees to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA). It was claimed that IRoA
mistreats detainees, which means that such transfers violated Canada's constitu-

where an agreed treatment framework was

tion.

in place. In 2007,

A Canadian federal judge concluded in 2008 that Afghan detainees were not

entitled to protection

under the Canadian Charter and dismissed Amnesty

national's claim. 47

Inter-

The Canadian Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the
Canadian forces lacked "effective control" over Afghan territory; that the Canadian
Charter therefore should not apply to that territory; that IRoA had not consented
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Canadian Charter over Afghan nationals; and that instead

government and IRoA expressly

identified international law as the

law governing treatment of detainees in Canadian custody. 48

UK Cases
The ECtHR has been far less deferential to the laws and prerogatives of foreign sovereigns and to the diplomatic judgments of the ministries of States parties, including
but not limited to situations in which a State seeks to transfer to another country

—

a detainee picked

Al-Saadoon

v.

up

in a non-international

armed

conflict.

UK

United Kingdom offers a current example. 49 Although the

government won the case

in

its

domestic courts, the case came out the opposite

way from Munaf, on similar facts, in the ECtHR. 50 The UK courts deemed it lawful
for the United Kingdom to transfer to Iraqi authorities for trial two Iraqi murder
suspects. 51 The individuals faced the death penalty under Iraqi law and sued to
block their transfer from UK custody, claiming that it would violate the ECHR prohibitions against the death penalty and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
The UK Court of Appeal concluded that the individuals were not within the UK's
jurisdiction for purposes of the application of the
tional

ECHR,

considering an interna-

arrangement between the United Kingdom and the government of Iraq

garding the allocation of legal and physical custody of detainees.

The
the

individuals appealed to the

ECHR.

53

The Court

case) that the applicants

first

ECtHR, which held

concluded

(in its

that the transfer breached

opinion on the admissibility of the

were within the jurisdiction of the ECHR. 54

the Court held that the death penalty could be considered

and contrary

to Article 3 of the

to death

and executed.
and

Iraqi territory to the

alty assurances

real risk

of the applicants' being sentenced

HMG argued that

it

had no option but

as-

to respect

who were Iraqi nationals held on
courts when so requested, the Court was

transfer the applicants

custody of the Iraqi

not satisfied that the United
plicants' rights

inhuman and degrading

(The United Kingdom had not sought death penalty

surances from Iraq.) Although
Iraqi sovereignty

On the merits,

Convention and that there were substantial

grounds for believing that there was a
55

re-

52

Kingdom had done

all it

could have to secure the ap-

under the Convention, including by trying to negotiate death penwith the Iraqi government. 56 In contrast to the

US Supreme

Court's deference to the Iraqi legal system and Iraq's decision to prosecute some-

one alleged

to have

under either

Iraqi

broken

Iraqi law, the

ECtHR stated,

"There was no obligation

domestic law or international law which required either for the

applicants' cases to be referred to the Iraqi criminal courts or for
sified as

criminal detainees."

57

them

The Court concluded unanimously

to be reclas-

that there

had

been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention over the UK's objections that "a
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finding that a Contracting State was under an obligation to secure the Convention

and freedoms when acting territorially and outside the regional space of the
Convention gave rise to real conceptual, practical and legal difficulties." 58
rights

The Court's ruling makes
in

its

European country cannot transfer a person

clear that a

custody to another government's custody where there are substantial grounds

for believing there

is

a real risk of the person's being subjected to ill-treatment, even

during an armed conflict and even where the transferring government
the individual in another State's territory
the custody of the territorial State.

It is

and seeking to

particularly notable that the

ECtHR

con-

were

Iraqi

at issue

nationals (rather than the nationality of the forces holding them, that

ECtHR

ordered the

matic steps, despite the

UK government to

holding

transfer the individual to

cluded that the transfer was unlawful even where the detainees

Further, the

is

is,

British).

undertake particular diplo-

UK government's unambiguous assessment that doing so

would have an adverse diplomatic effect. Thus, unlike the courts in Munaf and
Kiyemba II, the ECtHR concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the underlying
allegations and reached a decision on the substance of those allegations.
Finally, in a case involving the conflict in Afghanistan, the

by former

faced a suit

United Kingdom

UK detainees in Afghanistan challenging a UK policy per-

mitting transfers of detainees to the Afghan National Directorate of Security

(NDS). 59 The detainees claimed that they were subjected to torture
transferred,

and

that their transfers therefore violated

court concluded that
ties if it

NDS

met

facility.

61

ECHR Article

were

The

UK

transfer detainees to a third

Again, in contrast to the decisions of

US

Kiyemba II, the UK court concluded that it had jurisdiction
allegations

3.

60

HMG could continue to transfer detainees to two NDS facili-

number of conditions, but could not

a

after they

courts in

Munaf and

to hear the underlying

and reached a decision on the merits based on an in-depth probe of

those allegations. Although the

UK court concluded that at least some UK transfers

could continue and was more deferential to diplomatic judgments by

HMG than

the

ECtHR,

the

UK court system and subsequently to the ECtHR (if they continue to lose in

it

seems

likely that the claimants will appeal the decision first

within

UK courts).
Claims about

Illegality in Intelligence Activities

Yet another category of litigation has raised hard questions for courts: litigation in

which the heart of the case implicates

classified intelligence

to the activities of intelligence agencies.

At times,

Of particular

between several

means that the litigation may
which are by definition highly

this

implicate intelligence relationships between States,
sensitive.

interest in this category of litigation

UK and US cases.
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Cases

Two recent cases in US courts bear mention: el-Masri v. United States and Mohamed
62
The US executive branch invoked the "state secrets" priviv. Jeppesen Dataplan.
lege as a way to avoid litigating both cases. When the US government invokes that
head of the agency whose activities are at issue

privilege, the

that the litigation,

if allowed

to proceed,

files

an

affidavit stating

might disclose information that could en-

danger national security.
In el-Masri, the plaintiff sued the former director of the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), three aviation companies and unnamed intelligence agents,
that the

CIA detained him

in

Macedonia and flew him

CIA

Afghanistan where he was abused, before the

alleging

to a detention facility in

realized

it

had detained the

wrong person and released him. El-Masri claimed this violated the US Constitution
and international norms prohibiting arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment. 63

The Fourth Circuit dismissed the case, concluding that even though US government officials had discussed the rendition program publicly at a high level of generality, secret information formed "the very subject matter" of the program.
Specifically, the court noted that the state secrets privilege attaches and may bar the
entire proceedings

where "there

is

a reasonable danger that [the information's]

disclosure will expose military (or diplomatic or intelligence) matters which, in the
interest of national security,

stances
that

make

should not be divulged" and where "the circum-

clear that privileged information will

any attempt

be so central to the

litigation

to proceed will threaten that information's disclosure." 64

The

court concluded:

[W]e must

reject El-Masri's

view that the existence of public reports concerning his

leged rendition (and the CIA's rendition

Complaint from

dismissal.

Even

if

program

al-

in general) should have saved his

we assume, arguendo, that the state secrets privilege

does not apply to the information that media outlets have published concerning those
topics, dismissal

of his Complaint would nonetheless be proper because the public in-

formation does not include the
those central facts
Masri's claim

—

the

—remain

facts that are central to litigating his action. Rather,

CIA means and methods
state secrets.

The Supreme Court denied

that

form the subject matter of El-

65

a writ of certiorari in 2008.

In Jeppesen, the Ninth Circuit, in a closely decided en banc opinion, took the

same approach

to the privilege. Five foreign nationals sued a subsidiary of Boeing,

claiming that the subsidiary provided planes,
to the

CIA

treated

flight

to render individuals to "black sites,"

by US and foreign

officials.

planning and

knowing

logistical

that they

support

would be mis-

The United States intervened, invoking the state
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and arguing that the court must dismiss the entire action. An affidavit by former CIA Director Hayden stated, "Disclosure of the information covand
ered by this privilege assertion reasonably could be expected to cause serious
secrets privilege

in

some

instances, exceptionally grave

—damage

—

to the national security of the

United States and, therefore, the information should be excluded from any use in

The US government and the defendants relied on precedent holding
that "a suit predicated on the existence and content of a secret agreement between a
plaintiff and the government must be dismissed on the pleadings because the Very
this case."

66

subject matter' of the suit

is

secret." 67

A Ninth Circuit panel rejected that view, concluding that it was not appropriate
to stop the lawsuit at

its

outset,

but the Ninth Circuit,

state secrets privilege required dismissal

of the

sitting en banc,

plaintiffs' case.

68

In discussing

role in evaluating the claim of the privilege, the court struck a balance

erence to the executive branch and the need to provide
the invocation of the privilege.

some

held that the
its

between def-

objective review of

It stated,

In evaluating the need for secrecy, "we acknowledge the need to defer to the Executive

on matters of foreign policy and national

security

and surely cannot

legitimately find

ourselves second guessing the Executive in this arena." But "the state secrets doctrine

does not represent a surrender of judicial control over access to the courts." Rather, "to
ensure that the state secrets privilege

than necessary,
its

invocation."

it is

is

asserted

essential that the courts

no more frequently and sweepingly

continue

critically to

examine instances of

69

Thus, in the face of highly controversial alleged US government activity, two
cuit courts

have taken a reasonably broad reading of the

cir-

state secrets privilege, dis-

missing the cases at the pleading stage at the request of the

US executive branch to

avoid revealing in litigation sensitive evidence that would impact national security.

UK Cases
UK courts, by contrast, have been less sympathetic to the government's interests in
protecting intelligence information, a fact that seems likely to affect UK policies
moving forward. This
brought against the

is

illustrated

by recent decisions

UK government by a UK resident, Binyam Mohamed, to ob-

tain information about his alleged treatment
States; cases

ees seeking

in three cases: a case

by the United Kingdom and United

brought by Mohamed and several other former Guantanamo detain-

damages from the

UK government; and a case brought by Mohamed

and others against Jeppesen UK.

The Binyam Mohamed litigation
durally complex. 70 In 2008,

to obtain intelligence information

was proce-

Mohamed, then detained at Guantanamo and charged
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in a military

commission, sued the

UK

We Fight

government

to obtain

any information

it

had received from the United States about his detention and interrogation. He
claimed that he was detained in Pakistan, mistreated there, then moved by the
United States to Morocco and Afghanistan, mistreated there, and ultimately sent to

Guantanamo. He

also claimed that the

US

was, provided to

UK

intelligence agencies

intelligence officials questions to ask him,

view reports from the United

mation was to allow him

States.

fully to

knew where he

and received

inter-

Mohamed's stated goal of obtaining the infor-

defend himself in the military commission.

Although the US government subsequently dropped the military charges
against

Mohamed and

Mohamed's habeas

shared the relevant material in redacted form with

attorneys, a

UK court ultimately ordered HMG to disclose cer-

tain secret information to his lawyers,

and the press then sought

to obtain that in-

formation. In 2009, the court concluded that the intelligence documents detailing

Mohamed's treatment should not be

published, based in part

on

"threats"

by the

United States to withhold from the United Kingdom future intelligence sharing.

To that end, the court redacted seven paragraphs in its judgment that described the
information the United Kingdom received from the United States regarding
Mohamed's treatment during interrogation. That court subsequently reconsidered its decision, ordering the seven paragraphs to be made public.

On appeal,

the Court of Appeal agreed, notwithstanding

HMG's

assertion that

Kingdom and the United States
United Kingdom has from the point

"the intelligence relationship between the United
is

by

far the

most

significant relationship the

of view of internal security and the protection of broader international interest" 71

and

that revealing the intelligence information

from the United

States

"profoundly damaging to the interests" of the United Kingdom.

United States

itself,

under both the Bush and

Obama

72

would be

Indeed, the

administrations, had as-

would adversely affect the intelligence
relationship. The basis for the Court of Appeal's decision was its view that the information contained in the seven paragraphs already was public; it concluded that
the United States had conceded that it had mistreated Mohamed, based on language in a public habeas decision reflecting that Mohamed had alleged torture and
that the United States had not contested those allegations. 74 The Court of Appeal
serted that the release of this information
73

also cited the

Obama
from

importance of "open

justice," 75

evidenced a skepticism that the

administration really would withhold important intelligence information

a close ally 76

and

stated

its

own view that

the information in the seven para-

graphs would not undercut the UK's national security 77 in concluding that the

paragraphs should be
This decision

one

is

made

public.

notable for at least three reasons.

State's courts to obtain

First,

it

illustrates the

use of

information for use in another State's courts. Second,
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UK courts to look behind the UK government's national

security judgments, even when the

a particular

S.

government has made clear its strong belief that

will affect its ability to obtain future intelligence

from

its

most important ally and that ally has made explicit on the record its views about the
release of the information. Third,

it

illustrates that decisions in

US

habeas cases

may have implications for foreign litigation. As noted above, all three Court of Appeal judges were influenced

by their belief that the United

States had,

by choosing

not to challenge Mohamed's allegations of mistreatment in another Guantanamo
detainee's habeas case, effectively conceded that he
it

far less

had been tortured, thus making

important to preserve the secrecy of the seven paragraphs describing

Mohamed's treatment.
The ongoing Jeppesen

US and UK

litigation reveals a similar interplay

between

litigation in

As noted above, Mohamed and four other defendants sued
Jeppesen Dataplan in a US court. They also are suing a related subsidiary, Jeppesen
UK, in a UK court. In July 2009, Jeppesen UK agreed to let the civil case brought by
courts.

Mohamed go to trial. 78 Mohamed's counsel believe that, as a result, confidential information about his alleged rendition will become public, which
relevant to the

likely will

prove

US litigation.

Some of the same

detainees filed a

civil

lawsuit against the United

Kingdom,

UK authorities, including MI5
and MI6, in their torture and unlawful detentions. The UK government filed a response asking whether, in principle, the UK common law was sufficiently flexible
seeking compensation for the alleged complicity of

on civil claims for damages to rely on a process whereby
there would be parallel open and closed pleadings, disclosure, witness statements
and hearings. The trial would be partly open and partly closed, as would the judgment. In the open elements of the proceedings, claimants' counsel would represent
them in the normal way; for the closed elements, special advocates with security
clearances would protect their interests but could not discuss the classified inforto enable a court hearing

mation with the claimants. In

May 2010, the UK Court of Appeal held that such a

closed procedure was not available in principle, in large part because

and hear all the evidence which is seen
and heard by a court determining his case is so fundamental, so embedded in the com-

the principle that a litigant should be able to see

mon law, that, in the absence of parliamentary authority, no judge should override it,
at

any rate in relation to an ordinary civil claim, unless (perhaps)

agree otherwise.

The United Kingdom sought permission
Although

all

parties to the claim

79

HMG's

filings are

to appeal to the

UK Supreme Court.

not yet public, the United Kingdom presumably saw
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itself as

faced with an impossible choice between,

many documents

that the

United Kingdom would

the allegations of misconduct by

its officials

case fairly, and,

on the other,

damage

UK's national security

to the

— seek public
ments —would have
to

tion

We Fight

impractical.

80

disclosing

all

been

in

to use to counter

of those documents and thereby causing

The

UK

government's other op-

certificates for as

many

as 140,000

time-consuming and seemed

incredibly

Given the conundrum

and need

like

and therefore allow the court to try the

interests.

immunity

interest

on the one hand, withholding

which

found

it

itself, it is

docutotally

not surprising

Kingdom announced in November 2010 that it settled the
with Mohamed and six other former Guantanamo detainees, reportedly for
that the United

lions of

pounds. 81 In addition, the

possible role in facilitating

US

UK plans to seek a "judicial inquiry"

renditions.

likely to lead to further litigation (in

both

82

Any

case

mil-

about

revelations in that inquiry

its

seem

UK and US courts), unless the inquiry's

findings remain confidential.

Canadian/Swedish Cases

Canada took
gations that

a very different

its

approach than the United States in dealing with

government contributed

he claims he was tortured.
States expelled

to the transfer of Mr. Arar to Syria,

where

A judicial inquiry in Canada concluded that the United

Arar to Syria based on

false assertions

Mounted Police to US officials that Arar was linked to
C$10.5 million to

alle-

settle his litigation

from the Royal Canadian

al

Qaeda. Canada paid Arar

and the Prime Minister issued him an apol-

Sweden paid three million kronor to Ahmed Agiza, an individual
allegedly handed over by Sweden to the CIA and rendered to Egypt, where he was
ogy.

83

Likewise,

mistreated. 84 Although the United States has

Arar too,

it

has declined to do

III.

come under

pressure to compensate

so.

Real-World Effects of Litigation Wins and Losses

Having reviewed the types of cases that individuals have brought and seen the
sharp divergences in the outcomes of litigation in the United States and European
States,

had

one must

a real effect

ask:

Does the

on how these

Have the outcomes of these cases
conflicts? The answer is a clear yes, both

litigation matter?

States fight

for the States that are parties to the litigation,

and

for third States.

Claims of Unlawful Detention
Litigation regarding unlawful detention has
States

and European

States,

had an impact on both the United

though the impact

is

not the same for each group. As

an immediate matter, courts have ordered the United States to transfer a number
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Guantanamo habeas litigation. The litigation has had
as well. First, it has forced the judicial branch to opine on

of detainees as a result of the
other, less direct effects

the scope of people
fore

Boumediene

whom the United States legally may detain, a decision that, be-

largely was in the

y

hands of the executive. The developing habeas

caselaw thus narrows the executive branch's discretion, at least with regard to those

detained at

Guantanamo and arguably with regard

to

anyone the United

States

detaining pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.
said, the district courts

definition of who

Second and

it

have only narrowed

can detain

at

Guantanamo.

relatedly, the litigation

the type of person the United States

quent to the

US

on March

filing

view of the scope of

its

definition.

It is

United States

is

is

at least

on paper

choosing to detain in Afghanistan. Subse-

which the government proffered

Guantanamo

detention policy in Afghanistan to track that

detaining in Afghanistan, however.

88

ciary has upheld the continued detention of some at
it

illustrates to

branch's arguments about

whom

ment, seen as more neutral,

is

its

detainees, the

unclear the extent to which this change has affected

positive effect in that

That

government's asserted

—

detention authority over
its

US

is

86

appears to have affected

13, 2009, in

Department of Defense modified
87

slightly the

85

those

it is

whom

the

Third, the fact that the judi-

Guantanamo maybe having a

who are highly skeptical of the executive

detaining that another branch of govern-

affirming the legality of some of the detentions.

For the United Kingdom and other States parties to the ECHR, the scope of their
ability to

conduct security detentions during armed conflict and the procedures

that they

must provide

to those they detain remain unsettled. There does not ap-

pear to be public information about

how the United Kingdom

has implemented

the holdings of al-Skeini and al-Jedda

on the ground, perhaps in part because the
United Kingdom is no longer detaining anyone in Iraq. However, the al-Jedda decision makes it quite likely that the United Kingdom and other European States
will push hard to obtain UN Security Council resolutions in advance of using force
abroad. Further, European States
tain (rather than a

may begin

to seek specific authorization to de-

more general authorization to take "all necessary measures"), to

make plain that the right to conduct security detentions is authorized under a particular

UN Charter Chapter VII resolution. Obtaining a Security Council resolu-

tion could at least
in

armed

conflict,

narrow the scope of application of human
but

it

will

not obviate the need for the United

possibly other States parties to the
ularly given the

rights

law to

activities

Kingdom (and

ECHR) to consider ECHR requirements, partic-

admonitions of several Law Lords that at least part of ECHR Article

5 remains intact in the face of

UNSCR

1546, which authorized States to take

all

necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of the security and stability of

another country. Another option would be for States parties to derogate from
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ECHR Article 5, as authorized by ECHR Article
do so would face high political costs.
Presumably ECHR States parties

—

15,

though

a State that

also will consider carefully

decided to

whether

—and

ECHR rights, such as the right to life and the
right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment (either by the ECHR

how

to act in accordance with other

State party that initially detains the person or
State transfers the person), during

Even

if

armed

by another

conflict

which the

first

and peacekeeping operations. 89

do not have

States conclude that they

State to

apply the

legal obligations to

ECHR in most overseas situations—a view that generally would be consistent with
the language in Bankovic

v.

Belgium

and prudence. For example,

—they may begin

do so

to

as a

matter of policy

might be that the transfer rule that the International

it

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established in Afghanistan (that
forces

would

transfer detainees to the

taining them)

was crafted by ISAF

caselaw. (In Brogan

v.

ISAF

that

Afghan government within 96 hours of de-

States with

United Kingdom, the

—

is,

an eye toward

ECtHR

Article 5

ECtHR concluded that a particular de-

UK officials held a person for 103 hours
without bringing him before a judge or releasing him —violated ECHR Article 5. 90
tention by the United

Kingdom

Those crafting the 96-hour
detention length that the

These considerations

rule

may

—and the

—mean

which

have been trying to estimate a pre-court

ECtHR would find acceptable.)

to bring cases directly against the

international law

in

that

ability

of individuals affected by armed conflict

governments for alleged violations of domestic or

European

States increasingly are inclined to take a

more cautious approach to detention. European ISAF forces are choosing to detain
few enemy fighters, and some States ultimately ceased to detain any, even while
their troops

tection

and

remained present

intelligence collection,

most obvious problem with
individuals
at

or

in Afghanistan. 91 This poses

known

practical

burdens on

a very cautious use of detention

to be hostile to

bombing those

and places

problems for force pro-

forces or

is

that

it

forces.

leaves

The

many

—including those caught shooting
—
engage
the same kind of

ISAF forces

Afghan

civilians

in

free to

conduct over and over. This makes the already dangerous job of an ISAF soldier
even more dangerous, and
security to Afghans,

reconstruction.

it

arguably delays the ability of ISAF forces to provide

something most ISAF States agree

is

an important element of

A reluctance to detain inadvertently can provide incentives to kill

rather than capture

—not

a desirable

outcome from an

intelligence or counterin-

surgency point of view. The 96-hour rule also hinders intelligence collection. This
is

not to suggest that ISAF and Afghan authorities should not pursue the goal of

prosecuting individuals to the extent possible, but

about

it is

to suggest that concerns

litigation in this context are adversely affecting ISAF's

444

work.

)

Ashley

S.

Peeks

Claims of Unlawful Treatment

As noted above, US courts have not handed victories to plaintiffs who sued government officials based on allegations that those officials had a hand in their mistreat-

on the US government,
though of course events such as the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib and other revelations of detainee mistreatment shone a harsh spotlight on US detention practices and
ment. Thus, these cases have had

little

practical effect

92

resulted in both legislation (such as the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
tive orders (such as Executive

and agents

Order 13491,

treat detainees in a

manner

93

drafted to ensure that

consistent with

all

and execu-

US employees

Common Article

3 of the

Geneva Conventions).
In contrast, a case such as al-Skeini seems likely to have a significant impact
the
to

on

UK government. The concession by the UK government that the ECHR applies

its

detention

may be

facilities in

inclined to treat

all

foreign

war zones suggests

that the United

future overseas detentions during

peacekeeping operations as being covered by the

ECHR. Some

armed

Kingdom

conflict or

questions remain

unanswered, such as whether the ECtHR's caselaw on what constitutes "cruel, in-

human, or degrading" detention conditions in the United Kingdom sets
for conditions at

a baseline

UK overseas detention facilities and, per the Soering principle, for

conditions in the facilities to which the United Kingdom seeks to transfer someone. 94

At the very least, the ECHR's requirement that a

State party

conduct an "indepen-

dent and impartial" investigation into an alleged violation of the ECHR would attach
to

any alleged violations that took place in

UK detention facilities abroad. 95

Claims of Unlawful Transfer

The real-world impact of the transfer litigation in US courts is minimal. In view of
Munafand Kiyemba II, the only principle with which the United States must comply
when transferring a detainee picked up in a non-international armed conflict is
one that the United States already follows: it cannot transfer a person when it is
more likely than not that he will be tortured. 96 The other aspects of a transfer the
identity of the receiving State, the conditions under which the person will be transferred and the timing of transfer
are left to the executive branch.

—

—

Even though Canada won

its

Afghan

transfer litigation, the case arguably

still

on Canada's actions during armed conflict. From November
2007 to February 2008, pending Amnesty International's request for an interim injunction against transfers, Canada chose not to transfer detainees to the Afghans,
presumably relying instead on short-term, ad hoc detention arrangements. 97 A top
had a

chilling effect

Canadian general stated publicly that
case,

if

Canada

lost the

Amnesty

International

Canadian troops would have been unable to detain combatants and would have

been forced to hunker down in secure bases. This would
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Canada's contribution to the ISAF mission and would have taken a significant

NATO troop contributor off the battlefield. 98 Even after its win in the litigation, the
Canadian government's Afghan detention policy remains under

significant political

knew that IRoA mistreated detainees at the time that Canada handed its detainees to IRoA. Opposition members
of the Canadian Parliament have held hearings and are demanding access to
pressure in light of allegations that the government

unredacted versions of relevant military records." In view of
scrutiny,

it

seems

safe to

assume

to detain few, if any, individuals
will

that

Canadian forces

on the

battlefield

have nowhere to transfer the detainees. The

this intense public

in Afghanistan are

choosing

out of concern that their troops

litigation thus

appears indirectly

on Canadian detention policy.
Litigation has had an even more direct impact on UK detention policy. The
death penalty appears to be the third rail for the ECtHR, such that any transfers of
to have

had

detainees

a significant impact

who might

realistically face the

death penalty are certain to be deemed

unlawful by that court. This suggests that any State party in that situation will seek

death penalty assurances from the receiving State, even

judgment

is

that

it is

if

the transferring State's

unlikely to be able to obtain such assurances.

Coupled with

concerns about mistreatment of transferred detainees, as in the Evans case,

it

seems

almost certain that as transfers get harder, States will reduce the number of individuals they detain in the first place. 100

It

also

means

that States are placing additional

weight on their ability to monitor a detainee after he
will

is

transferred,

something they

not always be able to secure. Indeed, the Evans court placed explicit conditions

on the UK's

ability to

continue to transfer detainees to certain

NDS facilities; these

conditions include that

(i) all

transfers

must be made on the express basis

be given access to each transferee on a regular
interview on each occasion; [and]

terviewed in private

It

seems

fair to

on

(ii)

.

.

.

basis,

that the

UK monitoring team is to

with the opportunity for a private

each transferee must in practice be visited and in-

101
a regular basis.

say that this transfer litigation has caused the United

Kingdom to be

more circumspect in detaining belligerents or civilians taking direct part in hostilities in Afghanistan, and thus directly has impacted the way the UK conducts itself on the battlefield.
far

Claims about Intelligence Activities
It is

Binyam Mohamed succeeds
court found the company liable for

difficult to predict the real- world implications if

in his case against

Jeppesen Dataplan.

If a

Mohamed's alleged mistreatment during part of his time in detention (and implied
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US government), it presumably would
have a chilling effect on other contractors who are deciding whether to perform
particular activities for the US government. It is difficult to say how much of a chilla relationship

ing effect

between Jeppesen and the

would have, though.

it

Mohamed won

If the

Supreme Court granted

his case against Jeppesen in the

United

States,

it

certiorari

and

seems very likely

UK courts would take that into account in the litigation before them. Likewise, if his UK litigation against Jeppesen results in any disclosure of confidential inthat the

formation about the rendition program, that would make
to use that information in

it

easier for his

US lawyers

US court and avoid the state secrets privilege by claiming

that the information already was public. 102

The litigation by Mohamed seeking access to US intelligence reports in the
UK's possession has the potential to affect intelligence sharing between the United
States and the United Kingdom. In a letter to the United Kingdom, former State
Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger wrote, "We want to affirm the public
disclosure of these documents is likely to result in serious damage to US national
security and could harm existing intelligence information-sharing arrangements
between our two Governments." 103 The Obama administration affirmed that
view. 104 In the wake of the release of the seven paragraphs, a White House spokes-

man

stated,

"We're deeply disappointed with the court's judgement because we

shared this information in confidence and with certain expectations. As

we

warned, the court's judgement will complicate the confidentiality of our intelligencesharing relationship with the United Kingdom, and

decision-making going forward."
say

more

affected,

publicly about
it is

105

it

have to factor into our

Because the two governments are unlikely to

how and the extent to which

intelligence sharing

may be

One might expect,
of each government now may be aware that the

difficult to assess the actual

though, that intelligence officers

will

impact of the

case.

information they exchange with each other might be at risk of release to a court

(and eventually to the public), especially in legally contentious areas such as those
discussed here.

The Jeppesen litigation, the damages litigation against the United Kingdom by
former Guantanamo detainees and the Binyam Mohamed treatment litigation all
stem from allegations that the United Kingdom assisted the United States in rendering and detaining individuals believed to be fighting the United States. As a general matter, this

seems

the United States

on

related costs for the

likely to

heighten the UK's caution

when

sensitive issues, because the political, financial

United Kingdom have been high, even

if

mately lose their cases. At a time when intelligence cooperation
ical, this is

cooperating with

an unfortunate development.
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Effects

In addition to the specific real-world implications that flow
tion, there are a

armed

fight

few other ways in which

set

of litiga-

how States

of litigation will affect

not exclusively) for European States.

conflicts, particularly (but

First, this litigation sets

this type

from each

precedent that litigants will use in future litigation asso-

ciated with non-international

armed

conflicts.

made

Unlike decisions

by the executive branches of governments, court decisions such

exclusively

as those in the

United Kingdom bind the government, not just in the specific cases before the
courts, but also in factually similar situations in the future.

ECtHR create precedent not just
other States parties to the ECHR.

decisions in

for the State involved in the suit, but also for

the
all

Of course,

Second, the sheer quantum of litigation creates penumbral concerns about op-

where the legal

erating in "gray areas"

European

States to take the opposite

rules are not black

and white. This may cause

approach from the one made famous by then-

Deputy Director of National Intelligence Michael Hayden, who
to live

on the

edge.

.

sive within the law."

the extension of

think hard

human

.

My spikes will have chalk on them.

human

when

change

if one
its

.

.

"We're going

We're pretty aggres-

.

Knowledge that courts have been reasonably sympathetic to

armed

conflict

cannot but cause States to

considering establishing a policy that

may not be consistent with

rights rules to

rights principles,

Third,
to

.

106

stated,

even

if it is

consistent with the law of war.

State in a military coalition such as

NATO loses a case and is forced
and

policy, that almost certainly will affect the operations

policies of

other States within that coalition, as well as non-coalition States involved in the
conflict.

For example,

if

a court concludes that State A,

against non-State actors in State B,
State B, State

first

itself has

many fora as possible

during armed conflict to

in order to increase the likelihood of success

and

a trend within

about decisions made by the United States
during armed

litigate in as

and of having

a

litigation victory.

Reasons for Divergence and Future Steps

identified a series of cases

conflict, in contrast to a trend

within

courts to limit litigation

and contractors)

UK courts and the ECtHR to

deem unlawful)

by the United Kingdom during armed

448

US

(as well as other States

allow such litigation and to review (and often
tions taken

custody to

by one coalition partner may

and operational impact greater than the actual
IV.

II

its

won similar litigation. Therefore, it is in the in-

terest of those challenging State practices

Part

fighting a conflict

not transfer detainees in

instance. Thus, a litigation loss

another partner that

policy

is

A is likely to have to rely on its coalition partners (or State B) to detain

individuals in the
affect

may

which

the decisions and ac-

conflict (or during activities

1

Ashley

related to the

US

this divergence.

S.
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conflict with al Qaeda). This Part considers possible reasons for

107

Reasons for Diverging Outcomes in

US and European Cases

One possible reason for the divergence is the strong tradition of deference in the
US system to the executive in areas of national security and armed conflict. 108 Bolstered

by doctrines such

as the political question

and

act of state doctrines

and the

rule of non-inquiry, courts generally have hesitated to step into certain areas that

are likely to have a direct impact

on

foreign policy decisions

by the executive

UK courts have used a doctrine of "justiciability" that is similar
appears that in the past few years UK courts
to the US political question doctrine,
branch. While the

it

have taken a more robust approach to judicial review of executive national security
decisions. For example, in

A

v.

Secretary of State for the

Home

Department, the

Kingdom to
detain certain terrorist suspects without trial was inconsistent with the ECHR. 109
As one scholar has written, "The decision appears to presage a new judicial boldHouse of Lords held

that the legal regime that permitted the United

ness regarding national security

—

a sphere in

traditionally been blunted by a self-imposed

ecutive branch."

110

which scrutiny by British courts has

custom of judicial deference to the ex-

This stands in contrast to the traditional view of UK courts that

they should not

set aside administrative decisions save

able"

—

where they were aberrant or

totally

a doctrine of judicial self-restraint that bit with particular force

"unreason-

when

national

The extent to which the [Human Rights Act] frees British courts
from these shackles by encouraging the use of the more intensive proportionality test
favored by the European Court of Human Rights has been the subject of considerable
controversy. Courts and commentators have expressed quite diverse views as to how
much deference should be extended to the policies of the executive and legislature by
security

was

at stake.

courts charged with determining whether a given measure breaches an

ECHR right.

A second,

the

related element that

is

fostering this divergence

is

the United States and European States approach their international

way

1 1

in

which

human

rights

The US executive branch consistently has taken the position that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 112 does not apply
obligations.

US courts accordingly have not sought to extend the application
of the ICCPR to US activity overseas. (Nor have courts determined that the treaty is
self- executing.) Indeed, given how cautious US courts have been in extending constitutional rights extraterritorially, it is no surprise that the ICCPR has not served
as a mechanism for US litigants to persuade courts to apply human rights principles to US activity abroad, including during armed conflict.
extraterritorially.
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Conversely,

all

European Union

States that are

We Fight

members of the Council of Europe

States) are parties to the

ECHR, which

(including

all

essentially serves as a "bill

of rights" for these States, and which applies during both peacetime and wartime. 113

As has been discussed throughout

forcement mechanism

this article, the

ECHR contains

an en-

—the European Court of Human Rights—which hears and

decides cases brought by individuals against States parties (as well as by States
against other States). Decisions

courts interpreting the

and underreported
and

will fight

armed

—

—

from the ECtHR (and from domestic European

ECHR), including those

factor affecting the rules

conflicts. If

conflict serve as a

European

discussed above, are a critical

by which Europeans have fought

historical

and

political

"pushing" mechanism away from

concerns about

conflict, the

ECHR

mechanism toward the increasing application of human rights
warfighting. In the view of one scholar who has written on this issue, "Eu-

serves as a "pulling"
rules to

ropean governments increasingly have to take into account the possible
the European Convention

on

Indeed, section 2(1) of the

home and abroad."
UK's Human Rights Act requires UK courts, when

ECHR right, to

consider

ECtHR caselaw. 115 Although ECtHR decisions do not constitute

formally

binding precedent for

edy

114

military operations both at

considering a question that arises in connection with an
relevant

of

effects

at the

domestic

UK courts, "the fact that a complainant unable to get a rem-

level

can take the matter to Strasbourg increases the pressure

on UK courts to produce outcomes consistent with European jurisprudence." 116
The HRA thus may account for reduced judicial deference in UK courts in areas
that traditionally did receive deference, such as national security decisions.

Others are more skeptical that the

ropean warfighting. In

armed

ECHR has played a major role in affecting Eu-

this view, actions

forces are driven as

much by a

by European governments and

fear of triggering criminal

their

law prohibitions,

including murder, torture and other offenses derived from their International

Criminal Court obligations, as by a concern about litigation in the ECtHR. Further,

some

believe that using

human

rights principles to

war may help win hearts and minds, and thus
goals.

fill

in gaps in the laws of

better achieve the States' military

Yet others believe that certain European States use the applicability of the

ECHR as an excuse not to undertake certain lawful, though politically unpopular,
may not be overly concerned about actually losing a
case before the ECtHR. It may even be the case that some government officials
hope, through the application of human rights rules, to make conflict harder to
activities,

fight,

A

even though they

and thus

to stem the frequency of conflict.

third reason that the

US government may prevail more

often in

its

courts

because the United States has a vibrant ongoing debate about national security
sues, with loud

and persuasive voices on both
450

sides of the political

spectrum

is

is-

(as

Ashley

Peeks
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well as in the middle). Judges considering these types of cases have been exposed to

the whole range of arguments about
sensible or indefensible.

why

certain national security decisions are

Although these arguments

judicial decision, atmospherics matter. Indeed,

views

among the federal judges

may not

factor directly into a

one might point to a wide range of

considering detention cases (and identify a divide

loosely along partisan lines) as an illustration of the breadth of judges' positions

national security-related issues. In contrast, the United

on

Kingdom (and other States

in Europe) appear to have fewer politicians, journalists

and academics making

compelling public arguments about the importance of a robust national security
policy; the louder voices

come from

the

human

rights

community. Judges, being

—

—

by what they do and do not hear. Thus, it may be the
case that the UK court decisions, which of late have tended to favor human rights
arguments over national security arguments, stem in part from the atmospherics

human,

are influenced

in the country,

which

largely are set

tional security arguments.

by those who

prioritize civil liberties over na-

117

Ways to Mitigate the Divergence
It is

beyond cavil that the type of litigation described above is having a very real im-

on how

pact

their cases against States, this
this

For those

States are fighting conflicts.

impact

is all

who

have brought and

won

for the good. For States losing the cases,

impact can be detrimental, particularly where the judicial decision

ciently takes into account operational realities of

armed

conflict

insuffi-

and thus

leaves

no acceptable options. (This is not to suggest, however, that State offishould bear no accountability if they violate the law, as is discussed below.)

States with
cials

What

steps

might these

(and maximize their

States take to

ability to

win

minimize the occurrence of this

cases

when litigation

litigation

arises)?

A good first step would be for States' political leadership to make the national
security arguments clearly

and persuasively to

their judges, parliamentarians

and

the European publics. For European governments to gain greater support for defense missions, they need to better educate their publics about why the current military missions are

important for European security. To date, they have been slow to

do so. For example,

it

took two years for German Chancellor Angela Merkel to give

German parliament about Afghanistan (and Germany's role in
ISAF) or to visit Afghanistan. 118 Of course, it is the European parliaments that ultia speech to the

mately must fund military expenditures, and that can offer constructive support or

open

criticism of European participation in

ISAF and other operations. European

cabinets should ensure that their parliamentarians are sufficiently briefed

German governAfghanistan. Yet many

ous threats; parliamentary concerns are a major reason that the

ment, for instance, has limited

its

presence and role in
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domestic parliaments do not have access to important intelligence information.
France, for instance, lacks a parliamentary intelligence oversight committee. 119

Even

in States in

which parliaments have not served

European participation

as

major stumbling blocks to

in coalitions, parliaments that are well-educated

threats can serve as another bridge

about the

between the government and the public.

—and an important one

Another step

for the

US government

—would be

to rec-

ognize the interconnectedness of this litigation and the fact that a State's national

now

security policy decisions
courts.

have an impact that extends beyond that

The US and European governments should

State's

avoid, to the greatest extent

possible, surprising each other with changes in laws or with high-impact court decisions.

The

pending

best

way

to

this

is

to hold early consultations with close allies

legislation or court cases that

during armed

conflict.

to describe a court case

ine

do

could

affect

how

on

that State conducts itself

For instance, Canada convened a meeting of ISAF partners
faced regarding detention in Afghanistan.

it

any of a number of other existing fora

in

which relevant

One can imag-

State officials could

hold such discussions.

A

final step

—and one

—

that will require further study

is

to consider

whether

drawn from counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine offer ways to
minimize litigation in the future. For example, one source of problems in the
transfer litigation is the weakness of the host government, which results both in
subpar detention facilities and in a weak domestic law enforcement system that is
unable to prosecute those who engage in detainee abuse. The US COIN manual
emphasizes the importance of building up the domestic institutions of the State
under challenge from insurgents. 120 Doing so creating better detention facilities,
better-trained guards and stronger prosecution systems
would improve the conditions into which the United States and European States hope to transfer detainees, and thus would reduce litigation in the transfer realm. Further, it should be
apparent to all States participating in ISAF that any legal violations or abuses committed by their troops are likely to come to light and are almost certain to undermine their COIN operations. 121 With fewer actual (as opposed to falsely claimed)
certain principles

—

violations, the

quantum of

litigation

should

fall

loss

during a

conflict,

COIN. 122 These payments, which
diminish the impetus to bring

may advance
are distinct

in

in

COIN

doctrine

sympathy or recognition of

the cause of the State undertaking

from claims payments, may serve

legal claims against the State

States should consider other non-judicial
selves accountable.

as well. Finally,

made

recognizes that ex gratia or solatia payments,

someone's

—

undertaking COIN.

mechanisms by which

The mechanisms should be

to

to hold

them-

able to reflect operational realities

wartime, including the need to preserve intelligence relationships, while ensur-

ing that the executive branches

do not operate unchecked. These might include
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internal investigations

by

entities

S.

such as inspectors general, which are housed

within an agency, but independent from

produce
tions,

classified

and

Peeks

its

leadership. These investigations could

unclassified versions of reports, as well as

recommenda-

where appropriate, that individuals wronged by governmental conduct be

compensated. These might also include inquiries led by retired esteemed individuals

such as retired federal judges (which appears similar to what the United King-

dom is considering in establishing an inquiry about its role in renditions). If seen as
credible

and

fair,

these types of investigations could also stanch the flow of

litigation.

At the same time, an increased
to

embed journalists

by the United States and European States
and otherwise document their own compliance with the law,
effort

draw attention to violations of the law by non-State actors, may affect
the outcomes of specific cases and may also improve for States the wider atmoas well as to

spherics surrounding the cases that non-State actors are bringing.

V.

These cases
fight,

Conclusion

illustrate that litigation is

having an impact on

how

States currently

and on how they will fight in the future. This is not to argue against all judicial

involvement in issues that implicate national security.

It is

to suggest, though, that

such involvement should be measured and cautious; court judgments, while often
addressing genuine problems with certain aspects of warfare, sometimes are
crafted in

ways that are overly abstracted from the choices that the losing govern-

ments have to make. Nor

is

this to suggest that executive

branch decisionmakers

should not have to comply with laws, regulations and related restrictions, or should
not face criminal sanctions when their behavior warrants
for the judiciary to act with restraint in this area,

there

it.

It is

to suggest the

need

some

cases

and to suggest

that in

maybe non-judicial mechanisms that are better tailored to thread the needle

between oversight and accountability, on one hand, and the need to preserve the
confidentiality of certain types of decision

making and

policies,

on the

other.
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Asymmetric Warfare:

How to Respond?

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg*
Introduction

Demands for a reform of the law of armed conflict are often justified by
claiming that the "novel"
the inadequacy of that
terized

phenomenon of asymmetric warfare has proven

body of law.

Allegedly, the law of armed conflict

by a post-Westphalian approach,

that

symmetric warfare between belligerents that

is, its

is

underlying concept

will abide

by

its

charac-

is

one of

rules only because

they expect their opponent to also abide (the principle of reciprocity). In asymmetric

warfare reciprocity

threats brought about

law of armed
It will

is

become obsolete and the allegedly "new"
"novel" phenomenon call for an adaptation of the

said to have

by that

conflict.

be shown in

this article that

asymmetric warfare is

far

from being unprec-

edented, and that either the law of armed conflict has been adapted to address past

forms of asymmetric warfare

or, in

other instances, adaptation has been unneces-

sary despite the asymmetries. Accordingly, the calls for

founded,

are, at a

minimum, premature.

It is

"new" law,

if

not un-

conceded, however, that

it

has

become increasingly difficult to cope with certain forms of asymmetry; therefore it
is of the utmost importance to develop strategies that enable States and their armed
forces to adequately respond to
Finally, this article will focus

asymmetric warfare.

on

situations of armed conflict,

national or of a non-international character. Cross-border
* Professor

Germany.

of Public International

—or

whether of an

inter-

so-called spillover

Law at the Europa-Universitat Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder),
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conflict neither

change the character of the

armed conflict nor pose insurmountable problems. If, for instance, non-State actors
engaged in a non-international armed conflict seek refuge in a neighboring State,
1

this

does not necessarily

There

mean

that they will be

may be situations, however,

that

immune from

attack.

do not qualify as an armed

conflict even

though armed forces are engaged in military operations against "asymmetric actors."

While the law of armed
does not

mean

conflict will not

be applicable in such circumstances,

that public international law

is

silent

on

this

the matter. For instance,

counter-piracy operations are governed by the law of the sea or, as in the case of
piracy off the coast of Somalia, by applicable

Very often international human
vention

—

based on
It

will play

an important

rights
role.

3

UN

Security Council resolutions. 2

—though contained

law

in a regional

Counterterrorism operations

may

con-

also

be

UN Security Council resolutions or on the inherent right of self-defense.

needs to be emphasized with regard to the

latter,

4

however, that States have not

yet agreed

upon

gimes that

maybe applicable, the armed forces deployed to counterterrorism oper-

ations

too often lack the legal clarity and legal security that are of

all

the criteria that give rise to the right. Because of the variety of re-

vital

importance for the success of contemporary military operations.

I,

Forms of Asymmetric Warfare

Some of the past efforts to define asymmetric warfare have not been very helpful in
identifying the underlying problems. For instance, asymmetric warfare used to be

defined as "a conflict involving two states with unequal overall military and eco-

nomic

resources." 5 In reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the definition has

been modified. Asymmetric warfare

is

now

defined by one author as "leveraging

inferior tactical or operational strength against [the] vulnerabilities of a superior

opponent to achieve disproportionate

effect

with the aim of undermining [the op-

ponent's] will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor's strategic objectives." 6

While

this definition

conflicts,

it

has the advantage of not being limited to inter-State armed

has not added much, insofar as almost

all

armed

conflicts

have been

asymmetric.

Asymmetries
zation, values

in warfare include

asymmetries of power, means, methods, organi-

and time. 7 Asymmetry can be participatory, technological, normative,

doctrinal or moral. 8 In that sense, wars have always been characterized

one form of asymmetry. For instance, any armed
States will

the

by

conflict involving the

at least

United

by definition be asymmetric because of the technological superiority of

US armed

forces.

The same holds

true for any

armed

conflict involving

State actors, be they partisans, resistance fighters, rebels or terrorists.
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must not be forgotten

any war or armed

that in

element of surprise that makes

it

conflict there

is

a considerable

impossible to predict its course or outcome. The

enemy may employ methods, strategies or tactics not envisaged and that aim at the
opponent's vulnerabilities. Asymmetry, therefore, is not a "novel" phenomenon as
some would characterize it but an intrinsic characteristic of any war. 9
It

gal

therefore seems that the term "asymmetric warfare,"

term of art,

is

nothing but a description of a

which is by no means a le-

of life. In this context,

fact

however, important to bear in mind that warfare, particularly in Western
is

perceived from a post-Westphalian perspective

—

that

is,

as

armed

it is,

societies,

hostilities

predominantly conducted under State control and between combatants in which
civilians

and

civilian objects are largely

spared from violence and destruction.

From the outset of its development in the middle of the nineteenth century, the
modern law of armed conflict has been based on that approach. It must also be
noted

that, to a certain extent, the

accepts

—the

different

law of armed conflict recognizes

forms of asymmetry.

Still,

that of symmetric warfare in which the use of force

implicitly

the law's underlying concept
is

is

limited to lawful targets and is

premised on the belief that the parties to the conflict

The development of the law of armed

—or

will abide

by its

rules.

conflict has resulted in abolishing the

prevalence of military necessity over considerations of humanity ("Kriegsrasongeht

by establishing an operable balance between the two that, while
placing limits on the means and methods of war, does not make warfare impossi10
ble.
This approach has been, still is and will continue to be challenged by the convox Kriegsmanier")

duct of

hostilities in

contemporary armed

increasingly structured

conflicts that are characterized

and systematic deviation from the

"tendency for the violence to spread and permeate

all

law. There

is

by an

a growing

domains of social life. This is

because the weaker side uses the community as a cover and a logistical base to con-

duct attacks against a superior military apparatus." 11 Hence, in asymmetric
warfare,

the weaker party, recognizing the military superiority of its opponent, will avoid open

confrontation that
stead

it

will

is

bound to

lead to the annihilation of its troops

tend to compensate

its

means and methods and prolonging the
tion against

its

and

to defeat. In-

inadequate arsenal by employing unconventional
conflict

through an undercover war of attri-

well-equipped enemy. 12

summary, the term "asymmetric warfare" is to be understood as applying to
armed hostilities in which one actor/party endeavors to compensate for its miliIn

tary,

economic or other deficiencies by resorting to the use of methods or means of

warfare that are not in accordance with the law of armed conflict (or of other rules
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important to

motives or strategic

stress that the

goals of asymmetric warfare, while important to understand, are irrelevant
legal point

does not

a

of view. Finally, the definition of asymmetric warfare here proposed

mean

that other forms of asymmetries are neglected.

Applying the Lex Lata

//.

It

from

needs to be emphasized from the outset that the law of armed conflict has never

been modified with a view to compensate for technological
the parties to the conflict. For instance, Russia
to outlaw the

submarine

Those

able threat to their superior surface forces.

ments

in

and the United Kingdom endeavored

means of naval warfare because

as a

weapons technology have

at best

between

dissimilarities

it

posed a consider-

were in vain. 13 Develop-

efforts

been an incentive for a modification of

the law with a view to meeting humanitarian considerations. 14 (Although there are

times

when one cannot avoid the impression that humanitarian considerations are

a pretextual

war

argument

for the true intention of abolishing

war through the laws of

(correctly characterized as "lawfare" 15 ).)

On the other hand, the law of armed conflict has been adapted to address certain
forms of participatory asymmetries. For instance,

many of the

atrocities

commit-

ted during the Second World War were justified as legitimate responses to the con-

duct of asymmetric warfare by the opposing belligerent, inter
attacks.

That led to the

of hostages and other innocent

killing

wanton destruction of villages

German Wehrmacht. The law
in order to eliminate

in territory occupied or

alia,

by partisan

civilians,

or to the

under the control of the

of armed conflict has been progressively developed

such conduct in future armed

conflicts.

Hence, the law of armed conflict accepts asymmetries in warfare, be they technological or doctrinal,

of preserving

and

it

reacts to

such asymmetries only

if

there

is

a necessity

minimum standards of humanity or of "alleviating as much as possi-

ble the calamities of war." 16 Moreover, the law of international

armed conflict aims
to maintain the public character of warfare by indirectly reserving the right to harm
the

enemy to

a privileged

group of actors. 17

Normative and Moral Asymmetries
Normative and moral asymmetries, while sometimes posing considerable
and/or operational problems,
the law of international

armed

are, in principle, irrelevant

political

from the perspective of

conflict.

This especially holds true with regard to the legality or
the use of armed force under thejws

ad bellum. According

application, the law of international

armed
466
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to the principle of equal

conflict applies to every situation
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amounting to an international armed conflict irrespective of the political or strategic goals pursued and irrespective of the legality of the resort to armed force by either of the belligerents. 18 Therefore moral or normative asymmetries are, in
principle, irrelevant, although they

may have

considerable political and strategic

impact.

This also holds true for a resort to the use of armed force authorized or mandated

by the UN Security Council. As emphasized in the 1999 UN Secretary-General's Bulletin,

the "fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law

are applicable to United Nations forces

when

in situations of armed conflict they

are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent
their

engagement."

.

.

and

for the duration of

19

Moreover, the causes for a resort to the use of armed force have no impact on the
scope of applicability of the law of armed conflict. There have been suggestions that
military operations aiming at the protection of
stricter legal limitations

the context of the

than "regular" armed

human

conflicts.

Kosovo campaign, provides

20

rights are

governed by

State practice, such as in

insufficient evidence to establish

that such suggestions have a basis in existing law. 21

Other normative asymmetries may have an impact on the law of armed conflict.

Such normative asymmetries occur if the parties to an international armed conflict
are not

bound by the same

treaties.

As

in general international law, law of armed

conflict treaties only apply to States parties unless a State

expressly accepts

not party to a given treaty

and applies it. 22 Absent such a declaration, the hostilities will only

be governed by customary international (humanitarian) law.
Treaties

do not, however, become inapplicable if members of an alliance are not

bound by the same
is,

States within

treaties.

The ensuing

potential interoperability problems, that

an alliance operating under different

solved by a "matrix" solution. Thus,

if

a certain task involves conduct that

violate a treaty obligation of some alliance
trust that task to units of States

legal obligations, are often

would

members, the force commander will en-

not bound by the treaty restrictions. The

legality

of

such conduct has been recognized by Article 21(3) of the 2008 Convention on
Cluster Munitions, which provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article

1

of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their
military personnel or nationals,

may

tions with States not party to this

hibited to a State Party."

by which they

23

are equally

tarian law. Again, the

national caveats or

engage in military cooperation and opera-

Convention that might engage in

Finally, States

bound

activities

pro-

may differ on the interpretation of a treaty

or of a rule of customary international humani-

problem of interoperability

is

very often solved by either

by other procedural safeguards, such
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Asymmetric Actors (Participatory Asymmetries)
It

has been rightly stated that one of the characteristics of asymmetric warfare (as

understood here)

is

that the "dividing line

consciously blurred and at times erased."

24

between combatants and

is

from new. The

far

amounting

to

existing law of armed con-

based on the experience of past armed conflicts and has, in principle, pre-

flict is

served the general distinction between protected civilians on the one
the other hand, persons who, either as combatants or as

armed groups or
International

changed

as civilians, take a direct part in hostilities.

Armed

realities

Conflict

armed

I

(AP

I),

which diminishes the obliga-

from the

tion of combatants to distinguish themselves

civilian population. 25

provision does not constitute customary international law and
bility is limited to situations
1

(4)

conflict to the

of war has not always been satisfactory. This especially holds true

for Article 44(3) of 1977 Additional Protocol

Article

hand and, on

members of organized

Unfortunately, the adaptation of the law of international

to

is

This inevitably results in attacks against

the civilian population and individual civilians, or even in conduct

prohibited perfidy. Such conduct

civilians

of the Protocol.

That

scope of applica-

its

of "internationalized armed conflicts" in the sense of

26

However,

certainly provides a degree of protection

it

members of organized armed groups who

intentionally disregard

its

minimum

requirements. 27

Apart from

that, the

law of international armed conflict

directly participating in the hostilities

who

is

rather clear: persons

qualify neither as combatants nor as

members of any of the other privileged groups 28 do not enjoy combatant immunity
or, when captured by the enemy, prisoner of war status. As far as civilians are concerned, this has been expressly recognized by Article 51(3),

AP

I:

"Civilians shall

enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities."

Of course,

of direct participation in hostilities

is

the exact
far

from

meaning and scope of the concept

settled.

29

The same holds

regard to the legal status of civilians directly participating in
tinue to consider
tion

30

them

as civilians protected

who may, however, be attacked

(for

hostilities.

true with

Some con-

under the Fourth Geneva Conven-

such time they are directly participating

for their conduct. 31 Others consider

them "unlawful
combatants" who are protected by neither the Third Geneva Convention on the
treatment of prisoners of war nor the Fourth Geneva Convention. 32
The law of international armed conflict provides a rather elaborate set of rules
responding to participatory asymmetry and offers an operable solution to most of
the problems encountered in recent international armed conflicts. While there is
no prohibition of entrusting persons other than combatants with the commission
in hostilities)

and punished
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of acts harmful to the enemy, those persons not enjoying combatant immunity di-

must understand that they enjoy no protection
under the law of armed conflict beyond the minimum standards laid down in Article 75 of AP I and in Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Accordingly, members of organized armed groups that do not belong to a party
to an international armed conflict but who directly participate in hostilities do not
rectly participating in hostilities

pose an insurmountable legal problem. They may either be considered as civilians
directly taking part in the hostilities,
tion, are liable to attack

the organized

who,

for the duration of their direct participa-

and who maybe prosecuted after capture,

armed group

to

which they belong

is

or, alternatively,

a party to a non-international

by side with the international armed conflict. In the
latter instance, the members of such a group
at least if and as long as they perform a "continuous combat function" within the organized armed group 33 are
legitimate targets who enjoy neither combatant immunity nor prisoner of war status

armed

conflict that exists side

—

—

after capture.

Non-international Armed Conflicts

Non-international armed conflicts are asymmetric by nature, particularly
ular

armed

forces are engaged in hostilities against organized

if

reg-

armed groups of

non-State actors. Since, however, the concept of "combatant" does not apply to
non-international

of the actors.

It is

international

armed conflicts the

important to note in

armed

applicable law

is

not built on the

this context that the

legal status

very existence of a non-

conflict presupposes that there exists at least

one organized

armed group engaging in armed hostilities against the government or against another organized armed group. Hence, members of an organized armed group do
not qualify as

There

is,

civilians.

is

widely accepted. 34

however, one unresolved issue relating to those members of an orga-

nized armed group

some

This

who do

prefer to consider

not perform a "continuous combat function." While

them

civilians, 35 others are

cording to an individual's function within the group.

unwilling to differentiate ac36

The least common denomi-

members of an organized armed group performing a "continuous
combat function" in a non-international armed conflict do not enjoy general pronator

is

that

tection

and

armed

conflict

are liable to attack.
is

Of course,

the State party to a non-international

not prevented from prosecuting them

if

captured under

its

domestic criminal law.
In non-international

armed

conflict civilians enjoy general protection.

They

may lose that protection, however, if they deliberately decide to take a direct part in
the hostilities. Accordingly, Article 13(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol
vides: "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded
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hostilities."

is

declaratory of customary

37

Intentional Violations of the

Although not without

Law

difficulties, as

has been shown, participatory and normative

asymmetries can be coped with under the existing law; however, the core of the

problem posed by asymmetric warfare
conflict

by asymmetric

is

intentional violation of the law of armed

actors.

General Aspects

Asymmetric actors

in

armed

conflict either intentionally violate the principle of

distinction or endeavor to incite their
gressible principle"

38

opponent

to act in violation of that "intrans-

of the law of armed conflict.

The law of armed conflict provides

a rather clear response to

any form of asym-

metric warfare that aims at blurring the principle of distinction, whether by way of
disguising as civilians,

by abusing civilian objects

for military purposes or

attacks against the civilian population or individual civilians.

practice persist. If it

is

Still,

by direct

the problems in

not feasible to identify enemy combatants or members of en-

emy organized armed groups because they appear to be civilians, a decision not to
attack may result either in suicide or, even worse, in prohibited direct attacks
against the civilian population. Of course, combatants who do not distinguish
themselves properly when engaged in hostilities do not enjoy combatant immunity
or prisoner of war status when captured. While they may be prosecuted for their
conduct, this is considered by many military commanders to be an insufficient
response to their practical problems.
Similar problems exist with regard to the principle of proportionality.

The law

of armed conflict does not prohibit attacks that result in the incidental loss of civil-

damage to civilian objects. Such "collateral damage" is
a violation of the law of armed conflict only if it is excessive (in contrast to "extensive") in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 39 In
view of that prohibition, and in view of the media's attention to any civilian losses
in armed conflict, an asymmetric actor will seek either to provoke the opponent
into an attack causing excessive collateral damage or to make the public believe
ian

life,

injury to civilians or

that an attack has been disproportionate. Systematic violations of the principle of

distinction entail the considerable risk that the

opponent applies

different stan-

dards for the assessment of proportionality. "If such tactics are systematically em-

ployed for a strategic purpose, the

enemy may

feel a

compelling and overriding

necessity to attack irrespective of the anticipated civilian casualties
Still,

the prohibition

on

excessive collateral
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is

clear.

and damage." 40
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military necessity do, of course, play an important part, especially with regard to

the determination of the anticipated military advantage. However, military necessity as

such does not justify a deviation from the well established humanitarian

standards of the law of armed conflict. 41

Moreover, asymmetric actors

many

will in

cases deliberately act contrary to

their obligation to take feasible precautions in attack, particularly by using civilians

or civilian objects as shields or by transferring military objectives into densely populated areas. Despite the obvious illegality of such conduct, the opponent will be

prevented from attack if the attack is expected to result in excessive collateral damage.

Here the law of armed

conflict itself introduces

an element of asymmetry by

privileging unlawful conduct.
Finally, a further

problem

exists

with regard to the obligation of the attacker to

do everything feasible to limit attacks to lawful targets and to avoid, if possible, and,
in any event, to minimize excessive collateral damage. 42 It would go too far to conclude that parties to a conflict that possess advanced weapons systems are under an
absolute obligation to only

weapons. The

fact that

make use of sophisticated and

such weaponry

is

highly discriminating

available does not necessarily

mean

that

weapons may no longer be employed. Sophisticated and advanced weapons are expensive and they may, therefore, be reserved for attacks on
more important targets. It must be recognized, however, that
less sophisticated

advanced

militaries are held to a higher standard as a matter of law because

cautions are feasible for them.

As the gap between "haves" and "have-nots" widens

21st century warfare, this normative relativism will grow. In a sense,

the birth of a capabilities-based

The consequence

is

more prein

we are witnessing

IHL regime. 43

that to a certain extent the standard of feasibility privileges the

weaker side of an armed conflict, thus adding another form of normative asymmetry into the

law of armed

conflict.

Use of Prohibited Weapons

The law of armed

conflict

and arms control

into a single regime labeled "humanitarian

law,

which are increasingly merging

arms control/' provide a well estab-

lished set of rules that either prohibit the use of certain
in certain circumstances.

44

In asymmetric warfare the weaker party

clined to disregard such prohibitions or restrictions
citing the superiority

weapons or restrict their use

of the opponent.

45

and

may be

to justify a deviation

in-

by

Moreover, as pointed out by the Interna-

Committee of the Red Cross, "it is evident that if one Party, in violation of
definite rules, employs weapons or other methods of warfare which give it an

tional
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immediate, great military advantage, the adversary may, in

duced

no

to retort at

once with similar measures."

basis in existing law.

with a superior

The

fact that a

enemy does not

46

its

own

Such justifications have, however,

armed conflict is confronted
means of warfare whose use is

party to an

justify the use

of a

prohibited under the law of international and non-international
Therefore, the threat of imminent defeat
the use of prohibited

conflict unless the "very survival of a State

may be improperly used
conflict. It

is

it

may be

is

its

Nuclear Weapons advi-

contrary to the law of armed

at stake."

47

It is

obvious that

to justify a violation of the rules

this hold-

and principles of the

needs to be emphasized, however, that the Court's finding

has no basis in the law of armed conflict.
vance,

conflict.

means of warfare.

sory opinion held that the use of nuclear weapons

law of armed

armed

not sufficient grounds for resorting to

is

Unfortunately, the International Court of Justice in

ing

defence, be in-

to the jus

If

the survival argument has any rele-

ad bellum.

Prohibited Methods of Warfare

One

man

feature of asymmetric warfare
shields."

armed

With regard

suicide bombings; another

to the former,

it is

The law is

means and/or methods.

is

the use of "hu-

important to note that the law of

conflict does not prohibit suicide attacks unless they are

sort to perfidious

I,

is

conducted by

re-

48

different with regard to the use of human shields. Article 51(7) of AP

in prohibiting the use of the "presence or

movements of the

or individual civilians ... to render certain points or areas

civilian

immune from

operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives
shield, favor or

impede military operations,"

reflects

military

from attacks or to

customary international

—

49

population

—

The law of armed conflict provides a possible though not undisputed solution to cope with the issue of human shields by distinguishing between voluntary
law.

and involuntary human
Civilians,

shields.

whatever their motives,

who voluntarily serve

as

human

shields

may

be considered as taking a direct part in hostilities for the duration of such participation, thereby losing their protected status

spite

under the law of armed

arguments to the contrary, involuntary

civilians.

51

human

conflict. 50

De-

shields retain their status as

Accordingly, attacks against a shielded military objective will be prohib-

ited if the incidental losses

tion to the concrete

emphasized

and

among involuntary human shields are excessive in
direct military advantage anticipated.

52

It

rela-

needs to be

in this context that

the appraisal of whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military ad-

vantage anticipated must

make allowances

for the fact that,
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involuntary) presence of civilians at the
civilian casualties

site

of the military objective, the

can be expected to be higher than usual.

number of

53

However, the distinction between involuntary and voluntary human

many cases,

in

not provide an operable solution in practice because

shields will,

it is

virtually

impossible to determine whether a person has deliberately and freely decided to

human shield or is being forced to so act.
Moreover, while the law of armed conflict may not prohibit a proportionate at-

serve as a

tack against a shielded lawful target,

death of a considerable

it

will

prove a most

number of civilians politically.

difficult task to

defend the

In asymmetric warfare, the

weaker party often consciously and systematically turns to the practice of using

human

shields in order to exploit the political

attacker will find

stances

it

will

itself.

not

and moral dilemma

in

which the

Thus, while the law purports to offer a solution, in most in-

assist in

overcoming those dilemmas.

Preliminary Conclusions

Doubts have been expressed as to whether asymmetric warfare can "still be grasped

by and measured against the concept of military necessity, for the complexities and
intangibility of such scenarios escape its traditionally narrow delimitations." 54
These doubts particularly extend to responses to the actions of non-State actors

who intentionally and systematically deviate from well established standards of the
law of armed conflict. Their opponents may be induced to reemphasize considerations of military necessity that may result either in a more liberal interpretation of
the law of armed conflict or in
stacle to the success

Of course,

its

irrelevance because

considered an unfair ob-

of military operations.

reciprocity

is

an important factor in maintaining the continued

fectiveness of the law of armed conflict. If one party to
ally

it is

and systematically disregards

its

rules

and

an armed conflict intention-

principles in order to achieve a

military or political advantage, the opponent's readiness to continue to

with the law

On

may steadily decrease. There are,

the one hand, the law of

asymmetric

actor's conduct.

armed

While

conflict

it is

ef-

comply

however, solutions to the problem.
is

flexible

enough

to respond to an

true that such responses put a heavier bur-

den on the law-abiding party to the conflict, the values underlying the law of armed

and the achievements of the past 150 years should not be given up too easily. While it is conceded that the growing asymmetries in warfare have the potential
conflict

of shaking the very bases of the law of armed conflict, this does not mean that there
is

a need for an adaptation of the law to the
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must be admitted that complying with the law has become increasingly

it

difficult, the

law of armed conflict provides solutions to the threats posed by the

current versions of asymmetric warfare. Moreover, the emergence of international

criminal law has added a further and quite powerful enforcement

ensuring compliance with the law of armed conflict.
ever,

whether non-State actors

will

understand

It

mechanism for
may be questioned, how-

that, despite their inferiority in

arms and military technology, they would ultimately

profit

from compliance with

the law of armed conflict. If intentional violations of the law are part

an overall

strategy,

would be quite naive to

it

and parcel of

believe that asymmetric actors

would

be deterred from such violations by either lawful responses or criminal
proceedings.

For that reason,

would ultimately

it is

whether "incentives" to non-State actors

also doubtful

result in

compliance with the law of armed

conflict.

Proposed

amnesties, reconciliation procedures, truth commissions and similar measures

have not necessarily proven to contribute to an increased effectiveness of the law of

armed

conflict

during active

hostilities.

In certain circumstances they

may serve as

an operable tool to reestablish peace and security in post-armed conflict

As

reality

societies.

shows, however, such steps have not prevented egregious atrocities from

occurring during armed conflicts. Additionally, the law of armed conflict

important to be sacrificed on the

altar

of political expediency.

Any form

is

far

too

of impu-

would run counter to the very object and purpose of the law of armed
and of international criminal law.
conflict
Once faced with the challenge of responding to asymmetric warfare, States must
be prepared to invoke the law of armed conflict in two respects.
nity

—

The

application of the law vis-a-vis asymmetric actors. This in-

first is strict

cludes, but

is

not limited to, treating them as combatants. For instance, some States

respond to asymmetric threats by resorting to "targeted killings"

(also labeled "ex-

trajudicial killings") of individuals suspected of being involved in unlawful attacks

against
that

government

forces, civilians or civilian objects. It

under the law of armed

conflict there

is

ings. If the targeted individual qualifies as a

must be borne

in

mind

no general prohibition of targeted killcombatant, including as a

member of

who is "performing a continuous combat function," or
as a civilian directly participating in hostilities, he or she may be attacked. There is,
an organized armed group

however, disagreement whether there
the individual

paid

is

if

that

is

is

an obligation to rather capture than

a feasible alternative. 55

Of course,

the political price to be

frequently considered to be too high, creating an unwillingness

of many governments to consent (or resort) to targeted
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Second and closely related to the
in explaining to the general public

first

aspect,

governments should be proactive

and to all concerned political actors their under-

standings of the law of armed conflict, both in general and in

given concrete situation.

It is

its

application to a

therefore important to have an up-to-date military

manual that reflects the current state of the law of armed conflict as it is understood
by the government. Given the adoption of new treaties, developments in customary international law and new interpretations of existing treaties, it is not sufficient
to simply publish a manual once; it must be updated to reflect changes in the law.
For instance, the manual of the

German armed

nearly two decades ago. Because

it

ing, for instance, in the context

of the conflict in Afghanistan,

German government's

of the law of armed conflict. Consequently,

pursuing a

political

was published

in 1992 56

does not provide answers to legal questions

creasingly difficult to identify the
state

forces

it is

it

has

position

—

aris-

become

in-

on the current

rather easy for certain actors

agenda to claim that the German armed forces operating in

Afghanistan have violated the law.

must not be forgotten that one feature of asymmetric warfare
is the use
or rather abuse
of the media and of public opinion. It is therefore
crucial to provide prompt and reliable information. The German armed forces, after an attack on Taliban fighters and two tanker trucks in September 2009, had to
learn in a quite painful manner that a time-consuming and unstructured investigation will fuel further speculation as to what actually occurred and will only assist
In this context,

it

—

—

the enemy, either directly or indirectly.

The air attack on the trucks and the Taliban fighters who were in the immediate
vicinity was conducted in accordance with the law of armed conflict. The fighters
were lawful targets because they were members of an organized armed group performing a "continuous combat function." Because there were reasonable grounds
for assuming that the trucks
and the fuel they carried would be used for attacks
against civilians and International Security Assistance Force personnel, they had
become lawful military objectives by either their use or intended purpose. At the
time of the decision to attack the trucks and the Taliban fighters, the commanding
officer rightly relied on the information available to him.
The reconnaissance photographs showed about 70 individuals attempted to free
one of the trucks that had become stuck in a river. According to a human intelligence source who had been very reliable in the past, the people surrounding the
trucks were Taliban fighters. Recognizing his obligations under the law of armed

—

—

German

conflict, the

officer

who

authorized the attack decided to only use two

five-hundred-pound bombs in order to spare a nearby farm and village. Shortly after the attack

been

killed.

it

was reported in some media reports that as many as 142 people had

In these

initial reports,

the statuses of the people allegedly killed or
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injured was uncertain;
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some spoke of "Taliban and

civilians," others

of "predomi-

nantly civilian casualties." Other reports stated that the majority of civilians killed

who were

or injured were innocent persons from the nearby village

only trying to

acquire fuel for their personal needs.

On

April 16, 2010, the Office of the Public Prosecutor decided to dismiss

criminal proceedings against the
that decision

German

was based reveals that

able grounds to

assume

The report on which
at the time of the attack there had been reasonofficers involved.

that the individuals surrounding the trucks

While the public prosecutor could not

were Taliban.

rule out the presence of civilians, the report

some were civilians, at least some of those had directly participated
the hostilities. In any event, there was no convincing evidence of a large number

indicated that
in

all

if

of civilian casualties. Even
ues, there

would be no violation of the law of armed

and

losses

there had been civilian casualties, the report contin-

if

injuries

were not excessive in relation to the military advantage

pated. Unfortunately, the report
tary information.

made

conflict because the incidental

It

was not

was

until

available to the public.

By

classified

because

it

antici-

contained sensitive mili-

October 2010 that an unclassified version was

that time public opinion

had already been

influ-

enced by unfounded allegations of violations of the law of armed conflict. The genperception has not been altered since the release of the report because neither

eral

the Office of the Public Prosecutor nor the Federal Ministry of Defence has
proactively disseminated
It is,

it.

of course, understood that thorough investigations are important in order

to be credible

and

in order to protect the

members of the armed forces allegedly in-

volved in a violation of the law of armed conflict.
left

to those

tise),

who,

Still,

the

media field should not be

in disregard of their lack of information (and

pursue their

ernment response

political

all

too often exper-

ends by claiming violations of the law.

will often

A delayed gov-

be considered as evidence of secrecy.

History has shown that reports of national authorities entrusted with the investigation of alleged violations of the law of armed conflict

by their own forces will

in

many instances be received with suspicion; therefore States engaged in military operations should be prepared to entrust investigations to an independent fact-finding
entity

able

whose functions

are to conduct a thorough investigation

and trustworthy information

to

government decisionmakers and the

In that regard, governments, whether Additional Protocol

AP

I,

or,

members of high

I

reli-

public.

formally applies or

make use of the fact-finding commission under Artialternatively, agree on another investigatory body composed of

not, should be encouraged to
cle 90,

and provide

political reputation.
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Conclusion
i

Asymmetric warfare

and to

its

clearly constitutes a challenge to the international legal order

underlying values. While

tablished rules

it

does not justify a deviation from the well es-

and principles of the law of armed

conflict,

it

is

necessary to

means available. Because asymmetric actors
abandon the options opened by a deliberate violation of the law of armed
strengthen that law by

all

will

not

conflict,

incentives to non-State actors to bring about compliance will very often prove
futile.

in

Despite the potential political implications, the application of military force

accordance with the law of armed conflict is the

first

way to respond to

the threats

posed by asymmetric warfare. This, however, must be accompanied by a proactive

and credible information policy. Additionally, thorough investigation/fact-finding
by a neutral and respected international commission of the actions of the nonState actors

would be an

effective step that

could contribute to repressing such

conduct.

A further step

is

criminal prosecution, under either domestic or international

who violate the law. While some may object, often citing the

criminal law, of those

frequently heard cliche that "one man's terrorist
fighter,"

holding accountable those

proach to deterring those
tion efforts

may

who

who

violate the

is

law

another man's freedom
is

the only promising ap-

choose to violate the law. Amnesties or reconcilia-

have proven successful in limited instances;

however, whether they have had

—or

will

have

—

it

is

doubtful,

a lasting effect. Rather, they

may

prove to be an incentive for asymmetric actors to continue to pursue or even
increase their unlawful conduct.

These conclusions do not, however,

armed

their

relieve States

from their obligation vis-a-vis

forces to clarify the applicable law for situations not

international or non-international

and take the necessary measures

—

will

whether they are enemy

conflict.

to

an

Moreover, governments ought

and evaluate the challenges posed by asymmetric warfare

to thoroughly scrutinize

whatever their nature

armed

amounting

to reduce their vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities

always be an interesting target for asymmetric actors,

States or non-State actors, e.g., terrorists.
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XVIII
Concluding Remarks:

LOAC and Attempts to

Abuse or Subvert It

Yoram Dinstein*

This has been another

high level of expectations as regards

The

series

By now, there is a
each and every Newport conference.

intellectually stimulating conference.

of annual gatherings has become de rigueur for any serious military law-

yer or academic specializing in the jus ad helium, the jus in hello or the law of the sea.

Newport conferences vary from one year to another. A
decade ago, all eyes were focused on the air campaign in Kosovo. After 9/11, the
"war on terrorism" and its innumerable corollaries loomed large. Then came the
hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermath. But, while no two Newport
conferences are alike, "it's the same always different." What is the same is the road
that we are all traveling on together. What is different
over a stretch of time
pertains to the particular bumps on that road, the new detours caused by fallen
rocks and construction in progress, not to mention the need to constantly watch
The

topics explored in the

—

out for slippery conditions.

As a

"recidivist"

concluding speaker in the Newport conferences,

I

usually

choose a number of diverse themes emerging from the exchanges of views to dwell
on. This time, allow

me, there
tice

is

me to concentrate on a single

a troubling aspect of the presentations

(and not for the

first

* Professor Emeritus, Tel

time). This relates, as

Aviv University,

Israel.

it

(albeit

two-pronged)

and the deliberations

topic.

that

I

To
no-

were, not to the music but to the

LOAC and Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It
tone: not the presentations or interventions in debates

by themselves, but the

manner in which they are made. I am rather taken aback by the fact that, when military lawyers who practice the law of armed conflict (LOAC) take the floor, they invariably sound on the defensive. Defensive about what and why?
The answer, first and foremost, is that we have to defend our shared societal values against the barbarians

who are pushing in at the gates of civilization. Of course,

there have always been barbarians exerting force at the gates of civilization.

Roman Empire

held off the hordes of the ancient barbarians for

But one must never

feel

complacent. After

ancient barbarians did overwhelm the

all,

many

Roman

Empire.

If

we want
(i.e.,

to ensure that

rogue States and

organized armed groups of non-State actors whose modus operandi

It is

vigilantly verify that they are

centuries.

in time, the relentless pressure of the

our own defenses are not breached by the modern barbarians

we must

The

is

terrorism),

maintained in good shape.

necessary to take into account that in

modern times

the onslaught of the

become more insidious because they have adopted lawfare as one of
the most effective weapons wielded against us. "Lawfare" is an expression popularized in the last decade by Charlie Dunlap (who is here with us). Lawfare is to be understood as a means of warfare, and indeed as a countermeasure against military
reverses. Since the modern barbarians are unable to win discrete battles against the
technologically superior armed forces arrayed against them, they try to win the war
by using lawfare. What the barbarians do is use and generally abuse legal arguments to foil any military success that may be scored by the armed forces of civibarbarians has

—

—

lized nations.

The notion of winning war by lawfare may appear to be far-fetched. Yet, we
must not underrate the potency of lawfare as a weapon of mass destruction in
attuned to the peculiarities of the era
this case, a weapon of mass disinformation
in which we live. Allegations of breaches of LOAC by our troops (usually magnified
in propaganda to the scale of "atrocities") tend to drive a wedge between our military community and the civil society. When the public perception is that "atrocities" have been perpetrated by our troops, no victory in the field can repair the
psychological damage done to the cause for which we are fighting.
The Vietnam conflict has shown that a civilized country such as the United

—

—

States can

win military battles, yet

turns against

it.

Post-Vietnam,

lose a

it is

war only because public opinion

folly to lose sight

opinion: polls indicating opposition to a war

(which

more

is

the only

—than

outcome that counts

of

mood

may determine

in the final analysis)

its

no

at

home

swings in public
political

less

outcome

—perhaps even

actual defeats sustained in military encounters.

Lawfare was not a major consideration
so today. This

is

a

at the

time of Vietnam, but

it

new development that has come about at or around
484
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Whatever

the twenty-first century.
into play

new element brought

precise origins, the

arguments can be

that legal

is

its

effectively

canvassed to corrode the

done by condemning
as unlawful the means and methods of warfare resorted to by our troops. In particindispensable home-front support for a given war. This

ular, lawfare
fully

on the

seems to

strike the right

chord with the public when

sensitive issue of civilian losses

incidental to attacks executed

is

by our armed

it

(and damage to

hammers skill-

civilian objects)

forces against lawful

enemy

targets.

The subject is encapsulated in the commonly used phrase "collateral damage."
The most fascinating dimension of lawfare, as practiced against us today, is the
profound irony of the entire situation. On one side, you have the modern barbarians who are conducting hostilities in an utterly lawless fashion: not only do they ignore LOAC; they trample it underfoot. Specifically, the barbarians do not hesitate
to kill civilians (including a sacrifice of their own civilians) on a large scale. In fact,
they slaughter civilians on a large scale recklessly and even in a premeditated
fashion.

On the other side, you have civilized nations.

Generally speaking, civilized na-

by LOAC. They do so notwithstanding the complications resulting
from the diametrically opposite conduct of the enemy. Indeed, despite many

tions abide

temptations,

LOAC

room when

confronting the barbarians. If anything, in the

LOAC

—

as accepted

has not been relaxed to allow civilized nations

and practiced by

civilized nations

last

more elbow
few decades

—has become more

rigor-

ous than ever.
It

goes almost without saying that instances of breaches of LOAC do occur even

where

armed forces are concerned. However, (i) relatively speaking, these
few and far between (although they are usually well-publicized in the

civilized

instances are

media); and

(ii)

there

is

in place a highly developed military justice system that

trusted with the strict enforcement of

LOAC

through constant training

The long and the short of it

is

en-

and the winnowing out of offenders

(many participants in the present conference represent that
enormous human and financial resources in disseminating
directives into the troops

is

that the civilized

at all

system).

We also spend

LOAC and instilling its

command levels.

armed

forces

—on the whole

have a laudable record of implementation of LOAC, whereas the barbarians have

an appalling one. This

modern

is

where the true "asymmetry of warfare"

is

manifested in

One would have
expected that the civilized side would go on the legal offensive, charging the enemy
times. But here

is

the puzzling aspect of that asymmetry.

with recourse to methods of barbarism that contravene every cardinal principle of

LOAC.

Instead, while

sive against us

we keep relatively silent,

the barbarians

mount a legal offen-

own show

of open disdain for

through lawfare. Unfazed by their
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LOAC, they dare to accuse us of contravening it. They behave as free riders, and yet

—indeed, mass murder of
outrage
might have been expected. The
How do we respond? Not with
tone
present conference—
gatherings — has been

they

literally get

away with murder

civilians.

the

in the

prevailing
fensive

that

and even apologetic.

under our

skin,

consequence,

and we

appears that the barbarians have managed to get

It

suffer

from

irrational

pangs of a guilty conscience. As a

command echelons on our side often bend over backward in the ap-

plication of LOAC.

What has come

to light in the course of the conference

mission accomplishment

in Afghanistan, airstrikes essential to

unimpeachable

—have been scrapped,

damage to civilians.
fling practice

de-

as in similar

— and

is

that,

legally

so as to avoid altogether lawful collateral

We have also heard about the Israeli army resorting to the baf-

of issuing, prior to attacks against lawful targets,

individual warnings to

enemy

logistical effort invested,

civilians

on

many thousands of

their cellular phones. Just think of the

undertaken without any

rhyme or

legal

reason, in such

an operation.

As we have repeatedly been told
them,

it's

us? If we

is

not about

about us." But what does our odd defensive behavior truly show about

sound as if we were in the wrong in circumstances where we are actually in

the right, this
guilt

in the present conference, "this

is

not due to any intrinsic societal values.

It is

due to an uncalled-for

complex, based on a specious sense that perhaps our technological superiority

has led us to conduct hostilities in a

manner

that

LOAC.

incompatible with

is

In reality, technological superiority (epitomized by precision-guided munitions,

unmanned

aerial vehicles

warfare) has led civilized

(UAVs) and

a host of other sophisticated tools of

—

armed forces to pay greater

to the detailed constraints of LOAC. Attacks are

information about what
collated in real time,

One can

is

forth. Yet,

we

attention

now more surgical than in the past,

going on "on the other side of the

and so

sincerely say that

—

rather than lesser

hill" is increasingly

are simply not giving ourselves a break.

"we have met the enemy and

us."

it is

As

far as

am

I

we should undergo some sort of mental
therapy. Otherwise, civilization may not outlast the modern barbarians.
I would like to address the central theme of lawfare: viz., enemy civilian losses.
concerned, the moral of the story

is

that

Civilized nations adhere tenaciously to the cardinal

LOAC principle of distinction

between combatants and civilians. What this principle denotes is that every feasible
precaution must be taken in wartime to ensure that innocent

be spared from injury by exempting them from attack.
civilians" in order to distinguish
civilians

but take a direct part in

genuine

civilians

hostilities,

I

its

will

use the phrase "innocent

from those who masquerade

thereby losing the exemption from

tack for such time as they are doing so (a stretch of time which
in

enemy civilians

is

as

at-

quite controversial

length as the oral discussion in the present conference has demonstrated).
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The exemption from

attack embraces also civilian objects, namely,

objects that

all

are not military objectives (as defined negatively in Article 52 of 1977 Additional

Protocol

I

to the

Geneva Conventions).

1

By following the principle of distinction in the course of hostilities, civilized belor destroy civilian objects
ligerent parties, in principle, kill enemy civilians
only when the losses (to human beings) or damage (to property) constitute collateral damage. Admittedly, human errors and technical malfunctions do occur occa-

—

sionally. But, otherwise, solely lawful targets are selected for attack. Nevertheless,
civilians

—and

civilian objects

—

are inevitably subject to

cated in or around these targets, because this
It is

is

deemed

harm when present or locollateral

frequently glossed over (especially in the media) that

collateral

damage

to

enemy

civilians virtually for

consequence of attacks against lawful

targets.

damage.

LOAC

takes

some

granted as an inescapable

Such damage

is

the case owing to

some civilians and civilian
combatants and military objectives.

the simple fact that lawful targets cannot be sterilized:
objects will almost always be in proximity to

Hence, a

modicum

of collateral damage to civilians cannot possibly be avoided

unless a battle rages in the middle of the ocean or the desert (where
civilian objects are
ties are

no

civilians or

within range of the contact zone in which the belligerent par-

conducting attacks against each other).

Far from imposing an all-embracing prohibition on collateral damage to en-

emy

civilians

and

civilian objects,

words of Additional Protocol

LOAC

I) it is

word

"proportionality"

And "excessive"
"extensive."

3

—we have

itself is

to keep

it

as long as (in the

not expected to be "excessive," compared to

the military advantage anticipated. 2 This
ality (the

expressly permits

is

the core of the principle of proportion-

not mentioned as such in the Protocol).

reminding ourselves

Extensive civilian casualties (and

—

damage

not synonymous with

is

to civilian objects), even

when plainly expected, may be perfectly lawful when reasonably determined to be
non-excessive (on the basis of the information at hand at the time of action) once

weighed against the military advantage anticipated. 4

The study of these expectations and anticipations is not an exact science, and
much depends on the perceived "value" of the military objective targeted in the circumstances prevailing at the time. There are numerous question marks that remain unresolved in the implementation of the principle of proportionality. Yet,
the principle itself is not contested by any civilized member of the international
community.
Of course, war is hell. LOAC has not undertaken a mission impossible of
purporting to eliminate the hellish consequences of war.
strives to
St.

do

is

reduce these consequences.

Petersburg Declaration (one of the very
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reiterate the

first

LOAC

basically

language of the 1868

treaties

on

record),

what
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LOAC strives at is
eral

damage

gether

— has

to civilians
to be

Not everybody
fare.

"alleviating as

and

as possible the calamities of war." 5 Collat-

civilian objects,

minimized
likes the

much

too

—when

alto-

accordance with the principle of proportionality.

in

down-to-earth attitude that

Indeed, in recent years, a

cannot be avoided

it

LOAC takes vis-a-vis war-

new major problem has arisen. The clear and present

danger of the barbarians in front remains unabated. But, in the meantime, another

menace has evolved in the back. This menace comes from the human rights zealots
and do-goodniks, whom I shall call "human rights-niks" for short. Far be it from

me to

suggest that every

human

we have

this rubric. In fact,

in

rights scholar or activist necessarily

our midst some genuine scholars in the arena of

human

rights (preeminently, Francoise

respect.

But

man

all

too often today

rights-niks

comes under

Hampson)

we encounter

for

the unpleasant

who, hoisting the banner of human

bring about a hostile takeover of

LOAC.

whom

This

is

I

have the greatest

phenomenon of hu-

rights law, are attempting to

an encroachment that we must

stoutly resist.

The human rights-niks in the back are by no means to be confused with the barbarians in front: far from endorsing methods of barbarism, the human rights-niks
would prefer a non-violent solution to every conflict. Nevertheless, the danger that
the

human rights-niks pose is equally acute, since they threaten to pull the legal rug

from under our feet. They thus aid and abet the lawfare of the enemy by leaving the
civil

society with the impression that

incompatible with the
Inter alia,

human

we are acting

loftier aspirations

rights-niks

would

(or reacting) in a

manner that is

of the law.

by introduc-

like to revolutionize the field

ing a normative system of warfare characterized by zero collateral

damage to

civil-

To accomplish that, they would like to disallow attacks against lawful military
targets, if these entail some collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects. Since
(as indicated) such collateral damage is bound to happen, this would imply the
banning of almost all attacks against enemy combatants and military objectives.
ians.

The

legal revolution that

human

rights-niks wish to engender relates to the

Human rightsfollowing LOAC in-

broad spectrum of norms that govern the conduct of hostilities.

wrong legal system by
They would like to see human rights law

niks tacitly accuse us of applying the

stead of human rights law.

wartime

as

much as

in peacetime:

not side by side with, but in lieu

applicable in

of,

LOAC.

This

kind of approach often resonates with the lay (and basically uninformed) public
large, if

ian"

only because

lots

of people cannot

when LOAC is referred to

law." After

all, it is

(as

it

tell

recurrently

"human"
is)

apart from "humanitar-

as "international

the humanitarian impulse that propels both

and international humanitarian law (aka LOAC).
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The trouble is that, if we were to do what the human rights-niks want us to do,
hostilities would become impracticable. That is to say, all forms of warfare would
be beyond the pale. Many human rights-niks do not hide that this is what they
truly
and ultimately want. They are animated by genuine motives of pacifism

—

—

(echoed even in one of the questions posed during the questions-and-answers time
in

our own conference), and they believe that LOAC stands in their way. What they

fail

to grasp

that

is

is

likely to

that,

while war

may be

nobly wished away,

it is

not a phenomenon

disappear as long as there are barbarians who force

it

on the civilized

And it is impossible to fight a war if we are not ready to shed blood. LOAC is

world.

doing what it can to ensure that bloodletting is confined to combatants, leaving innocent

civilians

civilian objects)

naked

out of the
is

circle

of fire.

Still,

damage to

zero collateral

not a hardheaded scenario in war, and

LOAC

civilians (or

recognizes that

truth.

When the position is examined objectively, it becomes obvious that LOAC is the
LOAC, civilian casualties
If human rights law were to

only effective dike against "total war." Without

in war-

time will not be reduced: they will escalate.

replace

—
war—

LOAC
in

no feasible options of conducting hostilities were left to belligerent parties
ultimately no rules would survive, inasmuch as the legal paper- constraints
if

would simply be ignored by the clashing armies. Therefore, the genuine option
that must be exercised is not between LOAC (characterized by pragmatism and
common sense) and human rights law (untainted in its pristine purity). It is between LOAC and lawlessness. And just as we strenuously reject lawlessness
ticed

by the barbarians, we must not allow lawlessness

side out of a

as prac-

on our own
the wrong context

to be inflicted

misguided belief in some notional primacy

—

in

of human rights precepts.

Many

people think that the best solution to the problem

sorts, reflected in the

side with

dual application of both

one another)

in

is

a

compromise of

LOAC and human rights law (side by

an armed conflict. This

several reasons, such duality

is

may sound ideal, except that, for

neither necessary nor even possible in multiple

contexts.

The first plank of the argument is that, empirically, LOAC has withstood the test
of time.

LOAC has progressed for a long period of time: much longer than human
War

The evolution of
LOAC is a product of close cooperation among military personnel, lawyers and
diplomats. The whole system is generated and shaped by the special demands of
armed conflict, and is predicated on a calibrated balancing act between the requirements of military necessity and humanitarian considerations. Largely speaking,
rights

law (which

is

a product of the post-World

only human rights-niks believe that

II era).

LOAC has proved unequal to its task.
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Interestingly enough, the
col

human

—an instrument adopted 1977 through the pressure of developing coun—which (although binding on most countries the world) not accepted
in

I

tries

rights-niks object even to Additional Proto-

in

as

is

such by the United States and quite a few other countries. Even the United States
regards

some provisions of the Protocol (including those

cited

claratory of existing customary international law. But there
I

like to call it)

All the same,

that

it

is

by

me

here) as de-

a "Great Schism" (as

regarding the status of a host of other stipulations of the Protocol.

even detractors of diverse portions of the Protocol

has crossed the red line from

LOAC into human

graph). But, where differences

not contend

rights law.

LOAC and
Some relevant legal norms of LOAC and hu-

The second plank of the argument

human rights law is not categorical.
man rights law are actually identical

will

is

that the dissonance

(see the

and variations

between

example of torture
exist, that

in the next para-

does not necessarily

mean

human rights law is more "advanced." It must not be overlooked that most
human rights are subject to built-in limitations (such as national security), 6 and
that

above all— to outright derogations in wartime. 7 By contrast,
cifically

by and

wartime

for the challenges of

—

is

LOAC—crafted spe-

not subject to any similar

limitations or derogations.

human

For sure, there are some exceptional

rights

which are non-derogable. 8

—

—

you take the leading example to wit, the prohibition of torture you find
that, not coincidentally, the very same prohibition constitutes an integral part of
LOAC. 9 So why do we need human rights law?
The third plank of the argument is that, even from a humanitarian perspective,
LOAC must not be automatically categorized as inferior to human rights law. Certain norms of LOAC are more stringent than the parallel rules existing in the domain of human rights law in peacetime. To cite the two most obvious illustrations:
But,

(a)

if

The use of riot control agents (primarily, tear gas) as a method of warfare
is banned by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, yet is expressly
permitted for law enforcement purposes. 10 The concern underlying this
rule is not to loosen the core prohibition of the employment of chemicals
(gas warfare) in battle. 11

However, the

agents can be part of the arsenal

result

when

is

clear:

non-lethal chemical

quelling riots, although not in

combat.
(b)

The employment of expanding soft-nosed bullets is forbidden pursuant
to LOAC (on the ground that they cause unnecessary suffering), 12 but
due to their greater stopping power they have become almost standard

—

issue to anti-terrorist special law

enforcement units
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When all is said and done, I do not deny that human rights law has a role to play
in

armed

conflict. First, there is a natural

armed conflicts (both in light of the

international law in non-international

circumstances of a

"civil

complementarity of the two branches of

war" and by dint of the historical fact that the applicability

of LOAC in such conducts is a fairly recent occurrence and there are
gaps in the law). Second, even in inter-State armed conflicts,
silent (a leading

deserters).

13

1

special

still

significant

LOAC is sometimes

example is the issue of the summary trial and possibly execution of

think that whenever there

is

a lacuna in

an international or non-international armed

LOAC (in the setting of either

conflict),

it

must be

filled

by human

rights law.
Still,
is

the thrust of the matter

no correspondence between

is

that

where

LOAC is not silent—and when there

LOAC and human rights law—there is no way out

of having to choose between the two. In such situations, the rule

LOAC prevails over human rights law as the
central principle

straightforward:

armed conflict. 14 This
has been acknowledged more than once by the International

Court of Justice. 15

Human

is

lex specialis in

the incontrovertible lex lata today.

It is

happy about this state of affairs. What they
would like to do is change the law by moving the signposts. There are many indicarights-niks are plainly not

tions of such attempts.

None

heard here about targeted

amounting to
Personally,

we have
of enemy combatants by drones (i.e., UAVs)

more

killing

invidious than the allegation that

"extrajudicial killings."
I

find this allegation ludicrous.

batants in wartime does not
their pipe

is

dream, some

courtroom scenario
crimes (although

in

it is

amount

an "extrajudicial

killing"? Apparently, in

human rights-niks replace the battlefield by an imaginary
which enemy

soldiers are charged with the

not clear what these crimes

participating in battle in wartime

room, individual

to

What death inflicted on enemy com-

is

not a crime per

soldiers are apparently

considering that the mere

se).

summoned to

due process guaranteed.

judicial proceedings with

are,

commission of

In this fictitious court-

face charges

If capital

and undergo

punishment ensues,

the killing ceases to be "extrajudicial." Criminal prosecution, conviction and pun-

ishment (even the death penalty) thus replace the prosecution of
military formations

on the ground,

hostilities

by

at sea or in the air.

Well, in the real world (as distinct from the dreamworld of human rights-niks),

armed

clashes in

wartime occur not in a chimerical courtroom but in

battle:

any

exchanges between the parties consist of fire traded between military units. Only
those

who breathe the

rarefied air of the

United Nations headquarters

—removed

—can come up with the perception of wartime violence

from any vestiges of reality

as

an "extrajudicial killing." The more one considers the ramifications of the bizarre at-

tempt to bring "judicial killings"

—and

their
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antinomy of "extrajudicial killings"
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into the vocabulary of war, the

some sci-fi
Once we return to

disposed to the conclusion that

is

it

be-

adventure in a faraway galaxy.

longs in

colossal casualties to
in

more one

wartime

—

this planet,

its artillery

barrages and airstrikes

enemy combatants only because

becomes evident

it

with

that

all hostilities

they are

—causing

enemy combatants

are conducted "extrajudicially."

enemy combatants can be inflicted "extrajudicially"
wholesale, why can it not be done in retail? And if it can be executed by manned
military aircraft, why can it not be carried out by military UAVs?
That being the

I

case, if death to

am not saying that present-day LOAC is perfect or that it should remain static.

There

are,

of course, bones of contention in

LOAC: some more profound

already referred to the "Great Schism" relating to Additional Protocol
less intense. All

these issues have to be addressed,
in

which discussions
to

that

alluded.

I

is

as practitioners of

that

traveling

hostile takeover of

fora (for-

place about the

trying to drive

I

and others

and there are countless

—sometimes heated—take
road and the road bumps
which have
home
The point
am
we—
the same road— must do whatever we can
and academics
mal and informal)

I)

have

(I

LOAC

to prevent the

LOAC by the human rights-niks. This is quintessential because

what the human rights-niks would

like to

bring about

is

not merely a

shift in

em-

phasis but a regime change: a legal regime change that will revolutionize the field

by making

hostilities

impossible to engage in effectively.

Notwithstanding the existence of powerful non-governmental

(NGO)

lobbies,

which endorse the approach of the human rights-niks, I do not believe that there
any reason

for defeatism within

rights-niks or

by NGOs.

It is

is

our ranks. International law is not created by human

created by States through treaties and custom.

general practice of States demonstrates that

do not support the attempt to subvert

it

The

LOAC is alive and well, and that States

through the adoption of human rights law

tenets.

Some of

us in this

room

Mike Schmitt,
as part of a larger Group of

(Charlie Dunlap, Charles Garraway,

Dale Stephens, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg and

I),

Experts under the aegis of HPCR (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict

Research

at

Harvard University), have

missile warfare manual,

16

which had a

just finished the preparation of

NATO launch

in Brussels in

an

air

March

and

2010.

We have toiled for the last six years, in the course of which we have consulted informally

(bilaterally, regionally

ommend

and

multilaterally) with

dozens of governments.

I

rec-

document (which, together with a
detailed commentary,
runs for more than three hundred pages). The manual
consists of 175 black-letter rules adopted by consensus. By itself, the consensus is
an extraordinary achievement, bearing in mind that it reflected the views of dozens
of experts from Canada to China, from Geneva (the International Committee of
that

you take

a look at the resultant

17
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.

Yoram Dinstein
the

Red Cross)

to Washington,

DC. But what I want to spotlight is the extensive in-

formal consultations with governments, even in countries (such as Russia) that

were not represented in the Group of Experts.

As the commentary on the manual discloses, the consensus on the black-letter
rules was not always easy to arrive at, and often a compromise between conflicting
views had to be worked out. But let me assure you that the text of the
warfare manual, as adopted,

is

couched in pure

LOAC

air

and missile

language. That

is

exactly

what every government consulted wanted. The chatter of the human rights-niks
was not heard at any time during the deliberations with those who actually formulate

and implement international

My advice to this gathering

is,

law.
therefore, threefold:

(a)

Keep up the good work on the application and interpretation of LOAC.

(b)

Keep poachers

(c)

Above

all,

off the grass.

keep the

faith.
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